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Foreword 
initiates the Parliaments and Legislatures Series published by 
Ohio State University Press. This series provides for the publication of 
studies of parliamentary or legislative institutions in democratic societies. 
The Inter-Parliamentary Union, an international organization of the par­
liaments of the world, headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland, counts 178 
national parliaments in existence today. In addition to these national par­
liamentary bodies, there exist a substantial number of important sub-
national legislatures, particularly the state or provincial legislatures in 
federal systems. 
A parliament may operate primarily as a sounding board and lis­
tening post for citizens in a democratic society who need a representative 
institution that can give them a voice in governing their country. Or, 
alternatively, a legislature may have a deep and penetrating role in for­
mulating and enacting the laws of the land. Although parliaments and 
legislatures play a variety of roles in democratic societies, they are central 
and essential institutions for democracy. Free people govern themselves 
in large-scale societies only through elected representative assemblies em­
powered to speak and act for them. In short, parliaments and legislatures 
are at the heart of democracy. 
That these institutions come in many sizes and shapes, and play 
different political and governing roles, makes them important and inter­
esting to study. Yet assemblies, parliaments, and congresses are not partic­
ularly well-understood institutions. In the new democracies of eastern 
and central Europe, or in the renewed or developing democracies in Third 
World countries, there is an urgency about understanding parliamen­
tary assemblies and how they work. In the well-established democracies 
xv 
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of North America and western Europe, legislative bodies may seldom be 
the subjects of extensive research and study, and often they are excoriated 
(as Americans engage in "Congress bashing") because these institutions do 
not live up to citizens' expectations. 
The United States Congress has been studied fairly extensively, and 
yet there is much left to be better understood. James E. Campbell illumi­
nates one important curiosity about Congress, asking why the Democratic 
Party was able to maintain majority party status in the House of Represen­
tatives for fully four decades. His cogent argument and extensive data anal­
ysis enrich his claim that Democratic hegemony in the House stemmed 
from that party's enjoyment of a relatively large number of "cheap seats," 
winning disproportionately in congressional districts with markedly low 
electoral turnout. 
Campbell anatomizes the congressional election system in detail in 
order to demonstrate how the system so systematically advantaged the 
Democratic Party. His analysis provides a convincing explanation for the 
era of Democratic House majorities. And it contributes importantly to 
the growing debate about the fairness and efficacy of the electoral system 
through which members of the House of Representatives are chosen. His 
discussion of the proposals and prospects for electoral reform so as to di­
minish the impact of "cheap seats" will provide valuable resource material 
for policy debate at home, and indicate potential sources of disputation 
about parliamentary electoral laws abroad. 
Samuel C. Patterson 
General Advisory Editor 
Preface 
A n the 1950s and 1960s, every major sport had a dominant team. Base­
ball had Casey Stengel's New York Yankees. Pro football had Vince Lom-
bardi's Green Bay Packers. Hockey had the Montreal Canadiens. In 
college basketball, it was John Wooden's UCLA teams. In the NBA, it 
was Red Auerbach's Boston Celtics. All were perennial winners. Everyone 
expected them to win, and year after year they did. They were the teams 
to beat. They were dynasties. 
Though it did not seem so clear at the time, there was another dy­
nasty in America's greatest sport, politics. It was the Democratic Party in 
the House of Representatives. It was a dynasty that outlasted all of the 
others. It survived until its surprising collapse in the 1994 midterm elec­
tion. For better or worse, Democrats held a majority of seats in the House 
of Representatives, and therefore controlled the business of the House, 
for most of the last 60 years and for 40 consecutive years between the 
1954 and 1994 elections. This longevity of a partisan majority is unprece­
dented in American history. No other party at any point in our history 
continuously controlled the House, the Senate, or the Presidency over 
such a prolonged period. As Norman Ornstein (1990: 24) put it, "One 
of the most enduring, puzzling, and contentious phenomena of modern 
American political life is the persistence of the Democratic majorities in 
Congress even as the Republicans tighten their stranglehold on the White 
House." But, while Republicans from time to time lost their grip or 
"stranglehold on the White House," the Democrats' hold on the House 
was impressively constant. 
A political dynasty, unlike a sports dynasty, has real consequences, 
and a dynasty in American politics in the later half of the twentieth 
xvii 
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century has tremendous and far-reaching consequences. The Democratic 
dynasty in the House shaped policy, both in the specifics and in the gov-
ernment's approach to problems. It also shaped our politics—how well 
the government functions and how well elections serve as an institution 
of popular control of the government. Although the Democratic dynasty 
came to a startling close with the 1994 midterm, it has left an indelible 
imprint on American politics. Because of its pervasive effects, the Demo­
cratic Party's control of the House of Representatives may be the most 
important single feature of American politics in the second half of this 
century and, thus, should be thoroughly understood. How did Demo­
crats achieve their lock on the House and how did they lose it? This book 
is about the many reasons for this dominance, particularly the structural 
reasons. An important and generally overlooked reason, I argue, is the 
electoral system and, more specifically, that aspect of the system that allocates con­
gressional representatives within states to single-member congressional districts. 
This system played a crucial role in preserving and augmenting the Democratic 
majority in the House. 
How were Democrats able to do what no other party was able to do 
at any other point of our history? Did a majority of American voters over 
the last 40 years freely choose the Democratic Party in fair and competi­
tive elections to rule the House? Or, was the seemingly permanent Demo­
cratic majority a consequence of a breakdown in the political system, a 
breakdown in the fairness and competitiveness of elections that failed 
to offer voters a real choice? Cynics argued that Democrats rigged the 
system to keep themselves in power, suggesting that Democrats were 
actually less popular than Republicans with the public—a twist on the 
Republicans' "silent majority" theme of the late 1960s. Alternatively, I 
find a more fundamental basis for an institutional Democratic advantage. 
I contend that the electoral system, the single-member equal-population 
congressional district system, works to the benefit of the Democrats in 
House elections. It does so primarily because the system allows huge dif­
ferences in the numbers of voters casting ballots from one congressional 
district to the next, notwithstanding "one-person, one-vote" judicial rul­
ings. Democrats benefit from turnout disparities among districts because 
they consistently win many districts with very low turnouts. They win a 
large majority of the "cheap seats." This allows them to carry more dis­
tricts. They get a "bigger bang for the buck" or "more seats for the vote." 
The analysis further finds that the benefit Democrats derive from this 
turnout disparity is considerable, that it has been greatest when they were 
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most in need of seats, and that, therefore, the electoral system helped to 
maintain the four-decade-long Democratic majority. 
Although the tilt to the electoral system had helped to buffer the 
Democratic majority against the shifting political winds of four decades, 
it was not enough to prevent the collapse of the Democratic dynasty in 
1994. In the 1994 midterm election, the Democratic electoral system ad­
vantage was no match for the political tide of a Republican realignment. 
The realignment had begun in the late 1960s, with Nixon's Southern 
strategy, the racial polarization of the electorate (Carmines and Stimson, 
1989), and "the gender-gap" movement of white males toward the GOP. 
Although set back by Watergate and sidetracked by a drifting Bush ad­
ministration, the realignment was reinvigorated in the 1980s under the 
Reagan administration and eventually deepened to congressional con­
tests in the 1990s. The shift was so great that by 1994 Democrats no 
longer enjoyed their usual advantage of having more uncontested con­
gressional candidates than Republicans. With this sea change in public 
partisanship and a sitting Democratic president held in low esteem by 
much of the public, even a pro-Democratic electoral system could not 
retain the House for the Democrats. Nevertheless, beneath it all, the elec­
toral system still madfe a difference. As in^past years, Democrats carried a 
large majority of the cheap seats in 1994 and, as in past years, because of 
this more Democrats sat in the House than would have under a neutral 
electoral system. 
While the underpinnings of the Democratic dynasty and its collapse 
are important to understand in order to understand American political 
history through much of the twentieth century, they are important to 
understand for broader purposes as well. This analysis sheds light more 
generally on a broad range of political subjects: elections, electoral sys­
tems, political geography, political parties, voter turnout, class politics, 
and representation. The consistent bias of the American electoral system 
for the House of Representatives has many very important consequences. 
It strikes at the very root of the democratic process. If the deck is stacked 
for one party in the electoral deal, it raises very real concerns about who 
plays the game, how the game is played, and who wins and who loses in 
policy disputes as well as in elections. 
The argument that the electoral system has been significantly tilted 
in favor of Democrats is based on an examination of congressional elec­
tion returns since 1936. To the extent possible, I have tried to keep this 
data analysis simple. Regression analysis is used at several points, but the 
XX • PREFACE 
book's central point is based on simple arithmetic. The findings do not 
rest on elaborate estimation techniques, with their sometimes nonobvious 
assumptions. The analysis asks how bias from all possible sources (gerry­
mandering, etc.) is created and then, on the basis of the answer to that 
question, directly computes an estimate of system bias. The approach 
necessarily makes some assumptions of its own, but these are examined 
in detail (appendix B), and, to provide further confidence in the findings, 
several different methods of estimating bias are also examined (also pre­
sented in appendix B). While there are a few points of disagreement, 
the analyses converged in support of the cheap-seats thesis. Democrats 
dominate the low-turnout districts, the cheap seats. The single-member 
district electoral system worked consistently to the advantage of the Dem­
ocratic Party, up to and including the dramatic 1994 election, and this 
advantage augmented the party's control of the House. Just as the tilt of 
the electoral system helped to enlarge Democratic majorities in the past, 
it enlarged the Democratic House minority in 1994 and increases the 
prospects of Democrats regaining control of the House in the future. 
• The Questions • 
This research addresses two related questions: (1) why did the Democrats 
enjoy the longest continuous House majority in U.S. history, and (2) did 
electoral system bias significantly favor Democrats? My research into 
these questions began in 1991 when Democratic control of the House 
looked permanent and was completed in the fall of 1995 several months 
after Republicans, who had been 40 years in the minority, took control of 
the House following the stunning 1994 midterm election. 
Three aspects of this project sustained my interest and, I hope, will 
sustain yours. They were the three P's: politics, puzzles, and precision. 
First, though the methods of this research are as coldly objective as I 
could make them, the subject is intensely political and very politically 
important. The reasons behind a party's control of the House and the 
possible existence of bias in the electoral system are both important politi­
cal and very partisan issues. It is difficult to imagine a question of greater 
importance to a representative democracy than whether the will of citi­
zens participating in the electoral process is fairly represented. Second, 
both subjects of this book present interesting puzzles. How did Demo­
crats hold huge House majorities for four decades? Political scientists 
were late in addressing this important question. They only began asking 
the question in the 1990s and even then were indirect about it, asking 
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why divided government had become common rather than why Demo­
crats had a "lock" on the House. The question of electoral system bias was 
more heavily researched, as part of more general evaluations of electoral 
systems (usually focusing on the swing ratio rather than bias), yet almost 
no attention had been paid to the conflicting estimates of bias. Why had 
some found a pro-Democratic bias and others a pro-Republican bias? Fi­
nally, the electoral system bias question required a precise answer. Much 
research conducted under the rubric of social science is not remotely sci­
entific. But even research that takes the "science" in social science seri­
ously often aspires to little more than beating randomness, achieving 
statistical significance. To say that some effect probably exists, that it may 
not be due to dumb luck, may be to say something but usually is not 
to say much. While recognizing uncertainty and remaining sensitive to 
assumptions (even in the use of hard election return data), I wanted to 
answer not just whether electoral system bias existed but to gauge as pre­
cisely as possible and with several different measures (to add further cer­
tainty to the answer) the extent of bias and its basis. Each measure zeroed 
in on the same estimate of bias. The election returns of 1994 used in the 
analysis in chapter 8 proved to be especially fortuitous in this regard. 
With the majority party changing hands for the first time in 40 years, 
we could now make very certain and precise estimates of electoral sys­
tem bias. 
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A Democratic Dynasty

"n Tuesday, November 6, 1994, the politically unthinkable happened. 
The Republican Party won a majority of seats in the U.S. House of Repre­
sentatives, taking control of the House away from the Democrats for the 
first time in 40 years. Republicans gained 52 seats, the greatest midterm 
seat change in nearly half a century. Some called it a political earthquake. 
Others declared it a revolution. The 231 Republican representatives were 
13 more than necessary to end, dramatically and unexpectedly, what 
most had come to consider a permanent Democratic majority in the 
House. Everywhere, Republicans were jubilant, and Democrats stunned. 
It was little consolation to Democrats that the new Democratic minority 
was larger than any Republican minority in the prior four decades. The 
hard, cold fact remained: for the first time in 40 years, Democrats in the 
House were now in the minority. 
When Republicans had last held a majority in the House, Winston 
Churchill was prime minister of Great Britain, Nikita Khrushchev was 
still years away from becoming premier of the Soviet Union, the French 
had recently suffered defeat in Vietnam, there were only 48 states, the 
U.S. Senate was deciding whether to censure communist-hunting Sena­
tor Joe McCarthy, Tom Dewey was governor of the state of New York, 
Rocky Marciano was heavyweight boxing champion, Studebaker made 
automobiles, television was in black and white, Ronald Reagan was the 
new host of the General Electric Theater, and the Dodgers were in Brook-
lyn.1 It all seems like part of ancient history now. 
The last Republican majority in the House ended with the 1954 
election, Eisenhower's first midterm election. For the next four decades 
the Democratic Party's control of the House was uninterrupted. Election 
in and election out, Democrats won a majority of House seats. To put the 
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record on more human dimensions, not a single member of either party 
elected in 1994 had served in Congress when the Republicans were last 
in the majority.2 Outside of Congress, a majority of Americans voting in 
1994 had either not been born or had not yet entered elementary school 
when Republicans last held the House.3 Even for elderly Americans the 
last Republican majority was a distant and fading memory. While political 
observers regularly speculated before elections about which party would 
win the White House or which party would control the Senate, for most 
of the last 40 years, no one seriously questioned who would control the 
House. A Democratic majority was taken for granted. In more regal 
terms, from 1954 to 1994, the House of Representatives was dominated 
by a Democratic dynasty. And though, like all dynasties, this one eventu­
ally came to an end, it was nonetheless impressive. 
Actually, the Democratic dynasty in the House was established well 
before 1954. Democrats dominated the House for more than six decades. 
In all but four of the last 62 years, between 1932 and 1994, Democrats 
controlled a majority of the House. Republicans won fleeting majorities 
in the 1946 midterm and again in the 1952 elections (riding Eisenhower's 
coattails), but, otherwise, Democrats had a solid lock on the House. This 
book explores the reasons for this unusual success, the basis of the Demo­
cratic dynasty, and how the dynasty finally collapsed in the 1994 midterm 
election. More particularly, the book is about several structural advan­
tages that Democrats have enjoyed in House elections, especially the elec­
toral system advantage that Democrats have enjoyed in the way in which 
votes are translated into seats. 
• The Effects of a Congressional Dynasty • 
The lengthy tenure of the Democratic majority in the House had im­
portant consequences. To no small extent, Democratic dominance of the 
House shaped most aspects of political life for generations of Americans. 
It affected political leadership, the relationship between and the behavior 
of the political parties, the public's relationship to the government, the 
extent of political competition in the system, and the kinds of public poli­
cies adopted by the government. It would be difficult to exaggerate the 
effects of the Democratic dynasty. 
The Power of Political Parties 
Despite the common cynical view that parties do not matter and that 
partisans of either stripe are all the same, there is much to say otherwise. 
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Political parties matter. The parties differ in their policies and philoso­
phies, and this makes a difference in the way they govern. Democrats and 
Republicans are not at the extremes of the political spectrum, but neither 
are they tweedledum and tweedledee. Democrats as a group are more 
liberal than Republicans on a variety of issues, and there is even greater 
divergence between Democratic and Republican lawmakers. Parties have, 
admittedly, weakened a bit both in the electorate and among leaders from 
the 1950s to the 1980s. Crises, assassinations, unrest, scandals, and the 
simple passage of time since the New Deal (with the natural succession 
of new generations of voters) took their toll on the stability of partisan 
preferences. But the decline of partisanship is often exaggerated (Keith 
et al., 1992). Most voters and, with rare exceptions, all elected leaders 
are affiliated with the Democratic or Republican Parties. Most of these 
partisans continue to be loyal to their party, whether in the voting booth 
or in the legislative chamber. Moreover, there is evidence that partisan­
ship has been reinvigorated in the 1980s and 1990s (Miller, 1991; Rohde, 
1991, 1992). Thus, the dynasty of a political party is not just a curiosity. 
It has real consequences. 
The party that controls the House makes a difference in a number 
of ways. It determines House party and committee leadership, who in 
turn determine which legislation is considered. It determines how legisla­
tion is formed, what coalitions are built, what rules govern debate, and 
what amendments are permitted. As Schattschneider (1942) wrote some 
time ago, democratic politics is about numbers. If you have the numbers 
in the electorate or in the legislative chamber, you can wield power. The 
majority party controls the legislative process and thus shapes public poli­
cies that affect the day-to-day lives of Americans and people around the 
world.4 A party that controls the levers of legislative power election after 
election for decades at a stretch and presumes that it will have that power 
indefinitely is in an especially powerful position. 
Divided Government and Gridlock 
The powers of the House, however, even when in the hands of a single 
party for decades at a time, are not without limits. The system of checks 
and balances in general and the prerogatives of the presidency in par­
ticular are impediments to an aggressive House majority, at least when 
the opposition party sits at the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue. Even 
with the restraint that a vigilant president can sometimes impose on the 
House majority, there is also a downside—divided government. With one 
party fixed as a majority in the House and with significant competition 
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in presidential elections, divided government has become a more fre­
quent occurrence. 
While some debate its consequences, divided government is com­
monly thought to produce a whole host of institutional pathologies, sum­
marized variously as "gridlock," "stalemate," or "deadlock." Governance 
is more difficult under divided government. Rather than bridging the 
separation of powers to foster cooperation, the political parties deepen 
differences and heighten conflict in a divided government. Compromise 
becomes both more necessary and less possible because of partisan differ­
ences. Moreover, when compromise is reached, neither party gets what it 
considers good policy. With coherent partisan policy a political impossi­
bility, the process too often produces "lowest-common-denominator" pol­
icy and pandering to assemble a winning coalition. When compromise is 
not achieved because of partisan conflict, government grinds to a halt 
and crucial issues go to the back burner until they boil over into a crisis. 
Both the gargantuan budget deficits of the 1980s and early 1990s 
and the savings and loan debacle of the 1980s are prime examples of 
problems both precipitated and neglected by gridlocked, divided 
government.5 
Political Competition 
The importance of the permanent Democratic majority went beyond its 
policy consequences. The Democratic dynasty also both revealed and ex­
acerbated an important weakness in our political system—a serious defi­
ciency in political competition. The proper functioning of modern 
republican governments depends on political competition. Without it, 
there is little to check the abuse of power, to spur the adoption of sound 
policies, and to interest citizens in participating in the electoral process. 
The longevity of the Democratic majority in the House indicated that, in 
this most critical of American political institutions, competition was sorely 
lacking for a considerable stretch of recent history. 
For several decades, serious competition was absent in most individ­
ual congressional elections.6 In a significant number of districts, there was 
no competition whatsoever. While the number of uncontested districts 
varies a good deal from one election to the next, typically voters in 60 to 
70 districts have lacked a choice between major party House candidates. 
Even in contested districts, competition is often more apparent than real 
(Jacobson, 1990). Most incumbents win reelection, and most win by siz­
able vote margins. In elections since the 1950s, typically more than 90 
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percent of incumbents seek reelection, and more than 90 percent of these 
are successful. Generally, incumbents win reelection with about 65 per­
cent of the vote. Nationally, district-level competition has deteriorated 
since the 1960s. Indeed, from the 1950s to 1990, both the reelection rates 
of incumbents and their vote margins have increased, leading David 
Mayhew (1974) to write of "the vanishing marginals." In 1990, for ex­
ample, 96 percent of incumbents seeking reelection were reelected, and 
three out of four who were returned to office won by a comfortably safe 
margin, receiving in excess of 60 percent of the vote. Even in 1992, in 
what appeared to be the worst of times for incumbents, with the House 
check-bouncing scandal, broadscale redistricting, and a public holding 
the Congress in very low regard, 93 percent of incumbents running in 
the general election were reelected. Again, in 1994, in one of the most 
tumultuous midterm elections in this century, with Congress sinking to 
new depths in public esteem, with term-limit propositions passing in one 
state after another, and with what political commentators viewed as gen­
eral voter anger at "government as usual," 91 percent of incumbents run­
ning in the general election were still reelected.7 
The uncompetitiveness of individual congressional elections under­
mines the electoral process. The purpose of elections is to exert popular 
control of government. Competitive elections are supposed to keep 
elected officials "on their toes." Fearing electoral reprisal in the next elec­
tion, representatives have a strong incentive to respond to constituents 
and to support policies that constituents would approve of by the next 
election (even if they might not favor these policies immediately).8 If elec­
tions are uncompetitive, the electoral incentive for good representation 
is missing, at least in the short run. While the anticipation of possible 
competition in future elections might induce attentive representation, 
the uncertainty of serious opposition in some future election may provide 
less of an inducement for good representation than the certain confronta­
tion of a serious challenger in the next election. In addition, uncompeti­
tive elections affect the relation of citizens to their government. The 
ability of citizens to shape government through the electoral process de­
pends on their having a real choice between viable candidates. Without 
a real choice, democratic elections fail as instruments of popular control, 
and the public's sense of control over the course of government withers, 
and their willingness to participate in the democratic process wanes. 
As regrettable as the lack of competition in individual congressional 
elections is, the larger absence of competition for control of the House 
was even more so. The fact that the same party held a majority in the 
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House for four decades led both leaders and citizens to believe that con­
trol of the House was not only unchanging but unchangeable. The Dem­
ocratic House majority was a routine outcome, a fixture on the political 
scene. The consequences of a one-party political system in the House are 
easily predictable. If Democratic control of the House is a foregone con­
clusion in each election, citizens must feel less efficacious and more frus­
trated. However they vote locally and whomever they elect locally, the 
national result was, until 1994, never in doubt.9 No matter how good 
times were for the Republicans or how bad they were for the Democrats, 
the results were the same: a Democratic majority.10 
Political Leadership 
The absence of competition for control of the House was also felt among 
political leaders. On the Republican side, for most of the last four de­
cades, there was little real hope of being in the majority. Even well into 
the 1994 campaign itself, few thought a Republican majority was really 
possible. With serious doubts about ever serving in the majority, many 
Republicans sensed the futility of party building and worked instead for 
their personal goals. On the Democratic side, there was little fear of losing 
their majority. Taking for granted their party's power, Democratic candi­
dates had less of an incentive to work in behalf of their party (since what­
ever they did, the Democratic majority survived) and less of a reason 
to restrain their use of institutional power. Presumably, weakened party 
discipline and loyalties among leaders ultimately weaken partisanship in 
the public, as policy differences between the parties (the foundation of 
reasoned partisanship) become less distinct. 
The lack of competition certainly affected relations between the par­
ties and the possibility of bipartisanship and collegiality in working to­
gether for the public interest. Lord Acton long ago observed that, "Power 
corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely." As far as the politics of 
the House were concerned, the uninterrupted 40-year rule by a single 
party was, in practice, too close to absolute power. Democrats ruled the 
House and many Republicans felt that they were second-class citizens. 
Near the end of the Democratic dynasty, three House Republicans (Dick 
Armey, Jennifer Dunn, and Christopher Shays) and their staffs (Koop­
man et al., 1994) produced a thorough review of the various political 
pathologies that they attributed to prolonged one-party rule. It was their 
judgment that the Democratic dynasty had been a corrupting influence 
on the political system. 
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Among other things, Armey and his colleagues suggested that the 
permanent Democratic House majority supported a system of special in­
terest politics in which the broader public's concerns were neglected in 
favor of those of interest groups contributing heavily to Democratic cam­
paign coffers. It built itself a bloated and irresponsible congressional bu­
reaucracy and committee system. They also argued that the arrogance of 
the Democratic dynasty created a climate that too often led to outright 
corruption—including the Koreagate scandal of 1976, the Abscam scan­
dal of 1980, former-speaker Jim Wright's book royalty scandal, former-
representative Dan Rostenkowski's House post office scandal in 1992, 
and the House banking scandal. However, it is the institutional abuses of 
the system, the undemocratic manipulation of the rules and procedures 
of the House to squelch debate and to prevent Republican influence in 
the process, that most frustrated Republicans. As Armey and his col­
leagues saw it, Democratic leadership in the House, not satisfied with 
the natural powers of a majority, attempted to suppress the minority by 
frequently resorting to rules restricting or preventing floor amendments 
and by employing highly partisan leadership strategies designed to ex­
clude Republicans from the process. Frustrated with their indefinite ex­
clusion from a meaningful role in governing, many Republicans adopted 
more extreme and combative positions regarding the policies of the ma­
jority and more skeptical (or even cynical) views about government in 
general. Even if the report of Armey and his colleagues is not accepted 
as an unbiased assessment of the impact of the permanent Democratic 
House majority on American politics, it is indicative of how Republicans 
thought they had been treated, what they thought about the conse­
quences of the Democratic dynasty, and how badly relations between the 
parties had deteriorated. 
An Overview 
Figure 1.1 takes an overview of the suspected consequences of the one-
party House. This causal model links the various suspected effects of this 
dominance. The diagram suggests the far-ranging consequences of the 
Democratic dynasty. Five effects (indicated by bold causal paths in the 
figure) are likely. 
First, the seemingly permanent Democratic House majority may 
have, both directly and indirectly, weakened the internal cohesion of the 
political parties. Serious competition rallies partisans, and, in its absence, 
they may feel less compelled to come to the aid of their party.11 
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Permanent Party Congressional Competition 
Majority: Padlock 
Interbranch Divided Conflict: Government Gridlock 
Strength of Public Support 
the Political for the Political 
Parties System 
Figure 1.1 
Suspected Effects of the Democratic Dynasty in the U.S. House of Representa­
tives on the Political System 
Note: Possible interaction effects of the strength of parties and party competition on divided 
government's impact on gridlock have been omitted for the sake of clarity. Also for clarity, a 
number of additional causal factors have been excluded. See figure 1.2 for other factors that 
might affect the permanence of the House majority. 
Second, while the Democratic dynasty, in part, reflected an absence 
of political competition in the system, it also probably dampened compe­
tition. With the control of the House an apparently settled matter, there 
was less at stake in elections. Running for election or reelection to Con­
gress is a tremendous emotional and financial commitment. The prospect 
of spending a career in the minority, effectively isolated from real policy 
making, must have discouraged some potentially strong Republican can­
didates (including Republican incumbents) from running for office. The 
end result: even less-competitive politics. 
Third, the permanence of the Democratic majority, which was 
seemingly immune to what happened at the polls, may have had serious 
consequences for the public's attitudes about the political process and 
government in general. The fact that the Democratic majority survived, 
almost regardless of what voters did, would seem to have undermined 
public support for the political system, reduced the public's sense of polit­
ical efficacy, fostered political cynicism, and reduced turnout. 
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Fourth, the Democratic dynasty, combined with competitive presi­
dential elections, increased the likelihood of divided government. In the 
past, the party that won the White House would almost always win con­
trol of the House. When it occurred, divided government was usually the 
product of presidential party losses in the midterm election. This is no 
longer so. Democrats maintained their control of the House, even when 
Republican presidential candidates won in landslide elections. The result: 
more frequently divided government. 
Finally, the permanence of the Democratic majority in the House 
accentuated conflict between presidents of either party and the Con-
gress—producing institutional gridlock. An entrenched majority is an 
emboldened (perhaps arrogant) majority, less disposed to work cordially 
even with presidents of their own party. While great attention has been 
paid by scholars, journalists, and politicians to the problems of divided 
government and institutional gridlock, these problems and many of the 
pathologies associated with them may have deeper roots in the apparent 
permanence of the Democratic majority in the House. As Representative 
Jim Leach (R-IA) put it, the fundamental problem of American govern­
ment may not have been "gridlock" but "padlock."12 That is, Democratic 
control was so secure for 40 years, it was like having a padlock on the 
House. 
As the causal model also suggests, the five suspected direct effects 
of padlock are often mutually reinforced by its indirect effects.13 The en­
trenched majority in the House increases gridlock, which in turn strains 
public support for the political system. It also increases the likelihood of 
divided government, which in turn heightens institutional conflict (grid­
lock), and so on. In short, a long-standing congressional majority for one 
party, whether that one party is the Democratic Party or the Republican 
Party, is in many ways very unhealthy for the political system. 
• Understanding the Democratic Dynasty • 
The longevity of the Democratic House majority has been an important 
feature of the modern American political landscape and is important to 
understand. How did the Democratic majority become so firmly en­
trenched for so many years? What finally dislodged it? The following 
chapters examine a number of plausible answers. 
Chapter 2 reviews the record of Democratic dominance in the 
House over the last four decades. It places the Democratic House record 
in historical perspective and compares it to the party's record in seeking 
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other political offices. While Democrats were successful in winning other 
offices, and while parties have been successful in other times, the dura­
tion and extent of the Democratic majority in the House from 1954 to 
1994 is unique. The analysis also discovers a pattern in the Democrats' 
success. The party had greater success in elections for offices with smaller 
electoral districts. Democrats have been more successful in running 
for state legislative and House seats than in statewide (Senate and guber­
natorial) or national (presidential) races. This pattern suggests that the 
single-member-district electoral system may have something to do with 
Democratic success in House elections. (Some background on the House 
electoral system is provided in an appendix at the end of this chapter.) 
After establishing the pattern of greater Democratic success in House 
elections, a potential explanation for the permanent Democratic majority 
is proposed—the cheap-seats thesis. The thesis proposes that to a signifi­
cant extent, the Democratic dynasty was preserved and expanded as a result of the 
electoral system. As configured, the single-member-district electoral system required 
Republicans to receive more votes than Democrats in order to win the same number 
of seats. This systematic overrepresentation favoring the Democratic Party resulted 
from Democrats winning a disproportionate number of very-low-turnout districts— 
the cheap seats. 
The cheap-seats explanation is not the only explanation for the 
Democratic dynasty. Chapter 3 explores a number of alternatives, sources 
of the recently departed Democratic majority other than the electoral 
system. The fundamental causes that might have maintained the Demo­
cratic majority are presented in figure 1.2. As the causal diagram depicts 
it, there are two possible direct influences on Democratic padlock beyond 
the possible effects of partisan bias in the electoral system. One set of 
alternative explanations finds the basis of the Democratic dynasty in the 
intentional decisions of the voters. While such an explanation is seem­
ingly straightforward, suggesting that the Democrats have controlled the 
House because voters want it that way, there are actually a variety of 
causes for these Democratic congressional votes. Some trace Democratic 
votes to the free choice of voters, while others suggest institutional rea­
sons that might induce those votes. That is, some votes are cast for Demo­
crats because more Democratic candidates enjoy the various advantages 
of incumbency, and Democrats receive some votes by default, since a 
number of Democratic congressional candidates run unopposed. An­
other explanation suggests that Democratic dominance can be traced di­
rectly to this lack of opposition: Democrats are set well on their way to a 
majority, since Republicans traditionally conceded some number of seats 
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General Voter 
Support for the 
Democratic Party 
Coalition Character Responsiveness of 
and Ideology of the the Electoral System 
Democratic Party 
Votes for Democratic Permanent Democratic 
Congressional Congressional Majority: 
Candidates Padlock 
Net Democratic 
Uncontested Seat 
Advantage 
Net Democratic Democratic 
Candidate Incumbency Partisan Bias in 
Advantage the Electoral System 
Figure 1.2 
Suspected Factors Maintaining the Democratic Dynasty in the U.S. House of 
Representatives 
Note: An arrow pointing at another arrow indicates an interaction effect. For instance, the 
responsiveness of the electoral system is suspected to magnify the effect of voter support 
for Democrats on the Democratic dynasty. 
to the Democrats before any ballots are cast, giving the Democratic Party 
an uncontested-seat advantage. 
There are two general explanations of the Democratic dynasty that 
find that voters wanted to fill a majority of House seats with Democrats. 
There is the simple explanation that more voters generally preferred 
Democrats in government and a more complex set of explanations claim­
ing that voters have been particularly likely to prefer Democrats in 
Congress. 
Most obviously, the Democratic majority may have simply reflected 
Democratic strength in the electorate. From the New Deal through at 
least the late 1970s, Democrats outnumbered Republicans in the elector­
ate. Moreover, throughout the 40-year reign of the Democrats in the 
House, voters nationally cast a majority of votes for Democrats in con­
gressional elections. This vote majority was then amplified into a larger 
seat majority by the responsiveness of the House electoral system. Thus, 
it is hardly surprising that more Democrats than Republicans were 
elected to the House. 
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While voters over the last 40 years may have generally favored 
Democratic government over Republican government, this does not ex­
plain why Democrats have been more successful in running for the 
House rather than for other offices. Although this differential success of 
Democrats, especially noticeable in contrasting their record in presiden­
tial elections to their record in House contests, may mean that features of 
the electoral systems distort the intentions of voters for or against Demo­
crats, it may also mean that some critical number of voters, for any num­
ber of reasons, are especially inclined to want Democrats to serve in the 
House. 
Several theories claim that voters deliberately chose a Democratic 
Congress as a vote for divided rather than unified party government. 
According to these theories, we have often had Democratic Congresses 
and usually had Republican presidents because that is what voters 
wanted. There are several possible reasons for wanting divided govern­
ment. Some split-ticket voters may have believed that Republicans were 
better suited to executive duties and the representation of broader na­
tional interests while Democrats were better suited to legislative responsi­
bilities and the representation of narrower local interests (though the 
results of the 1994 midterm seem to conflict with this view). Others may 
have wanted a moderate government. Either party governing alone 
would tilt away from the center. However, divided government would 
force compromise or a blending of the policy positions of the two parties. 
Still others may have felt alienated from both parties, opposed to the rule 
of either party on its own, and voted for divided government so that each 
party would have enough power to check and to frustrate the other. 
These theories are assessed in chapter 3. 
The character of the parties may also account for the greater Demo­
cratic success in running for the House. There are two party-based expla­
nations. They trace the Democratic strength in the House to the 
difference between the parties in their ideologies regarding government 
and the nature of the party coalitions. First, the Democratic Party's suc­
cess in the House may have resulted from its progovernment or big-
government philosophy. This perspective may have been particularly 
helpful in congressional races. As proponents of expansion of a variety of 
government programs, the Democrats were more willing and adept at 
serving diverse local interests. Democrats were more likely to "bring 
home the bacon" for their constituents. This constituency service may 
have been rewarded by the electorate, especially by the quarter of the 
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electorate that was willing to split its ticket between candidates of differ­
ent parties.14 
Second, from the ideological tilt of the parties favoring legislative 
Democrats, the diversity of the two parties' coalitions may account for 
Democratic success in congressional elections. The Democratic coalition 
has been larger and more diverse than the Republican coalition (Axelrod, 
1972; Stanley et al., 1986; and Erikson et al., 1989). Its diversity has pre­
sented problems for Democrats in national elections in which one candi­
date must appeal to the varied interests of the coalition in order to hold 
the pieces of the coalition together. Invariably some parts of the coali-
tion—white southerners, blacks, labor, Catholics, or liberals—have felt 
shortchanged, and some members have sat out elections or even defected 
to vote for the Republican. Because congressional districts seldom con­
tain the full range of these Democratic constituent groups, Democratic 
congressional candidates need not perform the same juggling act re­
quired of Democratic presidential candidates.15 Congressional Democrats 
could win in southern white districts, urban black districts, and northeast­
ern Catholic districts at the same time because their appeals could be 
tailored to the "political requirements" of each type of district. 
Beyond considering the free will of the voters as a basis for Demo­
cratic rule, chapter 3 also considers another possible basis, the candidates. 
Two partisan advantages regarding congressional candidates—incum-
bency and uncontested seats—may have preserved the Democratic 
House.16 Many speculated that incumbency was the foundation of the 
Democratic majority. Since a majority of incumbents were Democrats 
(until 1996), the Democratic Party has benefited more from the consider­
able advantages that candidates have who are incumbents. In addition, 
as a party, Democrats long enjoyed a candidate advantage in uncontested 
seats. Democrats have been much more likely than Republicans to win 
elections without a major-party opponent. By failing to offer a Republi­
can candidate to voters, Republicans essentially conceded a significant 
number of seats (and votes) before the election was even held. This 
gave Democrats an automatic "leg up" toward a majority. As chapter 3 
demonstrates, while the incumbency advantage and the uncontested-seat 
advantage for Democrats varied from one election to the next, these can­
didate advantages contributed significantly to sustaining the Democratic 
majority. 
Chapter 4 begins the assessment of the electoral system as an expla­
nation for the size and durability of the Democratic majority: Democrats 
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dominated the House for such a long period because of the extra seats 
that they won as a result of winning districts in which relatively few votes 
were cast. The chapter begins with an examination of the idea and the 
measurement of partisan bias in the electoral system. Partisan bias in an 
electoral system is the difference between the parties in the number (or proportion) 
of seats that each would win if they had received the same number of votes. There 
are good democratic reasons why a party should win more seats if it wins 
more votes; but, in an unbiased electoral system, two parties winning an 
equal number of votes should also win an equal number of seats. The 
chapter reviews the existing research about partisan bias in the American 
electoral system and assesses the appropriate way to measure bias. The 
principal point of chapter 4 is that partisan bias has been incorrectly esti­
mated in a number of previous studies and that it can be measured di­
rectly by comparing the average number of unwasted votes (that is, votes 
cast for winning candidates) that each party receives.17 Bias is revealed if 
one party expends more unwasted votes per victory than the other party. 
Chapter 5 presents the core of the case that the Democratic Party's 
success in the cheap seats bolstered their long-standing majority in the 
House. The chapter begins with an examination of turnout differences 
across contested districts in elections from 1954 to 1992. Turnout is mea­
sured by the actual number of citizens voting for congressional candi­
dates in the district. The extent of variation is surprisingly large. The 
American system requires equal political representation in the sense of 
"one person, one vote," but in practice voters living in some districts get 
a lot more say about who gets to be a member of Congress than voters 
who happen to live in other districts. The chapter introduces the idea of 
the "unwasted vote," the number of votes cast for a winning candidate.18 
An unbiased electoral system ought to require, on average, the same 
number of unwasted votes from each party—to win one seat ought to 
require the same number of votes from one party as it does from the 
other. If the average winning Democrat receives 90,000 votes while the 
average winning Republican receives 110,000 votes, the Democratic 
Party has a distinct advantage.19 In market terminology, the Republicans 
are paying a higher price in terms of votes for their victories than Demo­
crats are spending. This is what the evidence will demonstrate. It will also 
demonstrate that although the electoral system has regularly favored the 
Democrats, the extent of this bias has varied a good deal. In some election 
years, the electoral system is nearly neutral. In others, it is strongly tilted 
toward the Democrats. 
Chapter 6 explains why partisan bias has varied from election to 
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election. A variety of reasons, from legal changes regarding apportion­
ment to a weakening of class politics, may have caused a long-term trend 
in partisan bias since 1954. Possible shorter-term trends involving the 
effects of partisan gerrymandering at the beginning of decades, following 
redistricting, and the gradual erosion of these effects in subsequent elec­
tions are also examined. Turnout may also have affected bias, if the non­
voters in some elections are Democratic voters when turnout surges in 
other elections. The factor most influential in affecting the extent of par­
tisan bias is the congressional vote itself The analysis shows that the Dem­
ocrats' cheap-seat advantage was greatest when they needed it most, 
when their national congressional vote was at its lowest levels. While the 
alternative explanations of Democratic House strength explored in chap­
ter 3 have merit, Democratic victories in the cheap seats provided an 
important foundation for their majority. Chapter 6 also reexamines the 
swing ratio, or the electoral system's responsiveness in light of the vari­
ability of partisan bias. Because partisan bias has varied with the congres­
sional vote and prior estimates of the swing ratio have assumed that bias 
was a constant or stable feature of the electoral system, the responsiveness 
of the system has been underestimated. 
Chapter 7 places the partisan bias of the electoral system in histori­
cal perspective. It compares the bias of the electoral system in the period 
since 1954 with that of earlier elections. The analysis indicates that the 
electoral system since at least 1936 has been biased in favor of the Demo­
crats and that this bias also was greatest when Democrats were less 
popular. 
Chapter 8 explores why the seemingly invincible Democratic major­
ity came to its unexpected and dramatic end in the 1994 midterm. How 
did the unthinkable actually happen? How did partisan control of the 
House, that had for so long appeared unchangeable, finally change? The 
Democratic dynasty had been supported by the voters, candidate factors 
(incumbency and uncontested seats), the nature of the parties, and the 
electoral system. How did Republicans in 1994 surmount these factors 
to win a majority of seats? Was there a revolt against incumbents? Were 
congressional Democrats swept away by the electorate's anti-Clinton sen­
timent? Did Democrats lose their uncontested seat advantage? Did the 
cheap seats vanish, or did Democrats lose their hold on this advantage? 
Or was 1994 the long-postponed deepening of the gradual partisan re­
alignment that had helped Republican presidential candidates in the 
1980s? 
The analysis in chapter 8 indicates that several of the factors that 
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had sustained the Democratic dynasty remained potent in 1994. Demo­
crats in 1994 maintained their incumbency advantage over Republicans, 
and the electoral system remained tilted in favor of the Democrats. How­
ever, these advantages were not enough to protect the Democratic major­
ity against the loss of the party's advantage in uncontested seats and a 
deepening Republican realignment of voter allegiances. For the first time 
in 40 years, a majority of voters in 1994 voted for Republican congres­
sional candidates, and, for the first time in more than 40 years, there were 
more uncontested Republican candidates than uncontested Democrats. 
Things, however, would have been much worse for Democrats if the elec­
toral system had been neutral. As in previous elections, Democrats in 
1994 won a large number of low-turnout districts. This extended their 
impact of Democratic votes and restrained the impact of Republican 
votes. Five different estimates of electoral system bias in 1994 indicate 
that the system was tilted in favor of the Democrats by about 4 percent of 
House seats. As a result, though the party with the largest share of votes 
in a plurality-rule electoral system normally wins a much larger share of 
seats, this was not true in 1994. The Republicans' share of seats about 
equalled their share of votes. By contrast, in the previous 20 elections, 
when Democrats won vote majorities, their share of seats consistently and 
significantly exceeded their share of votes. 
The book concludes in chapter 9 with a discussion of the conse­
quences of the cheap-seats phenomenon. The Democratic stronghold in 
low-turnout districts has had profound consequences for political repre­
sentation. How do cheap seats, won disproportionately by one party, af­
fect the representation of the general public, of those who turn out to 
vote, of congressional districts, of minority groups, and of individual citi­
zens? Do cheap seats overrepresent liberal perspectives in the policy-
making process? Do the cheap-seats phenomenon and the bias it creates 
in the electoral system help to explain why many Americans have become 
frustrated with the political system in general and with Congress in par­
ticular? Are the residents of low-turnout, cheap-seat districts represented 
well by the electoral system? What would happen if turnout in these 
cheap-seat districts rose? How would the results change? To push matters 
to the extreme of "what ifs," what would the electoral system produce 
and what bias would remain if everyone voted? At the group level, what 
is the relationship of the cheap-seats phenomenon to racial politics and 
efforts to redress social and political discrimination against African 
Americans? At the individual level, what are the implications of cheap 
seats for the principle of equal political representation? Finally, if one 
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concludes that cheap seats are dysfunctional for the political system, that 
they undermine the representativeness of the government because they 
unfairly eliminate political competition or because they violate basic prin­
ciples of political equality, can anything be done to reduce their impact 
or to eliminate them entirely? 
First, however, we should survey the record. Setting aside for the 
moment the spectacular Democratic crash of 1994, how successful were 
Democrats in winning elections and controlling different parts of the gov­
ernment from 1954 to 1992? Were Democratic candidates particularly 
successful in seeking some offices rather than others? 
• Appendix • 
The House Electoral System 
An electoral system encompasses everything that affects how votes are 
used to determine who wins elections and serves in office. The structure 
of an electoral system is derived from constitutional provisions and elec­
toral laws. Among other things, they define who is eligible to vote and 
who is eligible to seek office, when and where elections are held, and, 
most important, how many votes are required to win an election. The 
major distinctions among electoral systems are between multimember-
district proportional-representation systems, in which several representa­
tives are selected from a district in proportion to the votes cast for the 
various political parties, and single-member-district, plurality-rule sys­
tems, in which the party receiving the most votes in a district elects a 
single representative. It is important to keep in mind that the conse­
quences of these electoral laws, principles, and structures are determined 
by their interaction with the distribution of the vote. For instance, a 
plurality-rule, single-member-district system may greatly overreward the 
majority party if the vote is evenly distributed across the country. If the 
vote is more varied in parts of the country, the majority party would not 
be as greatly overrewarded in winning seats. 
The House electoral system is based on constitutional provisions, 
federal and state laws, and judicial interpretations of both. The system 
has evolved over time into a single-member-district system in which rep­
resentatives are elected by a plurality of the district vote. The U.S. Consti­
tution defined only the most general features of the House electoral 
system. In Article 1, Section 2, and as amended by the Fourteenth 
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Amendment, the Constitution provides for the term of office for the 
House, voter eligibility standards, qualifications for service in the House, 
the standards and timing of apportionment of representatives to the 
states (by population reallocated every 10 years, with each state receiving 
a minimum of one seat), and provisions for filling vacancies in seats.20 
Section 4 of Article 1 leaves the designation of "the times, places, and 
manner of holding elections" to the U.S. House to the states, and Section 
5 gives the power to judge election disputes to the House. Judicial inter­
pretations of the "equal protection" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
have also affected the House electoral system. Arguably the two most im­
portant features of the House electoral system, single-member districts 
and the plurality-vote rule for deciding election winners, are not even 
mentioned in the U.S. Constitution. 
The Constitution did provide for periodic reapportionment. Every 
10 years the Congress redistributes House seats among the states on the 
basis of state populations, as measured by the census. Until 1911, Con­
gress expanded the number of seats in the House and awarded seats to 
the states on the basis of the ratio of population to seats. After 1911, the 
House size was set by statute at 435 (with some temporary exceptions for 
the admission of new states between decennial reapportionments). Sev­
eral methods have been used to apportion or allocate the 435 seats to the 
states at the beginning of every decade on the basis of state populations 
(see Congressional Quarterly, 1985, 683-90, and Butler and Cain, 
1992, 19). 
Once a state has received its allocation of seats, it may determine 
how they will be elected within the state. In the 1800s, most state legis­
latures designated areas of the state as single-member congressional 
districts. However, some chose to elect representatives to the House in 
at-large or statewide elections without districts, and still others provided 
for a combination of single-member districts and a single at-large state­
wide representative. Several states conducted at-large elections well into 
the twentieth century.21 By 1970, however, all states had adopted the 
single-member-district system. 
The redistricting process of drawing district boundaries within the 
states is primarily the responsibility of state legislatures, although others 
are often involved as well. As in the general legislative process, governors 
play a role in redistricting, through the threat of a veto. Some states, in 
an effort to reduce the impact of partisan politics, use commissions to 
draw district lines. The federal government is involved in the process 
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both through court rulings mandating equally populated districts and 
federal laws (most notably the Voting Rights Act) prohibiting redis­
trictings that would dilute the influence of the votes of racial minorities. 
Federal laws not only bring the courts into the redistricting process but 
provide for an active role for the U.S. Department of Justice. 
The prevailing decision rule for determining the winner of a con­
gressional election is plurality rule. That is, the winning candidate is the 
one with more votes than any other candidate. Most states adopted 
plurality-rule from the outset. However, a few southern states use a ma-
jority-rule and runoff system. Under this system, a candidate is elected if 
he or she receives a majority of the vote (a likely occurrence, unless there 
are more than two candidates in the field). If no candidate receives a 
majority of the vote, the top two vote getters compete in a second, or 
runoff, election. The candidate receiving a majority of the vote in the 
runoff election is elected to serve a term in the House. 
Finally, it is important to note that the evaluation of the electoral 
system depends only on the political reality of votes actually cast and seats 
actually awarded. To evaluate the system, analysts sometimes attempt to 
determine how voters might vote if the political climate were more or less 
favorable to a party; however, the starting point is always the actual votes 
cast and seats awarded. Electoral system analysis does not attempt to an­
ticipate what would happen if new voters turned out to vote, if more 
districts were contested, if better candidates ran, if district boundaries 
were changed, or if the parties altered their appeals. Such analyses may 
be useful, but they entail the strong assumption that political changes can 
be made in isolation. For instance, if turnout rose from current levels to 
100 percent of all eligible voters, undoubtedly a great many other 
changes would also take place. Electoral system analyses largely avoid this 
quagmire by examining only what would happen if vote shares for the 
parties shifted among those who actually voted, with all other conditions 
(e.g., district boundaries) unchanged. 
2

The Democratic Record

democrats dominated congressional politics from the 1930s to the 
1990s. As impressive as this was, their uninterrupted control of the House 
from 1954 to 1994 was even more so. This chapter puts the four-decade-
long Democratic dynasty in perspective—comparing it to prior congres­
sional majorities, evaluating its durability in confronting forces hostile to 
such longevity, and contrasting the Democrats' success in the House to 
their success in other offices. The record shows that the recent Demo­
cratic majority was unprecedented and that Democrats had greater suc­
cess in House elections than in elections for higher offices. This later fact 
suggests that there may be something about the House electoral system 
that provided Democrats with an edge. The principal thesis of this book 
explains the nature of this edge: the single-member-district electoral 
system, in combination with a steady constellation of socioeconomic, 
geographic, and political factors, allowed Democrats to win a significant 
number of congressional districts with relatively few votes, and this 
helped the Democratic Party maintain its substantial congressional 
majority. 
• The Longevity of the Democratic Majority Q 
In the history of Congress, other consecutive majorities did not even 
come close to matching the duration of the Democratic majority from 
1954 to 1994. Table 2.1 ranks the five longest party majorities in the 
House from 1855 to 1995. As the rankings indicate and as Ornstein 
(1990) observes, the Democratic Party's control of the House from the 
20 
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Table 2.1 
Longest Consecutive Partisan Majorites in the 
U.S. House of Representatives, 1855-1995 
First Period of Number of 
Election Continuous Consecutive 
Majority Party in Series Control Congresses 
1. Democrats 1954 1955-1995 20 
2. Republicans 1894 1895-1911 8 
2. Republicans 1858 1859-1875 8 
4. Democrats* 1932 1933-1947 7 
4. Republicans* 1918 1919-1933 7 
Source: Omstein et al. (1992: table 1-18). Since new Congresses are sworn in after 
the start of a new year, the years of control overlap. The 103rd Congress elected in Novem­
ber 1992 took office in January 1993 and will serve until January of 1995. 
Note: The table includes all instances in which a party controlled the House for more 
than four consecutive terms since 1854. 
Th  e 72nd Congress (1931-33) is counted as a Republican House. Republicans had 
won a bare majority of seats in the 1930 election, although Democrats gained a majority and 
organized the chamber after the death of several Republican members. 
1950s into the 1990s was two-and-a-half times as long as any previous 
majority. Before the recent era of Democratic dominance, no party sus­
tained its majority beyond eight consecutive congresses. The Democratic 
House majority installed in the 1954 election lasted 20 terms.1 
From the mid-1950s to the 1994 midterm elections, Republicans 
were not even especially close to taking control of the House. Table 2.2 
presents the magnitude of Democratic majorities over this period. Al­
though the Democratic Party's majorities were modest following the 1954 
and 1956 elections, their subsequent majorities were large (in excess of 
55 percent). Democrats usually had a cushion of more than 40 seats. On 
three occasions they achieved "veto-proof majorities" of over 290 seats 
(or, more than 73 seats above a bare majority). Even at their low points, 
Democrats maintained substantial majorities. Republicans closed within 
30 seats of a majority on only three occasions since the mid-1950s (1968, 
1972, and 1980), and, from the mid-1950s to 1994, Republicans were 
never closer than a full 25 seats short of a bare majority. The Democratic 
dynasty was not only sustained over an unprecedented number of elec­
tions but was not seriously threatened for several decades. 
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Table 2.2 
Democratic Representatives in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1954-1992 
Number of Democratic Size (in Seats) 
Democratic Seat of Democratic 
Resulting from Election Representatives Percentage Majority 
1954 232 53.3 +15 
1956 234 53.8 +17 
1958 283 64.9 +65 
1960 262 60.0 +44 
1962 258 59.4 +41 
1964 295 67.8 +78 
1966 248 57.0 +31 
1968 243 55.9 +26 
1970 255 58.6 +38 
1972 242 55.8 +25 
1974 291 66.9 +74 
1976 292 67.1 +75 
1978 277 63.7 +60 
1980 243 55.9 +26 
1982 268 61.8 +51 
1984 253 58.2 +36 
1986 258 59.3 +41 
1988 260 59.8 +43 
1990 267 61.5 +50 
1992 258 59.4 +41 
Mean 261 60.0 +44 
Nonmajorities 0 (0%) 
55% or Less 2(10%) 
Note: The size of the Democratic majority is the number of seats in excess of a bare 
majority. This is generally the number of Democratic representatives less 217 seats, since a 
majority of a body of 435 would require 218 seats. The House expanded for the 1958 and 
1960 elections to accommodate the entrance of Alaska and Hawaii as states. The minimum 
majority in 1958 and 1960 was thus 219 seats. 
Q The Durability of the Democratic Majority • 
The Democratic majority in the House was remarkable for its durability 
as well as its longevity. It endured through a period that should have 
been very inhospitable to its survival. A number of developments should 
have made it very difficult for Democrats to sustain their majority. Parti­
san dealignment, political turbulence, Republican presidential landslides, 
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and partisan realignments presented challenges to the Democratic dy­
nasty. Despite these challenges, it survived. 
First, through much of the past four decades, political parties were 
in decline. While of continuing importance to the political system, by sev­
eral measures parties became less important than they had been (Wat­
tenberg, 1990, 1991).2 The persistence of a party's majority in a period 
of weakened partisanship is impressive. The weakening of partisanship 
should have worked against the majority party, which clearly was the 
Democratic Party until at least the 1980s. If a party holds an advantage 
in partisanship, it benefits to the extent that voters' decisions are based 
on that partisanship. At the extreme, the majority party would win every 
election if partisanship were the only thing that affected voters' decisions. 
The weakening of partisanship should have opened elections up to in­
fluences (candidates, issues, etc.) that on occasion might tilt in favor of 
the minority party. With more personalized politics, one would have ex­
pected less continuity in party majorities. With congressional elections 
more dependent on local factors and less dependent on partisanship, one 
might have expected less stable partisan results in the aggregate and 
more swings of majorities from one party to the other. In short, with 
partisan dealignment, a Democratic majority should have been less cer­
tain. Instead, it became a long-term political fixture. 
Second, the great social and economic turbulence and change of the 
past 40 years of American history should have made it particularly diffi­
cult to reelect a House majority for either party. At different times and in 
different ways, foreign-policy issues, a variety of social issues, and the 
perennial economic issues divided the nation. The Vietnam War created 
especially deep divisions, and the scars from it remained long after the 
last American troops came home. Battles over civil rights were bitterly 
fought, and the racial divisions continue. Abortion policies activated 
deeply held convictions and created intense arguments. And then there 
were the ever-present economic issues. The period had stretches of sus­
tained economic growth (under both Democratic and Republican admin­
istrations) and deep and long recessions and stagflation. There were 
times of runaway inflation and sky-high interest rates as well as times of 
high unemployment. Throughout all the tumult, the Democratic major­
ity in the House was undisturbed. 
Beyond the waxing and waning of various issues, the political land­
scape has changed in many other ways. These changes also should have 
hampered the preservation of a majority. Through the civil rights 
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movement and the enactment of civil rights laws, the participation of Afri­
can Americans in the electoral process steadily rose from the 1950s to the 
1970s and beyond. New ethnic groups, particularly Hispanic Americans 
and Asian Americans, emerged as significant political interests. One 
might expect the emergence of new groups to create intraparty divisions 
for the Democrats' majority coalition and provide opportunities for 
growth in the Republicans' minority coalition. The methods of financing 
campaigns changed in this period, as did the general methods of con­
ducting congressional campaigns. Congressional campaigns became 
more media intensive and far more costly. All of these changes might 
have disturbed "politics as usual," the politics in which the Democratic 
majority was first formed. But it did not. Through it all, House Demo­
crats remained in the majority. 
Third, the Democratic majority survived repeated Republican pres­
idential victories, several of landslide proportions. Historically, the party 
winning the White House usually wins a majority in the House. Victori­
ous presidential candidates throughout history have had coattails on 
which congressional candidates of their party have ridden into office. Al­
though presidential coattails in recent years have been a bit shorter than 
they once were, they are still substantial (Campbell, 1986, 1991, 1992, 
1993). It is, thus, especially impressive that House Democrats consistently 
won despite presidential coattails often helping their Republican oppo­
nents. Democrats held a majority through six of Eisenhower's eight years 
in the White House, the eight years of the Nixon-Ford administrations, 
the eight years of the Reagan administration, and the four years of the 
Bush administration. Republican presidents were in the White House for 
26 of the 40 years (1954-94) that the Democrats held their House major­
ity. Moreover, Democrats retained their majority even in the face of Nix-
on's 1972 landslide victory over McGovern and Reagan's 1984 landslide 
defeat of Mondale. Regardless of which party occupied the White House 
and regardless of which party was helped or hurt by the top of the ticket, 
Democrats won a majority of House seats election after election. 
Fourth, the dealignment of the party system forged in the New Deal 
era set the stage for the emergence of a new party system, one much 
more favorably inclined toward Republicans. Until 1994, Democrats in 
the House had successfully weathered a partisan realignment favoring 
Republicans. From the 1930s through the 1950s and into the 1960s, a 
solid majority of the electorate thought of themselves as Democrats. In 
the 1950s and 1960s, Democrats in the electorate outnumbered Republi­
cans by nearly two to one. With this advantage, a Democratic House ma­
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jority was hardly surprising, though (as already noted) previous majority 
parties had been unable to maintain continuous control of the House for 
such a long period. This partisan balance in the public began to shift in 
the late 1960s and evidence of significant party identification shifts ap­
peared in the 1980s. The nation became less Democratic (Petrocik, 1987; 
Bullock, 1988; Carmines and Stimson, 1989). By the mid-1980s, the par­
ties were near parity (Miller, 1991, 561; Keene and Ladd, 1991, 92-93). 
Yet again, despite this trend against them, Democrats retained their 
House majority. 
• The National, Statewide, and Local Records • 
The fact that the Democratic House majority survived through partisan 
dealignment, social and economic turmoil, Republican presidential victo­
ries, and a pro-Republican partisan realignment is impressive. The Dem­
ocratic domination of the House is even more intriguing in that it was 
not equally evident for other elective offices. Democrats did not dominate 
the Presidency or statewide offices to the same extent or with the same 
consistency that they dominated the House. 
Within the framework of competitive two-party politics, a dominant 
or majority party is common. Party competition is rarely balanced per­
fectly. The majority party in the electorate usually is more successful than 
the minority party in races up and down the ticket. It is reasonable to 
expect that a majority party successful in seeking House seats should 
have about the same measure of success in running for the White House, 
the Senate, governorships, and state legislative seats. However, this was 
not the case over the past 40 years. Democrats were not equally successful 
in getting elected to all offices. To be sure, the Democrats over the past 
four decades were quite successful in seeking all offices other than the 
presidency, but they had no greater nor any more consistent success than 
in the House. The question is why? Why were Democrats particularly 
successful in electing a majority of the House? We should first review 
the record. 
Competition for the Presidency 
Democrats were not nearly as successful in presidential elections as they 
were in House elections. In fact, they occupied the White House for only 
14 of the 40 years in which they continuously controlled the House. From 
one perspective, presidential elections have been quite competitive. The 
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Table 2.3 
The Democratic Party's Success in Presidential Elections, 1956-1992 
Percentage of the Two-Party 
Presidential Popular Vote 
Year for the Democratic Candidate 
1956 42.25 
1960 50.09 
1964 61.34 
1968 49.59 
1972 38.21 
1976 51.07 
1980 44.71 
1984 40.83 
1988 46.06 
1992 53.40 
Mean 47.76 
Nonmajorities 6 (60%) 
55% or Less 9 (90%) 
Source: Computed from Congressional Quarterly's Guide to U.S. Elections, 2d ed. 
(1985). 
Note: Democratic vote minorities are indicated in bold. 
popular vote record is displayed in table 2.3. As the table shows, the 1960, 
1968, and 1976 elections were all narrowly decided in the popular vote. 
Moreover, while there have been landslide victories, neither party had a 
monopoly of lopsided victories. On the Republican side, Eisenhower won 
a solid victory over Stevenson in 1956 and Nixon won in a landslide over 
McGovern in 1972. On the Democratic side, Johnson defeated Goldwater 
by a wide margin in 1964. 
From another perspective, the parties have not been quite so com­
petitive in recent presidential elections. Over the past 25 years, Republi­
cans have had much more success than the Democrats in winning the 
White House. Beginning with the 1968 election, Republicans won five of 
seven presidential elections. Moreover, the two Republican presidential 
losses during that period were under unusual circumstances. In the post-
Watergate election of 1976, unelected Republican incumbent Gerald 
Ford only won the Republican nomination after a bitterly fought contest 
with Ronald Reagan and then very narrowly lost to Jimmy Carter, who 
as a southerner managed to carry most of the southern states crucial to a 
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Table 2.4 
The History of Divided Government, 1868-1994 
1868-1950 1952-1994 
Following 
Type of Election Divided Unified Divided Unified 
All Elections 26% 74 % 64% 36% 
(11) (31) (14) (8) 
Presidential Elections 10% 90% 55% 45  % 
(2) (19) (6) (5) 
Midterm Elections 43% 57% 73 % 27  % 
(9) (12) (8) (3) 
Note: The most prevalent result among a type of election in the historical period is 
indicated in boldface. Percentages are of elections (all, presidential year, or midterm) yield­
ing, respectively, either divided or unified government in the specified period of history. The 
number below the percentage is the actual number of elections in a given period resulting in 
divided or unified governments. 
Democratic victory. In 1992, Bill Clinton, another southern Democratic 
governor, defeated Republican incumbent George Bush, Bush was espe­
cially vulnerable, having presided over a sluggish economy, having re­
neged on his 1988 (read-my-lips) campaign pledge not to raise taxes, and 
having billionaire third-party populist candidate Ross Perot campaigning 
against him as well. 
Even with their 1976 and 1992 losses, the recent Republican record 
in presidential elections has been enviable. Indeed, prior to the 1992 
election, commentators often referred to the Republican "lock on the 
Electoral College." However, the Republican record in presidential elec­
tions was not even close to equaling the Democratic Party's record in 
House elections. Republican presidential victories are much less certain. 
Unlike Democratic victories in the House, Republican presidential victo­
ries were never taken for granted. Nonetheless, the fact that Republicans 
have been so successful in presidential elections makes the Democratic 
record in House elections even more of a curiosity. 
The disparity of Democratic success in House and presidential elec­
tions has greatly increased the incidence of divided government. The fre­
quency of divided and unified governments resulting from elections 
between 1868 and 1950 and from 1952 to 1994 are presented in table 
2.4 for all elections, on-year or presidential elections, and midterm elec­
tions. As the table indicates, once the exception, divided government is 
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now the rule. From the end of the Civil War until the early 1950s, the 
party winning the presidency usually also won a majority of seats in both 
houses of Congress. Only about a quarter of the elections between 1868 
and 1950 resulted in divided government. Moreover, presidential elec­
tions rarely produced divided government. Only 1 in 10 on-year elections 
during this period yielded divided results.3 The results of elections since 
1950 stand in stark contrast. Nearly two-thirds of elections from 1952 to 
1994 produced divided government. The pattern is even stronger in the 
most recent elections. Since 1968, 11 of the last 14 elections (79 percent) 
resulted in divided government.4 Although the consequences of this 
change are still not clear (Mayhew, 1991; Thurber, 1991; Fiorina, 1992a; 
Cox and Kernell, 1991), the ramifications of divided government are 
generally thought to be both substantial and detrimental to the proper 
functioning of the government (Burns, 1967; Cutler, 1986, 1987; Sund­
quist, 1987, 1988; Mezey, 1989). 
Democratic Strength in Statewide Offices 
Democrats have been much more successful in elections below the presi­
dential level. In elections to both Senate seats and governorships, the two 
major elected statewide offices, Democrats were quite successful over the 
past four decades. However, despite this strong record, Democrats did 
not have quite the same degree and consistency of success in Senate and 
gubernatorial races that they had in House elections. The Democratic 
record in the Senate and in governorships is presented in table 2.5. 
The Democratic record in Senate and House elections can be com­
pared in two ways. One is to examine how often the party has held a 
majority of seats during the past 40 years. House Democrats held solid 
majorities for 40 consecutive years. In the Senate, Democrats held a ma­
jority from 1954 to 1978, an impressive tenure. In 1980 Democrats lost 
control of the Senate and did not regain it until the 1986 election. Al­
though six years of Republican control in 40 years may not seem like a 
great deal of time, it is six more than enjoyed by House Republicans, who 
did not come even close to gaining a majority in this period. 
Democratic success in House and Senate elections may also be com­
pared using the percentage of election victories in Senate seats at stake 
in each election year. Again, while Democrats were successful in Senate 
elections, they were less successful in Senate elections than in House 
races. In the House, Democrats carried a majority of seats in 20 consecu­
tive election years. In the Senate, Democrats carried a majority of seats 
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Table 2.5 
The Democratic Party's Electoral Success in 
Major Statewide Offices, 1954-1992 
Percentage of Seats Wonor Held by Democrats

U.S. Senate Governorships

Year Held Won Held Won

1954 51 64 56 58

1956 51 51 58 58

1958 65 79 71 78

1960 64 63 68 58

1962 67 64 68 62

1964 68 80 66 70

1966 64 49 50 38

1968 58 53 38 42

1970 55 66 58 59

1972 57 49 62 65

1974 62 71 73 78

1976 62 67 76 71

1978 59 43 64 58

1980 46 35 54 50

1982 46 61 68 74

1984 47 49 68 50

1986 55 59 52 53

1988 55 58 56 53

1990 56 53 58 56

1992 57 50 60 67

Mean 57.3 58.2 61.2 59.9

Nonmajorities 3(15%) 5 (25%) 2(10%) 4 (20%)

55% or Less 8 (40%) 9 (46%) 4 (20%) 6 (30%)

Sources: Computed from Ornstein et al. (1992), ABC News' The '88 Vote (1989), and 
Congressional Quarterly's Guide to U.S. Elections, 2d ed. (1985), and the Statistical Abstract 
of the United States (1991). 
Note: Democratic minorities are indicated in bold. The percentage of seats "Held" by 
Democrats is the two-party proportion of all seats occupied by Democrats after the election, 
whether or not those seats had been up for election in that year. The percentage of seats 
"Won" is the two-party percentage of all seats up for election in that year that were won by 
Democrats. The few odd-year gubernatorial elections were included in the subsequent even-
year percentages. 
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in 15 of the 20 years, losing a majority of seats at stake on five occasions 
(1966, 1972, 1978, 1980, and 1984). In another two election years, Demo­
crats just barely won a majority of seats that were at stake (1968 and 
1990). In these two years, Democrats carried a smaller share of Senate 
seats than in their poorest performance in House elections over this pe­
riod. The bottom line is this: although the Democratic Party's recent rec­
ord in Senate elections is strong, it did not dominate the Senate to the 
same extent or with the same consistency that it dominated the House. 
In most elections, it was "thinkable" that the Republicans could win a 
majority of Senate contests and assemble a majority of seats to obtain 
control of the Senate. 
The Democratic electoral record for governorships is similar to the 
Senate record. As in Senate elections, Democrats were quite successful 
in gubernatorial elections. Likewise, Democratic success in gubernatorial 
elections, though impressive, did not quite match their success in House 
elections- Because governorships are of varying terms and since different 
states schedule gubernatorial elections in different years, the Democrats' 
record in governorships can be examined in terms of the numbers they 
held at any point in time or the number that they won of those up for 
election in an election year. As table 2.5 shows, from 1954 to 1992, Demo­
crats only failed to occupy a majority of governorships for a single two-
year period (1968-69) and equaled Republican numbers in a second 
two-year period (1966-67). In 36 of the 40 years from 1954 to 1994, 
Democrats occupied a clear majority of statehouses. 
The Democratic success rate in gubernatorial elections is also im­
pressive. They won a clear majority of statehouses up for election in 16 
of the past 20 election years. Moreover, in two of the four elections in 
which they did not win a clear majority of gubernatorial elections (1980 
and 1984), Democrats and Republicans tied in their number of victories. 
Republicans were able to win a clear majority of gubernatorial elections 
in only 1966 and 1968. As in the Senate, Democrats were quite successful 
in governorships. Republican majorities were infrequent. Nevertheless, 
even this limited success surpassed the abysmal Republican record in 
House elections. 
Democratic Dominance of State Legislatures 
The Democratic record in state legislatures comes closest to equaling 
their House record. Table 2.6 presents the percentages of states with 
Democratic majorities in the lower and upper chambers of state legisla­
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Table 2.6 
The Democratic Party's Electoral Success in State Legislatures, 1954-1992 
Partisan Majorities in State Legislative Chambers 
Upper Chambers Lower Chambers 
Percent Percent 
Year Dem. Rep. Democratic Dem. Rep. Democratic 
1954 20 25 44 25 21 54 
1956 23 21 52 26 20 57 
1958 31 17 65 39 8 83 
1960 29 18 62 31 17 65 
1962 28 19 60 28 19 60 
1964 35 11 76 39 9 82 
1966 30 17 64 25 23 52 
1968 25 23 52 23 24 49 
1970 27 19 59 28 20 58 
1972 29 19 60 31 17 65 
1974 39 8 83 41 8 84 
1976 38 9 81 40 8 83 
1978 34 14 71 34 13 72 
1980 31 18 63 32 17 65 
1982 34 15 69 39 10 80 
1984 32 16 67 32 16 67 
1986 31 16 66 35 13 73 
1988 32 17 65 36 12 75 
1990 34 12 74 39 10 80 
1992 31 16 66 36 12 75 
Mean 30.7 16.5 65 33.0 14.9 69 
Nonmajorities 1 (5%) 1 (5%) 
55% or Less 3(15%) 3(15%) 
Sources: Computed from various volumes of The Book of the States, Congressional 
Quarterly Weekly Reports, and the Statistical Abstract of the United States. 
Note: Democratic minorities are indicated in bold. The number of legislatures do not 
total to 50 in each year, since Alaska and Hawaii elected their first legislatures as states in 
1958, Nebraska has a nonpartisan unicameral legislature, Minnesota also had a nonpartisan 
state legislature until the 1972 election, and, in several years, one or more legislatures were 
evenly divided between the parties. 
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tures. Democrats held control in a majority of upper houses of state legis­
latures following 19 of the 20 elections from 1954 to 1992. Prior to 1994, 
the last time that Republicans held a majority of upper chambers fol­
lowed the 1954 election. In 1954, Republicans controlled 25 of the 45 
upper houses in partisan state legislatures. In light of the fact that this 
election was before the one-person, one-vote court ruling requiring 
equally populated districts and that a number of these chambers had 
been elected in 1952 and were elected to four-year terms, one could easily 
conclude that since 1954, Democratic success in upper chambers of state 
legislatures was every bit as consistent as their success in the House of 
Representatives. 
Democrats dominated the lower chamber of state legislatures with 
almost the same consistency that they dominated the House. They con­
trolled a clear majority of lower chambers of state legislatures following 
19 of the 20 elections in which Democrats controlled the House. Republi­
cans came close to controlling a majority of state legislatures in 1966 and 
controlled a bare majority of chambers following the 1968 elections. If 
Democrats had won control of one additional lower chamber in 1968, 
their record of success at this level would have been as perfectly consistent 
as it was in the House of Representatives.5 
The Records Compared 
The record of the Democratic Party across the range of major offices re­
veals both interesting similarities and differences with their record of con­
sistent and substantial victories in the House. In comparing the record of 
consecutive Democratic majorities in the House from 1954 to 1992 to the 
party's record in other offices (see table 2.7), there is some order. Demo­
crats were least successful in running for the sole national office, the pres-
idency.6 For offices that require statewide votes (the U.S. Senate and 
governorships), they were more successful, though not as successful as 
they were in the House. Democrats were most successful in running for 
offices in which votes are cast within districts within the states—for the 
House of Representatives and for both the upper and lower chambers of 
state legislatures. This pattern has also been noted by Fiorina, who ob­
serves that "a large element in the increased incidence of divided govern-
ment—both nationally and in the states—is the decline in Republican 
legislative strength" (1992a, 58).7 
The similarities and differences in the consistency with which Dem­
ocrats have dominated different offices suggests why they were successful 
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Table 2.7 
Democratic Control of Various Offices, 1954-1992 
Degree of Democratic 
Level of Voting Office Party Success 
National The Presidency Moderate 
Statewide U.S. Senate, Governorships Great 
District U.S. House of Representatives, Upper Perfect or Near Perfect 
Chamber and Lower Chamber of 
State Legislature 
Note: Voting for the presidency might also be interpreted as occuring at the state level, 
because of the Electoral College. However, since each state as an electoral unit is not 
counted equally (as are states in senate and gubernatorial contests) and the candidates are 
common to all states, it may be more appropriate to treat presidential elections as a quasi-
national election. 
in general and why they dominated the House in particular. In view of 
the similarity of Democratic records for the two statewide offices (the Sen­
ate and governorships), the similarity of the records for districted offices 
(the House and state legislative offices), and the order of differences 
among the three levels, it is clear that Democrats have had an advantage 
in running for offices from smaller electoral districts. They have been 
more consistently successful in seeking districted offices. 
Why have Democrats been more successful in running for these 
more localized or districted offices? Several reasons are possible.8 Demo­
crats may be better at delivering government benefits to local areas. Their 
philosophy of government and their longtime control of the levers of 
governmental power may have helped them "bring home the bacon." 
Their more progovernment philosophy may have made it easier to coax 
competent potential candidates into running (Ehrenhalt, 1991), and this 
may have been especially important at lower levels of office, where the 
rewards for running are smaller and the pool of potential candidates not 
so well established. 
The thesis proposed here is that Democrats do particularly well in 
districted offices because the organization of votes into districts helps 
Democrats running for the House and state legislatures by allowing them 
to win in districts with relatively few votes. This is an advantage that Dem­
ocrats running in statewide and national races do not have. Compared to 
Republicans, Democratic House candidates tend to win in lower-turnout 
areas. Since Democrats have traditionally done well among lower socio­
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economic groups and since lower socioeconomic characteristics are 
strongly correlated with nonvoting, lower socioeconomic districts tend 
to elect Democrats, sometimes by large vote percentages but still with a 
relatively small number of actual votes because of the lower district turn­
out. As a result, compared to the Republican vote, the Democratic vote 
for the House is divided among districts in such a way that it elects more 
Democrats. Because House and state legislative elections are decided en­
tirely by the vote within particular districts, the fate of these candidates is 
not directly affected by the size of the district turnout.9 It only matters 
that a candidate receive more votes than any of his or her competitors, 
whether the "more" is of a huge number or a small number of voters. If 
votes for an office only matter within the confines of a district, the fact 
that turnout is low in the district and the party's winning candidate re­
ceives fewer actual votes than the winning candidates in other districts 
does not matter. 
While all that matters to House candidates is that they receive a 
plurality of the district vote, regardless of district turnout; this is not all 
that matters to candidates running for higher office. At the state level, 
where governors and senators are elected and where Electoral College 
votes for president are decided, congressional (or state legislative) district 
boundaries do not matter, and they do not limit the impact of low turnout 
on the aggregate vote. Governors and senators are decided by how many 
votes the candidates receive, not by how many congressional districts they 
carry. Thus, unlike a party's House candidates (or its state legislative 
candidates), it matters greatly to a party's presidential, senatorial, and 
gubernatorial candidates whether turnout is high or low in the party's 
stronghold districts.10 
This district-turnout explanation may explain more than why Dem­
ocratic House candidates (and state legislative) outperformed Democratic 
candidates for higher offices. It may also help to explain why Democrats 
dominated the House for so long. It suggests that there has been a Dem­
ocratic tilt to the House electoral system. This tilt has been based on Dem­
ocrats winning a disproportionate number of low-turnout districts. 
Because of the low turnout in these districts, Democrats have expended 
relatively few votes to win these cheap seats. The theory of cheap seats 
will be more fully elaborated shortly. 
The Electoral System and the Democratic Majority 
The Democratic record in House elections from 1954 to 1992 is certainly 
impressive. However, the record of Democratic victories does not per­
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Table 2.8 
The Overrepresentatlon of the Democratic House Vote, 1954-1992 
Democratic Vote Democratic Seat 
Election Percentage Percentage Difference 
1954 52.8 53.3 +.6 
1956 51.2 53.8 H-2.6 
1958 56.7 64.9 +8.2 
1960 55.1 60.0 +4.8 
1962 52.9 59.4 +6.6 
1964 57.8 67.8 +10.0 
1966 51.4 57.0 +5.6 
1968 51.0 55.9 +4.9 
1970 54.7 58.6 +3.9 
1972 53.2 55.8 +2.6 
1974 59.2 66.9 +7.7 
1976 57.4 67.1 +9.7 
1978 54.8 63.7 +8.9 
1980 51.5 55.9 +4.4 
1982 56.4 61.8 +5.2 
1984 52.5 58.2 +5.6 
1986 55.0 59.3 +4.4 
1988 54.2 59.8 +5.6 
1990 53.3 61.5 +8.1 
1992 53.1 59.4 +6.4 
Mean 54.2 60.0 +5.8 
Note: The Democratic vote percentages were calculated from volumes of The Statisti­
cal Abstract of the United States, with corrections being made for the inclusion of the District 
of Columbia, not counting Liberal Party votes for Democratic Party candidates in New York 
before 1960, estimates of turnout in uncontested districts in states in which that turnout is 
not reported, and several other minor discrepancies. Note that the actual vote calculated 
here is usually slightly more Democratic (a mean difference of about three-tenths of a per­
centage point more Democratic) than that reported by Omstein et al. (1990, table 2-2). 
fectly reflect the Democrats' success in attracting votes. The Democratic 
Party's share of votes for the House is smaller than its share of seats. Table 
2.8 presents for comparison the percentages of both votes and seats won 
by Democratic House candidates. 
As the table demonstrates, while Democrats have won a majority of 
votes, as well as seats, in each of the 20 elections from 1954 to 1992, their 
share of seats in each of these elections has consistently been larger than 
their share of votes. Over this period, the Democratic share of votes has 
ranged from a low of 51 percent in Eisenhower's 1956 reelection to a 
high of 58.5 percent in the post-Watergate election of 1974. Over the 
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same period, Democrats never occupied fewer than 53.3 percent of the 
seats (1954) and after the Johnson landslide of 1964 held 67.8 percent of 
the seats. Although they never received as much as 60 percent of the 
votes for the House in any election in the past 40 years, they held 60 
percent or more of the seats following 8 of the 20 elections of the Demo­
cratic dynasty. 
In a plurality-rule, single-member-district electoral system, such as 
that used to elect most House members, the party winning a majority of 
the national vote normally wins an even larger share of legislative seats.11 
Under the plurality-rule system, unlike various proportional representa­
tion methods, the party with a plurality of votes systematically receives an 
even larger proportion of seats. This is a long acknowledged characteris­
tic of the plurality system, originally dubbed "the cube law"—the ratio of 
seats split between two parties supposedly being a cubic function of the 
ratio of votes between the parties. While modern analysis indicates that 
the "cube law" is not a hard and fast law and that the precise translation 
of votes to seats (including how many seats each party could expect with 
50 percent of the vote) varies from one plurality-rule electoral system to 
another, these sophisticated analyses have supported the cube law's gen­
eral description of the S-shaped relation between a party's proportion of 
seats and its proportion of votes (Rae, 1971; Tufte, 1973; Taagepera and 
Shugart, 1989, 166). 
The cube-law description of the relationship between seats and 
votes is depicted by the S-curve shape in figure 2.1. The curve is in con­
trast to the diagonal, which reflects a system of perfect proportional rep­
resentation in which parties receive the same share of seats as their share 
of votes. The steepness of the slope in the middle of the vote distribution 
reflects the responsiveness of the electoral system. Responsiveness refers to 
the expected change in a party's share of seats from a specified change 
in votes. Plurality-rule systems, compared to proportional representation 
systems, are very responsive. For example, a 10 percentage point gain in 
the vote for a party (from 50 percent to 60 percent) would produce an 
equivalent 10 percentage point seat gain in a perfectly proportional rep­
resentation system but would produce a much larger (27 percent) change 
in a plurality-rule system (assuming the cube-law relationship). Note that 
the responsiveness of the electoral system is symmetric between the par­
ties. In the above example, whether the Democrats or the Republicans 
were the party in question, either would benefit equally by being the 
majority vote-getting party in the plurality-rule system and either would 
suffer equally by being the minority vote-getting party. 
THE DEMOCRATIC RECORD • 37

Plurality Suigle-Membcr-District System 
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Figure 2.1 
The Relationship between Seats and Votes in Plurality and Proportional Represen­
tation Electoral Systems 
Why is the plurality-rule system responsive? Why does it overrepre­
sent the party with the most votes? We will address this question more 
fully in chapter 4, but, for now, the plurality-rule system overrepresents 
the stronger party because it causes the minority vote-getting party to 
waste a larger portion of its vote in losing candidacies. A majority party 
does not waste many of its votes. It can even win in districts in which it 
receives less than its average vote percentage. The minority party, on the 
other hand, not only receives fewer votes but wastes many of those that 
they do receive. The minority vote party can even lose (and thereby 
wastes votes) in districts in which its vote percentage actually exceeds its 
average vote percentage. Thus, a minority party wastes votes on losing 
candidates because it wastes votes in districts where its vote falls short of 
its average plus some districts where its vote actually exceeds its average, 
only not by enough to establish a plurality. 
For instance, what would happen if Democrats received 57 percent 
of the national vote and the Republicans received 43 percent? If the vote 
were uniformly distributed across all districts in the country, Democrats 
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would win all of the districts. No votes cast for Democrats would have 
been wasted (they all would have won some representation), and all votes 
cast for Republicans would have been wasted (they would not have re­
ceived any representation). But because of all of the sociological bases of 
the vote, the national vote is not distributed evenly. Each party has pock­
ets of strength and areas of weakness. With 43 percent of the vote nation­
wide, Republicans would waste votes in any district in which it received 
43 percent of the vote or less, but would also waste votes in districts in 
which it performed better than its typical showing but not enough better 
to achieve a majority. Assuming some variation in the distribution of the 
Democratic vote, Democrats would only waste votes in districts in which 
they did much more poorly than their national average. Votes for Demo­
crats would only be wasted where a Democratic district vote percentage 
falls a full 7 percentage points below its national average of 57 percent. 
As a result, the plurality-rule system provides many more opportunities 
for the minority party to waste its votes, and this produces system 
responsiveness. 
The responsiveness of the plurality-rule electoral system is one rea­
son why Democrats were overrepresented or received a larger share of 
seats than votes; however, it is not the only possible means by which a 
party can be overrepresented. The electoral system can also be biased in 
favor of a party. The nature and causes of partisan bias in an electoral 
system will be explored in some detail in chapter 4. However, we should 
note at this point that bias in an electoral system is operationally defined 
as the proportion of seats above or below 50 percent when parties (in a 
two-party system) receive an equal number of votes. In an unbiased sys­
tem, each party should receive 50 percent of the seats when it receives 50 
percent of the votes. In a biased system, if both parties received the same 
vote, one party would win a larger share of seats. By definition, a biased 
electoral system is asymmetric in its treatment of the parties.12 
While the responsiveness of an electoral system is produced by the 
minority party wasting a larger share of its votes on losing candidates, 
electoral system bias appears when the average winning candidate of one 
party receives more votes than the average winning candidate of the op­
position party. A party is favored in an electoral system when it expends 
fewer votes in its victories than its opposition expends in its successful 
candidacies. Given a constant number of unwasted votes (votes not 
wasted in losing causes), a party would rather spend fewer, rather than 
more, votes per victory. As the analysis in later chapters will show, bias in 
the electoral system is one reason that Democrats win a larger share of 
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seats than votes, and this may have contributed to the longevity of the 
Democratic House majority. The single-member-district, plurality-rule 
electoral system, the way in which votes are counted to award seats to 
the parties, is biased in favor of the Democratic Party, and this helped 
Democrats maintain their majority in the House of Representatives (and 
also in most state legislatures). 
• The Cheap-Seats Thesis • 
How were Democrats able to maintain their large majorities in the House 
for so many years? There are several plausible explanations. Democratic 
majorities certainly could not have survived without a good deal of public 
support for Democratic candidates in general. Democrats were, indeed, 
the more popular party. Moreover, increased ticket splitting in the late 
1960s allowed Democratic congressional candidates to protect their vote 
majorities against national political tides often favoring Republicans and 
electing several Republican presidents. However, the vote majorities that 
the electorate provided for Democrats may be only part of the explana­
tion for the Democratic Party's long-term dominance of the House. Dem­
ocrats may have become entrenched as the House majority whether or 
not voters really wanted them to. The electoral system and the lack of a 
real choice for many voters also contributed to the Democratic dynasty. 
The argument advanced here is this: the Democratic Party has been par­
ticularly and continuously successful in House elections in part because the electoral 
system (owing to a constellation of interrelated political, social, economic, and geo­
graphic conditions) is biased in its favor. Democrats maintained a House dy­
nasty not only because of the number of voters casting Democratic ballots 
but also because of the distribution of its votes around the nation. The 
organization of its votes into a particular arrangement of congressional 
districts was critical to the maintenance of the Democratic majority. The 
electoral system favored Democrats because the party was able to extend 
the "purchasing power" of its votes over a larger number of seats. It was 
able to do this because it won a disproportionate share of very-low-
turnout seats, the cheap seats. The evidence in the following chapters 
will show that Democratic victories in these low-turnout districts were a 
consistent feature of elections over the past 40 years. Even in 1994, when 
Republicans finally ended the Democratic reign of the House, Democrats 
won a large portion of the low-turnout districts and this buffered their 
losses. As a result of Democrats prevailing in low-turnout districts, 
the average number of votes for winning Democratic congressional 
40 • CHAPTER 2 
candidates falls well below that for Republican winners. Consequently, if 
Democratic and Republican candidates across the country received the 
same number of votes, Democrats would win a significantly greater num­
ber of seats. 
There are several possible reasons for a Democratic cheap-seats bias 
in the electoral system, but the most plausible involves the conjunction of 
five factors: 
1. the system of single-member, equal-population congressional 
districts; 
2. the socioeconomic basis of the Democratic and Republican 
coalitions; 
3. the association of socioeconomic class with turnout; 
4. the socioeconomic homogeneity of housing patterns; and 
5. the reflection of these neighborhoods in drawing district 
boundaries.13 
A critical condition for the cheap-seats thesis is the institution of 
the single-member, equal-population congressional district system. The 
single-member district system, though not a constitutional requirement, 
is the prevailing method for apportioning a state's allocated number 
of seats to the House. This has not always been the case. Multimember 
districts, in either the form of statewide at-large elections or separate 
multimember districts, were used by many states up until the 1840s (Con­
gressional Quarterly, 1985, 678). Multimember districts, in the form of 
statewide at-large districts sometimes layered over individual districts, 
were traditional arrangements in Connecticut (ending in 1960), Hawaii 
(1968), New Mexico (1966), North Dakota (1960), Texas (1958), and 
Washington (1956) and were often used in other states before the 1950s 
to select representatives until redistricting plans could be worked out. 
At-large districts in states having two or more representatives were pro­
hibited by federal statute in the late 1960s (Congressional Quarterly, 
1985, 693). 
The equal population characteristic of our electoral system was also 
not always the case. While the Constitution apportioned seats to the states 
according to their populations, it was silent on not only whether those 
seats had to be assigned to electoral districts (single or multimember) but, 
if districted, whether the population in the districts had to be equal. Sub­
stantial malapportionment was common through the 1960s. The Su­
preme Court declared malapportionment impermissible by extending 
THE DEMOCRATIC RECORD • 41 
the one-person, one-vote principle to congressional districting in their 
ruling in Wesberry v. Sanders in 1964 and reinforced this standard nearly 
20 years later in their ruling in the case of Karcher v. Daggett (Congres­
sional Quarterly, 1985, 696). While neither the single-member-district ar­
rangement nor the equal-district-population rule were original to the 
American electoral system, they are now political ground rules that are 
firmly in place and serve as the first ingredient in the cheap-seats thesis.14 
The second and third ingredients in the cheap-seats thesis are the 
characteristics of the Democratic and Republican coalitions and their re­
lation to turnout. Compared to the Republican coalition, the Democratic 
coalition has consisted of sociodemographic groups that do not turn out 
at high rates. Democrats have been more likely to be on the lower rungs 
of the socioeconomic ladder and also are more likely to be from southern 
states (Axelrod, 1972; Stanley et aL, 1986; Erikson et al, 1989). Less-
educated and lower-income citizens, as well as southerners, are less likely 
to vote (Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980). 
Most important from the standpoint of the cheap-seats thesis, the 
partisan characteristics associated with turnout are also associated with 
where people live and (because of the single-member-district system) 
where they vote. Poor and working-class citizens are likely to live in 
neighborhoods apart from middle- and upper-class citizens, who vote at 
higher rates. Neighborhoods are not perfectly homogeneous in terms of 
class, but most neighborhoods can be generally characterized as con­
sisting of poor or working-class or middle-class or wealthy residents. In 
light of the proximity of residents with similar characteristics (education, 
income, and regional location) related to both turnout and partisanship, 
combined with the tradition of creating congressional districts with some 
geographic compactness and contiguity, as well as observing community 
boundaries (Butler and Cain, 1992, 65), it does not require intricate ger­
rymandering to produce an electoral bias.15 Because the Democratic co­
alition contains low-turnout groups that are geographically concentrated, 
the equal population, single-member-district electoral system allows 
Democrats to win many low-turnout districts and thereby win more seats 
nationally than Republicans would have won with an equal number of 
votes. 
The particular argument posed here to explain a pro-Democratic 
electoral system bias in modern American congressional elections is an 
application of a larger proposition about bias in single-member-district, 
plurality-rule electoral systems. A more generalized form of the electoral 
system bias proposition can be stated as: single-member-district electoral 
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systems apportioned by population are biased in favor of parties representing lower 
socioeconomic groups.16 The logic of this proposition is that lower socioeco­
nomic groups turn out to vote at lower rates and that the single-member-
district electoral system reduces the partisan impact of this low turnout 
by confining its implications within the districts. 
A hypothetical case illustrates the point. Assume a homogeneous 
lower socioeconomic district and a homogeneous upper socioeconomic 
district (of equal size populations) in a party system based on a strong 
class cleavage. Further assume that voting-age citizens of the lower socio­
economic class turn out at significantly lower rates than do those who 
are better off. The electoral outcomes in these two districts will be one 
representative of the lower-class party and one representative of the 
upper-class party, regardless of the turnout in the two districts. Because 
of the district organization of the votes, the lower-socioeconomic-class 
party is not hurt at all by the low turnout of its adherents and the upper-
socioeconomic-class party is not helped at all by the higher turnout of its 
supporters. All that matters to electing the two representatives is the vote 
division within each district rather than the actual number of total or 
pooled votes for each party. 
The thesis can be stated in an even more general form: any party 
whose adherents have characteristics associated with low turnout and are geographi­
cally concentrated by these characteristics will benefit from a districting system that 
reflects these geographic concentrations.11 As previously stated, the pertinent 
characteristics were socioeconomic, but the logic holds regardless of the 
particular characteristic associated with partisan voting, turnout, and 
geographic concentration. So long as district boundaries are drawn with 
respect for established communities, with concern for geographic com­
pactness and contiguity, and without regard to normal turnout levels in 
the proposed districts, the single-member-district electoral system should 
favor the party with low-turnout characteristics that tend to be also con­
centrated geographically.18 The party of low-turnout characteristics will 
be advantaged by winning the cheap seats. 
From this discussion, it should be clear that the single-member-
district electoral system is not inevitably biased in favor of the Democrats. 
It is the combination of factors linking a characteristic of potential voters, 
in this case socioeconomic status, to turnout and to partisanship, and the 
geographic concentration of that characteristic so that it is reflected in 
differences among districts, that makes a single-member-district electo­
ral system biased. If socioeconomic status were uncorrelated with turn­
out, or with partisanship, or with housing patterns, or if districts were 
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drawn in such a way that there were no aggregate socioeconomic differ­
ences among districts, then the single-member-district system would not 
generate electoral bias based on turnout differences.19 However, the 
cheap-seats thesis claims that in modern American politics all of these 
necessary ingredients are present and, as a consequence, the single-
member-district electoral system for the House is biased in favor of the 
Democratic Party. 
• Overview • 
The record of Democratic electoral success in the House from 1954 to 
1992 is impressive. The four-decade-long Democratic majority was im­
pressive, whether compared to the longevity of prior House majorities or 
to contemporary Democratic successes in other offices. The Democratic 
House majority over the 40 years preceding its collapse in 1994 was un­
precedented historically, sizable by any standard, and resilient to a variety 
of countervailing conditions. 
One perspective on the Democratic House majority set it in the con­
text of the party's success in seeking other political offices over this era. 
Democrats were quite successful, pretty much across the board. They 
won a majority of elections for most offices throughout this period. From 
Senate seats to governorships to state senate and state house seats, Demo­
crats usually won a majority of elections. The glaring exception to this 
Democratic ascendancy was the White House. In presidential elections, 
Republicans held their own with the Democrats. Some went so far as 
to claim that Republicans had an "electoral lock" on the White House. 
Barring unusual circumstances, such as the emergence of populist 
third-party candidates (such as Ross Perot) or scandals on the order of 
Watergate, Republicans seem to have had a clear edge in presidential 
elections (Will, 1988). 
Less obvious, but more telling, was the variation in Democratic suc­
cess below the presidential level. Democrats were most consistently suc­
cessful in seeking offices that represented districts rather than entire 
states. The success of Democrats in state legislative elections comes close 
to matching their impressive record in House races. While very successful 
in Senate and gubernatorial elections, the Democratic record in these 
races falls short of the party's near perfect record of majorities in the 
House and state legislatures over the past 40 years. The pattern is telling. 
These comparisons provide a clue to determining why Democrats domi­
nated the House of Representatives. There appears to be something 
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about districted offices that helps the chances of Democrats being elected 
and hurts the prospects of Republican victories. This brings us to the 
third point of the chapter. 
What is it about districted offices that helps Democrats? It may be 
that districting provides the party with an opportunity to win a number 
of cheap seats. Because of demographic links between partisanship, turn­
out, and district boundaries, Democrats regularly win many seats with 
relatively small numbers of votes, at bargain-basement prices (in terms of 
votes spent for a victory). Because of this, Democrats acquire more seats 
per vote than Republicans. Put differently, because of the system of con­
gressional districts and the nature of the two parties' coalitions, the elec­
toral system has been biased in favor of the Democrats. This thesis will be 
investigated at length in the following chapters. However, other explana­
tions have also been offered for the Democratic dynasty, and we now turn 
to them. 
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Voters, Parties, and

Candidates

.ow did Democrats dominate the House of Representatives for so 
many years? How did they preserve their majority through so many elec­
tions in an otherwise competitive two-party system? Party leaders had 
their ideas about this. As one might expect, Democrats and Republicans 
did not see eye to eye. Many Republicans thought that the system was 
rigged to give Democrats, especially Democratic incumbents, an advan-
tage.1 Through a combination of shameless partisan gerrymandering and 
the crafty exploitation of incumbency perquisites, including everything 
from pandering to constituents through pork-barrel politics to stuffing 
campaign coffers with PAC money to abusing the franking privilege by 
running permanent taxpayer-financed campaigns, Republicans figured 
Democrats overwhelmed and undermined the democratic electoral pro­
cess. By whatever mix of shenanigans, Republicans figured that "the fix 
was in." 
Democrats had a quite different interpretation. Many regarded 
their continuing majority as testimony to the Democratic Party's success­
ful representation of the American public. Voters filled the House with 
Democrats election after election because Democrats were more sensitive 
to the concerns of the average voter. Republicans were responsive to the 
monied interests, the "fat cats," while Democrats responded to the needs 
of the average working guy, and this was reflected at the polls—at least 
as the Democrats saw it. 
Like the debate among politicians, the explanations offered by polit­
ical scholars who addressed the subject differ on one central question: 
Did the Democratic Party's extended control of the House reflect the will 
of the voters?2 At one end of the spectrum are explanations that trace the 
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Democratic dynasty directly to the voters (recall figure 1.2). At the other 
end are claims that the Democratic majority was not so much a product 
of voters freely voting Democrats into office as a political system that 
made the survival of the Democratic majority all but inevitable. Still other 
theories occupy a middle ground, claiming that the Democratic majority 
was a result of both voters favoring Democrats and a political context that 
enhanced the prospects of a Democratic House.3 
The intentional explanations for the era of Democratic dominance, the 
first set of theories, claim that the long tenure of the Democratic majority 
reflected the will of the voters working through the democratic process. 
A majority of voters, year in and year out, chose a majority of Democratic 
House candidates in fair and competitive elections. A number of reasons 
have been advanced to explain why voters sent Democrats to the House, 
but all boil down to this: Democrats controlled the House because the 
American voters wanted it that way. The Democratic House resulted from 
the democratic system working as intended. 
Other theories claim quite the opposite, that the Democratic dy­
nasty was the result of a breakdown in democracy. The Democratic ma­
jority was not in place so long because citizens wanted it that way but 
because the arrangements of the electoral system made it a foregone con­
clusion. The Democratic dynasty was an artifact of the electoral system 
and not a reflection of the public's will. At the most extreme is the claim 
that the electoral system was consciously rigged, through the gerryman­
dering of congressional district lines, to subvert the will of the people in 
order to keep Democrats in power. In a more charitable vein, the elec­
toral system may have naturally worked to the advantage of a party under 
certain conditions and the Democratic Party just happened to have the 
necessary characteristics. The Democratic advantage may simply have 
been an unintended consequence of the electoral system. No rigging was 
required. From either perspective, these institutional explanations of the 
Democratic dynasty differ greatly from the intentional explanations. The 
Democrats were not an entrenched majority in the House because voters 
wanted it that way. Democrats controlled the House because the electoral 
system installed them in the majority, regardless of whether the electorate 
wanted them in control or not. In short, Democracy (as in, rule by the 
Democrats) was at the expense of democracy. 
Who or what was responsible for the Democratic dynasty? The first 
set of theories says that the voters were responsible. The second claims 
that the political system was responsible. There are still other possible 
culprits or heroes (depending on your point of view). Contextual explana­
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tions claim that characteristics of the candidates tilted the process toward 
the Democrats. Strictly speaking, the Democrats were in the majority be­
cause a majority of the electorate decided to vote for congressional Demo­
crats, but these vote decisions were steered toward the Democrats. For 
instance, a voter may have to decide between an incumbent Democratic 
representative who has lavished government largess on constituents and 
an inexperienced Republican challenger running an underfunded cam­
paign. If the voter opts to return the Democrat to office and thereby 
helps to renew the Democratic majority in the House, in one sense the 
Democratic majority is a product of the electorate's decision. But that is 
only part of the story. The voter, in this instance, has not been offered a 
full and fair choice between the parties. If the Republican candidate had 
enjoyed the same kind of government and campaign resources as the 
Democratic incumbent, if the campaign were conducted on a level play­
ing field, perhaps voters would have decided differently. 
While it is possible that a single explanation accounts for the sus­
tained Democratic majority, it seems more likely that the Democratic dy­
nasty was a result of a mix of several causes. There is no reason to assume 
that the Democrats attained their record by only one route or to think 
that the suggested causes are mutually exclusive. Although the principal 
point of this book is that there were substantial institutional reasons for 
the Democratic majority, it is also quite possible that there is merit also to 
the intentional and contextual explanations. 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine these noninstitutional 
explanations. The intentional explanations trace the Democratic majority 
to a single source, the voters. Voters, according to this explanation, either 
simply wanted Democrats in office or were especially interested in having 
Democrats in Congress. The principal contextual explanation traces the 
Democratic majority to congressional candidates. According to this expla­
nation, while the Democratic seat majority was based on its vote majority, 
that vote majority was not simply the expression of the free will of voters 
choosing between the parties' congressional candidates in a fair cam­
paign. We turn first to the voters and the parties as possible contributors 
to the Democratic dynasty. 
• Voters and Parties • 
Although there is controversy about what sustained the Democratic ma­
jority, one central fact is indisputable: Democratic congressional candi­
dates won a majority of votes cast in each congressional election from 
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The Democratic Congressional Vote, 1954-1992 
Note: The Democratic congressional vote is the percentage of the two-party vote. See the 
note to table 2.8 
1954 to 1992. As Fiorina observed prior to the 1994 election, Republicans 
"should not win a majority of House seats because they do not receive a 
majority of House votes" (1992a, 16). The congressional two-party vote 
percentage cast for Democratic candidates in elections over this period is 
charted in figure 3.1. The Democratic congressional vote in elections 
during this period typically fluctuated around 54 percent and never 
dipped below 50 percent. There is little question that Democratic 
congressional voters were the foundation for the Democratic dynasty. 
However, the Democratic vote may not be the whole story behind the 
Democratic seat majority. 
The Voice of the People 
From one perspective, the consistent success of Democratic congressional 
candidates in winning the support of a majority of voters from 1954 to 
1992 should not be surprising. Democrats consistently outnumbered Re­
publicans among those identifying with a political party during this 
period. On average, Democratic Party identifiers constituted about 53 
percent of the voting public (ranging from approximately 48 to 60 per­
cent), while about 37 percent of voters identified with the Republicans 
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(ranging from approximately 34 to 45 percent).4 With professed Demo­
crats outnumbering Republicans in each election (typically by almost a 
three-to-two margin), and with the inclination of partisans to support 
their own (even though defection rates have been higher among Demo­
crats), a consistent Democratic majority in the congressional vote might 
well be expected. 
This simple explanation of Democratic dominance, however, does 
not explain the disparity of Democratic success in seeking different of­
fices. If the public was so generally disposed to support Democrats, why 
did Democrats not have the same lock on the White House and the Sen­
ate that they had on the House? Why did Democrats more consistently 
win a majority of votes in House races than for elections for other offices? 
One reason may be the composition of the parties' coalitions. The Demo­
cratic coalition may be better suited to running in local rather than 
national contests. Tensions exist within all coalitions, but they have tradi­
tionally been greater within the more diverse Democratic coalition than 
among Republicans.5 Poking fun at the many divisions and routine tur­
moil within the Democratic Party, humorist Will Rogers said, "I belong 
to no organized political party—I am a Democrat" (Henning, 1992, 65). 
One persistent point of division within the Democratic coalition has been 
the inclusion of both generally liberal minority groups and generally con­
servative white southerners. Within congressional districts, however, this 
tension is often greatly reduced. In predominantly minority districts, 
Democratic candidates can tailor their appeals to the more liberal constit­
uency. In predominantly white southern suburban districts, Democrats 
can stake out a more moderate or conservative stance. In seeking higher 
office with a broader constituency, the intraparty tensions are less often 
defined away by district lines. Appeals to one part of the Democratic con­
stituency made in statewide or national races may cost candidates support 
from other constituencies within the party. These unavoidable tradeoffs 
in dealing with the Democratic coalition across district boundaries are 
likely to be more severe than those faced within less heterogeneous dis­
tricts, an advantage for House Democratic candidates.6 
It may also be the case that some voters have been more receptive 
to Democratic candidates for Congress than for other offices.7 A number 
of reasons have been advanced for why a small but strategically important 
minority of voters split their tickets to vote for Democratic congressional 
candidates (Alesina and Rosenthal, 1989, 1995; Jacobson, 1990, chap. 6; 
Fiorina, 1992a, 64-82, 1992b, 1992c, 1994; Petrocik, 1991; and Ing­
berman and Villani, 1993). Some ticket splitters may be trying to obtain 
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moderate policies in voting for Democratic congressional candidates and 
Republican presidential candidates. Barone and Ujifusa (1987) and Ales-
ma and Rosenthal (1989, 1995) argue that these moderate split-ticket vot­
ers vote for congressional Democrats, who generally favor more liberal 
policies, to balance the more conservative inclinations of Republican pres­
idential candidates. Others may vote with the intention of creating politi­
cal gridlock. If voters distrust both political parties, they may want a 
Democratic Congress and a Republican president to keep each other in 
check (Fiorina, 1991). Jacobson (1990) offers a different motivation for 
split tickets, with the congressional vote going to the Democrat. He sug­
gests that the basis of these votes lies in the mutually exclusive policy 
preferences by some voters and the policy stands of the parties. Voters 
want government officials to say yes to their special or local interests 
(more likely from Democrats), while at the same time saying no to the 
special interests of others (more likely from Republicans).8 Congressional 
representation focuses on local interests, where voters want more govern­
ment largess. This is right up the Democratic alley. Presidential politics, 
on the other hand, tends to focus on broader interests, where voters often 
want more government restraint. This is better turf for Republicans (Pe­
trocik, 1991). Other factors might also come into play that would help to 
explain why Democratic congressional candidates as a group have fared 
so well, but the basic fact is that, for the 40-year period from 1954 to 
1994, they consistently fared well at the polls.9 
After reviewing the partisan congressional vote history, one might 
be tempted to say that the puzzle of the sustained Democratic congres­
sional majority is no puzzle at all. Democrats won a majority of seats year 
in and year out because they won a majority of votes year in and year 
out. Thus, the Democratic majority in the House reflected the will of the 
people. It is as simple as that. What is the mystery? 
A Desired Dynasty? 
There are a couple of catches to the argument that the Democratic major­
ity simply reflected the desires of the electorate. First, a majority vote for 
Democratic candidates does not necessarily indicate that a majority freely 
favored a Democratic majority in the House over a Republican majority. 
Democrats may have won a majority of votes because of votes influenced 
by reasons other than those involved in offering a fair choice between the 
parties. Democratic candidates may have received many votes for reasons 
entirely unrelated to the character, perspectives, and quality of its candi­
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A Democratic Dynasty

"n Tuesday, November 6, 1994, the politically unthinkable happened. 
The Republican Party won a majority of seats in the U.S. House of Repre­
sentatives, taking control of the House away from the Democrats for the 
first time in 40 years. Republicans gained 52 seats, the greatest midterm 
seat change in nearly half a century. Some called it a political earthquake. 
Others declared it a revolution. The 231 Republican representatives were 
13 more than necessary to end, dramatically and unexpectedly, what 
most had come to consider a permanent Democratic majority in the 
House. Everywhere, Republicans were jubilant, and Democrats stunned. 
It was little consolation to Democrats that the new Democratic minority 
was larger than any Republican minority in the prior four decades. The 
hard, cold fact remained: for the first time in 40 years, Democrats in the 
House were now in the minority. 
When Republicans had last held a majority in the House, Winston 
Churchill was prime minister of Great Britain, Nikita Khrushchev was 
still years away from becoming premier of the Soviet Union, the French 
had recently suffered defeat in Vietnam, there were only 48 states, the 
U.S. Senate was deciding whether to censure communist-hunting Sena­
tor Joe McCarthy, Tom Dewey was governor of the state of New York, 
Rocky Marciano was heavyweight boxing champion, Studebaker made 
automobiles, television was in black and white, Ronald Reagan was the 
new host of the General Electric Theater, and the Dodgers were in Brook-
lyn.1 It all seems like part of ancient history now. 
The last Republican majority in the House ended with the 1954 
election, Eisenhower's first midterm election. For the next four decades 
the Democratic Party's control of the House was uninterrupted. Election 
in and election out, Democrats won a majority of House seats. To put the 
2 • CHAPTER 1 
record on more human dimensions, not a single member of either party 
elected in 1994 had served in Congress when the Republicans were last 
in the majority.2 Outside of Congress, a majority of Americans voting in 
1994 had either not been born or had not yet entered elementary school 
when Republicans last held the House.3 Even for elderly Americans the 
last Republican majority was a distant and fading memory. While political 
observers regularly speculated before elections about which party would 
win the White House or which party would control the Senate, for most 
of the last 40 years, no one seriously questioned who would control the 
House. A Democratic majority was taken for granted. In more regal 
terms, from 1954 to 1994, the House of Representatives was dominated 
by a Democratic dynasty. And though, like all dynasties, this one eventu­
ally came to an end, it was nonetheless impressive. 
Actually, the Democratic dynasty in the House was established well 
before 1954. Democrats dominated the House for more than six decades. 
In all but four of the last 62 years, between 1932 and 1994, Democrats 
controlled a majority of the House. Republicans won fleeting majorities 
in the 1946 midterm and again in the 1952 elections (riding Eisenhower's 
coattails), but, otherwise, Democrats had a solid lock on the House. This 
book explores the reasons for this unusual success, the basis of the Demo­
cratic dynasty, and how the dynasty finally collapsed in the 1994 midterm 
election. More particularly, the book is about several structural advan­
tages that Democrats have enjoyed in House elections, especially the elec­
toral system advantage that Democrats have enjoyed in the way in which 
votes are translated into seats. 
• The Effects of a Congressional Dynasty • 
The lengthy tenure of the Democratic majority in the House had im­
portant consequences. To no small extent, Democratic dominance of the 
House shaped most aspects of political life for generations of Americans. 
It affected political leadership, the relationship between and the behavior 
of the political parties, the public's relationship to the government, the 
extent of political competition in the system, and the kinds of public poli­
cies adopted by the government. It would be difficult to exaggerate the 
effects of the Democratic dynasty. 
The Power of Political Parties 
Despite the common cynical view that parties do not matter and that 
partisans of either stripe are all the same, there is much to say otherwise. 
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Political parties matter. The parties differ in their policies and philoso­
phies, and this makes a difference in the way they govern. Democrats and 
Republicans are not at the extremes of the political spectrum, but neither 
are they tweedledum and tweedledee. Democrats as a group are more 
liberal than Republicans on a variety of issues, and there is even greater 
divergence between Democratic and Republican lawmakers. Parties have, 
admittedly, weakened a bit both in the electorate and among leaders from 
the 1950s to the 1980s. Crises, assassinations, unrest, scandals, and the 
simple passage of time since the New Deal (with the natural succession 
of new generations of voters) took their toll on the stability of partisan 
preferences. But the decline of partisanship is often exaggerated (Keith 
et al., 1992). Most voters and, with rare exceptions, all elected leaders 
are affiliated with the Democratic or Republican Parties. Most of these 
partisans continue to be loyal to their party, whether in the voting booth 
or in the legislative chamber. Moreover, there is evidence that partisan­
ship has been reinvigorated in the 1980s and 1990s (Miller, 1991; Rohde, 
1991, 1992). Thus, the dynasty of a political party is not just a curiosity. 
It has real consequences. 
The party that controls the House makes a difference in a number 
of ways. It determines House party and committee leadership, who in 
turn determine which legislation is considered. It determines how legisla­
tion is formed, what coalitions are built, what rules govern debate, and 
what amendments are permitted. As Schattschneider (1942) wrote some 
time ago, democratic politics is about numbers. If you have the numbers 
in the electorate or in the legislative chamber, you can wield power. The 
majority party controls the legislative process and thus shapes public poli­
cies that affect the day-to-day lives of Americans and people around the 
world.4 A party that controls the levers of legislative power election after 
election for decades at a stretch and presumes that it will have that power 
indefinitely is in an especially powerful position. 
Divided Government and Gridlock 
The powers of the House, however, even when in the hands of a single 
party for decades at a time, are not without limits. The system of checks 
and balances in general and the prerogatives of the presidency in par­
ticular are impediments to an aggressive House majority, at least when 
the opposition party sits at the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue. Even 
with the restraint that a vigilant president can sometimes impose on the 
House majority, there is also a downside—divided government. With one 
party fixed as a majority in the House and with significant competition 
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in presidential elections, divided government has become a more fre­
quent occurrence. 
While some debate its consequences, divided government is com­
monly thought to produce a whole host of institutional pathologies, sum­
marized variously as "gridlock," "stalemate," or "deadlock." Governance 
is more difficult under divided government. Rather than bridging the 
separation of powers to foster cooperation, the political parties deepen 
differences and heighten conflict in a divided government. Compromise 
becomes both more necessary and less possible because of partisan differ­
ences. Moreover, when compromise is reached, neither party gets what it 
considers good policy. With coherent partisan policy a political impossi­
bility, the process too often produces "lowest-common-denominator" pol­
icy and pandering to assemble a winning coalition. When compromise is 
not achieved because of partisan conflict, government grinds to a halt 
and crucial issues go to the back burner until they boil over into a crisis. 
Both the gargantuan budget deficits of the 1980s and early 1990s 
and the savings and loan debacle of the 1980s are prime examples of 
problems both precipitated and neglected by gridlocked, divided 
government.5 
Political Competition 
The importance of the permanent Democratic majority went beyond its 
policy consequences. The Democratic dynasty also both revealed and ex­
acerbated an important weakness in our political system—a serious defi­
ciency in political competition. The proper functioning of modern 
republican governments depends on political competition. Without it, 
there is little to check the abuse of power, to spur the adoption of sound 
policies, and to interest citizens in participating in the electoral process. 
The longevity of the Democratic majority in the House indicated that, in 
this most critical of American political institutions, competition was sorely 
lacking for a considerable stretch of recent history. 
For several decades, serious competition was absent in most individ­
ual congressional elections.6 In a significant number of districts, there was 
no competition whatsoever. While the number of uncontested districts 
varies a good deal from one election to the next, typically voters in 60 to 
70 districts have lacked a choice between major party House candidates. 
Even in contested districts, competition is often more apparent than real 
(Jacobson, 1990). Most incumbents win reelection, and most win by siz­
able vote margins. In elections since the 1950s, typically more than 90 
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percent of incumbents seek reelection, and more than 90 percent of these 
are successful. Generally, incumbents win reelection with about 65 per­
cent of the vote. Nationally, district-level competition has deteriorated 
since the 1960s. Indeed, from the 1950s to 1990, both the reelection rates 
of incumbents and their vote margins have increased, leading David 
Mayhew (1974) to write of "the vanishing marginals." In 1990, for ex­
ample, 96 percent of incumbents seeking reelection were reelected, and 
three out of four who were returned to office won by a comfortably safe 
margin, receiving in excess of 60 percent of the vote. Even in 1992, in 
what appeared to be the worst of times for incumbents, with the House 
check-bouncing scandal, broadscale redistricting, and a public holding 
the Congress in very low regard, 93 percent of incumbents running in 
the general election were reelected. Again, in 1994, in one of the most 
tumultuous midterm elections in this century, with Congress sinking to 
new depths in public esteem, with term-limit propositions passing in one 
state after another, and with what political commentators viewed as gen­
eral voter anger at "government as usual," 91 percent of incumbents run­
ning in the general election were still reelected.7 
The uncompetitiveness of individual congressional elections under­
mines the electoral process. The purpose of elections is to exert popular 
control of government. Competitive elections are supposed to keep 
elected officials "on their toes." Fearing electoral reprisal in the next elec­
tion, representatives have a strong incentive to respond to constituents 
and to support policies that constituents would approve of by the next 
election (even if they might not favor these policies immediately).8 If elec­
tions are uncompetitive, the electoral incentive for good representation 
is missing, at least in the short run. While the anticipation of possible 
competition in future elections might induce attentive representation, 
the uncertainty of serious opposition in some future election may provide 
less of an inducement for good representation than the certain confronta­
tion of a serious challenger in the next election. In addition, uncompeti­
tive elections affect the relation of citizens to their government. The 
ability of citizens to shape government through the electoral process de­
pends on their having a real choice between viable candidates. Without 
a real choice, democratic elections fail as instruments of popular control, 
and the public's sense of control over the course of government withers, 
and their willingness to participate in the democratic process wanes. 
As regrettable as the lack of competition in individual congressional 
elections is, the larger absence of competition for control of the House 
was even more so. The fact that the same party held a majority in the 
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House for four decades led both leaders and citizens to believe that con­
trol of the House was not only unchanging but unchangeable. The Dem­
ocratic House majority was a routine outcome, a fixture on the political 
scene. The consequences of a one-party political system in the House are 
easily predictable. If Democratic control of the House is a foregone con­
clusion in each election, citizens must feel less efficacious and more frus­
trated. However they vote locally and whomever they elect locally, the 
national result was, until 1994, never in doubt.9 No matter how good 
times were for the Republicans or how bad they were for the Democrats, 
the results were the same: a Democratic majority.10 
Political Leadership 
The absence of competition for control of the House was also felt among 
political leaders. On the Republican side, for most of the last four de­
cades, there was little real hope of being in the majority. Even well into 
the 1994 campaign itself, few thought a Republican majority was really 
possible. With serious doubts about ever serving in the majority, many 
Republicans sensed the futility of party building and worked instead for 
their personal goals. On the Democratic side, there was little fear of losing 
their majority. Taking for granted their party's power, Democratic candi­
dates had less of an incentive to work in behalf of their party (since what­
ever they did, the Democratic majority survived) and less of a reason 
to restrain their use of institutional power. Presumably, weakened party 
discipline and loyalties among leaders ultimately weaken partisanship in 
the public, as policy differences between the parties (the foundation of 
reasoned partisanship) become less distinct. 
The lack of competition certainly affected relations between the par­
ties and the possibility of bipartisanship and collegiality in working to­
gether for the public interest. Lord Acton long ago observed that, "Power 
corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely." As far as the politics of 
the House were concerned, the uninterrupted 40-year rule by a single 
party was, in practice, too close to absolute power. Democrats ruled the 
House and many Republicans felt that they were second-class citizens. 
Near the end of the Democratic dynasty, three House Republicans (Dick 
Armey, Jennifer Dunn, and Christopher Shays) and their staffs (Koop­
man et al., 1994) produced a thorough review of the various political 
pathologies that they attributed to prolonged one-party rule. It was their 
judgment that the Democratic dynasty had been a corrupting influence 
on the political system. 
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Among other things, Armey and his colleagues suggested that the 
permanent Democratic House majority supported a system of special in­
terest politics in which the broader public's concerns were neglected in 
favor of those of interest groups contributing heavily to Democratic cam­
paign coffers. It built itself a bloated and irresponsible congressional bu­
reaucracy and committee system. They also argued that the arrogance of 
the Democratic dynasty created a climate that too often led to outright 
corruption—including the Koreagate scandal of 1976, the Abscam scan­
dal of 1980, former-speaker Jim Wright's book royalty scandal, former-
representative Dan Rostenkowski's House post office scandal in 1992, 
and the House banking scandal. However, it is the institutional abuses of 
the system, the undemocratic manipulation of the rules and procedures 
of the House to squelch debate and to prevent Republican influence in 
the process, that most frustrated Republicans. As Armey and his col­
leagues saw it, Democratic leadership in the House, not satisfied with 
the natural powers of a majority, attempted to suppress the minority by 
frequently resorting to rules restricting or preventing floor amendments 
and by employing highly partisan leadership strategies designed to ex­
clude Republicans from the process. Frustrated with their indefinite ex­
clusion from a meaningful role in governing, many Republicans adopted 
more extreme and combative positions regarding the policies of the ma­
jority and more skeptical (or even cynical) views about government in 
general. Even if the report of Armey and his colleagues is not accepted 
as an unbiased assessment of the impact of the permanent Democratic 
House majority on American politics, it is indicative of how Republicans 
thought they had been treated, what they thought about the conse­
quences of the Democratic dynasty, and how badly relations between the 
parties had deteriorated. 
An Overview 
Figure 1.1 takes an overview of the suspected consequences of the one-
party House. This causal model links the various suspected effects of this 
dominance. The diagram suggests the far-ranging consequences of the 
Democratic dynasty. Five effects (indicated by bold causal paths in the 
figure) are likely. 
First, the seemingly permanent Democratic House majority may 
have, both directly and indirectly, weakened the internal cohesion of the 
political parties. Serious competition rallies partisans, and, in its absence, 
they may feel less compelled to come to the aid of their party.11 
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Permanent Party Congressional Competition 
Majority: Padlock 
Interbranch Divided Conflict: Government Gridlock 
Strength of Public Support 
the Political for the Political 
Parties System 
Figure 1.1 
Suspected Effects of the Democratic Dynasty in the U.S. House of Representa­
tives on the Political System 
Note: Possible interaction effects of the strength of parties and party competition on divided 
government's impact on gridlock have been omitted for the sake of clarity. Also for clarity, a 
number of additional causal factors have been excluded. See figure 1.2 for other factors that 
might affect the permanence of the House majority. 
Second, while the Democratic dynasty, in part, reflected an absence 
of political competition in the system, it also probably dampened compe­
tition. With the control of the House an apparently settled matter, there 
was less at stake in elections. Running for election or reelection to Con­
gress is a tremendous emotional and financial commitment. The prospect 
of spending a career in the minority, effectively isolated from real policy 
making, must have discouraged some potentially strong Republican can­
didates (including Republican incumbents) from running for office. The 
end result: even less-competitive politics. 
Third, the permanence of the Democratic majority, which was 
seemingly immune to what happened at the polls, may have had serious 
consequences for the public's attitudes about the political process and 
government in general. The fact that the Democratic majority survived, 
almost regardless of what voters did, would seem to have undermined 
public support for the political system, reduced the public's sense of polit­
ical efficacy, fostered political cynicism, and reduced turnout. 
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Fourth, the Democratic dynasty, combined with competitive presi­
dential elections, increased the likelihood of divided government. In the 
past, the party that won the White House would almost always win con­
trol of the House. When it occurred, divided government was usually the 
product of presidential party losses in the midterm election. This is no 
longer so. Democrats maintained their control of the House, even when 
Republican presidential candidates won in landslide elections. The result: 
more frequently divided government. 
Finally, the permanence of the Democratic majority in the House 
accentuated conflict between presidents of either party and the Con-
gress—producing institutional gridlock. An entrenched majority is an 
emboldened (perhaps arrogant) majority, less disposed to work cordially 
even with presidents of their own party. While great attention has been 
paid by scholars, journalists, and politicians to the problems of divided 
government and institutional gridlock, these problems and many of the 
pathologies associated with them may have deeper roots in the apparent 
permanence of the Democratic majority in the House. As Representative 
Jim Leach (R-IA) put it, the fundamental problem of American govern­
ment may not have been "gridlock" but "padlock."12 That is, Democratic 
control was so secure for 40 years, it was like having a padlock on the 
House. 
As the causal model also suggests, the five suspected direct effects 
of padlock are often mutually reinforced by its indirect effects.13 The en­
trenched majority in the House increases gridlock, which in turn strains 
public support for the political system. It also increases the likelihood of 
divided government, which in turn heightens institutional conflict (grid­
lock), and so on. In short, a long-standing congressional majority for one 
party, whether that one party is the Democratic Party or the Republican 
Party, is in many ways very unhealthy for the political system. 
• Understanding the Democratic Dynasty • 
The longevity of the Democratic House majority has been an important 
feature of the modern American political landscape and is important to 
understand. How did the Democratic majority become so firmly en­
trenched for so many years? What finally dislodged it? The following 
chapters examine a number of plausible answers. 
Chapter 2 reviews the record of Democratic dominance in the 
House over the last four decades. It places the Democratic House record 
in historical perspective and compares it to the party's record in seeking 
10 • CHAPTER 1 
other political offices. While Democrats were successful in winning other 
offices, and while parties have been successful in other times, the dura­
tion and extent of the Democratic majority in the House from 1954 to 
1994 is unique. The analysis also discovers a pattern in the Democrats' 
success. The party had greater success in elections for offices with smaller 
electoral districts. Democrats have been more successful in running 
for state legislative and House seats than in statewide (Senate and guber­
natorial) or national (presidential) races. This pattern suggests that the 
single-member-district electoral system may have something to do with 
Democratic success in House elections. (Some background on the House 
electoral system is provided in an appendix at the end of this chapter.) 
After establishing the pattern of greater Democratic success in House 
elections, a potential explanation for the permanent Democratic majority 
is proposed—the cheap-seats thesis. The thesis proposes that to a signifi­
cant extent, the Democratic dynasty was preserved and expanded as a result of the 
electoral system. As configured, the single-member-district electoral system required 
Republicans to receive more votes than Democrats in order to win the same number 
of seats. This systematic overrepresentation favoring the Democratic Party resulted 
from Democrats winning a disproportionate number of very-low-turnout districts— 
the cheap seats. 
The cheap-seats explanation is not the only explanation for the 
Democratic dynasty. Chapter 3 explores a number of alternatives, sources 
of the recently departed Democratic majority other than the electoral 
system. The fundamental causes that might have maintained the Demo­
cratic majority are presented in figure 1.2. As the causal diagram depicts 
it, there are two possible direct influences on Democratic padlock beyond 
the possible effects of partisan bias in the electoral system. One set of 
alternative explanations finds the basis of the Democratic dynasty in the 
intentional decisions of the voters. While such an explanation is seem­
ingly straightforward, suggesting that the Democrats have controlled the 
House because voters want it that way, there are actually a variety of 
causes for these Democratic congressional votes. Some trace Democratic 
votes to the free choice of voters, while others suggest institutional rea­
sons that might induce those votes. That is, some votes are cast for Demo­
crats because more Democratic candidates enjoy the various advantages 
of incumbency, and Democrats receive some votes by default, since a 
number of Democratic congressional candidates run unopposed. An­
other explanation suggests that Democratic dominance can be traced di­
rectly to this lack of opposition: Democrats are set well on their way to a 
majority, since Republicans traditionally conceded some number of seats 
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Democratic Party 
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Figure 1.2 
Suspected Factors Maintaining the Democratic Dynasty in the U.S. House of 
Representatives 
Note: An arrow pointing at another arrow indicates an interaction effect. For instance, the 
responsiveness of the electoral system is suspected to magnify the effect of voter support 
for Democrats on the Democratic dynasty. 
to the Democrats before any ballots are cast, giving the Democratic Party 
an uncontested-seat advantage. 
There are two general explanations of the Democratic dynasty that 
find that voters wanted to fill a majority of House seats with Democrats. 
There is the simple explanation that more voters generally preferred 
Democrats in government and a more complex set of explanations claim­
ing that voters have been particularly likely to prefer Democrats in 
Congress. 
Most obviously, the Democratic majority may have simply reflected 
Democratic strength in the electorate. From the New Deal through at 
least the late 1970s, Democrats outnumbered Republicans in the elector­
ate. Moreover, throughout the 40-year reign of the Democrats in the 
House, voters nationally cast a majority of votes for Democrats in con­
gressional elections. This vote majority was then amplified into a larger 
seat majority by the responsiveness of the House electoral system. Thus, 
it is hardly surprising that more Democrats than Republicans were 
elected to the House. 
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While voters over the last 40 years may have generally favored 
Democratic government over Republican government, this does not ex­
plain why Democrats have been more successful in running for the 
House rather than for other offices. Although this differential success of 
Democrats, especially noticeable in contrasting their record in presiden­
tial elections to their record in House contests, may mean that features of 
the electoral systems distort the intentions of voters for or against Demo­
crats, it may also mean that some critical number of voters, for any num­
ber of reasons, are especially inclined to want Democrats to serve in the 
House. 
Several theories claim that voters deliberately chose a Democratic 
Congress as a vote for divided rather than unified party government. 
According to these theories, we have often had Democratic Congresses 
and usually had Republican presidents because that is what voters 
wanted. There are several possible reasons for wanting divided govern­
ment. Some split-ticket voters may have believed that Republicans were 
better suited to executive duties and the representation of broader na­
tional interests while Democrats were better suited to legislative responsi­
bilities and the representation of narrower local interests (though the 
results of the 1994 midterm seem to conflict with this view). Others may 
have wanted a moderate government. Either party governing alone 
would tilt away from the center. However, divided government would 
force compromise or a blending of the policy positions of the two parties. 
Still others may have felt alienated from both parties, opposed to the rule 
of either party on its own, and voted for divided government so that each 
party would have enough power to check and to frustrate the other. 
These theories are assessed in chapter 3. 
The character of the parties may also account for the greater Demo­
cratic success in running for the House. There are two party-based expla­
nations. They trace the Democratic strength in the House to the 
difference between the parties in their ideologies regarding government 
and the nature of the party coalitions. First, the Democratic Party's suc­
cess in the House may have resulted from its progovernment or big-
government philosophy. This perspective may have been particularly 
helpful in congressional races. As proponents of expansion of a variety of 
government programs, the Democrats were more willing and adept at 
serving diverse local interests. Democrats were more likely to "bring 
home the bacon" for their constituents. This constituency service may 
have been rewarded by the electorate, especially by the quarter of the 
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electorate that was willing to split its ticket between candidates of differ­
ent parties.14 
Second, from the ideological tilt of the parties favoring legislative 
Democrats, the diversity of the two parties' coalitions may account for 
Democratic success in congressional elections. The Democratic coalition 
has been larger and more diverse than the Republican coalition (Axelrod, 
1972; Stanley et al., 1986; and Erikson et al., 1989). Its diversity has pre­
sented problems for Democrats in national elections in which one candi­
date must appeal to the varied interests of the coalition in order to hold 
the pieces of the coalition together. Invariably some parts of the coali-
tion—white southerners, blacks, labor, Catholics, or liberals—have felt 
shortchanged, and some members have sat out elections or even defected 
to vote for the Republican. Because congressional districts seldom con­
tain the full range of these Democratic constituent groups, Democratic 
congressional candidates need not perform the same juggling act re­
quired of Democratic presidential candidates.15 Congressional Democrats 
could win in southern white districts, urban black districts, and northeast­
ern Catholic districts at the same time because their appeals could be 
tailored to the "political requirements" of each type of district. 
Beyond considering the free will of the voters as a basis for Demo­
cratic rule, chapter 3 also considers another possible basis, the candidates. 
Two partisan advantages regarding congressional candidates—incum-
bency and uncontested seats—may have preserved the Democratic 
House.16 Many speculated that incumbency was the foundation of the 
Democratic majority. Since a majority of incumbents were Democrats 
(until 1996), the Democratic Party has benefited more from the consider­
able advantages that candidates have who are incumbents. In addition, 
as a party, Democrats long enjoyed a candidate advantage in uncontested 
seats. Democrats have been much more likely than Republicans to win 
elections without a major-party opponent. By failing to offer a Republi­
can candidate to voters, Republicans essentially conceded a significant 
number of seats (and votes) before the election was even held. This 
gave Democrats an automatic "leg up" toward a majority. As chapter 3 
demonstrates, while the incumbency advantage and the uncontested-seat 
advantage for Democrats varied from one election to the next, these can­
didate advantages contributed significantly to sustaining the Democratic 
majority. 
Chapter 4 begins the assessment of the electoral system as an expla­
nation for the size and durability of the Democratic majority: Democrats 
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dominated the House for such a long period because of the extra seats 
that they won as a result of winning districts in which relatively few votes 
were cast. The chapter begins with an examination of the idea and the 
measurement of partisan bias in the electoral system. Partisan bias in an 
electoral system is the difference between the parties in the number (or proportion) 
of seats that each would win if they had received the same number of votes. There 
are good democratic reasons why a party should win more seats if it wins 
more votes; but, in an unbiased electoral system, two parties winning an 
equal number of votes should also win an equal number of seats. The 
chapter reviews the existing research about partisan bias in the American 
electoral system and assesses the appropriate way to measure bias. The 
principal point of chapter 4 is that partisan bias has been incorrectly esti­
mated in a number of previous studies and that it can be measured di­
rectly by comparing the average number of unwasted votes (that is, votes 
cast for winning candidates) that each party receives.17 Bias is revealed if 
one party expends more unwasted votes per victory than the other party. 
Chapter 5 presents the core of the case that the Democratic Party's 
success in the cheap seats bolstered their long-standing majority in the 
House. The chapter begins with an examination of turnout differences 
across contested districts in elections from 1954 to 1992. Turnout is mea­
sured by the actual number of citizens voting for congressional candi­
dates in the district. The extent of variation is surprisingly large. The 
American system requires equal political representation in the sense of 
"one person, one vote," but in practice voters living in some districts get 
a lot more say about who gets to be a member of Congress than voters 
who happen to live in other districts. The chapter introduces the idea of 
the "unwasted vote," the number of votes cast for a winning candidate.18 
An unbiased electoral system ought to require, on average, the same 
number of unwasted votes from each party—to win one seat ought to 
require the same number of votes from one party as it does from the 
other. If the average winning Democrat receives 90,000 votes while the 
average winning Republican receives 110,000 votes, the Democratic 
Party has a distinct advantage.19 In market terminology, the Republicans 
are paying a higher price in terms of votes for their victories than Demo­
crats are spending. This is what the evidence will demonstrate. It will also 
demonstrate that although the electoral system has regularly favored the 
Democrats, the extent of this bias has varied a good deal. In some election 
years, the electoral system is nearly neutral. In others, it is strongly tilted 
toward the Democrats. 
Chapter 6 explains why partisan bias has varied from election to 
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election. A variety of reasons, from legal changes regarding apportion­
ment to a weakening of class politics, may have caused a long-term trend 
in partisan bias since 1954. Possible shorter-term trends involving the 
effects of partisan gerrymandering at the beginning of decades, following 
redistricting, and the gradual erosion of these effects in subsequent elec­
tions are also examined. Turnout may also have affected bias, if the non­
voters in some elections are Democratic voters when turnout surges in 
other elections. The factor most influential in affecting the extent of par­
tisan bias is the congressional vote itself The analysis shows that the Dem­
ocrats' cheap-seat advantage was greatest when they needed it most, 
when their national congressional vote was at its lowest levels. While the 
alternative explanations of Democratic House strength explored in chap­
ter 3 have merit, Democratic victories in the cheap seats provided an 
important foundation for their majority. Chapter 6 also reexamines the 
swing ratio, or the electoral system's responsiveness in light of the vari­
ability of partisan bias. Because partisan bias has varied with the congres­
sional vote and prior estimates of the swing ratio have assumed that bias 
was a constant or stable feature of the electoral system, the responsiveness 
of the system has been underestimated. 
Chapter 7 places the partisan bias of the electoral system in histori­
cal perspective. It compares the bias of the electoral system in the period 
since 1954 with that of earlier elections. The analysis indicates that the 
electoral system since at least 1936 has been biased in favor of the Demo­
crats and that this bias also was greatest when Democrats were less 
popular. 
Chapter 8 explores why the seemingly invincible Democratic major­
ity came to its unexpected and dramatic end in the 1994 midterm. How 
did the unthinkable actually happen? How did partisan control of the 
House, that had for so long appeared unchangeable, finally change? The 
Democratic dynasty had been supported by the voters, candidate factors 
(incumbency and uncontested seats), the nature of the parties, and the 
electoral system. How did Republicans in 1994 surmount these factors 
to win a majority of seats? Was there a revolt against incumbents? Were 
congressional Democrats swept away by the electorate's anti-Clinton sen­
timent? Did Democrats lose their uncontested seat advantage? Did the 
cheap seats vanish, or did Democrats lose their hold on this advantage? 
Or was 1994 the long-postponed deepening of the gradual partisan re­
alignment that had helped Republican presidential candidates in the 
1980s? 
The analysis in chapter 8 indicates that several of the factors that 
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had sustained the Democratic dynasty remained potent in 1994. Demo­
crats in 1994 maintained their incumbency advantage over Republicans, 
and the electoral system remained tilted in favor of the Democrats. How­
ever, these advantages were not enough to protect the Democratic major­
ity against the loss of the party's advantage in uncontested seats and a 
deepening Republican realignment of voter allegiances. For the first time 
in 40 years, a majority of voters in 1994 voted for Republican congres­
sional candidates, and, for the first time in more than 40 years, there were 
more uncontested Republican candidates than uncontested Democrats. 
Things, however, would have been much worse for Democrats if the elec­
toral system had been neutral. As in previous elections, Democrats in 
1994 won a large number of low-turnout districts. This extended their 
impact of Democratic votes and restrained the impact of Republican 
votes. Five different estimates of electoral system bias in 1994 indicate 
that the system was tilted in favor of the Democrats by about 4 percent of 
House seats. As a result, though the party with the largest share of votes 
in a plurality-rule electoral system normally wins a much larger share of 
seats, this was not true in 1994. The Republicans' share of seats about 
equalled their share of votes. By contrast, in the previous 20 elections, 
when Democrats won vote majorities, their share of seats consistently and 
significantly exceeded their share of votes. 
The book concludes in chapter 9 with a discussion of the conse­
quences of the cheap-seats phenomenon. The Democratic stronghold in 
low-turnout districts has had profound consequences for political repre­
sentation. How do cheap seats, won disproportionately by one party, af­
fect the representation of the general public, of those who turn out to 
vote, of congressional districts, of minority groups, and of individual citi­
zens? Do cheap seats overrepresent liberal perspectives in the policy-
making process? Do the cheap-seats phenomenon and the bias it creates 
in the electoral system help to explain why many Americans have become 
frustrated with the political system in general and with Congress in par­
ticular? Are the residents of low-turnout, cheap-seat districts represented 
well by the electoral system? What would happen if turnout in these 
cheap-seat districts rose? How would the results change? To push matters 
to the extreme of "what ifs," what would the electoral system produce 
and what bias would remain if everyone voted? At the group level, what 
is the relationship of the cheap-seats phenomenon to racial politics and 
efforts to redress social and political discrimination against African 
Americans? At the individual level, what are the implications of cheap 
seats for the principle of equal political representation? Finally, if one 
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concludes that cheap seats are dysfunctional for the political system, that 
they undermine the representativeness of the government because they 
unfairly eliminate political competition or because they violate basic prin­
ciples of political equality, can anything be done to reduce their impact 
or to eliminate them entirely? 
First, however, we should survey the record. Setting aside for the 
moment the spectacular Democratic crash of 1994, how successful were 
Democrats in winning elections and controlling different parts of the gov­
ernment from 1954 to 1992? Were Democratic candidates particularly 
successful in seeking some offices rather than others? 
• Appendix • 
The House Electoral System 
An electoral system encompasses everything that affects how votes are 
used to determine who wins elections and serves in office. The structure 
of an electoral system is derived from constitutional provisions and elec­
toral laws. Among other things, they define who is eligible to vote and 
who is eligible to seek office, when and where elections are held, and, 
most important, how many votes are required to win an election. The 
major distinctions among electoral systems are between multimember-
district proportional-representation systems, in which several representa­
tives are selected from a district in proportion to the votes cast for the 
various political parties, and single-member-district, plurality-rule sys­
tems, in which the party receiving the most votes in a district elects a 
single representative. It is important to keep in mind that the conse­
quences of these electoral laws, principles, and structures are determined 
by their interaction with the distribution of the vote. For instance, a 
plurality-rule, single-member-district system may greatly overreward the 
majority party if the vote is evenly distributed across the country. If the 
vote is more varied in parts of the country, the majority party would not 
be as greatly overrewarded in winning seats. 
The House electoral system is based on constitutional provisions, 
federal and state laws, and judicial interpretations of both. The system 
has evolved over time into a single-member-district system in which rep­
resentatives are elected by a plurality of the district vote. The U.S. Consti­
tution defined only the most general features of the House electoral 
system. In Article 1, Section 2, and as amended by the Fourteenth 
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Amendment, the Constitution provides for the term of office for the 
House, voter eligibility standards, qualifications for service in the House, 
the standards and timing of apportionment of representatives to the 
states (by population reallocated every 10 years, with each state receiving 
a minimum of one seat), and provisions for filling vacancies in seats.20 
Section 4 of Article 1 leaves the designation of "the times, places, and 
manner of holding elections" to the U.S. House to the states, and Section 
5 gives the power to judge election disputes to the House. Judicial inter­
pretations of the "equal protection" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
have also affected the House electoral system. Arguably the two most im­
portant features of the House electoral system, single-member districts 
and the plurality-vote rule for deciding election winners, are not even 
mentioned in the U.S. Constitution. 
The Constitution did provide for periodic reapportionment. Every 
10 years the Congress redistributes House seats among the states on the 
basis of state populations, as measured by the census. Until 1911, Con­
gress expanded the number of seats in the House and awarded seats to 
the states on the basis of the ratio of population to seats. After 1911, the 
House size was set by statute at 435 (with some temporary exceptions for 
the admission of new states between decennial reapportionments). Sev­
eral methods have been used to apportion or allocate the 435 seats to the 
states at the beginning of every decade on the basis of state populations 
(see Congressional Quarterly, 1985, 683-90, and Butler and Cain, 
1992, 19). 
Once a state has received its allocation of seats, it may determine 
how they will be elected within the state. In the 1800s, most state legis­
latures designated areas of the state as single-member congressional 
districts. However, some chose to elect representatives to the House in 
at-large or statewide elections without districts, and still others provided 
for a combination of single-member districts and a single at-large state­
wide representative. Several states conducted at-large elections well into 
the twentieth century.21 By 1970, however, all states had adopted the 
single-member-district system. 
The redistricting process of drawing district boundaries within the 
states is primarily the responsibility of state legislatures, although others 
are often involved as well. As in the general legislative process, governors 
play a role in redistricting, through the threat of a veto. Some states, in 
an effort to reduce the impact of partisan politics, use commissions to 
draw district lines. The federal government is involved in the process 
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both through court rulings mandating equally populated districts and 
federal laws (most notably the Voting Rights Act) prohibiting redis­
trictings that would dilute the influence of the votes of racial minorities. 
Federal laws not only bring the courts into the redistricting process but 
provide for an active role for the U.S. Department of Justice. 
The prevailing decision rule for determining the winner of a con­
gressional election is plurality rule. That is, the winning candidate is the 
one with more votes than any other candidate. Most states adopted 
plurality-rule from the outset. However, a few southern states use a ma-
jority-rule and runoff system. Under this system, a candidate is elected if 
he or she receives a majority of the vote (a likely occurrence, unless there 
are more than two candidates in the field). If no candidate receives a 
majority of the vote, the top two vote getters compete in a second, or 
runoff, election. The candidate receiving a majority of the vote in the 
runoff election is elected to serve a term in the House. 
Finally, it is important to note that the evaluation of the electoral 
system depends only on the political reality of votes actually cast and seats 
actually awarded. To evaluate the system, analysts sometimes attempt to 
determine how voters might vote if the political climate were more or less 
favorable to a party; however, the starting point is always the actual votes 
cast and seats awarded. Electoral system analysis does not attempt to an­
ticipate what would happen if new voters turned out to vote, if more 
districts were contested, if better candidates ran, if district boundaries 
were changed, or if the parties altered their appeals. Such analyses may 
be useful, but they entail the strong assumption that political changes can 
be made in isolation. For instance, if turnout rose from current levels to 
100 percent of all eligible voters, undoubtedly a great many other 
changes would also take place. Electoral system analyses largely avoid this 
quagmire by examining only what would happen if vote shares for the 
parties shifted among those who actually voted, with all other conditions 
(e.g., district boundaries) unchanged. 
2

The Democratic Record

democrats dominated congressional politics from the 1930s to the 
1990s. As impressive as this was, their uninterrupted control of the House 
from 1954 to 1994 was even more so. This chapter puts the four-decade-
long Democratic dynasty in perspective—comparing it to prior congres­
sional majorities, evaluating its durability in confronting forces hostile to 
such longevity, and contrasting the Democrats' success in the House to 
their success in other offices. The record shows that the recent Demo­
cratic majority was unprecedented and that Democrats had greater suc­
cess in House elections than in elections for higher offices. This later fact 
suggests that there may be something about the House electoral system 
that provided Democrats with an edge. The principal thesis of this book 
explains the nature of this edge: the single-member-district electoral 
system, in combination with a steady constellation of socioeconomic, 
geographic, and political factors, allowed Democrats to win a significant 
number of congressional districts with relatively few votes, and this 
helped the Democratic Party maintain its substantial congressional 
majority. 
• The Longevity of the Democratic Majority Q 
In the history of Congress, other consecutive majorities did not even 
come close to matching the duration of the Democratic majority from 
1954 to 1994. Table 2.1 ranks the five longest party majorities in the 
House from 1855 to 1995. As the rankings indicate and as Ornstein 
(1990) observes, the Democratic Party's control of the House from the 
20 
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Table 2.1 
Longest Consecutive Partisan Majorites in the 
U.S. House of Representatives, 1855-1995 
First Period of Number of 
Election Continuous Consecutive 
Majority Party in Series Control Congresses 
1. Democrats 1954 1955-1995 20 
2. Republicans 1894 1895-1911 8 
2. Republicans 1858 1859-1875 8 
4. Democrats* 1932 1933-1947 7 
4. Republicans* 1918 1919-1933 7 
Source: Omstein et al. (1992: table 1-18). Since new Congresses are sworn in after 
the start of a new year, the years of control overlap. The 103rd Congress elected in Novem­
ber 1992 took office in January 1993 and will serve until January of 1995. 
Note: The table includes all instances in which a party controlled the House for more 
than four consecutive terms since 1854. 
Th  e 72nd Congress (1931-33) is counted as a Republican House. Republicans had 
won a bare majority of seats in the 1930 election, although Democrats gained a majority and 
organized the chamber after the death of several Republican members. 
1950s into the 1990s was two-and-a-half times as long as any previous 
majority. Before the recent era of Democratic dominance, no party sus­
tained its majority beyond eight consecutive congresses. The Democratic 
House majority installed in the 1954 election lasted 20 terms.1 
From the mid-1950s to the 1994 midterm elections, Republicans 
were not even especially close to taking control of the House. Table 2.2 
presents the magnitude of Democratic majorities over this period. Al­
though the Democratic Party's majorities were modest following the 1954 
and 1956 elections, their subsequent majorities were large (in excess of 
55 percent). Democrats usually had a cushion of more than 40 seats. On 
three occasions they achieved "veto-proof majorities" of over 290 seats 
(or, more than 73 seats above a bare majority). Even at their low points, 
Democrats maintained substantial majorities. Republicans closed within 
30 seats of a majority on only three occasions since the mid-1950s (1968, 
1972, and 1980), and, from the mid-1950s to 1994, Republicans were 
never closer than a full 25 seats short of a bare majority. The Democratic 
dynasty was not only sustained over an unprecedented number of elec­
tions but was not seriously threatened for several decades. 
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Table 2.2 
Democratic Representatives in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1954-1992 
Number of Democratic Size (in Seats) 
Democratic Seat of Democratic 
Resulting from Election Representatives Percentage Majority 
1954 232 53.3 +15 
1956 234 53.8 +17 
1958 283 64.9 +65 
1960 262 60.0 +44 
1962 258 59.4 +41 
1964 295 67.8 +78 
1966 248 57.0 +31 
1968 243 55.9 +26 
1970 255 58.6 +38 
1972 242 55.8 +25 
1974 291 66.9 +74 
1976 292 67.1 +75 
1978 277 63.7 +60 
1980 243 55.9 +26 
1982 268 61.8 +51 
1984 253 58.2 +36 
1986 258 59.3 +41 
1988 260 59.8 +43 
1990 267 61.5 +50 
1992 258 59.4 +41 
Mean 261 60.0 +44 
Nonmajorities 0 (0%) 
55% or Less 2(10%) 
Note: The size of the Democratic majority is the number of seats in excess of a bare 
majority. This is generally the number of Democratic representatives less 217 seats, since a 
majority of a body of 435 would require 218 seats. The House expanded for the 1958 and 
1960 elections to accommodate the entrance of Alaska and Hawaii as states. The minimum 
majority in 1958 and 1960 was thus 219 seats. 
Q The Durability of the Democratic Majority • 
The Democratic majority in the House was remarkable for its durability 
as well as its longevity. It endured through a period that should have 
been very inhospitable to its survival. A number of developments should 
have made it very difficult for Democrats to sustain their majority. Parti­
san dealignment, political turbulence, Republican presidential landslides, 
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and partisan realignments presented challenges to the Democratic dy­
nasty. Despite these challenges, it survived. 
First, through much of the past four decades, political parties were 
in decline. While of continuing importance to the political system, by sev­
eral measures parties became less important than they had been (Wat­
tenberg, 1990, 1991).2 The persistence of a party's majority in a period 
of weakened partisanship is impressive. The weakening of partisanship 
should have worked against the majority party, which clearly was the 
Democratic Party until at least the 1980s. If a party holds an advantage 
in partisanship, it benefits to the extent that voters' decisions are based 
on that partisanship. At the extreme, the majority party would win every 
election if partisanship were the only thing that affected voters' decisions. 
The weakening of partisanship should have opened elections up to in­
fluences (candidates, issues, etc.) that on occasion might tilt in favor of 
the minority party. With more personalized politics, one would have ex­
pected less continuity in party majorities. With congressional elections 
more dependent on local factors and less dependent on partisanship, one 
might have expected less stable partisan results in the aggregate and 
more swings of majorities from one party to the other. In short, with 
partisan dealignment, a Democratic majority should have been less cer­
tain. Instead, it became a long-term political fixture. 
Second, the great social and economic turbulence and change of the 
past 40 years of American history should have made it particularly diffi­
cult to reelect a House majority for either party. At different times and in 
different ways, foreign-policy issues, a variety of social issues, and the 
perennial economic issues divided the nation. The Vietnam War created 
especially deep divisions, and the scars from it remained long after the 
last American troops came home. Battles over civil rights were bitterly 
fought, and the racial divisions continue. Abortion policies activated 
deeply held convictions and created intense arguments. And then there 
were the ever-present economic issues. The period had stretches of sus­
tained economic growth (under both Democratic and Republican admin­
istrations) and deep and long recessions and stagflation. There were 
times of runaway inflation and sky-high interest rates as well as times of 
high unemployment. Throughout all the tumult, the Democratic major­
ity in the House was undisturbed. 
Beyond the waxing and waning of various issues, the political land­
scape has changed in many other ways. These changes also should have 
hampered the preservation of a majority. Through the civil rights 
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movement and the enactment of civil rights laws, the participation of Afri­
can Americans in the electoral process steadily rose from the 1950s to the 
1970s and beyond. New ethnic groups, particularly Hispanic Americans 
and Asian Americans, emerged as significant political interests. One 
might expect the emergence of new groups to create intraparty divisions 
for the Democrats' majority coalition and provide opportunities for 
growth in the Republicans' minority coalition. The methods of financing 
campaigns changed in this period, as did the general methods of con­
ducting congressional campaigns. Congressional campaigns became 
more media intensive and far more costly. All of these changes might 
have disturbed "politics as usual," the politics in which the Democratic 
majority was first formed. But it did not. Through it all, House Demo­
crats remained in the majority. 
Third, the Democratic majority survived repeated Republican pres­
idential victories, several of landslide proportions. Historically, the party 
winning the White House usually wins a majority in the House. Victori­
ous presidential candidates throughout history have had coattails on 
which congressional candidates of their party have ridden into office. Al­
though presidential coattails in recent years have been a bit shorter than 
they once were, they are still substantial (Campbell, 1986, 1991, 1992, 
1993). It is, thus, especially impressive that House Democrats consistently 
won despite presidential coattails often helping their Republican oppo­
nents. Democrats held a majority through six of Eisenhower's eight years 
in the White House, the eight years of the Nixon-Ford administrations, 
the eight years of the Reagan administration, and the four years of the 
Bush administration. Republican presidents were in the White House for 
26 of the 40 years (1954-94) that the Democrats held their House major­
ity. Moreover, Democrats retained their majority even in the face of Nix-
on's 1972 landslide victory over McGovern and Reagan's 1984 landslide 
defeat of Mondale. Regardless of which party occupied the White House 
and regardless of which party was helped or hurt by the top of the ticket, 
Democrats won a majority of House seats election after election. 
Fourth, the dealignment of the party system forged in the New Deal 
era set the stage for the emergence of a new party system, one much 
more favorably inclined toward Republicans. Until 1994, Democrats in 
the House had successfully weathered a partisan realignment favoring 
Republicans. From the 1930s through the 1950s and into the 1960s, a 
solid majority of the electorate thought of themselves as Democrats. In 
the 1950s and 1960s, Democrats in the electorate outnumbered Republi­
cans by nearly two to one. With this advantage, a Democratic House ma­
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jority was hardly surprising, though (as already noted) previous majority 
parties had been unable to maintain continuous control of the House for 
such a long period. This partisan balance in the public began to shift in 
the late 1960s and evidence of significant party identification shifts ap­
peared in the 1980s. The nation became less Democratic (Petrocik, 1987; 
Bullock, 1988; Carmines and Stimson, 1989). By the mid-1980s, the par­
ties were near parity (Miller, 1991, 561; Keene and Ladd, 1991, 92-93). 
Yet again, despite this trend against them, Democrats retained their 
House majority. 
• The National, Statewide, and Local Records • 
The fact that the Democratic House majority survived through partisan 
dealignment, social and economic turmoil, Republican presidential victo­
ries, and a pro-Republican partisan realignment is impressive. The Dem­
ocratic domination of the House is even more intriguing in that it was 
not equally evident for other elective offices. Democrats did not dominate 
the Presidency or statewide offices to the same extent or with the same 
consistency that they dominated the House. 
Within the framework of competitive two-party politics, a dominant 
or majority party is common. Party competition is rarely balanced per­
fectly. The majority party in the electorate usually is more successful than 
the minority party in races up and down the ticket. It is reasonable to 
expect that a majority party successful in seeking House seats should 
have about the same measure of success in running for the White House, 
the Senate, governorships, and state legislative seats. However, this was 
not the case over the past 40 years. Democrats were not equally successful 
in getting elected to all offices. To be sure, the Democrats over the past 
four decades were quite successful in seeking all offices other than the 
presidency, but they had no greater nor any more consistent success than 
in the House. The question is why? Why were Democrats particularly 
successful in electing a majority of the House? We should first review 
the record. 
Competition for the Presidency 
Democrats were not nearly as successful in presidential elections as they 
were in House elections. In fact, they occupied the White House for only 
14 of the 40 years in which they continuously controlled the House. From 
one perspective, presidential elections have been quite competitive. The 
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Table 2.3 
The Democratic Party's Success in Presidential Elections, 1956-1992 
Percentage of the Two-Party 
Presidential Popular Vote 
Year for the Democratic Candidate 
1956 42.25 
1960 50.09 
1964 61.34 
1968 49.59 
1972 38.21 
1976 51.07 
1980 44.71 
1984 40.83 
1988 46.06 
1992 53.40 
Mean 47.76 
Nonmajorities 6 (60%) 
55% or Less 9 (90%) 
Source: Computed from Congressional Quarterly's Guide to U.S. Elections, 2d ed. 
(1985). 
Note: Democratic vote minorities are indicated in bold. 
popular vote record is displayed in table 2.3. As the table shows, the 1960, 
1968, and 1976 elections were all narrowly decided in the popular vote. 
Moreover, while there have been landslide victories, neither party had a 
monopoly of lopsided victories. On the Republican side, Eisenhower won 
a solid victory over Stevenson in 1956 and Nixon won in a landslide over 
McGovern in 1972. On the Democratic side, Johnson defeated Goldwater 
by a wide margin in 1964. 
From another perspective, the parties have not been quite so com­
petitive in recent presidential elections. Over the past 25 years, Republi­
cans have had much more success than the Democrats in winning the 
White House. Beginning with the 1968 election, Republicans won five of 
seven presidential elections. Moreover, the two Republican presidential 
losses during that period were under unusual circumstances. In the post-
Watergate election of 1976, unelected Republican incumbent Gerald 
Ford only won the Republican nomination after a bitterly fought contest 
with Ronald Reagan and then very narrowly lost to Jimmy Carter, who 
as a southerner managed to carry most of the southern states crucial to a 
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Table 2.4 
The History of Divided Government, 1868-1994 
1868-1950 1952-1994 
Following 
Type of Election Divided Unified Divided Unified 
All Elections 26% 74 % 64% 36% 
(11) (31) (14) (8) 
Presidential Elections 10% 90% 55% 45  % 
(2) (19) (6) (5) 
Midterm Elections 43% 57% 73 % 27  % 
(9) (12) (8) (3) 
Note: The most prevalent result among a type of election in the historical period is 
indicated in boldface. Percentages are of elections (all, presidential year, or midterm) yield­
ing, respectively, either divided or unified government in the specified period of history. The 
number below the percentage is the actual number of elections in a given period resulting in 
divided or unified governments. 
Democratic victory. In 1992, Bill Clinton, another southern Democratic 
governor, defeated Republican incumbent George Bush, Bush was espe­
cially vulnerable, having presided over a sluggish economy, having re­
neged on his 1988 (read-my-lips) campaign pledge not to raise taxes, and 
having billionaire third-party populist candidate Ross Perot campaigning 
against him as well. 
Even with their 1976 and 1992 losses, the recent Republican record 
in presidential elections has been enviable. Indeed, prior to the 1992 
election, commentators often referred to the Republican "lock on the 
Electoral College." However, the Republican record in presidential elec­
tions was not even close to equaling the Democratic Party's record in 
House elections. Republican presidential victories are much less certain. 
Unlike Democratic victories in the House, Republican presidential victo­
ries were never taken for granted. Nonetheless, the fact that Republicans 
have been so successful in presidential elections makes the Democratic 
record in House elections even more of a curiosity. 
The disparity of Democratic success in House and presidential elec­
tions has greatly increased the incidence of divided government. The fre­
quency of divided and unified governments resulting from elections 
between 1868 and 1950 and from 1952 to 1994 are presented in table 
2.4 for all elections, on-year or presidential elections, and midterm elec­
tions. As the table indicates, once the exception, divided government is 
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now the rule. From the end of the Civil War until the early 1950s, the 
party winning the presidency usually also won a majority of seats in both 
houses of Congress. Only about a quarter of the elections between 1868 
and 1950 resulted in divided government. Moreover, presidential elec­
tions rarely produced divided government. Only 1 in 10 on-year elections 
during this period yielded divided results.3 The results of elections since 
1950 stand in stark contrast. Nearly two-thirds of elections from 1952 to 
1994 produced divided government. The pattern is even stronger in the 
most recent elections. Since 1968, 11 of the last 14 elections (79 percent) 
resulted in divided government.4 Although the consequences of this 
change are still not clear (Mayhew, 1991; Thurber, 1991; Fiorina, 1992a; 
Cox and Kernell, 1991), the ramifications of divided government are 
generally thought to be both substantial and detrimental to the proper 
functioning of the government (Burns, 1967; Cutler, 1986, 1987; Sund­
quist, 1987, 1988; Mezey, 1989). 
Democratic Strength in Statewide Offices 
Democrats have been much more successful in elections below the presi­
dential level. In elections to both Senate seats and governorships, the two 
major elected statewide offices, Democrats were quite successful over the 
past four decades. However, despite this strong record, Democrats did 
not have quite the same degree and consistency of success in Senate and 
gubernatorial races that they had in House elections. The Democratic 
record in the Senate and in governorships is presented in table 2.5. 
The Democratic record in Senate and House elections can be com­
pared in two ways. One is to examine how often the party has held a 
majority of seats during the past 40 years. House Democrats held solid 
majorities for 40 consecutive years. In the Senate, Democrats held a ma­
jority from 1954 to 1978, an impressive tenure. In 1980 Democrats lost 
control of the Senate and did not regain it until the 1986 election. Al­
though six years of Republican control in 40 years may not seem like a 
great deal of time, it is six more than enjoyed by House Republicans, who 
did not come even close to gaining a majority in this period. 
Democratic success in House and Senate elections may also be com­
pared using the percentage of election victories in Senate seats at stake 
in each election year. Again, while Democrats were successful in Senate 
elections, they were less successful in Senate elections than in House 
races. In the House, Democrats carried a majority of seats in 20 consecu­
tive election years. In the Senate, Democrats carried a majority of seats 
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Table 2.5 
The Democratic Party's Electoral Success in 
Major Statewide Offices, 1954-1992 
Percentage of Seats Wonor Held by Democrats

U.S. Senate Governorships

Year Held Won Held Won

1954 51 64 56 58

1956 51 51 58 58

1958 65 79 71 78

1960 64 63 68 58

1962 67 64 68 62

1964 68 80 66 70

1966 64 49 50 38

1968 58 53 38 42

1970 55 66 58 59

1972 57 49 62 65

1974 62 71 73 78

1976 62 67 76 71

1978 59 43 64 58

1980 46 35 54 50

1982 46 61 68 74

1984 47 49 68 50

1986 55 59 52 53

1988 55 58 56 53

1990 56 53 58 56

1992 57 50 60 67

Mean 57.3 58.2 61.2 59.9

Nonmajorities 3(15%) 5 (25%) 2(10%) 4 (20%)

55% or Less 8 (40%) 9 (46%) 4 (20%) 6 (30%)

Sources: Computed from Ornstein et al. (1992), ABC News' The '88 Vote (1989), and 
Congressional Quarterly's Guide to U.S. Elections, 2d ed. (1985), and the Statistical Abstract 
of the United States (1991). 
Note: Democratic minorities are indicated in bold. The percentage of seats "Held" by 
Democrats is the two-party proportion of all seats occupied by Democrats after the election, 
whether or not those seats had been up for election in that year. The percentage of seats 
"Won" is the two-party percentage of all seats up for election in that year that were won by 
Democrats. The few odd-year gubernatorial elections were included in the subsequent even-
year percentages. 
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in 15 of the 20 years, losing a majority of seats at stake on five occasions 
(1966, 1972, 1978, 1980, and 1984). In another two election years, Demo­
crats just barely won a majority of seats that were at stake (1968 and 
1990). In these two years, Democrats carried a smaller share of Senate 
seats than in their poorest performance in House elections over this pe­
riod. The bottom line is this: although the Democratic Party's recent rec­
ord in Senate elections is strong, it did not dominate the Senate to the 
same extent or with the same consistency that it dominated the House. 
In most elections, it was "thinkable" that the Republicans could win a 
majority of Senate contests and assemble a majority of seats to obtain 
control of the Senate. 
The Democratic electoral record for governorships is similar to the 
Senate record. As in Senate elections, Democrats were quite successful 
in gubernatorial elections. Likewise, Democratic success in gubernatorial 
elections, though impressive, did not quite match their success in House 
elections- Because governorships are of varying terms and since different 
states schedule gubernatorial elections in different years, the Democrats' 
record in governorships can be examined in terms of the numbers they 
held at any point in time or the number that they won of those up for 
election in an election year. As table 2.5 shows, from 1954 to 1992, Demo­
crats only failed to occupy a majority of governorships for a single two-
year period (1968-69) and equaled Republican numbers in a second 
two-year period (1966-67). In 36 of the 40 years from 1954 to 1994, 
Democrats occupied a clear majority of statehouses. 
The Democratic success rate in gubernatorial elections is also im­
pressive. They won a clear majority of statehouses up for election in 16 
of the past 20 election years. Moreover, in two of the four elections in 
which they did not win a clear majority of gubernatorial elections (1980 
and 1984), Democrats and Republicans tied in their number of victories. 
Republicans were able to win a clear majority of gubernatorial elections 
in only 1966 and 1968. As in the Senate, Democrats were quite successful 
in governorships. Republican majorities were infrequent. Nevertheless, 
even this limited success surpassed the abysmal Republican record in 
House elections. 
Democratic Dominance of State Legislatures 
The Democratic record in state legislatures comes closest to equaling 
their House record. Table 2.6 presents the percentages of states with 
Democratic majorities in the lower and upper chambers of state legisla­
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Table 2.6 
The Democratic Party's Electoral Success in State Legislatures, 1954-1992 
Partisan Majorities in State Legislative Chambers 
Upper Chambers Lower Chambers 
Percent Percent 
Year Dem. Rep. Democratic Dem. Rep. Democratic 
1954 20 25 44 25 21 54 
1956 23 21 52 26 20 57 
1958 31 17 65 39 8 83 
1960 29 18 62 31 17 65 
1962 28 19 60 28 19 60 
1964 35 11 76 39 9 82 
1966 30 17 64 25 23 52 
1968 25 23 52 23 24 49 
1970 27 19 59 28 20 58 
1972 29 19 60 31 17 65 
1974 39 8 83 41 8 84 
1976 38 9 81 40 8 83 
1978 34 14 71 34 13 72 
1980 31 18 63 32 17 65 
1982 34 15 69 39 10 80 
1984 32 16 67 32 16 67 
1986 31 16 66 35 13 73 
1988 32 17 65 36 12 75 
1990 34 12 74 39 10 80 
1992 31 16 66 36 12 75 
Mean 30.7 16.5 65 33.0 14.9 69 
Nonmajorities 1 (5%) 1 (5%) 
55% or Less 3(15%) 3(15%) 
Sources: Computed from various volumes of The Book of the States, Congressional 
Quarterly Weekly Reports, and the Statistical Abstract of the United States. 
Note: Democratic minorities are indicated in bold. The number of legislatures do not 
total to 50 in each year, since Alaska and Hawaii elected their first legislatures as states in 
1958, Nebraska has a nonpartisan unicameral legislature, Minnesota also had a nonpartisan 
state legislature until the 1972 election, and, in several years, one or more legislatures were 
evenly divided between the parties. 
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tures. Democrats held control in a majority of upper houses of state legis­
latures following 19 of the 20 elections from 1954 to 1992. Prior to 1994, 
the last time that Republicans held a majority of upper chambers fol­
lowed the 1954 election. In 1954, Republicans controlled 25 of the 45 
upper houses in partisan state legislatures. In light of the fact that this 
election was before the one-person, one-vote court ruling requiring 
equally populated districts and that a number of these chambers had 
been elected in 1952 and were elected to four-year terms, one could easily 
conclude that since 1954, Democratic success in upper chambers of state 
legislatures was every bit as consistent as their success in the House of 
Representatives. 
Democrats dominated the lower chamber of state legislatures with 
almost the same consistency that they dominated the House. They con­
trolled a clear majority of lower chambers of state legislatures following 
19 of the 20 elections in which Democrats controlled the House. Republi­
cans came close to controlling a majority of state legislatures in 1966 and 
controlled a bare majority of chambers following the 1968 elections. If 
Democrats had won control of one additional lower chamber in 1968, 
their record of success at this level would have been as perfectly consistent 
as it was in the House of Representatives.5 
The Records Compared 
The record of the Democratic Party across the range of major offices re­
veals both interesting similarities and differences with their record of con­
sistent and substantial victories in the House. In comparing the record of 
consecutive Democratic majorities in the House from 1954 to 1992 to the 
party's record in other offices (see table 2.7), there is some order. Demo­
crats were least successful in running for the sole national office, the pres-
idency.6 For offices that require statewide votes (the U.S. Senate and 
governorships), they were more successful, though not as successful as 
they were in the House. Democrats were most successful in running for 
offices in which votes are cast within districts within the states—for the 
House of Representatives and for both the upper and lower chambers of 
state legislatures. This pattern has also been noted by Fiorina, who ob­
serves that "a large element in the increased incidence of divided govern-
ment—both nationally and in the states—is the decline in Republican 
legislative strength" (1992a, 58).7 
The similarities and differences in the consistency with which Dem­
ocrats have dominated different offices suggests why they were successful 
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Table 2.7 
Democratic Control of Various Offices, 1954-1992 
Degree of Democratic 
Level of Voting Office Party Success 
National The Presidency Moderate 
Statewide U.S. Senate, Governorships Great 
District U.S. House of Representatives, Upper Perfect or Near Perfect 
Chamber and Lower Chamber of 
State Legislature 
Note: Voting for the presidency might also be interpreted as occuring at the state level, 
because of the Electoral College. However, since each state as an electoral unit is not 
counted equally (as are states in senate and gubernatorial contests) and the candidates are 
common to all states, it may be more appropriate to treat presidential elections as a quasi-
national election. 
in general and why they dominated the House in particular. In view of 
the similarity of Democratic records for the two statewide offices (the Sen­
ate and governorships), the similarity of the records for districted offices 
(the House and state legislative offices), and the order of differences 
among the three levels, it is clear that Democrats have had an advantage 
in running for offices from smaller electoral districts. They have been 
more consistently successful in seeking districted offices. 
Why have Democrats been more successful in running for these 
more localized or districted offices? Several reasons are possible.8 Demo­
crats may be better at delivering government benefits to local areas. Their 
philosophy of government and their longtime control of the levers of 
governmental power may have helped them "bring home the bacon." 
Their more progovernment philosophy may have made it easier to coax 
competent potential candidates into running (Ehrenhalt, 1991), and this 
may have been especially important at lower levels of office, where the 
rewards for running are smaller and the pool of potential candidates not 
so well established. 
The thesis proposed here is that Democrats do particularly well in 
districted offices because the organization of votes into districts helps 
Democrats running for the House and state legislatures by allowing them 
to win in districts with relatively few votes. This is an advantage that Dem­
ocrats running in statewide and national races do not have. Compared to 
Republicans, Democratic House candidates tend to win in lower-turnout 
areas. Since Democrats have traditionally done well among lower socio­
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economic groups and since lower socioeconomic characteristics are 
strongly correlated with nonvoting, lower socioeconomic districts tend 
to elect Democrats, sometimes by large vote percentages but still with a 
relatively small number of actual votes because of the lower district turn­
out. As a result, compared to the Republican vote, the Democratic vote 
for the House is divided among districts in such a way that it elects more 
Democrats. Because House and state legislative elections are decided en­
tirely by the vote within particular districts, the fate of these candidates is 
not directly affected by the size of the district turnout.9 It only matters 
that a candidate receive more votes than any of his or her competitors, 
whether the "more" is of a huge number or a small number of voters. If 
votes for an office only matter within the confines of a district, the fact 
that turnout is low in the district and the party's winning candidate re­
ceives fewer actual votes than the winning candidates in other districts 
does not matter. 
While all that matters to House candidates is that they receive a 
plurality of the district vote, regardless of district turnout; this is not all 
that matters to candidates running for higher office. At the state level, 
where governors and senators are elected and where Electoral College 
votes for president are decided, congressional (or state legislative) district 
boundaries do not matter, and they do not limit the impact of low turnout 
on the aggregate vote. Governors and senators are decided by how many 
votes the candidates receive, not by how many congressional districts they 
carry. Thus, unlike a party's House candidates (or its state legislative 
candidates), it matters greatly to a party's presidential, senatorial, and 
gubernatorial candidates whether turnout is high or low in the party's 
stronghold districts.10 
This district-turnout explanation may explain more than why Dem­
ocratic House candidates (and state legislative) outperformed Democratic 
candidates for higher offices. It may also help to explain why Democrats 
dominated the House for so long. It suggests that there has been a Dem­
ocratic tilt to the House electoral system. This tilt has been based on Dem­
ocrats winning a disproportionate number of low-turnout districts. 
Because of the low turnout in these districts, Democrats have expended 
relatively few votes to win these cheap seats. The theory of cheap seats 
will be more fully elaborated shortly. 
The Electoral System and the Democratic Majority 
The Democratic record in House elections from 1954 to 1992 is certainly 
impressive. However, the record of Democratic victories does not per­
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Table 2.8 
The Overrepresentatlon of the Democratic House Vote, 1954-1992 
Democratic Vote Democratic Seat 
Election Percentage Percentage Difference 
1954 52.8 53.3 +.6 
1956 51.2 53.8 H-2.6 
1958 56.7 64.9 +8.2 
1960 55.1 60.0 +4.8 
1962 52.9 59.4 +6.6 
1964 57.8 67.8 +10.0 
1966 51.4 57.0 +5.6 
1968 51.0 55.9 +4.9 
1970 54.7 58.6 +3.9 
1972 53.2 55.8 +2.6 
1974 59.2 66.9 +7.7 
1976 57.4 67.1 +9.7 
1978 54.8 63.7 +8.9 
1980 51.5 55.9 +4.4 
1982 56.4 61.8 +5.2 
1984 52.5 58.2 +5.6 
1986 55.0 59.3 +4.4 
1988 54.2 59.8 +5.6 
1990 53.3 61.5 +8.1 
1992 53.1 59.4 +6.4 
Mean 54.2 60.0 +5.8 
Note: The Democratic vote percentages were calculated from volumes of The Statisti­
cal Abstract of the United States, with corrections being made for the inclusion of the District 
of Columbia, not counting Liberal Party votes for Democratic Party candidates in New York 
before 1960, estimates of turnout in uncontested districts in states in which that turnout is 
not reported, and several other minor discrepancies. Note that the actual vote calculated 
here is usually slightly more Democratic (a mean difference of about three-tenths of a per­
centage point more Democratic) than that reported by Omstein et al. (1990, table 2-2). 
fectly reflect the Democrats' success in attracting votes. The Democratic 
Party's share of votes for the House is smaller than its share of seats. Table 
2.8 presents for comparison the percentages of both votes and seats won 
by Democratic House candidates. 
As the table demonstrates, while Democrats have won a majority of 
votes, as well as seats, in each of the 20 elections from 1954 to 1992, their 
share of seats in each of these elections has consistently been larger than 
their share of votes. Over this period, the Democratic share of votes has 
ranged from a low of 51 percent in Eisenhower's 1956 reelection to a 
high of 58.5 percent in the post-Watergate election of 1974. Over the 
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same period, Democrats never occupied fewer than 53.3 percent of the 
seats (1954) and after the Johnson landslide of 1964 held 67.8 percent of 
the seats. Although they never received as much as 60 percent of the 
votes for the House in any election in the past 40 years, they held 60 
percent or more of the seats following 8 of the 20 elections of the Demo­
cratic dynasty. 
In a plurality-rule, single-member-district electoral system, such as 
that used to elect most House members, the party winning a majority of 
the national vote normally wins an even larger share of legislative seats.11 
Under the plurality-rule system, unlike various proportional representa­
tion methods, the party with a plurality of votes systematically receives an 
even larger proportion of seats. This is a long acknowledged characteris­
tic of the plurality system, originally dubbed "the cube law"—the ratio of 
seats split between two parties supposedly being a cubic function of the 
ratio of votes between the parties. While modern analysis indicates that 
the "cube law" is not a hard and fast law and that the precise translation 
of votes to seats (including how many seats each party could expect with 
50 percent of the vote) varies from one plurality-rule electoral system to 
another, these sophisticated analyses have supported the cube law's gen­
eral description of the S-shaped relation between a party's proportion of 
seats and its proportion of votes (Rae, 1971; Tufte, 1973; Taagepera and 
Shugart, 1989, 166). 
The cube-law description of the relationship between seats and 
votes is depicted by the S-curve shape in figure 2.1. The curve is in con­
trast to the diagonal, which reflects a system of perfect proportional rep­
resentation in which parties receive the same share of seats as their share 
of votes. The steepness of the slope in the middle of the vote distribution 
reflects the responsiveness of the electoral system. Responsiveness refers to 
the expected change in a party's share of seats from a specified change 
in votes. Plurality-rule systems, compared to proportional representation 
systems, are very responsive. For example, a 10 percentage point gain in 
the vote for a party (from 50 percent to 60 percent) would produce an 
equivalent 10 percentage point seat gain in a perfectly proportional rep­
resentation system but would produce a much larger (27 percent) change 
in a plurality-rule system (assuming the cube-law relationship). Note that 
the responsiveness of the electoral system is symmetric between the par­
ties. In the above example, whether the Democrats or the Republicans 
were the party in question, either would benefit equally by being the 
majority vote-getting party in the plurality-rule system and either would 
suffer equally by being the minority vote-getting party. 
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Plurality Suigle-Membcr-District System 
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Legislative vote % 
Figure 2.1 
The Relationship between Seats and Votes in Plurality and Proportional Represen­
tation Electoral Systems 
Why is the plurality-rule system responsive? Why does it overrepre­
sent the party with the most votes? We will address this question more 
fully in chapter 4, but, for now, the plurality-rule system overrepresents 
the stronger party because it causes the minority vote-getting party to 
waste a larger portion of its vote in losing candidacies. A majority party 
does not waste many of its votes. It can even win in districts in which it 
receives less than its average vote percentage. The minority party, on the 
other hand, not only receives fewer votes but wastes many of those that 
they do receive. The minority vote party can even lose (and thereby 
wastes votes) in districts in which its vote percentage actually exceeds its 
average vote percentage. Thus, a minority party wastes votes on losing 
candidates because it wastes votes in districts where its vote falls short of 
its average plus some districts where its vote actually exceeds its average, 
only not by enough to establish a plurality. 
For instance, what would happen if Democrats received 57 percent 
of the national vote and the Republicans received 43 percent? If the vote 
were uniformly distributed across all districts in the country, Democrats 
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would win all of the districts. No votes cast for Democrats would have 
been wasted (they all would have won some representation), and all votes 
cast for Republicans would have been wasted (they would not have re­
ceived any representation). But because of all of the sociological bases of 
the vote, the national vote is not distributed evenly. Each party has pock­
ets of strength and areas of weakness. With 43 percent of the vote nation­
wide, Republicans would waste votes in any district in which it received 
43 percent of the vote or less, but would also waste votes in districts in 
which it performed better than its typical showing but not enough better 
to achieve a majority. Assuming some variation in the distribution of the 
Democratic vote, Democrats would only waste votes in districts in which 
they did much more poorly than their national average. Votes for Demo­
crats would only be wasted where a Democratic district vote percentage 
falls a full 7 percentage points below its national average of 57 percent. 
As a result, the plurality-rule system provides many more opportunities 
for the minority party to waste its votes, and this produces system 
responsiveness. 
The responsiveness of the plurality-rule electoral system is one rea­
son why Democrats were overrepresented or received a larger share of 
seats than votes; however, it is not the only possible means by which a 
party can be overrepresented. The electoral system can also be biased in 
favor of a party. The nature and causes of partisan bias in an electoral 
system will be explored in some detail in chapter 4. However, we should 
note at this point that bias in an electoral system is operationally defined 
as the proportion of seats above or below 50 percent when parties (in a 
two-party system) receive an equal number of votes. In an unbiased sys­
tem, each party should receive 50 percent of the seats when it receives 50 
percent of the votes. In a biased system, if both parties received the same 
vote, one party would win a larger share of seats. By definition, a biased 
electoral system is asymmetric in its treatment of the parties.12 
While the responsiveness of an electoral system is produced by the 
minority party wasting a larger share of its votes on losing candidates, 
electoral system bias appears when the average winning candidate of one 
party receives more votes than the average winning candidate of the op­
position party. A party is favored in an electoral system when it expends 
fewer votes in its victories than its opposition expends in its successful 
candidacies. Given a constant number of unwasted votes (votes not 
wasted in losing causes), a party would rather spend fewer, rather than 
more, votes per victory. As the analysis in later chapters will show, bias in 
the electoral system is one reason that Democrats win a larger share of 
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seats than votes, and this may have contributed to the longevity of the 
Democratic House majority. The single-member-district, plurality-rule 
electoral system, the way in which votes are counted to award seats to 
the parties, is biased in favor of the Democratic Party, and this helped 
Democrats maintain their majority in the House of Representatives (and 
also in most state legislatures). 
• The Cheap-Seats Thesis • 
How were Democrats able to maintain their large majorities in the House 
for so many years? There are several plausible explanations. Democratic 
majorities certainly could not have survived without a good deal of public 
support for Democratic candidates in general. Democrats were, indeed, 
the more popular party. Moreover, increased ticket splitting in the late 
1960s allowed Democratic congressional candidates to protect their vote 
majorities against national political tides often favoring Republicans and 
electing several Republican presidents. However, the vote majorities that 
the electorate provided for Democrats may be only part of the explana­
tion for the Democratic Party's long-term dominance of the House. Dem­
ocrats may have become entrenched as the House majority whether or 
not voters really wanted them to. The electoral system and the lack of a 
real choice for many voters also contributed to the Democratic dynasty. 
The argument advanced here is this: the Democratic Party has been par­
ticularly and continuously successful in House elections in part because the electoral 
system (owing to a constellation of interrelated political, social, economic, and geo­
graphic conditions) is biased in its favor. Democrats maintained a House dy­
nasty not only because of the number of voters casting Democratic ballots 
but also because of the distribution of its votes around the nation. The 
organization of its votes into a particular arrangement of congressional 
districts was critical to the maintenance of the Democratic majority. The 
electoral system favored Democrats because the party was able to extend 
the "purchasing power" of its votes over a larger number of seats. It was 
able to do this because it won a disproportionate share of very-low-
turnout seats, the cheap seats. The evidence in the following chapters 
will show that Democratic victories in these low-turnout districts were a 
consistent feature of elections over the past 40 years. Even in 1994, when 
Republicans finally ended the Democratic reign of the House, Democrats 
won a large portion of the low-turnout districts and this buffered their 
losses. As a result of Democrats prevailing in low-turnout districts, 
the average number of votes for winning Democratic congressional 
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candidates falls well below that for Republican winners. Consequently, if 
Democratic and Republican candidates across the country received the 
same number of votes, Democrats would win a significantly greater num­
ber of seats. 
There are several possible reasons for a Democratic cheap-seats bias 
in the electoral system, but the most plausible involves the conjunction of 
five factors: 
1. the system of single-member, equal-population congressional 
districts; 
2. the socioeconomic basis of the Democratic and Republican 
coalitions; 
3. the association of socioeconomic class with turnout; 
4. the socioeconomic homogeneity of housing patterns; and 
5. the reflection of these neighborhoods in drawing district 
boundaries.13 
A critical condition for the cheap-seats thesis is the institution of 
the single-member, equal-population congressional district system. The 
single-member district system, though not a constitutional requirement, 
is the prevailing method for apportioning a state's allocated number 
of seats to the House. This has not always been the case. Multimember 
districts, in either the form of statewide at-large elections or separate 
multimember districts, were used by many states up until the 1840s (Con­
gressional Quarterly, 1985, 678). Multimember districts, in the form of 
statewide at-large districts sometimes layered over individual districts, 
were traditional arrangements in Connecticut (ending in 1960), Hawaii 
(1968), New Mexico (1966), North Dakota (1960), Texas (1958), and 
Washington (1956) and were often used in other states before the 1950s 
to select representatives until redistricting plans could be worked out. 
At-large districts in states having two or more representatives were pro­
hibited by federal statute in the late 1960s (Congressional Quarterly, 
1985, 693). 
The equal population characteristic of our electoral system was also 
not always the case. While the Constitution apportioned seats to the states 
according to their populations, it was silent on not only whether those 
seats had to be assigned to electoral districts (single or multimember) but, 
if districted, whether the population in the districts had to be equal. Sub­
stantial malapportionment was common through the 1960s. The Su­
preme Court declared malapportionment impermissible by extending 
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the one-person, one-vote principle to congressional districting in their 
ruling in Wesberry v. Sanders in 1964 and reinforced this standard nearly 
20 years later in their ruling in the case of Karcher v. Daggett (Congres­
sional Quarterly, 1985, 696). While neither the single-member-district ar­
rangement nor the equal-district-population rule were original to the 
American electoral system, they are now political ground rules that are 
firmly in place and serve as the first ingredient in the cheap-seats thesis.14 
The second and third ingredients in the cheap-seats thesis are the 
characteristics of the Democratic and Republican coalitions and their re­
lation to turnout. Compared to the Republican coalition, the Democratic 
coalition has consisted of sociodemographic groups that do not turn out 
at high rates. Democrats have been more likely to be on the lower rungs 
of the socioeconomic ladder and also are more likely to be from southern 
states (Axelrod, 1972; Stanley et aL, 1986; Erikson et al, 1989). Less-
educated and lower-income citizens, as well as southerners, are less likely 
to vote (Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980). 
Most important from the standpoint of the cheap-seats thesis, the 
partisan characteristics associated with turnout are also associated with 
where people live and (because of the single-member-district system) 
where they vote. Poor and working-class citizens are likely to live in 
neighborhoods apart from middle- and upper-class citizens, who vote at 
higher rates. Neighborhoods are not perfectly homogeneous in terms of 
class, but most neighborhoods can be generally characterized as con­
sisting of poor or working-class or middle-class or wealthy residents. In 
light of the proximity of residents with similar characteristics (education, 
income, and regional location) related to both turnout and partisanship, 
combined with the tradition of creating congressional districts with some 
geographic compactness and contiguity, as well as observing community 
boundaries (Butler and Cain, 1992, 65), it does not require intricate ger­
rymandering to produce an electoral bias.15 Because the Democratic co­
alition contains low-turnout groups that are geographically concentrated, 
the equal population, single-member-district electoral system allows 
Democrats to win many low-turnout districts and thereby win more seats 
nationally than Republicans would have won with an equal number of 
votes. 
The particular argument posed here to explain a pro-Democratic 
electoral system bias in modern American congressional elections is an 
application of a larger proposition about bias in single-member-district, 
plurality-rule electoral systems. A more generalized form of the electoral 
system bias proposition can be stated as: single-member-district electoral 
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systems apportioned by population are biased in favor of parties representing lower 
socioeconomic groups.16 The logic of this proposition is that lower socioeco­
nomic groups turn out to vote at lower rates and that the single-member-
district electoral system reduces the partisan impact of this low turnout 
by confining its implications within the districts. 
A hypothetical case illustrates the point. Assume a homogeneous 
lower socioeconomic district and a homogeneous upper socioeconomic 
district (of equal size populations) in a party system based on a strong 
class cleavage. Further assume that voting-age citizens of the lower socio­
economic class turn out at significantly lower rates than do those who 
are better off. The electoral outcomes in these two districts will be one 
representative of the lower-class party and one representative of the 
upper-class party, regardless of the turnout in the two districts. Because 
of the district organization of the votes, the lower-socioeconomic-class 
party is not hurt at all by the low turnout of its adherents and the upper-
socioeconomic-class party is not helped at all by the higher turnout of its 
supporters. All that matters to electing the two representatives is the vote 
division within each district rather than the actual number of total or 
pooled votes for each party. 
The thesis can be stated in an even more general form: any party 
whose adherents have characteristics associated with low turnout and are geographi­
cally concentrated by these characteristics will benefit from a districting system that 
reflects these geographic concentrations.11 As previously stated, the pertinent 
characteristics were socioeconomic, but the logic holds regardless of the 
particular characteristic associated with partisan voting, turnout, and 
geographic concentration. So long as district boundaries are drawn with 
respect for established communities, with concern for geographic com­
pactness and contiguity, and without regard to normal turnout levels in 
the proposed districts, the single-member-district electoral system should 
favor the party with low-turnout characteristics that tend to be also con­
centrated geographically.18 The party of low-turnout characteristics will 
be advantaged by winning the cheap seats. 
From this discussion, it should be clear that the single-member-
district electoral system is not inevitably biased in favor of the Democrats. 
It is the combination of factors linking a characteristic of potential voters, 
in this case socioeconomic status, to turnout and to partisanship, and the 
geographic concentration of that characteristic so that it is reflected in 
differences among districts, that makes a single-member-district electo­
ral system biased. If socioeconomic status were uncorrelated with turn­
out, or with partisanship, or with housing patterns, or if districts were 
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drawn in such a way that there were no aggregate socioeconomic differ­
ences among districts, then the single-member-district system would not 
generate electoral bias based on turnout differences.19 However, the 
cheap-seats thesis claims that in modern American politics all of these 
necessary ingredients are present and, as a consequence, the single-
member-district electoral system for the House is biased in favor of the 
Democratic Party. 
• Overview • 
The record of Democratic electoral success in the House from 1954 to 
1992 is impressive. The four-decade-long Democratic majority was im­
pressive, whether compared to the longevity of prior House majorities or 
to contemporary Democratic successes in other offices. The Democratic 
House majority over the 40 years preceding its collapse in 1994 was un­
precedented historically, sizable by any standard, and resilient to a variety 
of countervailing conditions. 
One perspective on the Democratic House majority set it in the con­
text of the party's success in seeking other political offices over this era. 
Democrats were quite successful, pretty much across the board. They 
won a majority of elections for most offices throughout this period. From 
Senate seats to governorships to state senate and state house seats, Demo­
crats usually won a majority of elections. The glaring exception to this 
Democratic ascendancy was the White House. In presidential elections, 
Republicans held their own with the Democrats. Some went so far as 
to claim that Republicans had an "electoral lock" on the White House. 
Barring unusual circumstances, such as the emergence of populist 
third-party candidates (such as Ross Perot) or scandals on the order of 
Watergate, Republicans seem to have had a clear edge in presidential 
elections (Will, 1988). 
Less obvious, but more telling, was the variation in Democratic suc­
cess below the presidential level. Democrats were most consistently suc­
cessful in seeking offices that represented districts rather than entire 
states. The success of Democrats in state legislative elections comes close 
to matching their impressive record in House races. While very successful 
in Senate and gubernatorial elections, the Democratic record in these 
races falls short of the party's near perfect record of majorities in the 
House and state legislatures over the past 40 years. The pattern is telling. 
These comparisons provide a clue to determining why Democrats domi­
nated the House of Representatives. There appears to be something 
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about districted offices that helps the chances of Democrats being elected 
and hurts the prospects of Republican victories. This brings us to the 
third point of the chapter. 
What is it about districted offices that helps Democrats? It may be 
that districting provides the party with an opportunity to win a number 
of cheap seats. Because of demographic links between partisanship, turn­
out, and district boundaries, Democrats regularly win many seats with 
relatively small numbers of votes, at bargain-basement prices (in terms of 
votes spent for a victory). Because of this, Democrats acquire more seats 
per vote than Republicans. Put differently, because of the system of con­
gressional districts and the nature of the two parties' coalitions, the elec­
toral system has been biased in favor of the Democrats. This thesis will be 
investigated at length in the following chapters. However, other explana­
tions have also been offered for the Democratic dynasty, and we now turn 
to them. 
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.ow did Democrats dominate the House of Representatives for so 
many years? How did they preserve their majority through so many elec­
tions in an otherwise competitive two-party system? Party leaders had 
their ideas about this. As one might expect, Democrats and Republicans 
did not see eye to eye. Many Republicans thought that the system was 
rigged to give Democrats, especially Democratic incumbents, an advan-
tage.1 Through a combination of shameless partisan gerrymandering and 
the crafty exploitation of incumbency perquisites, including everything 
from pandering to constituents through pork-barrel politics to stuffing 
campaign coffers with PAC money to abusing the franking privilege by 
running permanent taxpayer-financed campaigns, Republicans figured 
Democrats overwhelmed and undermined the democratic electoral pro­
cess. By whatever mix of shenanigans, Republicans figured that "the fix 
was in." 
Democrats had a quite different interpretation. Many regarded 
their continuing majority as testimony to the Democratic Party's success­
ful representation of the American public. Voters filled the House with 
Democrats election after election because Democrats were more sensitive 
to the concerns of the average voter. Republicans were responsive to the 
monied interests, the "fat cats," while Democrats responded to the needs 
of the average working guy, and this was reflected at the polls—at least 
as the Democrats saw it. 
Like the debate among politicians, the explanations offered by polit­
ical scholars who addressed the subject differ on one central question: 
Did the Democratic Party's extended control of the House reflect the will 
of the voters?2 At one end of the spectrum are explanations that trace the 
45 
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Democratic dynasty directly to the voters (recall figure 1.2). At the other 
end are claims that the Democratic majority was not so much a product 
of voters freely voting Democrats into office as a political system that 
made the survival of the Democratic majority all but inevitable. Still other 
theories occupy a middle ground, claiming that the Democratic majority 
was a result of both voters favoring Democrats and a political context that 
enhanced the prospects of a Democratic House.3 
The intentional explanations for the era of Democratic dominance, the 
first set of theories, claim that the long tenure of the Democratic majority 
reflected the will of the voters working through the democratic process. 
A majority of voters, year in and year out, chose a majority of Democratic 
House candidates in fair and competitive elections. A number of reasons 
have been advanced to explain why voters sent Democrats to the House, 
but all boil down to this: Democrats controlled the House because the 
American voters wanted it that way. The Democratic House resulted from 
the democratic system working as intended. 
Other theories claim quite the opposite, that the Democratic dy­
nasty was the result of a breakdown in democracy. The Democratic ma­
jority was not in place so long because citizens wanted it that way but 
because the arrangements of the electoral system made it a foregone con­
clusion. The Democratic dynasty was an artifact of the electoral system 
and not a reflection of the public's will. At the most extreme is the claim 
that the electoral system was consciously rigged, through the gerryman­
dering of congressional district lines, to subvert the will of the people in 
order to keep Democrats in power. In a more charitable vein, the elec­
toral system may have naturally worked to the advantage of a party under 
certain conditions and the Democratic Party just happened to have the 
necessary characteristics. The Democratic advantage may simply have 
been an unintended consequence of the electoral system. No rigging was 
required. From either perspective, these institutional explanations of the 
Democratic dynasty differ greatly from the intentional explanations. The 
Democrats were not an entrenched majority in the House because voters 
wanted it that way. Democrats controlled the House because the electoral 
system installed them in the majority, regardless of whether the electorate 
wanted them in control or not. In short, Democracy (as in, rule by the 
Democrats) was at the expense of democracy. 
Who or what was responsible for the Democratic dynasty? The first 
set of theories says that the voters were responsible. The second claims 
that the political system was responsible. There are still other possible 
culprits or heroes (depending on your point of view). Contextual explana­
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tions claim that characteristics of the candidates tilted the process toward 
the Democrats. Strictly speaking, the Democrats were in the majority be­
cause a majority of the electorate decided to vote for congressional Demo­
crats, but these vote decisions were steered toward the Democrats. For 
instance, a voter may have to decide between an incumbent Democratic 
representative who has lavished government largess on constituents and 
an inexperienced Republican challenger running an underfunded cam­
paign. If the voter opts to return the Democrat to office and thereby 
helps to renew the Democratic majority in the House, in one sense the 
Democratic majority is a product of the electorate's decision. But that is 
only part of the story. The voter, in this instance, has not been offered a 
full and fair choice between the parties. If the Republican candidate had 
enjoyed the same kind of government and campaign resources as the 
Democratic incumbent, if the campaign were conducted on a level play­
ing field, perhaps voters would have decided differently. 
While it is possible that a single explanation accounts for the sus­
tained Democratic majority, it seems more likely that the Democratic dy­
nasty was a result of a mix of several causes. There is no reason to assume 
that the Democrats attained their record by only one route or to think 
that the suggested causes are mutually exclusive. Although the principal 
point of this book is that there were substantial institutional reasons for 
the Democratic majority, it is also quite possible that there is merit also to 
the intentional and contextual explanations. 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine these noninstitutional 
explanations. The intentional explanations trace the Democratic majority 
to a single source, the voters. Voters, according to this explanation, either 
simply wanted Democrats in office or were especially interested in having 
Democrats in Congress. The principal contextual explanation traces the 
Democratic majority to congressional candidates. According to this expla­
nation, while the Democratic seat majority was based on its vote majority, 
that vote majority was not simply the expression of the free will of voters 
choosing between the parties' congressional candidates in a fair cam­
paign. We turn first to the voters and the parties as possible contributors 
to the Democratic dynasty. 
• Voters and Parties • 
Although there is controversy about what sustained the Democratic ma­
jority, one central fact is indisputable: Democratic congressional candi­
dates won a majority of votes cast in each congressional election from 
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1954 to 1992. As Fiorina observed prior to the 1994 election, Republicans 
"should not win a majority of House seats because they do not receive a 
majority of House votes" (1992a, 16). The congressional two-party vote 
percentage cast for Democratic candidates in elections over this period is 
charted in figure 3.1. The Democratic congressional vote in elections 
during this period typically fluctuated around 54 percent and never 
dipped below 50 percent. There is little question that Democratic 
congressional voters were the foundation for the Democratic dynasty. 
However, the Democratic vote may not be the whole story behind the 
Democratic seat majority. 
The Voice of the People 
From one perspective, the consistent success of Democratic congressional 
candidates in winning the support of a majority of voters from 1954 to 
1992 should not be surprising. Democrats consistently outnumbered Re­
publicans among those identifying with a political party during this 
period. On average, Democratic Party identifiers constituted about 53 
percent of the voting public (ranging from approximately 48 to 60 per­
cent), while about 37 percent of voters identified with the Republicans 
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(ranging from approximately 34 to 45 percent).4 With professed Demo­
crats outnumbering Republicans in each election (typically by almost a 
three-to-two margin), and with the inclination of partisans to support 
their own (even though defection rates have been higher among Demo­
crats), a consistent Democratic majority in the congressional vote might 
well be expected. 
This simple explanation of Democratic dominance, however, does 
not explain the disparity of Democratic success in seeking different of­
fices. If the public was so generally disposed to support Democrats, why 
did Democrats not have the same lock on the White House and the Sen­
ate that they had on the House? Why did Democrats more consistently 
win a majority of votes in House races than for elections for other offices? 
One reason may be the composition of the parties' coalitions. The Demo­
cratic coalition may be better suited to running in local rather than 
national contests. Tensions exist within all coalitions, but they have tradi­
tionally been greater within the more diverse Democratic coalition than 
among Republicans.5 Poking fun at the many divisions and routine tur­
moil within the Democratic Party, humorist Will Rogers said, "I belong 
to no organized political party—I am a Democrat" (Henning, 1992, 65). 
One persistent point of division within the Democratic coalition has been 
the inclusion of both generally liberal minority groups and generally con­
servative white southerners. Within congressional districts, however, this 
tension is often greatly reduced. In predominantly minority districts, 
Democratic candidates can tailor their appeals to the more liberal constit­
uency. In predominantly white southern suburban districts, Democrats 
can stake out a more moderate or conservative stance. In seeking higher 
office with a broader constituency, the intraparty tensions are less often 
defined away by district lines. Appeals to one part of the Democratic con­
stituency made in statewide or national races may cost candidates support 
from other constituencies within the party. These unavoidable tradeoffs 
in dealing with the Democratic coalition across district boundaries are 
likely to be more severe than those faced within less heterogeneous dis­
tricts, an advantage for House Democratic candidates.6 
It may also be the case that some voters have been more receptive 
to Democratic candidates for Congress than for other offices.7 A number 
of reasons have been advanced for why a small but strategically important 
minority of voters split their tickets to vote for Democratic congressional 
candidates (Alesina and Rosenthal, 1989, 1995; Jacobson, 1990, chap. 6; 
Fiorina, 1992a, 64-82, 1992b, 1992c, 1994; Petrocik, 1991; and Ing­
berman and Villani, 1993). Some ticket splitters may be trying to obtain 
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moderate policies in voting for Democratic congressional candidates and 
Republican presidential candidates. Barone and Ujifusa (1987) and Ales-
ma and Rosenthal (1989, 1995) argue that these moderate split-ticket vot­
ers vote for congressional Democrats, who generally favor more liberal 
policies, to balance the more conservative inclinations of Republican pres­
idential candidates. Others may vote with the intention of creating politi­
cal gridlock. If voters distrust both political parties, they may want a 
Democratic Congress and a Republican president to keep each other in 
check (Fiorina, 1991). Jacobson (1990) offers a different motivation for 
split tickets, with the congressional vote going to the Democrat. He sug­
gests that the basis of these votes lies in the mutually exclusive policy 
preferences by some voters and the policy stands of the parties. Voters 
want government officials to say yes to their special or local interests 
(more likely from Democrats), while at the same time saying no to the 
special interests of others (more likely from Republicans).8 Congressional 
representation focuses on local interests, where voters want more govern­
ment largess. This is right up the Democratic alley. Presidential politics, 
on the other hand, tends to focus on broader interests, where voters often 
want more government restraint. This is better turf for Republicans (Pe­
trocik, 1991). Other factors might also come into play that would help to 
explain why Democratic congressional candidates as a group have fared 
so well, but the basic fact is that, for the 40-year period from 1954 to 
1994, they consistently fared well at the polls.9 
After reviewing the partisan congressional vote history, one might 
be tempted to say that the puzzle of the sustained Democratic congres­
sional majority is no puzzle at all. Democrats won a majority of seats year 
in and year out because they won a majority of votes year in and year 
out. Thus, the Democratic majority in the House reflected the will of the 
people. It is as simple as that. What is the mystery? 
A Desired Dynasty? 
There are a couple of catches to the argument that the Democratic major­
ity simply reflected the desires of the electorate. First, a majority vote for 
Democratic candidates does not necessarily indicate that a majority freely 
favored a Democratic majority in the House over a Republican majority. 
Democrats may have won a majority of votes because of votes influenced 
by reasons other than those involved in offering a fair choice between the 
parties. Democratic candidates may have received many votes for reasons 
entirely unrelated to the character, perspectives, and quality of its candi­
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Figure 3.2 
The Democratic Congressional Vote in Contested Districts, 1954-1992 
Note: The Democratic congressional vote is the percentage of the two-party vote in districts 
with candidates of both major parties. 
dates relative to Republican opponents. Most obviously, in light of the 
fact that there have been more Democratic than Republican incumbents, 
the benefits of incumbency may have provided an extra push in the Dem­
ocratic direction for a critical number of voters (again, recall figure 1.2). 
In addition, the greater number of uncontested Democratic candidates, 
restricting voter options to a Democratic vote or abstention, may have 
helped to produce Democratic majorities by default rather than by voter 
choice. The Democratic congressional vote in contested districts suggests 
that the total Democratic vote (in figure 3.1) may have exaggerated Dem­
ocratic popularity. In districts in which voters had a choice between a 
Democrat and a Republican, Republicans received a majority of the vote 
in six elections from 1954 to 1992 (1954, 1956, 1966, 1968, 1980, and 
1984). Figure 3.2 presents the Democratic House vote in contested dis­
tricts. While there is certainly selection bias in examining just contested 
seats (Republicans being highly unlikely to do very well in the seats that 
they left uncontested to Democrats, thus inflating the Republican vote 
percentage), national Democratic vote majorities appear to be inflated by 
the absence of Republican candidates on the ballots in many districts. 
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Second, on close inspection, the history of the Democrats' popular 
support is less overwhelming than it first appears. Although Democrats 
outnumbered Republicans, Democratic Party identification often hov­
ered at just over half of the electorate. In several elections in the 1980s, 
Democratic partisanship dropped below 50 percent.10 This sometimes 
marginal majority, combined with the greater defection rates of Demo­
cratic identifiers and the fact that Democratic candidates have not been 
quite as successful in other offices (especially the presidency), should tem­
per claims that the continuity of the Democratic House majority rested 
on public support alone. 
A closer inspection of the Democratic congressional vote also sug­
gests that reasons other than the electorate's support for the Democratic 
Party may have contributed to the party's success in the House. Although 
it is true that the Democrats won a majority of congressional votes, as well 
as seats, in each election from 1954 to 1992, their national vote margin 
was occasionally quite narrow. In 4 of the 20 elections in this period, 
Democrats received 51.5 percent or less of the national vote. The narrow­
est Democratic congressional vote majority was in 1968, an election in 
which Democrats received 51 percent of the vote. Democratic congres­
sional vote majorities were also slim in 1956 (51.2 percent), 1966 (51.4 
percent), and 1980 (51.5 percent). In another three elections, the Demo­
cratic vote majority was under 53 percent. These modest Democratic vote 
majorities were in the 1954 (52.8 percent), 1962 (52.9 percent), and 1984 
(52.5 percent) elections. In light of the narrow Democratic popular-vote 
victories in 7 of the 20 elections, it is quite possible that any number of 
elements in these elections, when combined with a strong base of Demo­
cratic partisanship, may have made the difference between a Republican 
or a Democratic popular-vote majority. As we shall see shortly, the Demo­
cratic Party enjoyed several advantages that might have been sufficient to 
maintain a Democratic House majority in these close elections. 
Finally, in examining the narrow Democratic popular-vote majori­
ties, it is difficult to imagine that Democrats would not have maintained 
a majority of seats even if their vote share had dropped below 50 percent. 
For instance, Democrats in 1968 won a bare majority of votes (51 per­
cent), but quite a healthy majority of seats (55.9 percent). Would the 
Democrats have lost 5.9 percent of seats in the House (about 26 seats) if 
they had lost just 1 percent of the vote? Very unlikely. Democrats main­
tained sizable seat majorities following several other elections (1962, 
1966, 1980, and 1984) in which their popular-vote majorities were mod­
est to narrow. Everyone would admit that the single-member-district sys­
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Table 3.1 
The Expected Democratic Seat Percentages and the Necessary Swing Ratio 
to Obtain the Observed Democratic Seat Percentages in Five Elections 
Democratic Percentage 
Seats Swing Ratio Necessary 
to Obtain 
Election Vote Actual Expected Difference Observed Seat Percentage 
1962 52.9 59.4 55.8 +3.6 3.2 
1966 51.4 57.0 52.1 +4.9 5.0 
1968 51.0 55.9 51.5 +4.4 5.9 
1980 51.5 55.9 52.3 +3.6 3.9 
1984 52.5 58.2 53.8 +4.4 3.2 
Note: Expected seat percentages assume no partisan bias and are based on Jacob-
son's estimates of the conversion rate of votes to seats, or the swing ratio (1990). Jacobson's 
estimate of the swing ratio (or responsiveness) from 1946 to 1964, using the national vote 
division, is approximately 2. This indicates that a party should expect to gain about 2 percent 
of seats for every additional 1 percent of the vote it receives (1990, table 5.5). After 1964, 
the swing ratio dropped to approximately 1.5. The necessary swing ratio assumes no partisan 
bias and is computed by subtracting 50 percent from both the actual percentage of seats 
and votes and then taking the ratio. For example, in 1962 assuming no bias (a party would 
win 50 percent of the seats with 50 percent of the vote), Democrats won 59.4 percent of the 
seats with 52.9 percent of the vote. Since the swing ratio is the ratio of seat change to vote 
change, the swing ratio in this case is 3.2 ((59.4 - 50)/(52.9 - 50) = 3.24). 
tern exaggerates majorities, or causes the minority vote party to waste a 
greater portion of its votes in losing causes. However, the Democratic 
Party's share of seats in these cases was much greater than what we would 
expect from only the magnification of majorities by the responsiveness of 
the single-member-district system. The normal amplification of the vote 
majorities would have produced much smaller seat majorities than what 
we actually observed. With vote percentages in the 51-to-53 percent 
range, Democrats should have won seats in the 52-to-56 percent range 
(226 to 244 seats)—not in the 56-to-59 percent range (a 13-to-l7 seat 
difference). The expected seat percentages in these five elections, com­
puted from the actual vote and Jacobson's estimates of the magnification 
factor or swing ratio (1990, 86), are presented in table 3.1. The table also 
presents the swing ratio that would have been necessary to produce the 
observed seat percentages (supposing an unbiased electoral system).11 
On the basis of the observed vote and existing swing-ratio estimates, 
it appears that the Democrats won about 3.6 percent to 4.4 percent more 
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seats in these five elections than one would have expected based on the 
normal amplification of a vote majority. This suggests that Democrats 
would have won a majority of seats in each of these elections even if they 
had failed to obtain a majority of the popular vote.12 The size of the "nec­
essary swing ratios" to obtain the actual percentage of seats also raises 
doubts about the neutrality of the House electoral system. Whereas Ja­
cobson estimates the pre-1966 swing ratio at about 2 percent of seats for 
every additional percentage of the vote and about 1.5 after 1964, the 
swing ratios that would have been necessary to obtain the Democratic 
seat shares in the five elections in table 3.1 were well over 3. In two years, 
the "necessary swing ratios" were equal to or greater than 5, more than 
three times larger than the estimated swing ratio! These unrealistic swing 
ratios suggest only one thing: the premise on which these swing ratios were cal­
culated, that the electoral system was neutral, is wrong. 
While congressional Democrats undoubtedly received a great deal 
of public support over the last 40 years, the continuity of the Democratic 
majority was based on more than votes alone. True, during this period 
Democrats won a majority of votes in each election, albeit a narrow ma­
jority in several. However, these vote majorities do not necessarily mean 
that Democratic majorities survived because the voters wanted it that way. 
A number of factors having little to do with voter judgments about the 
parties' relative governing capacities may have thrown enough votes to 
Democratic candidates to assemble a Democratic vote majority. Moreover, 
Democrats probably would have won a majority of seats in at least 5 of 
the 20 elections from 1954 to 1992, even if they had fallen short of a 
popular-vote majority. Democratic votes, cast for whatever reasons, may 
have been sufficient for the preservation of the Democratic House major­
ity, but they may not have been necessary to its survival. 
• The Candidates • 
The theory that the Democratic dynasty in the House was simply the 
product of the intentions of a majority of voters who wanted Democrats 
to represent them in Congress is open to challenge on a number of 
grounds. As already noted, Democrats most likely would have won a ma­
jority of seats even without a majority of votes. In addition, Democratic 
vote majorities did not necessarily mean that a majority of voters wanted 
to be represented by Democrats. The link between the vote and the inten­
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tions of voters involves several assumptions about the choices offered to 
voters. 
In this section, we turn to two candidate-related factors that boosted 
the number of votes that congressional Democrats received—incum-
bency and uncontested districts.13 While both incumbency and the lack 
of opposition in a district can be traced to past votes and anticipation of 
future votes in a district, both bestow on a party's candidate additional or 
bonus votes that have little to do with any preference that these voters 
might have for Democratic rather than Republican candidates. To the 
extent that the Democratic majority rests on these votes, it reflects more 
about the political system than the free will of the voters. 
Incumbency attracts votes. As a rule, congressional candidates can 
expect to receive additional votes when they are incumbents.14 Some vot­
ers are drawn to the incumbent, regardless of party, through a variety of 
reasons associated with the advantages of incumbency. Incumbents tend 
to be better known, better positioned to take credit for government pro­
grams, and better financed to run campaigns than their challengers. Oth­
ers vote for the incumbent simply out of inertia, giving the current 
occupant the benefit of any minor doubt. These advantages translate into 
votes. Because there were more Democratic than Republican incum­
bents, some portion of the Democratic vote majority was a product of 
votes cast because of incumbency. These votes attracted by incumbency 
are votes that would have been cast for incumbents of either party. To the 
extent that the Democratic vote majority has been based on votes gener­
ated by incumbency, it undermines the idea that the party's seat majority 
simply reflects the free will of the electorate expressed through a fair and 
unbiased electoral process. 
Congressional Democrats also received a number of votes by de­
fault. In uncontested districts voters can only choose to vote for the 
sole available congressional candidate or abstain from voting for that of­
fice. What do votes for these unchallenged congressional candidates 
reveal about the preferences of voters? It is hard to argue that these 
votes necessarily indicate a preference for representation of the party 
posting a candidate. Because a majority, sometimes an overwhelm­
ing majority, of uncontested districts in elections between 1954 and 1992 
involved Democratic congressional candidates without Republican 
opposition, Democrats nationally enjoyed an advantage over Republi­
cans. As in the case of incumbency-based votes, to the extent that the 
Democratic vote majority is based on votes that it received by default, 
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the vote cannot be read simply as having reflected voter sentiment for 
representation by Democrats. 
The Democratic Advantage in Incumbency 
Given the advantages of incumbents and the propensity of voters to vote 
for incumbents, even from the opposing party, it is clear that the party 
with more incumbent candidates has an advantage over the opposing 
party. The aggregate of the incumbency advantages of individual candi­
dates should show up in national vote totals. Since more Democratic can­
didates than Republican candidates have enjoyed incumbency status, the 
national Democratic congressional vote totals have been inflated over 
what the vote they would have been without the incumbency boost. In 
this section we examine the extent of the Democratic incumbency advan­
tage. After we also examine the advantage Democrats had enjoyed in 
uncontested seats, we will determine the extent to which this dual candi­
date advantage (incumbency and uncontested seats) was responsible for 
sustaining the party's dynasty.15 
The Democratic incumbency advantage from 1954 to 1992 rested 
on two indisputable facts: (1) more incumbents seeking reelection were Demo­
crats than Republicans, and (2) incumbency itself is generally worth votes, regard­
less of the incumbent's party.16 Not only were more Democratic candidates 
incumbents because more incumbents are Democrats, but in every elec­
tion from 1954 to 1992, Democratic incumbents were more likely to run 
for reelection than Republican incumbents (Gilmour and Rothstein, 
1993, 348-49).17 In view of these two facts, there is no doubt that some 
portion of the Democratic vote and seat majorities were a result of incum­
bency. The only real question is how much of the Democratic vote was 
based on the party's incumbency advantage. Was the dynasty preserved 
because of incumbency? Put differently, how many votes did the Demo­
cratic Party receive because of its incumbency advantage and how many 
votes would it have received if it did not enjoy this advantage? 
Table 3.2 presents the number of Democratic and Republican 
incumbents running for reelection from 1954 to 1992. As expected, 
throughout this period a majority of incumbents running in each election 
(with the single exception of 1954) were Democrats. Moreover, much as 
you would expect, given their substantial seat majorities, the Democratic 
lead in incumbents running in the general election was also usually sub­
stantial. In this period, there were typically anywhere from 70 to 90 more 
Democratic incumbents running than Republican incumbents. Rarely 
VOTERS, PARTIES, AND CANDIDATES • 5  7 
Table 3.2 
The Incumbency Advantage as a Democratic Party Advantage, 1954-1992 
Democratic Republican Net Democratic 
Incumbents Incumbents Incumbent Seat 
Election Year Running Running Advantage 
1954 196 205 - 9 
1956 218 186 +32 
1958 219 168 +51 
1960 267 135 +132 
1962 238 151 +87 
1964 231 160 +71 
1966 275 130 +145 
1968 230 175 +55 
1970 221 170 +51 
1972 221 154 +67 
1974 220 163 +57 
1976 252 128 +124 
1978 249 128 +121 
1980 248 143 +105 
1982 215 168 +47 
1984 254 154 +100 
1986 232 159 +73 
1988 245 163 +82 
1990 247 158 +89 
1992 211 136 +75 
1994 225 157 +68 
Source: Gary Jacobson supplied data up to 1992. The 1994 data were calculated 
from Congressional Quarterly (22 October 1994). The numbers include incumbents running 
against other incumbents. This occurred in 3 cases in 1952, 7 in 1962,1 in 1966, 4 in 1968, 
1 in 1970, 2 in 1972, 6 in 1980, and 5 in 1992. 
did the Democratic incumbency advantage slip below 50 incumbents, and 
on several occasions there were over 100 more Democratic than Republi­
can incumbents seeking reelection. As long as incumbency is worth some­
thing, and there is a good deal of research to indicate it is of substantial 
value, the national Democratic vote must have been boosted by the fact 
that more of its candidates ran as incumbents.18 
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The Democratic Uncontested-Seat Advantage 
In addition to the incumbency advantage, Democrats enjoyed an advan­
tage over Republicans in the number of seats that were won by default. 
Like the incumbency advantage, the uncontested-seat advantage boosted 
the national Democratic congressional vote above what it would have 
been if it had reflected the will of the voters choosing between Democratic 
and Republican representation. Of course, districts are usually uncon­
tested for a reason; the prospects for a successful challenge is so remote 
that prospective challengers are discouraged from making a futile run. 
Nevertheless, even if a challenge were futile, it is safe to say that some 
citizens who happen to reside in uncontested Democratic districts would 
vote for a Republican congressional candidate if that option were avail­
able. It is probably also safe to say that, while some of these would-be 
Republican congressional voters simply do not vote, at least at the con­
gressional level, others cast a meaningless vote for the lone candidate on 
the ballot. Thus, if uncontested seats boost a party's vote totals above what 
voters would have given the party if they had a choice between the parties 
and if Democrats had more uncontested districts than Republicans, then 
some portion of the Democratic vote merely reflected the lack of a choice 
presented to voters rather than the choice of the voters. How large was 
the Democratic uncontested-seat advantage, and how much did this ad­
vantage contribute to the Democratic vote? 
The number of uncontested seats for each party in elections from 
1954 to 1992 is presented in table 3.3. As the table indicates, Democrats 
held a consistent edge over Republicans in uncontested seats. The me­
dian Democratic advantage was 40 seats, though unopposed Democrats 
outnumbered unopposed Republicans by more than 60 in several elec­
tions. In recent years, the Democratic uncontested-seat advantage de­
clined and, as we will see in chapter 7, Republicans in 1994 actually had 
an uncontested-seat advantage over Democrats. However, throughout 
the era of continuous Democratic control of the House, Democrats were 
well on their way to a seat majority before a single ballot had been cast 
and some votes added to the Democratic totals by default rather than by 
choice. The question is how many? 
The Democratic Candidate Advantage 
Two factors enter into calculating the vote boost that Democrats received 
from their candidate advantage: (1) the number of seats in which each of 
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Table 3.3 
Uncontested Congressional Districts, by Political Party, 1954-1992 
Democratic 
Total Uncontested Uncontested 
Conaressional Unopposed Party Net Seat 
Election Year Districts (Percentage) Democrats Republicans Advantage 
1954 86 (20) 84 2 +82 
1956 72(17) 69 3 +66 
1958 97 (22) 96 1 +95 
1960 79(18) 76 3 +73 
1962 51 (12) 50 1 +49 
1964 42(10) 41 1 +40 
1966 57(13) 53 4 +49 
1968 48(11) 41 7 +34 
1970 63(14) 58 5 +63 
1972 54(12) 46 8 +38 
1974 60(14) 58 2 +56 
1976 52(12) 46 6 +40 
1978 70(16) 51 19 +32 
1980 56(13) 41 15 +26 
1982 58(13) 47 11 +36 
1984 68(16) 54 14 +40 
1986 74(17) 56 18 +38 
1988 81 (19) 61 20 +41 
1990 84(19) 48 36 +12 
1992 31 (7) 18 13 +5 
1994 52 (12) 16 35 -1  9 
Source: Calculated from Congressional Quarterly's Guide to U.S. Elections, 2d ed. 
(1985), and Congressional Quarterly Weekly Reports for 1988,1990, and 1992. The percent­
ages are of all districts that were uncontested. 
the parties had a candidate advantage (uncontested seats or incumbents) 
and (2) the percentage of votes that a party could typically expect because 
of a candidate advantage, the vote value to a party of an individual district 
being uncontested or defended by an incumbent. Using these two quanti­
ties, we can calculate the extent to which Democratic vote has been 
boosted by the party's candidate advantages. The benefit to the party is 
the product of the individual vote value of an advantage and the number 
of districts in which they have that advantage. 
We address first the number of districts in which Democrats and 
Republicans had candidate advantages that could have affected the 
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district's vote. The numbers of uncontested and incumbent districts (ta­
bles 3.2 and 3.3), however, require some adjustment before calculating 
the impact of the candidate advantage. The two advantages often overlap 
in the same districts. The single candidate in uncontested districts is usu­
ally an incumbent. Thus, the count of the uncontested-seat and incum­
bency advantages should be combined in order to avoid double 
counting.19 If the unopposed candidate and incumbency advantages 
were analyzed separately, we would exaggerate the total vote inflation 
from a party's candidate advantage. A party gets a boost for every uncon­
tested district and for every incumbent running in a contested district, 
but it is unrealistic to assume that a party would gain an additional boost 
if one of its unopposed candidates also happened to be an incumbent. In 
order to examine the total candidate advantage of the Democratic Party 
simultaneously, we combine the two types of advantages to indicate the 
Democratic advantage in uncontested seats and the additional Demo­
cratic advantage of incumbency in contested seats. 
Table 3.4 presents the number of unopposed candidates for each 
party (the same as in table 3.3) and the number of incumbents in each 
district who ran in contested districts. Observe that the Democratic Party 
consistently enjoyed an advantage in uncontested seats and since 1960 
also enjoyed an advantage of more incumbents in contested seats (with 
only one minor exception, 1974). In assessing the impact of these candi­
date advantages on the parties' vote, it is reasonable to assume that each 
uncontested seat has more of an impact than each contested incumbent 
seat; since with only one candidate on the ticket, voters are forced to vote 
for one party's candidate if they are to vote at all. The question that we 
must now address is how many votes does each of these candidate advan­
tages mean to the parties' total votes? Are the candidate advantages 
enough to make it appear that a majority of voters wanted Democratic 
candidates when really they either were steered that way by incumbency 
or were offered no alternative to the Democratic candidate? 
What difference does the lack of an opponent mean to the vote in 
an uncontested district? How many votes does a party forgo in leaving an 
opposing candidate unchallenged? Put differently, if a seat that had been 
uncontested instead was contested by two major-party candidates, how 
would the vote have changed? Certainly there would be many differences 
from one previously uncontested seat to another, but we would expect 
that turnout in the typical district would increase and that the number 
of votes for the party that had left the seat unopposed would increase 
considerably.20 There is no expectation that the party that had left the 
VOTERS, PARTIES, AND CANDIDATES Q 6  1 
Table 3.4 
The Democratic Candidate Advantage, 1954-1992 
Unopposed Candidates:

Incumbents and Open Seats Contested Incumbents

Net Seat Net Seat

Election Year Dem. Rep. Advantage Dem. Rep. Advantage

1954 84 2 +82 119 202 -83

1956 69 3 +66 153 183 -30

1958 96 1 +95 127 167 -40

1960 76 3 +73 194 130 +64

1962 50 1 +49 180 150 +30

1964 41 1 +40 191 159 +32

1966 53 4 +49 224 126 +98

1968 41 7 +34 192 167 +25

1970 58 5 +63 166 165 +1

1972 46 8 +38 179 146 +33

1974 58 2 +56 161 162 -1

1976 46 6 +40 210 122 +88

1978 51 19 +32 205 109 +96

1980 41 15 +26 212 128 +84

1982 47 11 +36 170 158 +12

1984 54 14 +40 201 140 +61

1986 56 18 +38 178 142 +36

1988 61 20 +41 185 144 +41

1990 48 36 +12 199 122 +77

1992 18 13 +5 196 125 +71

Note: A positive net seat advantage indicates an advantage for the Democrats. The 
number of unopposed candidates are from table 3.3. The number of contested incumbents 
are calculated from the total number of incumbents (in table 3.2) and the number of unop­
posed incumbents. The number of unopposed incumbents were provided by Gary Jacobson 
(personal correspondence, 5 April 1993). 
seat uncontested would be competitive by offering a candidate, but by 
running a respectable candidate, someone who would do little personally 
either to attract or repel voters, the party should draw a significant num­
ber of votes. Just how many is difficult to say. However, it is probably safe 
to say that it would be roughly similar to the number of votes received by 
the lower tier of losing candidates. A cautious, yet realistic, estimate is that 
these candidates would, on average, receive about 20 percent of the vote. 
One method of assessing the impact of uncontested seats is to ex­
amine the district vote before and after the seat was uncontested. With 
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respect to unopposed incumbents who constitute most of the unopposed 
candidates, Jacobson (1993) recently noted that, "In elections from 1946 
to 1990, the mean vote for incumbents in the current election who had 
been opposed in the previous election was 70.6 percent, while the mean 
vote for incumbents in the previous election who were unopposed in the 
current election average had been 71.2 percent. These figures are down­
wardly biased, of course—incumbents should attract opponents more 
frequently when their anticipated support is lower—but surely not 
enough to make 100 percent a plausible assumption" (50). This suggests 
that a party may forgo, on average, almost 30 percent of the vote by leav­
ing the opposition party unchallenged. However, given Jacobson's caveat 
that this 30 percent figure likely overestimates the impact of the uncon­
tested circumstance, since challengers are more likely to appear when a 
candidate is more vulnerable (e.g., postredistricting), and the fact that a 
number of districts are uncontested over several elections, we will place 
a slightly reduced vote value of the uncontested-seat advantage. We as­
sume that a party, on average, would receive about 23 percent of the vote 
by posting a candidate in a district that otherwise would have been left 
uncontested.21 
As we estimate it, the entire vote that a party would receive by con­
testing a currently uncontested seat is from an increase in turnout in the 
district rather than at the expense of the other party. This assumption 
is based on observed drop-off rates between contested and uncontested 
districts in presidential election years and a set of assumptions about the 
distribution of a district's vote in the uncontested and contested situa­
tions. First, on the basis of an examination of turnout drop off in on-year 
elections between presidential and congressional voting, turnout in­
creases by about 30 percent when a district is contested. In presidential 
election years from 1956 to 1988, the mean turnout drop off in uncon­
tested districts between presidential and congressional voting was about 
27 percent. On the basis of the national data for presidential and congres­
sional turnout, drop off in contested districts would appear to be approxi­
mately four percent. The net drop-off difference in uncontested seats 
is then 23 percent, indicating that the uncontested status of the district 
depresses turnout by 23 percent. Reorienting this to the gain produced 
by changing a district from the uncontested to the contested status 
amounts to a 30 percent boost. That is, a 23 percent turnout decline in 
changing from a contested to an uncontested seat is equivalent to a 30 
percent turnout increase in changing from an uncontested to a contested 
seat. Second, the analysis also assumes a rough equivalence between the 
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vote a party won by default when its seat was uncontested and the addi­
tional votes it would gain by increased turnout when the other party 
mounted a challenge. In an uncontested seat, a party will receive some 
votes that would have gone to the opposition if that option were available 
on the ballot to these voters. If the seat were contested, the party would 
lose these votes. On the other hand, in an uncontested seat, a party fails 
to receive some votes because the lack of a contest keeps some voters 
home. If the seat were contested, the party would gain these votes. We 
assume that these two votes are roughly equivalent.22 
There are many estimates of the vote value of incumbency and its 
increase in recent years (see Erikson, 1971, 1972; Cover, 1977; Cover 
and Mayhew, 1981; Born, 1979; Payne, 1980; Collie, 1981; Alford and 
Hibbing, 1981; Garand and Gross, 1984; Alford and Brady, 1993; Gel-
man and King, 1990; and Krashinsky and Milne, 1993). Initial estimates 
of the vote value of incumbency were based on vote changes between 
elections. These studies examined both the district vote for a candidate 
before and after he or she was an incumbent (the sophomore surge) and 
a party's vote in a district before and after an incumbent voluntarily 
leaves the seat (the retirement slump). With respect to the apparent effect 
of incumbency when an incumbent first runs for reelection (the sopho­
more surge), Cover and Mayhew (1981) found that incumbency in­
creased the vote by 2.3 percentage points in elections from 1962 to 1966 
and 6.8 in elections from 1968 to 1978. When the advantage of incum­
bency was lost to a party, it typically experienced a vote loss similar in 
magnitude to its vote gain after its candidate ran as an incumbent. Fol­
lowing an incumbent's retirement, the party's vote typically slumped by 
2.5 percentage points in elections from 1962 to 1966 and by 7.8 percent­
age points in elections from 1968 to 1978 (Cover and Mayhew, 1981; 
Jacobson, 1992, 29). 
A more sophisticated analysis of the incumbency advantage con­
ducted by (Levitt and Wolfram, 1996) has produced similar estimates. By 
their estimation, incumbency was worth 3.4 percentage points of the vote 
in contested elections from 1948 to 1958, 4 percentage points from 1960 
through 1968, 6.8 percentage points from 1970 through 1978, and 8 
percentage points from 1980 through 1990.23 Rather than reinventing 
the wheel, we will use these estimates of the vote value of incumbency to 
determine how much the Democratic Party's advantage of having more 
incumbents has inflated the Democratic congressional vote. 
Having the number of uncontested and contested incumbent seats 
for both parties established, as well as the vote value of these two candidate 
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Table 3.5 
The Democratic House Vote and the Simulated Vote, Removing the 
incumbency and Uncontested Seat Advantages, 1954-1992 
Democratic House Vote Percentage 
Without Candidate 
Election Actual Advantages Difference 
1954 52.8 51.6 -1.  2 
1956 51.2 50.2 -1.1 
1958 56.7 54.3 -2.  4 
1960 55.1 52.7 -2.  4 
1962 52.9 51.5 -1.  4 
1964 57.7 56.5 -1.3 
1966 51.4 49.2 -2.2 
1968 51.0 50.0 Q 
1970 54.7 53.6 - 1 .  1 
1972 53.2 51.8 - 1 .  3 
1974 59.2 57.7 - 1 .  5 
1976 57.4 55.0 - 2 .  4 
1978 54.8 52.6 - 2 .  2 
1980 51.5 49.7 - 1 .  8 
1982 56.4 55.3 - 1 .  1 
1984 52.5 50.5 - 2 .  1 
1986 55.0 53.3 - 1 .  6 
1988 54.2 52.6 - 1 .  6 
1990 53.3 51.9 - 1 .  5 
1992 53.1 51.7 - 1 .  4 
Mean 54.2 52.6 - 1 .  6 
Note: The elections in which the Democratic Party's vote percentage would have 
slipped below a majority without the party's candidate advantages are indicated in boldface. 
advantages, we can now determine their aggregate impact on the con­
gressional vote. Has the Democratic Party received a majority of the con­
gressional vote because their candidates have enjoyed the advantages of 
more often running unopposed or with the privileges of incumbency? 
The effects of candidate advantages for each party are presented in 
table 3.5. The table presents the division of the two-party vote with and 
without these advantages. The aggregate vote effect of incumbency and 
uncontested seats for each party was calculated as the product of three 
values. The first is the estimated vote percentage advantage for each type 
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of advantage (e.g., in the 1950s incumbency was worth 3.4 percent of the 
vote in a contested district). The second value is the mean number of 
votes cast in districts won by each party. The product of these values is 
the number of votes attracted to a party because of a candidate advantage 
in one of its typical districts. For example, for Democrats in 1956, incum­
bency was worth about 3.4 percent of the vote in each district. Since there 
were about 135,030 votes cast in the average contested district won by a 
Democrat that year, a 3.4 percent boost amounts to about 4,591 extra 
votes for each Democratic incumbent. To determine the aggregate effect, 
this must be multiplied by the number of districts in which the party 
enjoyed this advantage (see table 3.4). Since there were 153 Democratic 
incumbents running in the 1956 election, the Democrats attracted about 
702,423 additional votes because of incumbency (153 x 4,591). Of course, 
Democrats also received additional votes because of incumbency, and 
these must also be taken into account. 
Once the aggregate votes associated with the parties' candidate ad­
vantages were calculated, they were applied to the total national vote to 
determine the total vote that the parties would have received had neither 
party enjoyed these advantages.24 The adjustment amounts to a simula­
tion of the national vote if all seats were contested and neither party had 
a net incumbency advantage over the other. In calculating the total vote 
without these advantages, the votes a party attracted because of incum­
bent advantages are subtracted from its total vote and added to the op­
posing party's total vote. The votes attributable to uncontested seats are 
simply added to the opposing party's total vote, since the vote boost asso­
ciated with contesting the seat, as noted above, comes to a party in the 
increased turnout in a district. The figures and calculations involved in 
this simulation are presented in appendix A. 
As the figures in table 3.5 indicate, candidate advantages consis­
tently benefited the Democrats in House elections. Typically, their incum­
bency and uncontested-seat advantages added about 1.5 percentage 
points to the Democratic national vote. The net effects of these advan­
tages ranged from a pro-Democratic benefit of slightly less than 1 to 2.5 
percentage points. Even though this might appear to be a small effect, 
candidate advantages were apparently large enough to determine which party re­
ceived the majority of congressional votes in two elections, 1966 and 1980. In both 
cases, Democrats received a majority of the two-party congressional vote 
because many of their candidates in contested districts were incumbents 
and many others won election without opposition. The analysis suggests 
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that without these benefits Republicans would have won narrow vote ma­
jorities in both years. Moreover, in other elections, the Democratic vote 
majority would have been reduced considerably had they not enjoyed 
these candidate advantages. The Democratic share of the national two-
party vote would have dropped to 52 percent of the vote or less in fully 
half of the elections since 1954 without the aid of incumbency and the 
absence of Republican challengers in many districts.25 
Returning to the main point, this analysis of the parties' candidate 
advantages suggests that the Democratic lock on a majority in the House 
was not simply a function of voters freely choosing representation by 
Democrats in open contests on a level playing field. Although it is indis­
putably true that Democrats won a majority of the congressional vote in 
each election from 1954 to 1992, it is also true that these majorities were 
consistently padded by the presence of a greater number of Democratic 
incumbents and the absence of Republican challengers in many districts. 
In at least two cases (1966 and 1980), these Democratic candidate advan­
tages were apparently enough to provide Democrats with vote majorities 
that they otherwise might not have won. 
• Overview • 
Two different explanations of the Democratic dynasty were examined in 
this chapter. The first claims that Democrats maintained their House ma­
jority because voters wanted it that way. That is, the Democratic House 
majority was a result of voters freely expressing a preference for repre­
sentation by Democrats rather than by Republicans. There is certainly 
some evidence for this. Democratic congressional candidates won a ma­
jority of the vote in each election from 1954 to 1992. However, in several 
elections these vote majorities were quite small, and a majority vote does 
not necessarily indicate that voters freely chose Democrats. If voters have 
no choice, as is the situation in uncontested districts, or if a party receives 
a sizable vote simply because more of its candidates enjoy the advantages 
of incumbency, the party's vote majority may not reflect the support of 
the voters for that party's candidates. 
This raises a second explanation for the Democratic dynasty. Some 
speculate that the Democrats won a majority of seats because more Dem­
ocratic candidates ran without Republican opposition and more ran as 
incumbents, with all the advantages of holding office. The analysis indi­
cated that there is something to this explanation as well. Regardless of 
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party, running without opposition or running as an incumbent typically 
attracts additional votes. Democrats consistently had more candidates 
running unopposed than Republicans, and, with only a couple of excep­
tions, Democrats also had more incumbents running in contested districts 
than did Republicans. On the basis of the analysis, these Democratic-
candidate advantages were responsible for anywhere from 1 to 2.5 per­
centage points of the national Democratic presidential vote, enough that 
they probably were responsible for Democratic vote majorities in 1966 
and 1980. 
The analysis also suggests the plausibility of a third explanation of 
the Democratic dynasty, that the electoral system has been biased in favor 
of the Democratic Party. An examination of the five elections in which 
Democrats won narrow vote majorities reveals that their seat majorities 
remained substantial. Some discrepancy between seat and vote majorities 
can be expected because of the responsiveness of the single-member-
district plurality-rule system. However, in these several close elections, 
Democrats won seat majorities far in excess of what could be expected 
from the responsiveness (or swing ratio) of the electoral system alone. In 
at least these five elections, a quarter of the congressional elections held 
between 1954 and 1992, the Democratic majority vote, however moti­
vated, was not required for Democrats to win a majority of seats. More­
over, Republicans were denied a majority of contested seats in four of the 
six post-1954 elections in which they received a majority of the vote in 
contested districts (1966, 1968, 1980, and 1984). The Democratic share 
Table 3.6 
Four Elections in Which Democrats Won a Majority of Seats 
with a Minority of the Vote in Contested Districts 
Contested Districts 
Democratic Vote Democratic Seat 
Election Percentage Percentage 
1966 48.76 51.07 
1968 49.09 51.95 
1980 49.64 53.32 
1984 49.66 53.95 
Source: Computed from district returns as reported in Congressional Quarterly's 
Guide to U.S. Elections, 2d ed. (1985). 
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of votes and seats in contested districts in these four elections is presented 
in table 3.6. This suggests the possibility of partisan bias in the electoral 
system. 
We next turn to the issue of partisan bias. Has the electoral system 
been biased in favor of the Democratic Party? How has partisan bias been 
measured and what has prior research found? Did bias in the electoral 
system help to preserve the Democratic majority in the House for 40 
years? 
4
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Bias in the Electoral

System

Lhe cheap-seats thesis claims that the translation of votes into House 
seats has favored the Democratic Party and that this bias was important 
to the Democratic House majority. Was the electoral system biased? Did 
it favor Democrats? If so, by how much? Did it make the difference be­
tween a Democratic and a Republican majority in the House? This chap­
ter lays the foundation for addressing these questions.1 
The foundation consists of three matters regarding partisan bias in 
the electoral system—its definition and measurement, previous findings 
of electoral system bias, and the proposal of an alternative measure of 
bias. We first return to the issues of the conceptualization and operation­
alization of bias, matters addressed in a preliminary way in chapter 2. 
What does partisan bias mean, and how is it measured? After defining 
terms and evaluating the different approaches to its estimation, the cur­
rent state of research on bias in the House electoral system is reviewed. 
Research on bias in the House electoral system has failed to reach consen­
sus. Some find a Democratic electoral system, others a Republican system. 
What is the basis for these conflicting findings and which should we be­
lieve? The answer lies, I will argue, in the use of two different measures 
of the congressional vote in estimating bias. One measure is appropriate, 
while the other produces faulty estimates. Finally, on the basis of a theo­
retical model of partisan bias, an alternative measure that avoids several 
problems found in previous measures is developed. 
But first things first. Before offering a critique of the literature and 
proposing an alternative measure of bias, a few basics should be pinned 
down. What do we mean by partisan bias in an electoral system, and how 
has past research measured it? 
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Table 4.1 
Hypothetical Examples of Electoral Systems with and without Partisan Bias 
Democratic Republican 
Party Party 
Electoral System Case Votes Seats Votes Seats Partisan Bias 
A 50 50 50 50 None 
B 60 75 60 75 None 
C 60 75 60 60 Democratic 
D 20 15 20 10 Democratic 
E 80 100 80 90 Democratic 
A/ofe;The examples do not assume that the two parties receive their votes in the same 
election year. Obviously, in cases A, C, and E, they could not, since the vote totals would 
exceed 100 percent. The examples assume either that the electoral system translating one 
party's votes into seats in one election year is the same electoral system responsible for 
translating the other party's votes into seats at a later election or that the treatment of the 
parties could be deduced from simulated votes (the hypothetical, or Butler, method). 
Q The Concept and Measurement of Partisan Bias • 
As conventionally defined and as used here, partisan bias in an electoral 
system is the difference between the proportion ofseats that the political parties would 
be awarded if they were to receive identical shares of the national vote (see Niemi 
and Deegan, 1978; and Grofman, 1983). In an unbiased electoral system, 
there is no difference. If Democrats win Y percent of seats with X percent 
of the vote, Republicans would also win Y percent of the seats with the 
same X percent of the votes. A few examples, presented in table 4.1, illus­
trate this. Case A illustrates an unbiased electoral system. In this case, 
either party wins half the seats if it receives half of the votes. Case B is 
also an unbiased system, even though it deviates from proportional rep­
resentation. In case B, regardless of which party receives 60 percent of 
the vote, that party wins 75 percent of the seats. By contrast, cases C, D, 
and E illustrate biased electoral systems. In case C, the Republicans are 
awarded 60 percent of the seats for their 60 percent of the vote, while 
the Democrats are awarded 75 percent of the seats with the same vote 
share. This indicates a pro-Democratic partisan bias in the electoral sys­
tem, since Democrats and Republicans are awarded different shares of 
seats even though they received an identical proportion of the vote. What 
is crucial to the matter of partisan bias is that party labels should not 
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matter in the awarding of seats. If 60 percent of the vote translates into 
75 percent of the seats, it should do so for whichever party has received 
the 60 percent of the vote. An unbiased electoral system may well treat 
parties with different vote totals differently in awarding seats, but if it 
treats parties with the same vote totals differently, it can no longer be said 
to be unbiased. 
Partisan bias in an electoral system may exist at any level of support 
for the parties. If one party wins a larger share of seats than another party 
with an equal number of votes, whether the number of votes is few or 
many, there is partisan bias. Take case D. If the Democrats win 15 percent 
of the seats with 20 percent of the vote while the Republicans win only 
10 percent of the seats with 20 percent of the vote, there is bias in favor 
of the Democrats. At the other end of the spectrum (case E), if the Demo­
crats win every seat by receiving 80 percent of the vote and the Republi­
cans (presumably in another election year) win only 90 percent of the 
seats after receiving an equivalent 80 percent of the vote, there is again 
electoral system bias in favor of the Democrats. In both cases, partisan 
bias is reflected in the fact that equal vote totals for the parties are not 
accorded equal treatment in the awarding of seats. 
Although partisan bias may be present at any division of the vote, 
and while a number of measures of bias are possible (Taylor and Johnson, 
1979, 338-42; Grofman, 1983), bias is conventionally measured at the 50 
percent of the vote mark.2 That is, if the Democrats and the Republicans 
were to split the vote equally, each receiving precisely 50 percent of the 
vote, what would be the division of seats between the parties? Bias is indi­
cated when both parties, having equally divided the vote, do not also 
equally divide the seats. If an even-vote split results in Democrats winning 
53 percent and Republicans 47 percent of the seats, the electoral system 
is biased by 3 percentage points (53 percent — 50 percent) in favor of 
the Democrats. That is, the electoral system is biased to the point that 
Democrats win 3 percent more of the seats than they would have won in 
an unbiased electoral system. 
The conventional method for estimating bias uses regression analy­
sis (or a nonlinear estimation technique, such as logit analysis).3 The par-
ty's share of the congressional vote is specified as the independent 
variable and its share of congressional seats as the dependent variable. 
On the basis of the estimated intercept and slope, the expected seat share 
for the party when it receives 50 percent of the vote can be calculated. 
The difference between the expected seat share, based on the regression, 
and 50 percent is the measure of partisan bias. If the expected seat share 
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exceeds 50 percent, the electoral system is biased in that party's favor (the 
party whose seat and vote shares are used in the regression). If the ex­
pected seat share is less than 50 percent, the system favors the other 
party.4 
While there is general agreement on measuring bias at the 50 per­
cent vote point in the estimated relationship between votes and seats, 
there are differences over how partisan bias at this vote point should be 
estimated and what data are most appropriate to use in evaluating the 
electoral system. Niemi and Fett (1986) nicely assess the different ap­
proaches used in estimate characteristics of electoral systems, both re­
sponsiveness (or the swing ratio) and partisan bias. They note that there 
have been two general approaches to assessing electoral system character­
istics, the historical (multiyear) approach and the hypothetical (single­
year) approach. The two approaches employ different data in estimating 
the relationship between the proportion of seats and votes that parties 
receive. 
The historical, or multiyear, approach assesses the relationship be­
tween the actual aggregate percentage of seats and votes won by a party 
over some set of elections. That is, a regression analysis with the Demo­
cratic share of the vote as the independent variable and the Democratic 
share of seats as the dependent variable may be estimated with actual 
national election results from one election year to some later election 
year. The regression results may then be used (as described above) to 
estimate partisan bias. 
Because the historical approach requires estimation over some se­
ries of elections, it confronts a tradeoff. On the one hand, estimates of 
partisan bias (and responsiveness) are generally more reliable if they are 
based on a greater number of elections. At the extreme, the historical 
method cannot be used on a single election and is very unreliable when 
applied to a pair of elections (Niemi and Fett, 1986, 77-78). So, from a 
reliability standpoint, the more elections used in estimating bias with the 
historical approach, the better. On the other hand, there are reasons to 
believe that partisan bias may not be static, that the consequences of the 
electoral system may change through the years. Gerrymandering, mal-
apportionment, migration, and other factors may cause change in the 
bias of an electoral system over time. Immediately after reapportionment 
and redistricting, an electoral system may benefit one party, and, 10 years 
later, after demographic shifts, the system may favor the opposition party. 
These changes may be inappropriately "averaged out" in the historical 
approach's single estimate of bias for a series of elections. 
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An alternative to the historical approach is the assessment of elec­
toral system characteristics by using hypothetical data from a single elec­
tion. This approach, first suggested by Butler (1951), begins with the 
known data point of the actual share of seats and votes won by a party in 
the election. Additional data points (seats matched with votes) are gener­
ated by simulation. The standard simulation assumes a uniform vote 
swing across districts. That is, it assumes that an additional percentage of 
the vote for a party nationally would add an additional percentage point 
of the vote to that party's actual vote in each district. To the extent that 
the additional vote percentage for a party would have made a difference 
in the party winning the district's seat, the seat shares are adjusted ac­
cordingly for the simulated case. For example, consider the case of a 
party that actually received 55 percent of the national vote and 60 per­
cent of the seats. If an additional 1 percent of the vote in each district 
would have carried eight more seats for the party (or 1.8 percent of the 
seats), then, on the basis of the assumption of a uniform vote swing across 
districts, the party would have hypothetically won 61.8 percent of the 
seats if it had received 56 percent of the vote. Additional hypothetical 
election results are simulated by calculating the share of seats a party 
would have won across a range of national vote percentages. This pro­
vides sufficient data to then run a regression analysis of votes on seats. 
The partisan bias can then be calculated as the expected seat percentage 
for a party if it had received half of the votes. 
The hypothetical approach avoids the problem of assuming a single 
or constant partisan bias across a long series of elections. When this 
method is used, bias is estimated for each election year separately. How­
ever, this approach has problems of its own. The principal problem is the 
simulation. As Niemi and Fett observe, the single-year approach may be 
criticized "on the grounds that it is hypothetical. It is a measure of what 
might have been, not of what actually happened" (1986, 81). The as­
sumption of a uniform vote swing across districts is a simple assumption, 
but probably inaccurate. If a party loses or gains votes, it is unlikely to 
lose or gain them evenly across all districts. It might be easier for a party 
to gain a percentage of the vote in a competitive district than one solidly 
in the other party's column or solidly in its own. If true, rather than 
assume that a one percentage point gain in the national vote translates 
into a one percentage point vote gain in each district, we might assume 
that it translates into a vote gain of two or three percentage points in 
competitive districts and only a fraction of a percentage point in noncom­
petitive districts. If the uniform-vote-swing assumption is used for the 
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simulation when actual vote gains or losses would have been distributed 
differently, then electoral system characteristics (including partisan bias) 
could be misestimated.5 
While both the historical and hypothetical approaches have their 
shortcomings, both approaches have been used to assess the characteris­
tics (including the partisan bias) of the congressional electoral system. 
What have they found? 
• Estimates of Partisan Bias • 
Prior research has failed to reach a consensus regarding electoral system 
bias. Four principal studies of bias are considered here—Tufte (1973), 
Jacobson (1990), Brady and Grofman (1991), and King and Gelman 
(1991; Gelman and King, 1990).6 The findings range from the observa­
tion of a consistently pro-Democratic bias to a strong but diminishing 
pro-Republican bias. On the one hand, Tufte's (1973) seminal analysis of 
the partisan bias in the electoral system found a regular pro-Democratic 
bias. In this, his findings square with the explanation of the Democratic 
dynasty proposed here. On the other hand, more recent work by King 
and his associates (King and Browning, 1987; King and Gelman, 1991), 
suggests a pro-Republican bias over much of this period and is thus very 
much at odds with the partisan-bias explanation of the Democrats' suc­
cess in elections to the House. In order to determine the basis for these 
conflicting findings, we should review these analyses closely. 
Prior Research 
Like several earlier examinations of the relationship between votes and 
seats (Dahl, 1956; March, 1957), Tufte's analysis of the congressional elec­
toral system both was based on historical electoral data and produced 
evidence of a pro-Democratic partisan bias.7 Tufte examined a number 
of "triplets," or sets of three consecutive national elections. The votes-to-
seats regression estimates indicated a consistent pro-Democratic electoral 
system bias of varying magnitudes throughout most of this century. 
Using this same methodology, I extend Tufte's analysis to include 
elections up to 1988.8 These estimates of partisan bias are presented in 
table 4.2. The estimates agree on one point: the electoral system in House 
elections has been consistently biased in favor of the Democrats. While 
consistently biased in favor of the Democrats, the degree of pro-
Democratic electoral system bias has varied. The erratic estimates or 
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Table 4.2 
Tufte's Estimates of Partisan Bias, 1942-1988 
Estimated Pro-
Percentage of Votes to Elect Democratic 
Election Period 50 Percent of Seats for Partisan Bias 
Triplets" the Democrats (%) 
1942-46 48.1 +1.9 
1948-52 49.5 + .5 
1954-58 50.1 - .  1 
1960-64 47.4 +2.6 
1966-70 42.1 +7.9 
1972-76 49.8 + .2 
1978-82 46.3 +3.7 
1984-88 36.0 +14.0 
Grand Mean 46.2 +3.8 
Pre-1964 Mean 48.8 +1.2 
Post-1964 Mean 43.6 +6.5 
Note: The partisan bias estimates from 1942 to 1970 are from Tufte (1973, table 6). 
Estimates from 1972 to 1988 were computed from regressions estimated by the author. The 
data used in the regressions are the two-party vote and seat percentages computed from 
Omstein et al. (1990, tables 1-18 and 2-2). 
variability of Tufte's results are due, in part, to the fact that the analysis 
examines only three elections at a time.9 However, despite this variability, 
Tufte found the system favorable to the Democrats in all but one of the 
11 election triplets after 1906. Moreover, the single exception of contrary 
results (1954-58) was negligible (one-tenth of 1 percent). The extent of 
Democratic bias generally appeared moderate in magnitude. From 1954 
to 1970 (the last election in Tufte's series), the average bias in Tufte's 
analysis was about 3.5 percent of seats in favor of the Democrats (1973, 
550; and a bias of 3.8 percent of seats updated through 1988). That is, if 
the Democrats won exactly 50 percent of the national congressional vote, 
they would win 53.5 percent of the seats in the House. Translating this 
bias into seats, Democrats typically obtained approximately 15 more seats 
than they would have won in an unbiased system, a swing of about 30 
seats from the Republicans to the Democrats. The mean bias of the up­
dated series indicates an even slightly greater pro-Democratic bias (+3.8 
percent, or 17 seats). 
Tufte suggests several plausible sources of this bias. Bias, he notes, 
could have been produced by "gerrymandering, differential turnout 
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Table 4.3 
Jacobson's Estimates of Partisan Bias, 1946-1988 
All Districts 
Congressional Vote 
Percentage Measure 1946-1964 1966-1988 
National Vote 2.1% Democratic 3.9% Democratic 
Mean District Vote 14.6% Republican .5% Republican 
Source: Jacobson (1990, table 5.5 and p. 93). The bias estimates for the mean district 
vote were calculated by the author from the third equation in Jacobson's table 5.5. 
Note: Jacobson also estimated partisan bias only in contested congressional districts. 
Using the mean district vote in these contested districts, he found a 7.2 percent pro-
Republican bias from 1946 to 1964 and a .6 percent pro-Democratic bias from 1966 to 1988 
(1990, 93). 
across districts, and the population sizes of electoral districts" (548). Mal-
apportionment, the existence of districts with different-sized populations, 
appeared to be a substantial source of the bias. According to Tufte, Re­
publicans carried a disproportionate number of large population or over­
sized districts prior to reapportionment in the 1970s. On the basis of this 
finding, he concludes that "Republican seats were more expensive in 
terms of votes than Democratic seats" (548). Democrats controlled the 
House not just because they won more votes but because it took Demo­
crats, on average, fewer votes than Republicans to win a seat. Democrats 
won the cheap seats. 
Jacobson's (1990) analysis of partisan bias is really two analyses, one 
essentially concurring with the above findings of a pro-Democratic bias 
and another very much at odds with that conclusion. His estimates, based 
on historical data from 1946 to 1988, are displayed in table 4.3. Examin­
ing the relationship between the national congressional vote and seats 
(for all districts), Jacobson (1990) reports a 2 percent pro-Democratic par­
tisan bias in elections between 1946 and 1964 (9 seats) and nearly a 4 
percent pro-Democratic partisan bias (17 seats) from 1966 to 1988 (93). 
In the second part of his analysis, Jacobson examined the mean district 
vote, rather than the aggregated national vote, and reached a very differ­
ent conclusion. He found that the electoral system was biased to the ad­
vantage of Republicans, not Democrats, until the mid-1960s. Since the 
late 1960s, however, the electoral system has been essentially neutral to­
ward the parties, according to this estimate. Using the mean district vote, 
Jacobson's analysis indicates a startling 14.6 percent Republican advan­
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tage from 1946 to 1964. This bias shrank to a near negligible level of a 
half of a percentage point Republican advantage in elections since the 
mid-1960s.10 
Unlike the previous historical data based studies, Brady and Grof­
man (1991) adopted the hypothetical approach (the Butler method). 
They simulated election results 10 percentage points above and below 
the actual election returns, estimated a logit regression, and used the re­
gression estimates to determine the expected proportion of seats for a 
party if it had received 50 percent of the vote. They then estimated the 
characteristics of the congressional electoral system from 1850 to 1980. 
Their estimates of partisan bias in the post-World War II period are pre­
sented in table 4.4. The results generally suggest a minor pro-Democratic 
bias, finding the electoral system to have favored the Democrats in 11 of 
the 18 elections from 1946 to 1980. While their estimates indicate that 
bias nationally favored Democrats in elections since 1968, overall bias was 
quite erratic and regionally based. Brady and Grofman's regional analysis 
indicates that the electoral advantage Democrats enjoyed nationally was 
primarily located in the South and that the electoral system outside the 
South was actually biased in favor of Republicans, though this advantage 
has been quite small since the mid-1960s. 
King and his colleagues also are at odds with Tufte's finding of a 
pro-Democratic electoral system bias. In their state-by-state analysis of 
elections from 1950 to 1984, King and Browning (1987) find partisan 
bias in individual states but no general pattern of bias for either party.11 
In a more expansive examination of partisan bias over time, King and 
Gelman (1991) conclude that the electoral system has and continues to 
favor Republican candidates.12 These estimates of bias are produced from 
a modified hypothetical vote analysis in which vote swings are simulated 
on the basis of district characteristics rather than simply assumed to be 
uniform across all districts, as previous hypothetical analyses had done. 
On the basis of this more sophisticated and realistic vote simulation, they 
conclude, "Whereas the overall electoral system in the nonsouthern states 
moved from severe Republican bias to moderate Democratic bias, the 
deeper patterns beneath the configuration of incumbents and their elec­
toral advantages reveal an electoral system that has remained severely 
biased toward the Republican party for all elections in the past four de­
cades. Only the particular existing pattern of incumbents keeps the sys­
tem biased in favor of the Democrats" (129). 
Table 4.5 presents King and Gelman's (1991) estimates of partisan 
bias for elections from 1946 to 1984. Two sets of estimates are presented, 
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Table 4.4 
Brady and Grofman's Estimates of Partisan Bias, 1946-1980 
Estimated Pro-Democratic 
Partisan Bias 
Election All Districts Non-South 
1946 -2.5 -6.3 
1948 +4.7 -1.8 
1950 -2.8 -6.6 
1952 +4.2 -5.  0 
1954 +1.0 -8.  4 
1956 -1.0 -5.8 
1958 +1.2 -6.5 
1960 +1.0 -2.6 
1962 - .  5 -2.6 
1964 -1.5 -5.8 
1966 -5.  2 -1.0 
1968 + .7 -1.  4 
1970 +4.0 - .  8 
1972 +2.0 - .  4 
1974 +3.0 -2.  7 
1976 +4.7 - .  5 
1978 - .  1 - .  4 
1980 + .8 -1.1 
Grand Mean + .8 -3.  3 
Pre-1964 Mean +3.8 -5.1 
Post-1964 Mean +1.2 -1.0 
Percentage of Elections 57.9 0 
with Pro-Democratic Bias 
Source: Brady and Grofman (1991). 
an estimate of overall bias and an estimate of bias that controls for incum­
bency. The overall measure, probably the more appropriate of the two, 
indicates an electoral system heavily tilted toward the Republicans until 
the mid-1960s and very slightly pro-Democratic in recent years.13 While 
this diverges a good deal from many of the previous estimates of bias, 
King and Gelman's second series* is even more at odds with them. This 
series indicates a very strong pro-Republican bias that, though weakened 
in recent years, remains of substantial help to the Republicans. 
Has the electoral system been biased? The results are all over the 
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Table 4.5 
King and Gelman's Estimates of Partisan Bias, 1946-1984 
Estimated Pro-Democratic Partisan 
Bias (All Districts) 
Estimate with 
General Incumbency 
Election Estimate Effect Removed 
1946 -7.  2 -8.5 
1948 -6.  4 -7.0 
1950 -5.  7 -8.  7 
1952 -5.  9 -8.0 
1954 -6.5 -9.0 
1956 -5.  3 -8.7 
1958 -3.9 -7.6 
1960 -4.  5 -8.9 
1962 
-2.  5 -7.0 
1964 
-3.5 -5.7 
1966 +.7 -7.0 
1968 +.2 -6.5 
1970 + .1 -3.5 
1972 +.3 -4.2 
1974 
-2.3 -3.9 
1976 + .4 -5.0 
1978 +1.1 -3.8 
1980 +1.5 -2.5 
1982 
- .  2 -2.  4 
1984 +3.4 -4.  3 
Grand Mean -2.3 -6.1 
Pre-1964 Mean -5.1 -7.9 
Post-1964 Mean + .5 -4.  3 
Sources: The figures were obtained from Gary King. The first column reflects the re­
ported estimates of partisan bias in King and Gelman (1991, fig. 8). 
Note: King and Gelman's published estimates measured partisan bias in terms of the 
seat margin due to bias and is thus twice the magnitudes reported above. For example, King 
and Gelman report partisan bias in 1946 to increase the seat gap by about 15 percentage 
points. This is roughly twice the 7.2 percentage point value reported above. Also, the pub­
lished estimates included 1986. From their fig. 8, the overall bias in 1986 was only slightly 
less pro-Democratic than it was in 1984. 
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place. Tufte finds a consistent Democratic bias. Jacobson produces differ­
ent results depending on the congressional vote measure used. One set 
of estimates, concurring with Tufte's analysis, finds a moderate pro-
Democratic bias. Jacobson's second set of estimates finds a strong pro-
Republican bias that has declined to near neutrality in recent years. 
Brady and Grofman find mixed results with Democratic bias in the South 
and Republican bias elsewhere. King and Gelman find substantial change 
over time, with the system becoming more biased in favor of the Demo­
crats in recent years. However, they also find that, if incumbency effects 
are taken into account, the electoral system is significantly biased in favor 
of the Republicans. 
Two Measures of the Congressional Vote 
Why do these studies reach such divergent conclusions? Jacobson's dual 
analysis provides a clue. The reason for conflicting estimates of partisan bias is 
the use of different measures of the congressional vote. Assessments based on 
nationally aggregated congressional actual votes, including Tufte's analy­
sis and Jacobson's initial analysis, find a pro-Democratic bias. On the 
other hand, assessments based on the aggregate district vote percentages 
(e.g., the mean district vote percentage in an election year), including the 
research by King and Gelman, Campagna and Grofman, and Jacobson's 
final analysis, conclude either that the system has been unbiased or has 
actually favored Republicans. 
The implications of using the two different measures are evident 
in the estimates of partisan bias in table 4.6. Seats-vote regressions are 
estimated for elections from 1954 to 1992. Because of autocorrelation, 
the regressions are estimated with a two-stage Cochrane-Orcutt pseudo-
generalized least-squares technique. The most important result of this 
analysis is the difference in the estimate of partisan bias. Consistent with 
previous research, the regression using the partisan split of the national 
vote indicates a considerable (3.6 percent) pro-Democratic partisan bias. 
This bias added approximately 16 seats to the Democratic majority, not 
enough alone to account for Democratic majorities (except in 1954), but 
enough to provide a considerable boost and to be of help in sustaining 
these majorities.14 The regression using the mean district partisan-vote 
division, on the other hand, indicated a much more nearly neutral elec­
toral system.15 
Both the findings of previous research and those in table 4.6 raise 
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Table 4.6 
The Relationship between Two Measures of the Democratic Party's 
House Vote and Its Share of House Seats, 1954-1992 
Dependent Variable: Democratic Two-Party 
% of House Seats 
Indeoendent Variable* Mpa«*ure of II IVJwL/vl IVJwl I I Vul IGUM/IWB IVIwCiOUl v7 V  l 
the Two-Party Congressional Vote 0) (2) 
Democratic Share of the National 1.53 
Two-Party House Vote (.17) 
Mean Two-Party District Vote for — 1.16 
Democratic House Candidates (.22) 
Constant -23.02 -6.97 
(7.07) (7.91) 
Number of Cases 20 20 
R2 .81 .61 
Adjusted R2 .80 .59 
Standard Error of Estimate 1.82 2.74 
Durbin-Watson 1.62 1.35 
Expected Democratic 53.63 51.03 
Percentage of Seats when 
Democratic Vote Equals 50% 
Democratic Partisan Bias (%) + 3.63 (+15.8 seats]I +1.03 (+5.7 seats) 
Note; Standard errors are in parentheses. Because of autocorrelation in the OLS anal­
ysis, a two-stage Cochrane-Orcutt pseudo-GLS analysis was used to generate these coeffi­
cients (Ostrom, 1978). The first-order autocorrelations for each equation (.246 and .382, 
respectively) were used in the partial differencing of the lagged variables. The intercept has 
been converted to its OLS equivalent. 
two natural questions: Why do different measures of the congressional 
vote produce different estimates of partisan bias, and which measure is 
more appropriate for estimating bias? Since conclusions about partisan 
bias may rest on whether the congressional vote for a party is calculated 
as its percentage of the total national vote or its mean percentage of dis­
trict votes, we first ought to determine which measure is more appro-
priate.16 As both Taylor and Johnson (1979, 341-42) and Gudgin and 
Taylor (1979, 56) have argued, the contention here is that the national vote 
measure is the appropriate measure.17 Moreover, the mean district vote can be 
quite misleading (see Erikson, 1972, 1236-37).18 If the regression using 
the national vote rather than mean district vote is the appropriate one 
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Table 4.7 
Comparison of Turnout Effects on Nationally Aggregated and Mean 
District Congressional Votes, Using Two Hypothetical Districts 
District Vote Percentage and Total 
Vote for Candidate of Party 
Hvnothptir'al Conarp<?sional1 ly IM/V/LI IwUwCll v v  l *  y vwwlvl lUl 
District Democratic Republican Total Votes Cast 
District A 
Percent 80% 20% 
Votes 80,000 20,000 100,000 
District B 
Percent 20% 80% 
Votes 60,000 240,000 300,000 
Aggregated Party Vote: 
Total Vote 140,000 260,000 400,000 
Percentage of Total Vote 35% 65% 
Mean District Vote Percentage 50% 50% 
Note;The mean district-vote percentage is computed by summing the district percent­
ages (a sum of 100 percent for each party, in this particular case) and dividing by the number 
of districts. For example, Democrats won 80 percent of the vote in District A and 20 percent 
in District B, so their mean district-vote percentage is 50 percent ((80 + 20)/2). 
for estimating bias, partisan bias is substantial (as indicated in table 4.6) 
and should be a significant component in any explanation of the four-
decade-long Democratic House majority. 
The mean district vote measure is problematic for measuring bias 
because it weights all districts equally, regardless of the number of voters 
in them. Given the great variance in district size and turnout, the assump­
tion of equal weighting is quite erroneous. It is especially dangerous if 
one party does disproportionately well in high-turnout districts while the 
opposing party's strength is in lower-turnout districts.19 
The insensitivity of the mean district vote to different turnout rates 
and the problems this can create for studying partisan bias are illustrated 
by examining two hypothetical districts in table 4.7. District A is a low-
turnout district won handily by the Democratic congressional candidate. 
District B is a high-turnout district won just as easily by the Republican 
candidate. In the area encompassed by the two districts, Republican vot­
ers greatly outnumber Democratic voters (260,000 to 140,000). This fact 
is reflected in the percentage of the total vote accorded each party (65 
percent Republican to 35 percent Democratic). However, the mean dis­
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trict vote suggests something different. The mean district vote, by failing 
to take into account the smaller number of voters in District A, indicates 
that the parties are of equal strength. Clearly, the mean district vote indi­
cates parity only because it is completely insensitive to the turnout differ­
ential between the two districts.20 
While these hypothetical districts make the point well enough, in 
that the mean district vote departs significantly from the actual national 
vote, the point is sharpened by considering a more extreme case. Sup­
pose a system in which the Democrats and Republicans evenly split the 
total national congressional vote. Suppose further that because of severe 
malapportionment, gerrymandering, or turnout differences that each 
Democratic voter was in a separate district by him- or herself and all Re­
publican voters were grouped into a single district. The system would 
thus comprise numerous districts where Democrats received 100 percent 
of the district vote and a single district in which Republicans received 100 
percent of the district's vote. With an increasing number of districts, the 
mean district vote approaches 100 percent for the Democrats and 0 per­
cent for the Republicans. Voters in the one purely Republican district 
matter less and less to the mean district vote with each additional single-
voter Democratic district. Similarly, with an increasing number of dis­
tricts, the proportion of seats for each party approaches 100 percent for 
the Democrats and 0 percent for Republicans. When the mean district 
votes and the seat shares for the parties are compared, it would appear 
that the system was unbiased and perfectly proportional. However, we 
know that it is, in fact, severely biased in favor of the Democrats. Despite 
having won only half of the total national congressional vote, Democrats 
receive nearly all of the seats. As this extreme example illustrates, using 
the mean district vote in examining partisan bias may produce very erro­
neous conclusions. 
The fact that the two measures of the congressional vote differ in 
theory does not necessarily mean that they differ in practice. However, 
they do. As figure 4.1 shows, the mean district congressional vote consis­
tently overstates the Democratic vote and thus makes it appear as though 
Democrats are deserving of more seats in an unbiased system. For elec­
tions from 1954 to 1992, the mean district vote for Democrats exceeded 
their national vote percentage in every election. The difference was typi­
cally more than three percentage points and in several elections exceeded 
six percentage points.21 This difference reflects two factors: the very 
real turnout differences across districts and the partisan complexion of 
these districts. For example, in the 1988 elections, there were 23 contested 
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1952 1956 1960 1964 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992

Figure 4.1 
The Mean District Vote and the National Congressional Vote for Democrats, 
1954-1992 
Note: The congressional votes are two-party votes. See the note to table 2.8. 
districts (mainly Democratic districts) that cast fewer than 150,000 con­
gressional votes each. At the other end of the spectrum were 36 districts 
which cast more than 250,000 congressional votes each. In each of these 
districts, turnout was at least two-thirds again the total vote in the low-
turnout districts. In light of these differences, counting each district equally 
essentially counts individual voters quite unequally.22 A voter from a low-
turnout district carries much more weight in the mean district measure 
than his or her counterpart in a high-turnout district. Because of this, if 
the voter from the low-turnout district happens to vote differently from 
the typical national voter, the mean district vote measure will poorly re­
flect how voters are voting nationally. 
Because the mean district vote ignores differential turnout rates 
across districts, since turnout varies so greatly across districts and since, 
as Tufte observed (1973, 548)> turnout differences are an important 
source of bias in the electoral system, the mean district vote is an inappro­
priate measure of a party's appeal in the electorate. It should not be used 
to examine partisan bias in the electoral system. Using the mean district 
vote as a measure of a party's success in winning votes essentially elimi­
nates, by faulty operationalization, an important source of potential parti­
san bias—differential turnout rates. It even leads to incorrect conclusions 
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about which party is advantaged by the electoral system. Since the mean 
district vote always exaggerates the actual vote of the party carrying low-
turnout districts, its use creates the appearance that the party is being 
inadequately rewarded in seats for its share of the vote. 
The conflicting findings regarding partisan bias by studies examin­
ing actual votes rather than the percentage of district votes may be 
explained in a similar fashion. Consider Fiorina's explanation of the 
pro-Republican bias found in the King and Gelman study: "The greater 
geographic concentration of Democratic voters in urban areas makes it 
more likely that their votes will be wasted in excess majorities for Demo­
cratic candidates" (1992a, 18). While true in one sense, the statement is 
wrong in another. True, the concentration of votes makes it more likely 
that Democratic vote percentages will be wasted in excess majorities, sug­
gesting a pro-Republican bias as found by King and Gelman. However, 
while Democrats pay a higher price per victory in the percentage of the 
district vote, they do not necessarily pay a higher price per victory in 
terms of the actual number of votes cast. While Democratic candidates in 
urban districts run up large majorities in percentage terms, they are not 
especially impressive in actual votes, because the turnout in these districts 
is so low. When turnout in a typical district is on the order of 250,000 
votes, a district won with only 40,000 votes cast for the winner is a cheap 
seat even if those 40,000 votes were 100 percent of those voting in that 
district.23 
• An Alternative Measure of Partisan Bias • 
The electoral system studies that have been reviewed differ in many re­
spects, but they are essentially similar in their approach to estimating 
partisan bias. Whether examining time-series or cross-sectional data, us­
ing the national congressional vote or the mean district vote, they first 
estimate the relationship between votes and seats and then identify parti­
san bias by the expected seat share for a party when the parties divide 
the vote evenly.24 If, for instance, the seats-votes regression indicates that 
a party is expected to receive 55 percent of the seats when it receives 50 
percent of the national vote, partisan bias in the electoral system is esti­
mated at 5 percent in favor of the party. 
This study proposes an alternative approach to measuring partisan 
bias. The method builds on Tufte's observations about the sources of 
partisan bias: "If, in the aggregate of all districts, low-turnout or small 
districts are aligned with a particular party, there will be bias in the seats­
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votes curve since that party is winning seats with relatively small numbers 
of votes" (1973, 548). An electoral system, thus, is biased in favor of a 
party to the extent that one party expends fewer votes per victory (un­
wasted votes) than the opposing party.25 This alternative approach calcu­
lates the extent of partisan bias in an election produced by the electoral 
system allowing one party to win "seats with relatively small numbers of 
votes." The method calculates the mean number of votes each party ex­
pends in obtaining a victory, the mean number of unwasted votes. The 
extent of bias can then be directly calculated by comparing the number 
of unwasted votes per victory for a particular party with the mean num­
ber of unwasted votes for victorious candidates generally. 
Before examining the alternative measure in detail, an example 
might be useful. Consider again the hypothetical districts we examined 
earlier in table 4.7. Recall that the Democrats received 80,000 votes in 
low-turnout district A (80 percent of the district's vote), while the Repub­
licans received 240,000 votes in high-turnout district B (80 percent of 
that district's vote). Suppose that an electoral system was composed only 
of districts of these two types and that there were three districts of type 
A for every one of type B, as presented in table 4.8. The simple arithmetic 
indicates that the two parties would evenly divide the national vote in this 
system. For every four districts (three of type A and one of type B) Demo­
crats would receive a total of 300,000 votes, of which 240,000 were cast 
in three winning causes and 60,000 were wasted in a lost cause (a district 
B). For every set of four districts, Republicans would also receive a total 
of 300,000 votes. Only because of the way these Republican votes are 
organized into districts, 60,000 were cast in three losing causes and 
240,000 were cast in a single winning effort. Thus, in this hypothetical 
electoral system, when the vote is split evenly, Democrats win three-
quarters of the seats. This is because the partisan bias in the electoral 
system exacts a smaller than average number of unwasted votes from 
Democrats for a victory (80,000 per victory) and a larger than average 
number of unwasted votes from Republicans for a victory (240,000 per 
victory). If districts were redrawn so that both parties "spent" the mean 
number of votes for a victory (120,000), both parties would be as equally 
represented in the legislature as they were in the polling booths.26 
The unwasted-vote measure of partisan bias can best be understood 
by revisiting the electoral system's basic characteristics of responsiveness 
and partisan bias and the factors that affect them. The principal point is 
that partisan bias can be measured by examining unwasted votes because 
all of the factors affecting partisan bias exert their effect by changing the 
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Table 4.8 
A Hypothetical Electoral System 
District Vote Percentage and Total 
Vote for Candidate of Party 
Hypothetical Congressional 
District Democratic Republican Total Votes Cast 
District A1 80% 20% 
80,000 20,000 100,000 
District A2 80% 20% 
80,000 20,000 100,000 
District A3 80% 20  % 
80,000 20,000 100,000 
District B 20% 80% 
60,000 240,000 300,000 
Total Vote 300,000 300,000 600,000 
Percentage of Total Vote 50% 50% 
Seats Won 3 1 
Percentage of Total Seats 75% 25% 
Total Unwasted Votes 240,000 240,000 480,000 
Mean Unwasted Vote 80,000 240,000 120,000 
Pro-Democratic Partisan Bias 25% 
(percentage of seats) 
Note: Unwasted votes (indicated in bold) are votes cast for candidates who won elec­
tion. At 80,000 unwasted votes per victory, Democrats would win three seats (75 percent of 
all seats) with half of all unwasted votes (240,000/80,000 = 3). Partisan bias equals the 
percentage of seats won in excess of 50 percent with 50 percent of unwasted votes. In this 
case, bias is 25 percentage points pro-Democratic (75 - 50 = 25). 
mean number of unwasted votes for the parties. Responsiveness, on the 
other hand, is a function purely of wasted (and not unwasted) votes. 
Causes of Responsiveness and Partisan Bias 
Why are electoral systems more or less responsive, and why are they 
biased toward or against a party? As discussed briefly in chapter 2 and 
presented in table 4.9, the electoral system characteristics of respon­
siveness and partisan bias involve quite different mechanisms and reflect 
different aspects of the vote. Responsiveness, the rate by which votes 
translate into seats, is a function of a party wasting votes in losing causes. 
In the single-member-district, plurality-rule system, the party with the 
minority of the vote generally wastes a larger portion of its votes in losing 
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Table 4.9 
The Mechanisms of Responsiveness and Partisan Bias in Electoral Systems 
Electoral System Mechanism by Which One Party 
Characteristic Symmetry Is Underrepresented 
Responsiveness (Swing ratio) Symmetric A party wastes a larger share of 
its votes in districts that it loses 
than does the opposing party in 
districts that it loses. 
Partisan Bias Asymmetric A party expends more votes in 
districts that it wins than does 
the opposing party in districts 
that it wins. 
Note: Symmetry refers to whether parties receiving the same national share of the 
vote would receive the same national share of seats. 
Table 4.10 
How the Minority Party Wastes More of Its Votes in Losing Causes 
District Vote Above or Below the Party's 
National Vote Percentage 
Below Above 
Equal to National 
<m Party Vote % <m 
Majority Party Loss Win Win Win Win 
Minority Party Loss Loss Loss Loss Win 
Party Wasting Both Minority Minority Minority Neither 
Votes Parties Party Party Party Party 
Note: m is the margin of the majority party's national two-party vote above 50 percent. 
Thus, the majority party's vote = 50% + m, and the minority party's vote = 50% - m. For 
instance, if m = 5, the majority party would have received 55 percent and the minority party, 
45 percent of the two-party vote. The majority party would need to fall short of its national 
vote by 5 percent or more in order to lose a district. The minority party would need to exceed 
its national vote by 5 percent or more in order to win a district. 
causes. As a consequence, the party with a majority of the vote wins a 
larger share of seats than its vote share and the responsiveness of the 
electoral system is greater than one. 
The reason why minority parties waste a larger portion of their 
votes is illustrated in table 4.10. The table presents the five possible cir­
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cumstances of a party's district vote relative to the national vote and na­
tional vote margin (m) for both the majority and minority parties. The 
national vote margin refers to the difference between the national vote 
and an even division of the vote. In any district a party may receive (1) 
exactly its national vote percentage, (2) more than its national vote per­
centage but not in excess of its national vote margin, (3) more than its 
national vote percentage by more than its national vote margin, (4) less 
than its national vote percentage but less than its vote margin, or (5) less 
than the national vote and less than the national vote margin.27 At ex­
treme deviations from the national vote percentages, either both parties 
waste their votes or neither does. When a party falls well short of its na­
tional vote, whether it is in the majority or not nationally, it wastes what­
ever votes it obtains. When a party does exceedingly well in a district, 
its votes are not wasted. In the middle ground, however, differences are 
evident. The majority party wins districts, and therefore does not waste 
votes, so long as its district vote does not fall short of its national mar­
gin. The minority party, on the other hand, wastes votes even when 
its district vote exceeds its national vote percentage, but not by more 
than the margin of its loss. Thus, the majority party wastes votes in only 
one of the five situations, while the minority party wastes votes in four 
of the five. 
Figure 4.2 presents a causal model explaining the level of respon­
siveness in an electoral system. The immediate cause of electoral system 
responsiveness is the relative proportion of votes wasted on losing con­
gressional candidates. The greater the disparity between the parties in 
the proportion of votes they waste in losing causes, the greater the elec­
toral system's responsiveness. The disparity in wasted votes is in turn af­
fected by the level of competition in congressional districts. As observed 
from table 4.10, to the extent that districts are concentrated in the middle 
categories (generally competitive districts), only the minority party wastes 
votes. System responsiveness would be at its peak when one party barely 
carries every district and nearly half of all votes are wasted or cast in 
losing causes for one of the parties. A slight tilt of the vote in the opposite 
direction would cause an electoral avalanche. Finally, the level of compe­
tition in congressional districts is a function of the level of national com­
petition between the parties, especially when party votes are distributed 
more uniformly across the nation and gerrymandering is designed to 
dilute minority party votes in districts so that the party falls just safely 
short of a majority in any district (termed cracking by Butler and Cain 
[1992, 87]). 
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Figure 4.2 
A Causal Model of Responsiveness in Electoral Systems 
In contrast to responsiveness, partisan bias depends on the distribu­
tion of unwasted rather than wasted votes. Figure 4.3 is a causal model 
indicating the possible influences on the mean number of unwasted votes 
for a party and how this affects partisan bias. Many of the elements in­
cluded in the model were originally identified by Tufte (1973, 548-49). 
A system can be biased in favor of a party by reducing the mean number 
of unwasted votes per victory for that party and raising the mean number 
of unwasted votes per victory for the opposing party.28 That is, bias is 
generally produced by one party winning relatively cheap seats. How is 
such a partisan difference in the mean unwasted votes created? As the 
model indicates, a party can win with fewer votes if it wins districts where 
there are relatively few votes cast (so long as it does not win these districts 
with unusually high percentages of the vote), and these low-turnout dis­
tricts are a product of there being few voting-age citizens residing in the 
district (malapportionment) and low turnout among those who are eli­
gible to vote.29 While the model offers an explanation of how gerryman­
dering, vote margins, differential turnout, and malapportionment affect 
the partisan bias of an electoral system, the most important aspect of this 
model for our purposes is that bias is only directly determined by altering 
the mean number of unwasted votes per victory expended by each 
party.30 
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Figure 4.3 
A Causal Model of Partisan Bias in Electoral Systems 
Note: Arrows pointing to other arrows specify interaction effects. 
For measurement purposes, we can take advantage of the fact that 
the principal factors affecting partisan bias are funneled through the dif­
ference in the mean number of votes that parties expend in their victo­
ries. Unwasted votes have the great advantage that they can be counted. 
Because they can be counted, we can calculate partisan bias directly and 
sidestep many of the estimation problems encountered by conventional 
approaches to measuring bias. Moreover, we can obtain a measure of par­
tisan bias in every election year without resorting to simulating the vote 
with all of the assumptions that such a method entails. It does require 
that we assume that both parties at an even division of the national vote 
would waste a similar share of their votes in losing causes. This assump­
tion is reviewed in detail in appendix B, and, although there have been 
some exceptions, the data generally conform to the assumption. Finally, 
and quite importantly, unlike the historical measure of partisan bias, the 
unwasted-vote measure does not require bias to be a constant. It is quite 
plausible that bias might vary with the distribution of the vote, and this 
could have important political implications. If, for instance, partisan bias 
is greater when the party is doing well at the polls, it would only be add­
ing seats to an already large majority. On the other hand, if partisan bias 
is greater when a party is not doing as well in the vote, it may make a 
substantial difference, perhaps even determining which party has a con­
trolling majority in the legislature. 
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Measuring Partisan Bias with Unwasted Votes 
Having established the rationale for the approach, we can now outline 
the procedures for calculating partisan bias with unwasted votes. There 
are five steps. The first is to calculate the mean number of votes cast for 
each party in the seats that it won and the mean number of votes cast at 
the district level for the winning candidate, regardless of party. The sec­
ond is to calculate the total number of unwasted votes. The third step is 
to divide the total number of unwasted votes in half, to determine how 
many unwasted votes each party would have received if the vote were 
evenly divided. The fourth step is to divide this half of the total unwasted 
votes by the mean number of unwasted votes per victory for the party 
being examined. This indicates how many seats the party would have 
won if it had received 50 percent of the vote, on the assumption that it 
was "paying" for seats at its rate of unwasted votes per seat rather than 
the opposing party's rate or the mean rate. Finally, the number of seats 
the party would have won at its unwasted votes rate can then be divided 
by the total seats to put it in terms of percentages and subtracted from 
50 percent to indicate the direction and extent of bias. 
To follow up on the earlier example from table 4.8, the first step 
calculates the mean number of unwasted votes for Democrats, Republi­
cans, and the system as a whole. As the table indicates, the mean numbers 
of unwasted votes per victory are 80,000 for Democrats, 240,000 for Re­
publicans, and 120,000 overall. The second step, the calculation of the 
total number of unwasted votes, indicates that there were 480,000 un-
wasted votes cast in these four districts. Half of this total, the third step, 
would be 240,000 votes. Applying the fourth step, if the Democrats had 
received 240,000 unwasted votes and paid 80,000 unwasted votes per 
victory, they should receive three of the four, or 75 percent, of the total 
seats. Finally, considering that Democrats would have won 75 percent of 
the seats with half of the unwasted votes, this hypothetical electoral sys­
tem is biased by 25 percent of the seats in favor of the Democratic Party.31 
• Overview • 
This chapter reviewed the concept, measurement, and previous estimates 
of partisan bias in electoral systems and offered an alternative approach 
to its measurement. The concept of partisan bias in an electoral system is 
straightforward: it is the asymmetric treatment of political parties in the 
conversion of votes into seats. Operationally, it is the difference between 
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the proportion of seats that the political parties would win if they were to 
receive the same number of votes nationally. In an unbiased system, po­
litical parties that receive the same number of votes receive the same 
number of seats. By convention, the measurement of partisan bias in a 
two-party system compares the proportion of seats that the parties would 
win if each had half of the national vote. 
The existing research on partisan bias in the electoral system for 
the House in the last several decades has failed to reach a consensus re­
garding the extent or direction of bias. The findings are amazingly dispa­
rate. Some find Democratic bias, others find Republican bias, and still 
others find no consistent bias for either party. While there are many 
methodological differences among these studies that may have lead them 
to reach different conclusions, the principal reason for the lack of a con­
sensus finding is the difference in the measurement of the congressional 
vote used. Some studies examine the mean district vote percentage (or a 
variant thereof) and others the total national vote. The analysis of hypo­
thetical electoral systems demonstrates that the mean district vote is an in­
appropriate measure for assessing bias. Because it implicitly weights each 
congressional district equally, regardless of the actual number of votes 
cast in the district, the mean district vote measure of the congressional 
vote produces very misleading estimates of partisan bias. From a different 
perspective, the mean district vote is an inappropriate measure to assess 
the partisan bias of the electoral system because it is itself a product of 
that system. Redraw district lines and you get a different mean district 
vote, without a single change in an individual vote. To assess the effects 
of the system on the awarding of seats, you need a vote measure that is 
unaffected by how the system organizes votes. 
Appropriate estimates of partisan bias can be obtained by conven­
tional analysis of the relationship between the partisan division of the 
total national vote and seats. Such an analysis indicates that the Demo­
crats have typically enjoyed a partisan advantage over Republicans of 
about 15 to 16 House seats (3.6 percent of seats). That is, if both Demo­
crats and Republicans evenly divided the vote, based on the seat-vote 
relationship of elections in recent decades, Democrats would be expected 
to win 233 seats and Republicans 202 seats. This alone would not have 
accounted for the Democratic House majority, but it suggests that the 
electoral system has worked substantially to the advantage of Democrats. 
In the final part of the chapter, an alternative measure of partisan 
bias was proposed. Unlike the hypothetical method, this measure does 
not entail strong assumptions about how additional votes might have 
94 • CHAPTER 4 
affected election results and, unlike the historical method, it allows a sep­
arate reading of bias in each election year. This method is based on the 
unwasted votes cast for each party. Unwasted votes are votes cast for win­
ning candidates. An examination of both responsiveness and partisan 
bias, the two central characteristics of electoral systems, suggests that re­
sponsiveness results from one party having a larger share of its votes cast 
for losing candidates (wasted votes) than the opposing party, while parti­
san bias results from one party expending more unwasted votes per vic­
tory than the opposing party. By recognizing this basis for partisan bias, 
a straightforward method was devised to calculate directly the degree of 
electoral bias in an election year. 
This method for calculating partisan bias will be applied to House 
election returns from 1954 to 1992 in the next chapter and to the dra­
matic 1994 election in chapter 8. The results concur with the basic find­
ings of the conventional historical method using the total national vote. 
The electoral system has been biased in favor of the Democrats. As the 
cheap-seats thesis contends, the electoral system is biased because Demo­
crats win a disproportionate number of very-low-turnout seats. This pro­
vided an important foundation for four decades of Democratic Party 
control of the House. 
5
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The Price of a Seat

"o many House Democrats sit in cheap seats? Put differently, have 
winning Democratic candidates, on average, received fewer votes than 
winning Republican candidates? Without a doubt, they have. The analy­
sis will show that many House Democrats have been elected in districts 
with very low vote totals. Having won a substantial number of low-
turnout districts and spent relatively few unwasted votes for these victo­
ries, Democrats consistently have enjoyed a significant advantage over 
Republicans. 
The evidence from contested elections between 1954 and 1992 in­
dicates that Democrats consistently won an overwhelming majority of 
low-turnout districts. As a result, the average number of votes cast in Dem­
ocratic victories (Democratic unwasted votes) was much lower than that 
for winning Republicans. This provided the basis for partisan bias in the 
electoral system. There has been not one price for victory, but two, and Democrats 
have paid the lower price. If the two parties had expended the same number 
of unwasted votes per victory, as would have been the case in an unbiased 
system, the House would have been significantly more Republican. 
To begin the unwasted-vote analysis, we turn first to the matter of 
turnout in congressional districts. At least one notion of representative 
government requires that an electoral system come as close as practically 
possible to the equal representation of the nation's citizens. As Butler and 
Cain (1992, 67-68) observed, this equality of representation is central 
to the democratic principles of majority rule and popular sovereignty. 
Constitutional features such as state boundaries and extraconstitutional 
features such as the fixed number of representatives in the House are 
obstacles to designing a system that is perfectly equal in its representation 
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of citizens. However, with due consideration for these constitutional and 
extraconstitutional impediments, there is now a considerable body of law 
strictly applying the principle of equal representation, or "one person, 
one vote," to the reapportionment of representatives and the redrawing 
of district boundaries.1 The more basic principle lying behind one per­
son, one vote is that districts should be nearly equal in size so that the 
ballot of each voter has an equal opportunity of influencing the election 
of a representative. While the standard of equally sized districts in a for­
mal sense (equal populations) is now firmly entrenched, it is less evident 
that districts are effectively equal in size. It would be merely a constitu­
tional nicety rather than a guarantee of popular sovereignty to insist that 
districts be equally populated, if the numbers of actual voters in districts 
varied widely, with very few casting ballots in some districts while huge 
numbers voted in other districts in one election after another. This raises 
the question: How much disparity among congressional districts has 
there been in the number of votes actually cast? Are there cheap seats to 
be had? 
• Turnout in Congressional Districts • 
There are cheap seats. Despite strenuous efforts to ensure that districts 
are equal in population, districts vary greatly in their effective size, as 
measured by the actual number of votes cast. In 1990, for instance, there 
was one district (the Third District of Minnesota) where nearly 300,000 
citizens cast ballots, while in another contested district (the Eighteenth 
District of New York) just over 40,000 voters made it to the polls—an 
enormous 7.5-to-l disparity. In 1992, after reapportionment (so district 
population differences should have been as small as feasible), there were 
nearly 360,000 ballots cast in Maine's First Congressional District, while 
there were just over 50,000 ballots cast in California's Thirty-third 
District—a 7.2-to-l disparity.2 As Dodd and Oppenheimer (1985), Op­
penheimer (1989), and Ornstein (1990) have observed, these huge differ­
ences are by no means restricted to a few extreme districts in a couple of 
isolated election years. There are many districts that regularly record 
small turnouts and others that regularly record high turnouts. 
Table 5.1 presents some descriptive statistics regarding variation in 
district turnout, the effective size of the district. It displays the total num­
ber of congressional votes cast at both the twentieth and the eightieth 
percentiles of the turnout distribution for contested elections from 1954 
to 1992. To assist comparison, the percentage-point difference between 
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Table 5.1 
Variation of Total District Turnout in Contested Seats, 1954-1992 
Total Turnout in Contested Districts 
Percentage Standard 
Election 20th Percentile 80th Percentile Difference Deviation N 
1954 86,500 143,100 +65 36,068 346 
1956 112,200 188,600 +68 46,899 356 
1958 91,100 156,100 +71 42,604 334 
1960 117,500 208,800 +77 58,788 353 
1962 93,300 164,400 +76 43,650 366 
1964 125,400 197,600 +58 46,443 386 
1966 99,100 160,800 +62 36,261 374 
1968 129,500 191,900 +48 36,987 385 
1970 105,300 165,100 +57 35,317 372 
1972 144,900 205,000 +41 34,073 380 
1974 100,800 156,000 +55 33,555 374 
1976 150,800 208,500 +38 35,161 383 
1978 106,500 165,300 +55 36,512 365 
1980 158,700 223,100 +41 45,740 377 
1982 127,600 179,800 +41 33,133 376 
1984 177,900 232,900 +31 35,931 367 
1986 119,600 172,900 +45 33,549 361 
1988 177,000 231,700 +31 38,726 354 
1990 123,400 183,000 +48 41,313 350 
1992 196,000 261,000 +33 44,625 405 
Note: The mean percentage difference is 52 percent. Only single-member-district 
seats contested by both of the major parties are included. Seats uncontested by a major-
party candidate, multimember districts, seats won by third-party or independent congres­
sional candidates, and at-large seats (except those for one-district states) are excluded. The 
total district turnout measure is the total number of votes cast for any congressional candidate 
in the district. 
these percentiles is also presented. Since the table includes only contested 
elections, the number of districts falling below the twentieth percentile or 
above the eightieth percentile differs slightly from election to election, 
but there are usually about 70 districts in the low- and high-turnout cate­
gories (about 140 districts in total). Thus, the comparison of the bottom 
and top quintiles involves a substantial number of districts. The table 
also presents the standard deviations of the total district vote in these 
elections. 
There are large turnout differences across districts. The differences 
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Table 5.2 
Turnout in Seven Congressional Districts in New York and 
the Two Congressional Districts in Maine, 1990 
Maine New York 
District Winning Party Turnout District Winning Party Turnout 
1 Democrat 278,459 6 Democrat 60,641 
2 Republican 238,502 8 Democrat 78,042 
9 Democrat 54,644 
10 Democrat 76,431 
13 Democrat 59,003 
18 Democrat 40,796 
19 Democrat 74,761 
Total Votes Cast 516,961 444,318 
Total Districts 2 7 
between the bottom and top turnout quintiles of districts are consider­
able. Turnout in the top quintile of districts is about 50 percent greater 
than turnout in the bottom quintile. There are about as many votes cast 
in two districts at the eightieth percentile size as three districts of the 
twentieth percentile size. Standard deviations tell the same story. There 
is great variation around the average district turnout in each election 
year. While district turnout grew with population growth over the years, 
the typical turnout of a contested district was about 175,000 in presiden­
tial election years and 135,000 in midterms. Standard deviations of about 
40,000 voters, thus, represent a large difference between low- and high-
turnout districts. One standard deviation from the mean district vote 
amounts to roughly a quarter of the district's votes. In terms of votes cast, 
not population estimates, many congressional districts are very unequal. 
The magnitude of turnout differences is illustrated in more stark 
terms in table 5.2. The table contrasts Maine's two electoral districts with 
the seven lowest-turnout districts in New York for 1990. Over half a mil­
lion ballots were cast in the two districts in Maine, while fewer than 
450,000 votes were cast in seven New York districts combined. That is, 
about 70,000 fewer New Yorkers sent three and a half times as many 
representatives to Washington than a greater number of Maine voters. 
From the standpoint of votes cast, the Maine districts were extremely 
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expensive, while the New York seats were bargain-basement cheap. Sev­
eral of these cheap New York seats cover much of the Queens borough 
of New York City and together are an interesting example of cheap seats 
from the 1980s. 
New York's Cheap Borough 
The Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Districts of New York cover the 
Queens borough of New York City.3 Although some of these districts were 
uncontested in several elections during the 1980s, when the Republicans 
mounted a challenge, the seats were won cheaply. In comparison to other 
contested districts around the country, turnout in the Queens districts 
was low, and the seats were won with relatively few votes. All four districts 
have consistently elected Democrats to the House over the years and this 
continued throughout the 1980s. Joseph Addabbo represented the Sixth 
District from 1960 until his death in 1986.4 In 1986, the Sixth elected 
Floyd Flake, who won reelection into the 1990s. The Seventh District was 
represented by Benjamin Rosenthal from 1962 until his death in 1983. 
He was succeeded by Gary Ackerman, who, like Flake, was reelected into 
the 1990s. James Scheuer was first elected in 1964 and, despite several 
substantial redistrictings, has won each election since. He is currently 
serving in his sixteenth term. The Ninth District was initially represented 
in the 1980s by Geraldine Ferraro. She first won election in 1978 and 
represented the district until her nomination as Walter Mondale's vice 
presidential running-mate in 1984. She was succeeded by Thomas Man-
ton, who has been reelected since (in the district now numbered the 
Seventh). 
As a group, the Democratic delegations from Queens during the 
1980s were decidedly liberal. The Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) 
ratings, an index of liberalism in roll-call voting, for the representatives in 
these districts seldom fell below 80 percent and often was in the 90s 
for several representatives. Ferraro and Manton, who represented the 
more politically competitive Ninth District (numbered the Seventh in the 
1990s), were the least extreme in their records and often had liberal rat­
ings in the high 60s and 70s. The delegation was even more politically 
homogenous in its support of organized labor positions. The ratings of 
these representatives on the AFL-CIO roll-call index rarely fell below 
90 percent. 
Ethnically and racially, the Queens' districts were diverse. The Sixth 
District (southern Queens) was about 50 percent African American. The 
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Seventh and Eighth Districts (eastern and central Queens and northern 
Queens, respectively) had large Jewish populations. The Ninth (western 
Queens) had a large Catholic ethnic population, including many of Ital­
ian, Irish, and Greek ancestry. The Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Districts 
also had Hispanic populations of between 15 and 20 percent. Each dis­
trict also had significant numbers from the groups that predominate in 
adjoining districts. For instance, the Sixth and Seventh Districts also had 
a significant Catholic ethnic community, the Eighth included a significant 
number of African Americans, and the Sixth included a significant num­
ber of Jews and WASPs. Queens was also diverse economically. There 
were affluent areas and poor areas. But the borough as a whole is best 
typified as working class. As Barone and Ujifusa (1990, 827) observed 
about the Ninth, it was the Archie Bunker district of the 1970s and the 
Moonstruck district of the 1980s. Both allusions raise images of a colorful, 
crusty, working class, old-line-labor Democratic constituency. 
Elections in the four districts of Queens were not closely contested 
on a regular basis. In the five elections after the 1980s redistricting (1982 
to 1990), each of the four districts was left uncontested by Republicans at 
least once. The Eighth was uncontested by Republicans in three of the 
five elections. However, of the 12 contested races in Queens over this 
period, Democrats were held under 70 percent in 5. They exceeded 80 
percent only once. Although the four districts are by no means competi­
tive (although the Ninth was a district that Republicans had real hopes 
of gaining), and Republicans have not regularly mounted high-powered 
campaigns against the entrenched Democrats, they nonetheless occasion­
ally had credible showings. 
The turnout in the four districts of Queens regularly placed them 
near the bottom of turnout rankings among all contested districts. Each 
of the 12 contested elections held in these districts during the 1980s 
was in the lowest quintile of turnout. The districts often ranked among 
the 10 lowest in turnout (of contested seats). In 1990, turnout in the 
Ninth ranked third from the bottom and turnout in the Sixth District 
ranked fifth from the bottom (of 349). In 1986, three of Queens' districts 
ranked in the bottom 10 of turnout (of 360). In the 12 contested elec­
tions among these districts in the 1980s, the highest turnout ranking rela­
tive to other contested district was fiftieth from the bottom. Even at this 
high point, nearly 86 percent of contested districts that year had higher 
vote totals. The low turnout in Queens was also evident from conven­
tional measures. Turnout as a proportion of registered voters was about 
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8 to 10 percentage points less than it was for New York State as a whole.5 
These were clearly cheap seats. 
• Population and Turnout Differences • 
Some differences in district turnout are created by seats being appor­
tioned to states, and the limit on the total number of seats. Following 
the reapportionment in the 1990s, Montana and Wyoming were each 
apportioned a single seat, even though Montana had a population of over 
800,000 and Wyoming had a population of under 500,000. District popu­
lation disparities are also found in multiseat states. After the reapportion­
ment based on the 1990 census, the average district in Kansas had over 
620,000 people, while the average Oklahoma seat had a population of 
less than 530,000.6 These population differences can be the basis for sig­
nificant turnout differences among districts. However, even within the 
same state with equally populated districts, turnout differences among 
districts can be large. In the 1992 elections in California, for instance, the 
combined number of votes cast in the five districts with the highest turn­
out was nearly three times the total vote cast in the five California districts 
with the lowest turnout.7 
District turnout disparities, in themselves, do not create partisan 
bias. Indeed, they are not absolutely necessary for the creation of bias in 
an electoral system. However, as the causal model of partisan bias (figure 
4.2) in the last chapter suggested, these turnout differences set a context 
in which bias may develop. If there is a partisan association with district 
turnout (in the actual number of voters), there is a distinct possibility that 
there will also be a difference between the parties in the number of votes 
they receive per victory, and this is the basis for partisan bias. 
• Party Victories and District TUrnout • 
Turnout differences among districts only have implications for the parties 
if one party is disproportionately successful in winning high- or low-
turnout seats. If both parties did equally well in low- and high-turnout 
districts, the parties would be paying roughly the same price (in unwasted 
votes) for a seat, and these turnout differences would not matter much, 
at least in terms of representation of the parties. On the other hand, if 
the success of the parties correlates with the number of voters in districts, 
there may be significant partisan repercussions. If a party wins many low­
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turnout districts, it may also expend fewer votes for these victories, thus 
extending the purchasing power of its votes. Since the hypothesis is that 
partisan bias in the electoral system has helped Democrats, we might ex­
pect Democrats to have done well in the lower-turnout districts and Re­
publicans to have been more successful in the higher-turnout districts. 
They have. 
Democrats have been much more successful in low-turnout districts 
than have Republicans. The consistently disproportionate success of 
Democrats in low-turnout districts is evident in table 5.3. The table 
groups contested districts into quintiles by their total turnout in the par­
ticular election year for elections from 1954 to 1992.8 After grouping 
districts into the five turnout categories, the percentage of winning Dem­
ocratic candidates is calculated at each turnout level. To illustrate, in 1956 
Democrats won 75 percent of contested seats among districts ranked in 
the bottom fifth of turnout and only 29 percent of seats ranked in the top 
fifth of turnout. Democrats have had their greatest success in the districts 
with the lowest turnouts. The highest rate of Democratic success is in 
districts in the bottom quintile of turnout. This is true for each of the 20 
election years. Democrats typically won 4 of 5 of the very-lowest-turnout 
districts. Democrats won nearly 9 of 10 of these very-low-turnout districts 
in some years. In the second turnout quartile, Democrats usually won 
about 3 of 4 districts. In the middle-to-high-turnout districts, Republicans 
and Democrats competed nearly evenly, with Republicans winning in 
these districts just slightly more often than Democrats. 
The correlation and logit coefficients in table 5.3 tell a similar story, 
without grouping the districts by turnout categories. In every election 
from 1954 to 1992, there was a significant correlation between whether 
the district elected a Republican and the total number of ballots cast in 
the district. The correlations quite consistently fell within the .2-to-.3 
range. Logit analyses were also conducted with the party winning the seat 
(Republicans coded 1) as the dependent variable and the total turnout in 
raw votes as the independent variable. These logits indicated that the 
probability of the district electing a Republican rose by about three to 
four percentage points with every additional 10,000 votes cast in the dis-
trict.9 All of these coefficients were statistically significant and corres­
ponded closely with parallel regression analyses. 
Examination of both the grouped data and statistical analysis of un-
grouped data reveals a clear and consistent pattern. In every election 
over this period, Democrats won a larger share of seats in the lowest turn­
out category than in any other. In more than half of the elections, the 
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Table 5.3 
The Relationship between the Party of the Winning Congressional 
Candidate and District Turnout in Total Votes, 1954-1992 
Association 
between Total 
Percentage of Districts3 Won by District Turnout 
Democrats in Districts Grouped and the Election of 
(in Quintiles) by Total District a Republican 
Turnout in Votes Representative 
Low High Logit 
Year 1 2 3 4 5 r Derivative 
1954 61 49 34 32 38 .23 .033 
1956 75 54 35 34 29 .32 .039 
1958 76 49 53 54 42 .19 .022 
1960 84 52 39 48 37 .29 .027 
1962 81 48 49 45 39 .26 .033 
1964 82 70 54 57 57 .22 .024 
1966 77 49 38 41 49 .22 .032 
1968 69 64 48 43 37 .26 .039 
1970 78 61 43 44 38 .29 .045 
1972 70 61 49 38 41 .25 .039 
1974 82 65 55 52 56 .19 .028 
1976 87 63 65 54 52 .26 .038 
1978 88 64 56 51 51 .26 .036 
1980 84 53 44 43 43 .30 .037 
1982 79 56 53 52 56 .16 .025 
1984 77 57 41 46 51 .21 .032 
1986 72 65 42 53 47 .17 .026 
1988 84 53 60 46 38 .30 .043 
1990 89 70 55 53 47 .26 .033 
1992 83 57 53 52 54 .21 .026 
Mean 79 58 48 47 45 
Note: Only single-member-district seats contested by both of the major parties are 
included. The total district-turnout measure is the total number of votes cast for any congres­
sional candidate in the district. A table entry is the percentage of seats won by Democratic 
candidates at a particular level of turnout in a given election year. For example, Democrats 
in 1954 won 61 percent of contested districts in the lowest quintile of voter turnout measured 
by total votes cast. The correlation (r) is between the total district turnout and a dummy 
variable indicating whether the Republican won. The logit derivative indicates the change in 
the probability of the Republican congressional candidate being elected for every additional 
10,000 votes cast in the district. Thus, for every additional 10,000 votes in a district in 1954, 
the likelihood that the district elected a Republican increased by 3.3 percentage points. All 
logit coefficients were statistically significant at p < .01. 
2 
3
4
5 
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Table 5.4 
Contested Congressional Districts with Highest 
Total Congressional Voter Turnout, 1990 
Rank State and District Total Vote Winning Candidate Political Party 
1 Minnesota, 3 292,228 Ramstad Republican 
Maine, 1 278,459 Andrews Democrat 
Massachusetts, 10 258,022 Studds Democrat 
South Dakota, AL 257,298 Johnson Democrat 
Minnesota, 6 254,954 Sikorski Democrat 
6 California, 14 249,051 Doolittle Republican 
7 Florida, 9 244,666 Bilirakis Republican 
8 North Carolina, 4 240,057 Price Democrat 
9 Maine, 2 238,502 Snowe Republican 
10 Oregon, 1 238,259 AuCoin Democrat 
11 Arizona, 3 237,297 Stump Republican 
12 Florida, 14 236,304 Johnston Democrat 
13 Texas, 10 235,455 Pickle Democrat 
14 Florida, 6 234,009 Stearns Republican 
15 North Dakota, AL 233,973 Dorgan Democrat 
16 Florida, 11 232,961 Bacchus Democrat 
17 California, 37 232,082 McCandless Republican 
18 Arizona, 4 231,238 Kyi Republican 
19 California, 1 230,261 Riggs Republican 
20 Massachusetts, 6 229,461 Mavroules Democrat 
Seats Won by Each Party: Democrats 11 
Republicans 9 
Note: At-large statewide districts are indicated by AL. Also, only the 350 seats con­
tested by congressional candidates of both major parties in 1990 are examined. The single 
district won by a candidate without a major-party affiliation (Vermont-AL) is excluded. 
Democrats were next most successful in the second-to-lowest turnout 
group of districts. The pattern supports the thesis that the electoral sys­
tem allowed Democrats to win a substantial number of cheap seats.10 
The districts listed in tables 5.4 and 5.5 put some names with the 
numbers. Table 5.4 lists the 20 highest-turnout districts in 1990, the ac­
tual number of voters casting ballots for the House in those districts, and 
the winning congressional candidates and political parties. Table 5.5 pro­
vides the same information for the 20 contested seats with the lowest to­
tal turnout. 
The list of the highest-turnout districts, districts with turnout near 
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Table 5.5 
Contested Congressional Districts with Lowest 
Total Congressional Voter Turnout, 1990 
Rank State and District Total Vote Winning Candidate Political Party 
331 California-31 83,987 Dymally Democrat 
332 Tennessee-9 83,640 Ford Democrat 
333 California-30 78,083 Martinez Democrat 
334 New York-8 78,042 Scheuer Democrat 
335 Tennessee-4 77,272 Cooper Democrat 
336 West Virginia-4 76,894 Rahall Democrat 
337 NewYork-10 76,431 Schumer Democrat 
338 NewYork-19 74,761 Engel Democrat 
339 Mississippi-4 70,891 Parker Democrat 
340 Mississippi-2 70,671 Espy Democrat 
341 Maryland-7 70,157 Mfume Democrat 
342 Califomia-25 68,717 Roybal Democrat 
343 Michigan-13 67,817 Collins Democrat 
344 Mississippi-1 67,318 Whitten Democrat 
345 California-29 64,672 Waters Democrat 
346 New York-6 60,641 Flake Democrat 
347 NewYork-13 59,003 Solarz Democrat 
348 NewYork-9 54,644 Manton Democrat 
349 New Jersey-10 52,305 Payne Democrat 
350 NewYork-18 40,796 Serrano Democrat 
Seats Won by Each Party: Democrats 20 
Republicans 0 
Note:These lowest turnout districts are from the 350 seats contested by congressional 
candidates of both major parties in 1990. 
or in excess of 230,000 voters (listed in table 5.4), illustrates that no party 
has had a monopoly on these districts and that no clear thread runs 
through them. Of the 20 districts, Democrats won 11 and Republicans 
won 9. In terms of district characteristics, the highest-turnout districts 
tended to be in high-growth areas (such as Florida) and in predominantly 
white, northern nonurban areas. 
There is also diversity at the other end of the turnout spectrum, 
districts with turnout below 85,000 voters. Many of these districts were 
urban with sizable minority populations. Eleven districts were either in 
New York City or Los Angeles.11 African Americans made up a third or 
more of the district's population in 10 of the 20 districts. Several low­
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turnout districts also had large Hispanic populations. In addition, as one 
might expect of an election just prior to reapportionment, several low-
turnout districts were in areas that had lost population since the last 
remapping. 
• Unwasted Votes and the Price of Victory • 
Did the typical House Democrat win with fewer votes than the House 
Republican? Was the mean number of unwasted votes in a party's victo­
ries smaller for Democrats than for Republicans? Although the link be­
tween the success of the parties and the turnout in congressional districts 
is a good reason to suspect that Democrats paid a lower price (in votes) 
for their victories, it is logically possible that they did not. If Democrats 
had won by larger vote margins in these low-turnout districts, they might 
not have paid a smaller price for their victories than the Republicans, 
even though they often won in lower-turnout districts. To illustrate, if a 
Republican won a high-turnout district (200,000 votes) with 51 percent 
of the vote and a Democrat won a low-turnout district (120,000 votes) 
with 85 percent of the vote, each would have received the same number 
of votes in his or her victory (102,000 votes). 
In fact, Democrats did pay a lower price in votes for their victories 
in most elections than did Republicans.12 Democrats won many seats with 
low vote totals. The evidence is presented in table 5.6. While the pattern 
is not quite as sharp or as consistent as the partisan association with turn­
out, it is nevertheless clear in most election years. As in table 5.3, districts 
are grouped into quintiles based on the number of votes received by the 
winning candidate (unwasted votes). Among districts falling in the bottom 
20 percent range of the number of votes for the winning candidate, Dem­
ocrats typically won about 7 of 10 times. In several years, including 1990, 
Democrats won about 8 of 10 of these districts. In the next-to-lowest cate­
gory of unwasted votes, Democrats typically won nearly 6 of 10. In the 
three highest categories of unwasted votes, Democrats and Republicans 
were often quite competitive, or Republicans had a slight edge. 
As in the earlier analysis of the partisan association with district 
turnout, table 5.6 also presents a systematic analysis of the association 
between the number of votes cast for the winning candidate in a district 
and the party of the winning congressional candidate. Table 5.6 offers 
the correlations, based on ungrouped district data, between the winning 
party and the number of votes cast for the winning candidate of the dis­
trict. It also presents the results of logit analyses for each election. In the 
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Table 5.6 
The Relationship between the Party of the Winning Congressional Candidate 
and the Total Votes Cast for the Winning Candidate, 1954-1992 
Association between the Percentage of 
Districts Won by Democrats in Districts District Vote for the 
Grouped (in Quintiles) by Total Winning Candidate 
District Votes for the Winning and the Election 
House Candidate of a Republican 
Low High Logit 
Year 1 2 3 4 5 r Derivative 
1954 55 51 24 41 43 .13 .031 
1956 73 49 44 28 32 .30 .059 
1958 66 48 50 55 55 .04 .009 
1960 74 55 37 52 41 .19 .029 
1962 77 47 47 55 38 .22 .043 
1964 74 56 50 78 62 .04 .006 
1966 71 46 55 56 27 .25 .056 
1968 71 57 52 48 31 .29 .067 
1970 65 64 39 55 42 .17 .039 
1972 61 61 47 51 38 .18 .039 
1974 70 51 57 65 67 -.01 -.002 
1976 81 62 65 57 57 .16 .033 
1978 82 68 56 56 47 .22 .045 
1980 67 68 52 45 35 .29 .051 
1982 67 53 58 55 63 .04 .008 
1984 71 68 47 47 38 .26 .052 
1986 61 57 51 64 47 .07 .014 
1988 75 61 60 44 42 .24 .043 
1990 81 71 56 51 53 .19 .037 
1992 67 64 60 49 58 .12 .020 
Mean 70 58 50 53 46 
Note: Only single-member-district seats contested by both of the major parties are 
included. The total district vote for the winning candidate is the actual number of votes cast 
for that candidate. A table entry is the percentage of seats won by Democrats among all 
winning candidates receiving a particular range of votes in a given election year. For ex­
ample, Democrats in 1954 won 55 percent of the contested districts in the lowest quintile of 
total votes cast for the winning candidate. The correlation (r) is between the number of un-
wasted district votes and a dummy variable indicating whether the Republican won. The logit 
derivative indicates the change in the probability of the Republican congressional candidate 
being elected for every additional 10,000 unwasted votes cast in the district. Thus, for every 
additional 10,000 unwasted votes in a district in 1954, the likelihood that the district elected 
a Republican increased by 3.1 percentage points. The coefficients were statistically signifi­
cant (p < .01), except in 1958, 1964, 1974, 1982, and 1986. 
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logit analyses, the party of the congressional candidate winning the dis­
trict (Republicans coded 1) is the dichotomous dependent variable, and 
the number of votes cast for the winning candidate (in units of 10,000 
votes) is the independent variable. As expected, with one exception, the 
correlations and logit analyses indicate that in districts where the winning 
candidate received a relatively larger number of votes, that candidate was 
more likely to be a Republican. The relationship between the party win­
ning the seat and the number of unwasted votes cast in the district is 
statistically significant in 15 of the 20 elections examined. In most elec­
tions, the relationship was substantial. The logit analyses suggest that for 
every additional ten thousand unwasted votes cast in a district, the proba­
bility of the district winner being a Republican increased by about four 
to six percentage points. 
It is worth noting that the relationship between the number of un-
wasted votes and the party winning the district faltered in five elections. 
In 1958, 1964, 1974, 1982, and 1986, the associations fell short of statisti­
cal significance. In 1974, the association was actually in the opposite di­
rection, though not statistically significant and very nearly zero. This is a 
matter that we will return to later in this chapter and address fully in the 
next; however, at this point, we might note that a common thread runs 
through these years: each had an election in which Democrats did espe­
cially well. From 1954 to 1992, the national Democratic congressional 
vote reached or exceeded 55 percent on seven occasions (see table 2.8), 
and the elections noted above constitute five of these seven. The associa­
tion between the number of unwasted votes in a district and the party 
winning the seat, an association that forms the basis for partisan bias in 
the electoral system, was weakest when Democrats were doing well. The 
other side of this coin, the more politically interesting side, is that the 
association and, as we will shortly see, partisan bias were stronger when 
the Democrats were doing relatively less well nationally. This is a matter 
that will be addressed at greater length in chapters 6 and 7. 
The basic point, however, is that, while both parties have won some 
seats with low vote totals, Democrats consistently got the better bargains. 
A comparison of an equal number of the lowest-turnout districts won by 
each party in 1992 illustrates the Democratic advantage. In the 67 lowest 
turnout districts won by Democrats in 1992, they cumulatively received 
just under seven million votes. By contrast, in an equal number of the 
lowest-turnout districts won by Republicans that year, Republicans re­
ceived a total of more than 8.35 million votes, over 1.35 million more 
votes than Democrats for the same number of victories in the same elec­
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tion. The vote difference is about what it would have taken to have 
elected an additional 9 or 10 Republicans in 1992.13 
• The Extent of Bias • 
Having established the turnout and unwasted vote basis for partisan bias, 
we can now turn to the calculation of bias. As outlined at the end of the 
last chapter, there are five steps in calculating bias through unwasted 
votes: (1) compute the mean number of unwasted votes per victory for 
each party and overall, (2) compute the total number of unwasted votes, 
(3) compute an even division of all unwasted votes, (4) calculate (on the 
basis of steps 1 and 3) the number of seats a party would have won if it 
received half of the unwasted votes and expended votes per victory at 
that party's rate, and (5) convert this number of seats into a percentage, 
and subtract 50 percent from it, to obtain the percentage of seats attribut­
able to bias produced by the parties winning seats with different numbers 
of unwasted votes. 
The first step in calculating bias is demonstrated in table 5.7. The 
table presents the mean number of votes cast for winning congressional 
candidates for contested districts from 1954 to 1992, for all winning can­
didates and also for the winning candidates of each party. As one would 
expect on the basis of the earlier analysis, with a single exception (1974), 
the mean number of votes cast for winning Republican candidates consis­
tently exceeded the mean number of votes cast for winning Democratic 
candidates. Consistent with the cheap-seats explanation of the Demo­
cratic dynasty, fewer votes were expended in Democratic than in Republi­
can victories. By exacting a greater price for victory from Republicans 
than from Democrats, in most elections, the electoral system has been 
biased in favor of Democrats. 
Sometimes the differences between the parties were rather minor, 
but in some cases they were substantial. In 1958, 1964, and 1982, for 
instance, typical Republican winners did not receive many more votes 
than did typical Democratic winners. In these three elections, the differ­
ence of means was less than 2,200 votes, which accounts for less than 3 
percent of the mean Democratic winning vote. In most elections, how­
ever, the differences were sizable. Typical Republican winners received 
more than 10,000 more votes than typical Democratic winners in eight 
election years, and in several of these cases this amounted to the mean 
Republican winning vote being more than 15 percent greater than the 
mean Democratic winning vote. 
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Table 5.7 
Mean Number of Votes for Winning Democratic and Republican 
Congressional Candidates in Contested Elections, 1954-1992 
Contested Seats

AllContested

Democrats Republicans Seats 
Mean Mean Mean 
Seats Winning Seats Winning Total Winning 
Year Won Votes Won Votes Seats Votes 
1954 148 65,109 198 70,422 346 68,150 
1956 161 82,079 195 99,779 356 91,774 
1958 183 74,731 151 76,776 334 75,656 
1960 183 93,572 170 106,535 353 99,815 
1962 192 75,120 174 86,622 366 80,588 
1964 247 98,897 139 101,052 386 99,673 
1966 191 76,145 183 88,281 374 82,083 
1968 200 93,725 185 108,057 385 100,612 
1970 197 82,052 175 89,709 372 85,654 
1972 196 106,638 184 114,889 380 110,634 
1974 232 80,815 142 80,508 374 80,699 
1976 246 111,393 137 119,220 383 114,192 
1978 226 82,897 139 93,769 365 87,037 
1980 201 113,318 176 131,932 377 122,007 
1982 222 97,540 154 99,277 376 98,251 
1984 199 126,556 168 140,189 367 132,797 
1986 202 96,910 159 100,191 361 98,355 
1988 199 130,884 155 144,639 354 136,907 
1990 219 93,048 131 103,306 350 96,887 
1992 241 135,151 163 142,803 404 138,238 
Note: Seats uncontested by a major-party candidate, multimember districts, seats won 
by third-party or independent congressional candidates, and at-large seats (except those in 
one district states) are excluded from these calculations. 
The implications of these differences are clarified with an example. 
Consider 1988. The average vote for Democratic winners in 1988 was 
about 131,000 votes, while the average vote for Republicans was nearly 
14,000 votes greater. If the Democrats had received the same number 
of unwasted votes in this election but because of districting arrange­
ments expended the same number of unwasted votes per victory as 
Republicans, they would have won about 19 fewer seats. Of course, in 
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an unbiased electoral system, each party would expend an equal num­
ber of votes per victory, on average. 
The second and third steps involve the calculation of the total un-
wasted vote and an even division of that vote. The total unwasted vote in 
any election can be obtained by multiplying the total number of contested 
districts by the mean number of unwasted votes in contested districts. 
The results of the third step, the number of unwasted votes that each 
party would have received if the parties evenly divided the total vote, 
are presented in table 5.8. The table also presents the mean number of 
unwasted votes per Democratic victory in each election (taken from table 
5.7) and, taking the fourth step, divides the even split of unwasted votes 
by this Democratic rate of unwasted votes per victory. The result is the 
number of seats the Democrats would have won had they evenly divided 
the total vote but paid their lower unwasted-vote rate for each victory. 
This is the number of contested seats that Democrats would have been 
expected to win if the national congressional vote had been equally di-
vided.14 For example, half of the unwasted votes cast in 1988 amounted 
to a bit over 24.2 million votes. With 24.2 million unwasted votes and a 
victory rate of 1 seat for every 130,884 unwasted votes, Democrats would 
have won approximately 185 seats. 
The final step in calculating partisan bias is the conversion of seats 
that Democrats would have won with half of all unwasted votes into a 
percentage of all contested seats. Table 5.9 reports these percentages. 
The number of seats that the Democrats would have won with 50 percent 
of the vote (from table 5.8), given their rate of unwasted votes per victory, 
is divided by the total number of contested seats in the election (from 
table 5.7) to produce the percentage of seats that Democrats would have 
won. Because an unbiased system should award a party half of the seats 
for half of the votes, 50 percentage points are subtracted from this per­
centage to indicate the percentage of seats awarded to a party because of 
bias in the electoral system. For example, the 185 seats that Democrats 
could have been expected to win with half of the 1988 vote amounts to 
52.3 percent of all contested seats (185/354 = 0.523), a bias of 2.3 percent 
of the contested seats in favor of the Democrats. This amounts to an 8­
seat bias in favor of the Democrats or an inflation of their seat margin 
over Republicans of 16 seats. 
The mean bias in the system has been about 2.4 percent of the con­
tested seats. This is in the same ballpark as the earlier regression estimate 
of partisan bias using the national congressional vote (table 4.6). With 
approximately 382 contested seats in a typical election, partisan bias 
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Table 5.8 
Number of Contested Seats Democrats Would Have Won Based 
on an Even Division of the Vote and the Mean Number of 
Unwasted Democratic Votes per Victory, 1954-1992 
Contested Seats That 
Half of Unwasted Mean Number of Democrats Would 
Votes in Contested Unwasted Votes per Have Won with Half of 
Year Districts Democratic Victory the Unwasted Votes 
1954 11,789,850 65,109 181 
1956 16,335,750 82,079 199 
1958 12,634,500 74,731 169 
1960 17,617,300 93,572 188 
1962 14,747,650 75,120 196 
1964 19,236,900 98,897 194 
1966 15,349,550 76,145 202 
1968 19,367,800 93,725 207 
1970 15,931,650 82,052 194 
1972 21,020,350 106,638 197 
1974 15,090,650 80,815 187 
1976 21,867,900 111,393 196 
1978 15,884,300 82,897 192 
1980 22,998,500 113,318 203 
1982 18,471,250 97,540 189 
1984 24,368,150 126,556 193 
1986 17,753,100 96,910 183 
1988 24,232,500 130,884 185 
1990 16,955,250 93,048 182 
1992 27,924,116 135,151 207 
Note; Seats uncontested by a major-party candidate, multimember districts, seats won 
by third-party or independent congressional candidates, and at-large seats (except those for 
one district states) are excluded from these calculations. The number of contested seats that 
Democrats would have won had they won half the votes is computed by dividing the number 
in the first column by the one in the second. The half of the total national unwasted votes in 
contested districts is rounded to the nearest 50 votes. 
typically shifted about 9 or 10 seats in the Democratic direction, inflating 
the Democratic seat margin over Republicans by 18 to 20 seats. However, 
as noted previously, there was a good deal of variation around the typical 
degree of bias. In the 1974, post-Watergate, election, the electoral system 
actually favored the Republicans, though just barely, and in several other 
elections (1958, 1964, 1982, and 1986) bias favored the Democrats by less 
than 1 percent of contested seats. On the other hand, the system worked 
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Table 5.9 
Extent of Partisan Bias Resulting from the Different Expenditure of Votes per 
Seat for Democratic and Republican Congressional Candidates, 1954-1992 
Percentage of Contested Seats 
That Democrats Would Win 
with 50 Percent of the Percentage Partisan Bias 
Year Unwasted Vote from Unwasted Votes 
1954 52.3 +2.3 Democratic 
1956 55.9 +5.9 Democratic 
1958 50.6 + .6 Democratic 
1960 53.3 +3.3 Democratic 
1962 53.6 +3.6 Democratic 
1964 50.4 +.4 Democratic 
1966 53.9 +3.9 Democratic 
1968 53.7 +3.7 Democratic 
1970 52.2 +2.2 Democratic 
1972 51.9 +1.9 Democratic 
1974 49.9 +.1 Republican 
1976 51.3 +1.3 Democratic 
1978 52.5 +2.5 Democratic 
1980 53.8 +3.8 Democratic 
1982 50.4 +.4 Democratic 
1984 52.5 +2.5 Democratic 
1986 50.8 +.7 Democratic 
1988 52.1 +2.1 Democratic 
1990 52.0 +2.0 Democratic 
1992 51.1 +1.1 Democratic 
Grand Mean 52.4 +2.4 Democratic 
Pre-1964 Mean 52.7 +2.7 Democratic 
Post-1964 Mean 52.0 +2.0 Democratic 
Note: The Democratic seat percentage at 50 percent of the vote in contested seats 
was determined by calculating the total number of unwasted votes in contested seats and 
dividing that in half, to determine how many votes constituted 50 percent in each election 
(unwasted votes are those cast for winning candidates, only unwasted votes are counted to 
avoid mixing issues of bias and responsiveness). This 50 percent of the total vote was then 
converted into Democratic seats by dividing the number of votes constituting 50 percent 
by the mean number of votes received by winning Democratic candidates. The number of 
Democratic seats was then converted into a percentage by dividing it by the total number of 
contested seats and translating that proportion into a percentage. In calculating the means, 
pre-1964 includes the 1964 election. 
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considerably more to the advantage of Democrats at other times. In 1956, 
1962, 1966, 1968, and 1980, the electoral system favored Democrats by 
more than 3.7 percent of the contested seats, inflating the Democratic 
seat margin over Republicans by nearly 30 seats. 
• The Partisan Division of an Unbiased House • 
The analysis of partisan bias to this point has assessed bias at the point at 
which each party receives exactly half of the vote. An alternative is to 
calculate the extent of partisan bias at the actual vote divisions for the 
parties. Rather than applying the rate of Democratic unwasted votes per 
victory to a hypothetical, even division of unwasted votes, the prevailing 
systemwide rate of unwasted votes per victory (a party-neutral rate) can 
be applied to the actual number of votes for winning Democratic candi­
dates. We can thus determine how many fewer seats Democrats would 
have won in an unbiased system that exacted the same number of votes 
per victory from both parties. This measure of partisan bias allows us to 
go beyond the question of whether partisan bias exists, to the more cen­
tral question of this study: did partisan bias contribute significantly to the 
maintenance of the Democratic dynasty in the House? 
The effects of partisan bias in particular elections are presented in 
table 5.10. The table presents the actual distribution of seats to the parties 
resulting from an election and the distribution that would have resulted 
if the parties expended an equal number of votes for each victory. The 
latter is what would have resulted from an unbiased electoral system. 
The difference between actual election results and those of an unbiased 
electoral system indicates the impact of partisan bias in the system. The 
data necessary to calculate the results of an unbiased system appear 
in table 5.7. By multiplying the number of seats won by Democrats 
and their mean number of unwasted votes per victory, we arrive at 
the total number of unwasted votes. This is then divided by the mean 
number of unwasted votes for all contested seats, to obtain the num­
ber of seats that Democrats would have won if both Democrats 
and Republicans paid the same price in votes for a victory. To demon­
strate, on the basis of their number of victories and the mean number 
of unwasted votes per victory, Democrats received over 26 million 
unwasted votes in 1988 (199 X 130,884 = 26,045,916). If the system 
were designed so that Democrats expended the mean number of 
votes for a victory (136,907 in 1988), they would have won 190 seats 
(26,045,916/136,907 = 190.2) rather than the 199 that they actually won 
because of their winning cheap seats. In 1988, then, partisan bias gave 
THE PRICE OF A SEAT • 115 
Table 5.10 
Actual Party Distribution of Seats in the House of Representatives and the 
Distribution of Seats without Partisan Bias in the Electoral System, 1954-1992 
Seat Division without Difference in the 
Actual Seat Division Partisan Bias Number of 
Democratic 
Year Democrats Republicans Democrats Republicans Seats 
A. Contested IDistricts 
1954 148 198 141 205 - 7 
1956 161 195 144 212 - 1  7 
1958 183 151 181 153 - 2 
1960 183 170 172 181 -11 
1962 192 174 179 185 -1  3 
1964 247 139 245 141 - 2 
1966 191 183 177 197 - 1  4 
1968 200 185 186 199 - 1  4 
1970 197 175 189 183 - 8 
1972 196 184 189 191 - 7 
1974 232 142 232 142 0 
1976 246 137 240 143 - 6 
1978 226 139 215 150 -1 1 
1980 201 176 187 190 - 1  4 
1982 222 154 220 156 - 2 
1984 199 168 190 177 - 9 
1986 202 159 199 162 Q 
1988 199 155 190 164 - 9 
1990 219 131 210 140 - 9 
1992 241 163 236 168 - 5 
Mean 204 164 196 172 -8.1 
B. All Districts 
1954 232 203 225 210 7 
1956 234 201 217 218 - 1  7 
1958 283 153 281 155 - 2 
1960 262 175 251 186 -1 1 
1962 258 176 245 189 -1  3 
1964 295 140 293 142 - 2 
1966 248 187 234 201 -1  4 
1968 243 192 229 206 -1  4 
1970 255 180 247 188 - 8 
1972 242 192 235 199 - 7 
1974 291 144 291 144 0 
1976 292 143 286 149 - 6 
continued 
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Table 5.10 (continued) 
Actual Party Distribution of Seats in the House of Representatives and the 
Distribution of Seats without Partisan Bias in the Electoral System, 1954-1992 
Seat Division without Difference in the 
Actual Seat Division Partisan Bias Number of 
Democratic 
Year Democrats Republicans Democrats Republicans Seats 
B. All Districts 
1978 277 158 266 169 -11

1980 243 192 229 206 -14

1982 268 167 266 169 -2

1984 253 182 244 191 -9

1986 258 177 255 180 -3

1988 260 175 251 184 -9

1990 267 167 258 176 -9

1992 258 176 253 181 -5

Mean 263 173 254 181 - 8 .  1 
Note: Republican seat majorities are indicated in bold. The seat division without parti­
san bias was determined in two steps for each party: (1) the number of seats won by a 
party was multiplied by the mean number of votes cast for that party's winning candidates to 
determine the party's total number of unwasted votes, and (2) the party's total number of 
unwasted votes was then divided by the overall mean number of votes cast for winning 
House candidates to determine how many seats the party would have won if both parties 
expended the same number of votes per successful candidacy. The actual seat division for 
all districts is from Omstein et al. (1990), except for 1992, which was computed from election 
returns reported in Congressional Quarterly. The unbiased seat division of the entire House 
is calculated by adding the number of uncontested and multimember seats for each party to 
the calculated number of contested seats it would have won in an unbiased electoral system. 
nine seats to the Democrats that would have gone to Republicans in an 
unbiased system. 
Like the prior analysis, the figures in table 5.10 indicate a consistent 
Democratic bias in the electoral system. With the single exception of 
1974, Democrats won more seats than they would have in a neutral elec­
toral system. Typically, partisan bias shifted about eight or nine seats in 
the Democratic direction. However, again, there was considerable vari­
ance. During the period of the Democratic dynasty, from 1954 to 1992, 
the Democrats gained more than 10 seats through partisan bias in seven 
elections. More important from the standpoint of preserving the Demo­
cratic majority, partisan bias was responsible for Democrats winning a majority 
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of contested seats in six elections between 1954 and 1992. Without bias, Republi­
cans would have won a majority of contested seats in I960, 1962, 1966, 
1968, and 1980.15 This is in addition to the two elections, 1954 and 1956, 
in which Republicans actually won majorities of the contested seats de­
spite the electoral system's bias against them in those years. Thus, if the 
electoral system were unbiased, Republicans would have won a majority 
of contested seats in 8 of the 20 election years (40 percent). In 11 of 
the remaining 12 elections (1974 being the exception), the elimination of 
electoral bias would have narrowed the Democratic margin over Republi­
cans in contested seats. 
The second part of table 5.10 indicates the effect of partisan bias on 
the partisan composition of the entire House of Representatives, not just 
the contested seats. In this part of the table, election results from uncon­
tested and multimember districts are added to the results of contested 
seats. As these figures indicate, partisan bias in the electoral system, by 
itself, was generally insufficient to sustain the Democratic majority. The 
removal of bias in the electoral system may have produced a razor-thin 
Republican majority in only one election, 1956.16 In other elections, al­
though the removal of partisan bias would have narrowed the Demo­
cratic majority, sometimes quite substantially (e.g., 1966, 1968, and 1980), 
the other factors working to the party's advantage (its incumbency advan­
tage and uncontested-seat advantage), as well as the support for Demo­
cratic candidates by the voters, were enough to keep the Democratic 
majority in place. This is not to minimize the importance of partisan bias 
to the Democratic dynasty. It suggests instead that the Democratic major­
ity did not depend on any single factor alone, even one that benefited 
them as significantly and as consistently as the partisan bias of the elec­
toral system. 
• Partisan Bias and Incumbency • 
Although the pro-Democratic bias found in the preceding analysis is sig­
nificant and consistent, it is also underestimated. Some portion of parti­
san bias in prior elections carries into future elections through the effects 
of incumbency.17 Because Democrats systematically won more seats than 
would have been the case in an unbiased system, they had additional 
incumbents seeking reelection, and, through the various advantages of 
their office, these Democratic incumbents attracted an additional number 
of votes. As noted in chapter 3, estimates of the vote value of incumbency 
indicate that it was worth about four percentage points of a district's vote 
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in the 1950s and rose to about nine percentage points of the vote by 
the 1980s (Levitt and Wolfram, 1996). Since partisan bias produces more 
incumbents and incumbents produce more votes, the vote totals that we 
use in our analysis of a given election year have already been influenced 
to some extent by partisan bias in prior elections.18 
Because partisan bias consistently favored Democrats, as already 
demonstrated in the analysis of individual election years, the consider­
ation of carryover partisan bias effects from prior years should indicate 
that the general electoral system's bias was even more favorable to Demo­
crats. The logic is as follows. Some number of Democratic incumbents 
enjoy their incumbency by virtue of partisan bias in a prior election, and 
this is not necessarily limited to only the bias of the last election. These 
Democrats receive the generally larger vote that incumbents are able to 
attract rather than the smaller vote that they would have received had 
they run as challengers. In essence, there is an incumbency multiplier 
effect to partisan bias that has not been incorporated into the above cal­
culations and, if incorporated, would indicate an even stronger pro-
Democratic bias.19 
The estimation of the additional votes and seats derived from parti­
san bias in the immediately prior election involves a number of calcula­
tions and several assumptions. The analysis, in some detail, is presented 
in appendix C. The analysis indicates that some effects of partisan bias in 
past elections are carried into later elections via incumbency; however, 
these effects are marginal. 
The marginal nature of these carryover effects is due, in part, to the 
stability in the location of bias. That is, the very-low-turnout districts in 
the current election were very likely the very-low-turnout districts in 
prior elections. Correlations of the number of unwasted votes in districts 
won by Democrats in adjacent election years illustrates this stability. Four 
pairs of elections were examined: 1954-56, 1964-66, 1974-76, and 1984­
86. For each pairing, all districts that were contested in both election 
years were examined. In each of the four pairs of elections, the number 
of unwasted votes in a district in one election year was strongly and posi­
tively correlated with the number of unwasted votes in that district in the 
next election (.84 in 1954-56, .63 in 1964-66, .65 in 1974-76, and .69 in 
1984-86). This indicates substantial continuity in the location of the 
cheap seats, so earlier bias was not helping to elect many candidates that 
bias in the current election would not have helped anyway. In addition, 
carryover effects are marginal because many of the votes that Republicans 
THE PRICE OF A SEAT • 119 
would have gained if there had not been bias in earlier elections are votes 
that would be cast for losing Republican candidates. 
The bottom line is that incumbency typically boosts the number of 
seats linked to partisan bias by about two or three seats. Adding this car­
ryover effect of bias in previous elections to partisan bias in the current 
election indicates that the electoral system generally deviates by about 10 
to 12 seats from neutrality. 
• Overview • 
The electoral system systematically worked to the advantage of Demo­
crats. The origin of this advantage is the great disparity in turnout among 
districts. It was not at all unusual for turnout in one district to be more 
than half again the turnout of another. Most importantly, the evidence 
indicates that Democrats have done especially well in the low-turnout 
districts. With the exception of only one election since the 1950s (1974), 
fewer votes have been cast for the average winning Democratic candidate 
than for the average winning Republican candidate in each election year 
from 1954 to 1992. Democrats obtained a greater payoff from their votes 
or won additional seats because they won a significant number of seats 
with very few votes, the cheap seats. This was the basis of the pro-
Democratic partisan bias in the electoral system. 
After considering the extent to which incumbency carries forward 
the effects of prior partisan bias into later elections, it appears that parti­
san bias typically shifted about 10 to 12 seats away from the Republicans 
and to the Democrats. Among contested seats, this bias was sufficient to 
turn a Republican majority into a Democratic majority in six elections, in 
addition to the two election years (the 1954 and 1956 elections) in which 
Republicans won an outright majority of contested seats despite a pro-
Democratic electoral system bias. In 1956, without the bias of the elec­
toral system, Democrats might have narrowly lost their seat majority. 
Otherwise, however, the Democratic cheap-seats advantage was not by 
itself sufficient to account for the Democratic majority in all seats (both 
contested and uncontested), although it significantly narrowed the Dem­
ocratic majority on several occasions. In an unbiased electoral system, a 
Republican majority would have been within reach in several elections 
since 1954. 
The analysis also indicates that there was a fair degree of stability in 
the location of bias. The number of unwasted votes at the district level 
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were positively correlated across elections. The mean interelection corre­
lation of unwasted votes in districts was about .7. Despite this stability and 
despite the consistency with which bias favored the Democrats, there was 
also a good deal of variation in partisan bias.20 In some elections (1958, 
1964, 1974, 1982, and 1986), partisan bias was minimal and in others 
(1956, 1962, 1966, 1968, and 1980), large. This is the issue that we turn 
to next. Why has bias varied? We know that, in an immediate sense, elec­
toral system bias is the result of one party disproportionately winning 
low-turnout districts, but in a broader sense what causes this? What fac­
tors systematically affect bias, causing it to be larger in some elections and 
smaller in others? 
6
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"espite the consistency with which the electoral system has tilted in 
favor of the Democratic Party, the extent of this bias has varied greatly. 
In one election (1974), the system was nearly neutral. In five others 
(1958, 1964, 1974, 1982, and 1986), it tilted only slightly toward the 
Democrats (less than 1 percent, or fewer than four seats). At other times, 
Democrats benefited greatly from the system. In five elections (1956, 
1962, 1966, 1968, and 1980), the electoral system favored Democrats by 
at least 3.5 percent of contested seats (more than 15 seats).1 Other year-
by-year estimates, including studies reviewed in chapter 4, have also 
found considerable variation in bias. This variability is the principal sub­
ject of this chapter. What accounts for variation in the extent of partisan 
bias in the electoral system? 
One might initially presume that bias is a stable or fixed feature of 
an electoral system and that any variation in estimates of bias reflects 
errors in its estimation. The presumption that partisan bias is constant 
over some series of elections is a premise of many time-series or historical 
estimates of bias (as was the case in table 4.6).2 Bias, however, is not neces­
sarily a constant. It is certainly not a constant by definition. The defining 
characteristic of partisan bias is only that its effect on the conversion of 
votes into seats is asymmetric with respect to the parties. It is conceivable 
for an electoral system to be biased in favor of the Democrats in one 
election year and biased in favor of the Republicans at the next. Partisan 
bias is not necessarily a stable trait of an electoral system. 
There are several reasons to suppose that change in partisan bias is 
not only possible but that it is likely. Change in bias should be expected 
because the characteristics of the electoral system affecting bias—its 
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electoral laws and their implementation, district boundaries, population 
growth and migration, turnout rates, and party loyalties—change over 
time, some from one election to the next. Electoral laws tend to be stable, 
and district boundaries seldom change more than once every decade, but 
the other elements of the electoral system change more often. Turnout 
rates fluctuate. Party loyalties can be dramatically influenced by short-
term forces and occasionally shift more substantially. Population growth 
and migration are constantly changing parameters on the political land­
scape. These changes can affect the bias of the electoral system. 
Q Influences on Partisan Bias • 
In recent years, four conditions may have affected partisan bias. First, a 
variety of legal and socioeconomic developments may have caused a gen­
eral decline in the partisan bias of the electoral system. In particular, the 
more stringent application of the one-person, one-vote principle to con­
gressional reapportionment and the 1965 Voting Rights Act may have 
equalized turnout among districts and thereby reduced bias. Second, be­
cause the extent of partisan bias is sensitive to the way votes are organized 
into districts, periodic partisan gerrymandering may have affected bias. 
Bias may have been greatest immediately following redistricting and de­
teriorated as shifting populations and political preferences undid the 
effect of the remapping. Third, if partisan bias is a consequence of socio­
economic backgrounds linking Democratic preferences and nonvoting, it 
may have been smaller in higher-turnout elections. That is, if bias is a 
result of the nonvoting neighbors of Democratic voters reducing the 
price (in votes) of Democratic districts, it should be reduced on the occa­
sions when these usually inactive and likely Democratic neighbors turn 
out to vote. Finally, the size of the Democratic Party's vote may have af­
fected the extent of partisan bias. If in good Democratic years Democrats 
gain votes disproportionately in their lower-turnout districts, partisan-
turnout differentials should decline, the difference in the mean number 
of unwasted votes should also decline, and consequently the extent of 
partisan bias should be reduced. 
Sociolegal Changes and Partisan Bias 
There are three plausible sociolegal changes that may have caused parti­
san bias to decline over the past 40 years. The first involves the laws gov­
erning the apportioning of districts. Bias may be smaller because of more 
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stringent rules regarding the equal population size of districts and 
greater efforts to ensure equality. Certainly one factor that would account 
for turnout differences among districts and the resulting bias is the sig­
nificant disparity in the populations of districts (recall figure 4.2). Since 
the 1970s, following the Supreme Court's one-person, one-vote reappor­
tionment ruling in the 1964 case of Wesberry v. Sanders and its subsequent 
rulings requiring minimal district size differences in state reapportion­
ment plans, the population sizes of districts were greatly equalized.3 
The effect of these changes in reapportionment standards can be 
seen by comparing intrastate differences in district populations before 
and after Wesberry. In the reapportionment of districts following the 1960 
census (pre-Wesberry), the population size of districts differed greatly in a 
number of states. For instance, following redistricting for the 1960s, one 
district in Illinois had a population of only 279,000, while another had a 
population of 553,000.4 In Colorado, one district contained only 196,000 
people, while another had 654,000. In Michigan, the smallest district 
contained a population of only 177,000, while the largest was 803,000, 
and these intrastate differences were not particularly unusual. The tre­
mendous intrastate differences among districts in the 1960s and before, 
however, were not permitted in the 1970s. For instance, following the 
redistricting of the early 1970s, the smallest district in Illinois had a 
population of 460,000 and the largest just slightly more at 466,000.5 In 
Colorado, the smallest district was 439,000 and the largest 442,000. In 
Michigan, the district population differences similarly shrank to a nearly 
negligible 3,000 residents. Cox (1981, 23) calculated that the national av­
erage percentage point deviation of congressional district populations 
from the average district size in a state ranged from 14 to 22 percent in 
the 1950s and early 1960s. In the early 1970s, on the other hand, the 
national average deviation within a state was less than one percentage 
point, almost nonexistent. Across the nation, the reapportionment of the 
1970s, under a new judicial scrutiny, greatly equalized the population 
sizes of districts within states. 
In view of the reduction of population differences among districts, 
the proportionate difference between the number of voters casting ballots 
in districts may have also been reduced. That is, some of the turnout 
differences among districts in the 1950s and 1960s may have reflected 
large population differences among districts, differences that were 
greatly reduced by the rules guiding reapportionment in the 1970s. 
Smaller turnout differences may have also reduced the difference 
between the parties in their mean number of unwasted votes, thereby 
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reducing bias. As already noted, district turnout differences are often the 
reason for unwasted-vote differences between the parties, the basis of 
electoral system bias. Thus, reducing turnout differences by equalizing 
district populations may reduce partisan bias. 
The reapportionment criteria of the 1970s may not have been the 
only factor reducing partisan bias. Another set of legal and social changes 
that might have reduced partisan bias was the civil rights movement. Be­
cause of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and a series of court rulings, voter 
registration for blacks became a less imposing or discriminatory process, 
and a larger percentage of voting-age black Americans registered to vote, 
especially in southern states. Additionally, because of the civil rights 
movement, more blacks became politically active. With both the easing 
of voter-registration demands and the mobilization of black Americans, 
turnout among minorities increased significantly in the 1960s and 1970s. 
While black turnout was increasing, turnout among whites was declin-
ing.6 Thus, the turnout difference between black and white Americans 
shrank.7 This narrowing of the racial turnout gap should have also re­
duced turnout differences between historically low-turnout southern and 
northern inner-city districts with large minority populations and pre­
dominantly white districts with historically higher turnout. This should 
have increased the price in votes of the cheap seats and thereby reduced 
the partisan bias of the electoral system. 
Beyond the legal changes associated with reapportionment and mi­
nority voting rights, a further sociopolitical change might have also re­
duced partisan bias. Changes in the socioeconomic class makeup of the 
political parties may have contributed to a reduction in partisan bias over 
time. As Abramson et al. (1994) well document, the association between 
socioeconomic status and partisan voting has eroded a good deal since 
the 1950s, although Democrats continue to draw more support among 
the less educated and less affluent segments of society. With the deteriora­
tion in the association between party voting and class, Democratic candi­
dates may be doing a bit better in higher-socioeconomic, higher-turnout 
districts, and Republican candidates may be doing a bit better in lower 
socioeconomic, lower-turnout districts than they historically did. Thus, 
several legal and socioeconomic partisan changes may have caused a 
trend toward a less biased electoral system. 
On the other hand, during the time in which changes in the legal 
and socioeconomic aspects of the electoral system may have diminished 
partisan bias, demographic changes may have served to increase bias. 
Two demographic changes in particular may have heightened district 
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Figure 6.1 
Trend in Partisan Bias, 1954-1992 
turnout and partisan differences and, thus, increased bias. The first de­
velopment is the large-scale immigration of lower socioeconomic groups, 
especially Hispanics, primarily settling in inner-city neighborhoods. 
Many of these immigrants were illegal aliens, and many of them are in­
cluded in population counts used in establishing district boundaries. 
These illegal aliens, while contributing to the population count, do not 
contribute to the district's vote count, since as noncitizens they are ineli­
gible to vote. The second demographic change relevant to partisan bias 
is the "white flight" to the suburbs. A number of racial, life-style, trans­
portation, and economic developments caused a significant migration of 
the white middle class to the booming suburbs in the 1960s and 1970s. 
This may have also increased the district turnout differences between the 
parties and thereby increased partisan bias. Thus, there are both reasons 
to suppose that partisan bias favoring the Democrats may have decreased 
and countervailing reasons to suppose that bias may have increased 
throughout this period. 
Figure 6.1 plots the partisan bias of the electoral system since 1954. 
As the figure shows, there is no strong trend. Bias has fluctuated errati­
cally. For instance, the electoral system strongly benefited Democrats in 
1962, very weakly benefited them in 1964, and then again strongly bene­
fited them in 1966. Despite this volatility, there is some evidence sug­
gesting that partisan bias may be marginally smaller in recent years. 
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Before 1972, partisan bias exceeded 3 percent in 6 of the 10 elec­
tions. After 1972, partisan bias only reached that level on one occasion 
(1980). More systematically, a regression using an over-time, or temporal, 
countervariable indicates that partisan bias has been reduced by about a 
tenth of a percentage point in each election.8 An alternative regression 
using a dummy variable for elections after the 1970s reapportionment 
indicates that partisan bias is about 60 percent of its prior level.9 Thus, 
while certainly not a strong or consistent trend, there is some evidence 
to suggest that the electoral system is now working slightly less to the 
Democratic Party's advantage than it once did. Presumably, changes in 
the electoral rules for reapportionment and the weakening of the class 
basis of partisanship, changes that should have weakened partisan bias, 
were sufficient to more than offset the demographic shifts that might 
have bolstered bias in the electoral system. 
Redistricting and Partisan Bias 
Of the many possible sources of partisan bias, political folklore would 
probably hold partisan gerrymandering in the decennial redistricting 
process as the most pernicious. Republican and journalistic anecdotes 
abound of cases in which Democratic state legislators, governors, and 
even judges have designed, enacted, or imposed districting lines to max­
imize Democratic clout. There is certainly reason to give these stories and 
complaints some credence as general causes of partisan bias. As noted 
in chapter 2, Democrats have controlled a majority of state legislatures 
throughout this period and in many states have often had complete con­
trol of the executive and legislative branches of government. They have 
had ample opportunity to influence, if not actually draw, district bound­
aries. Naturally, political self-interest would lead the party to take advan­
tage of these redistricting opportunities. Thus, there is good reason to 
hypothesize, as many Republicans have, that redistricting provided the 
Democratic tilt to the electoral system. 
There are also good reasons, however, to suppose that redistricting 
has not been responsible for bias. First, although the Democratic Party 
controlled many redistricting plans, they have had to compromise with 
Republicans at many others, and, in some cases, Republicans controlled 
the power to redistrict. Democratic redistricting successes may have been 
muted by the necessity to compromise and partially offset in the aggre­
gate by Republican successes elsewhere. Second, even where Democrats 
controlled the process, there are competing demands in the drawing of 
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district lines. While the party would like to maximize its seats, its incum­
bents would like lines drawn to ensure their safe reelection, even at the 
expense of the party in adjoining districts. Racial concerns to ensure the 
possibility of the election of racial minorities, a concern fortified by 
the Voting Rights Act, also compete with partisan goals. Third, as noted 
in chapter 4, there are two ways a party can gain additional seats through 
redistricting. One way is to pack its opponent's voters into a few districts, 
increasing the partisan difference in the mean number of unwasted votes 
and, thus, partisan bias. However, a party can also gain an advantage by 
splitting up the opposition vote so that it falls just short of a majority in 
many districts (the strategy termed "cracking" [Butler and Cain, 1992, 
87]), thus increasing the responsiveness of the electoral system. That is, 
even intentional and successful gerrymandering may not take the form 
of increased partisan bias (Abramowitz, 1983). Finally, even when state 
Democrats attempt to pack Republican voters into a few districts, they 
are not likely to meet consistently with success. Standard redistricting 
criteria, such as the contiguity and compactness of districts, and the 
geographic distribution of partisans place some constraints on gerryman­
dering. Moreover, gerrymandering, even when relatively unconstrained, 
is an inexact science. Voters cannot always be counted on to behave as 
anticipated.10 
The effects of redistricting on bias are examined through several 
regressions. Each attempts to account for variation in the electoral sys­
tems' bias favoring the Democrats in elections from 1952 to 1992. The 
first specification includes a single dummy variable taking a value of 1 for 
each election immediately following a redistricting. The construction of 
this variable was complicated by the fact that states have been redistricted 
at irregular intervals and different times. Although states have usually 
been redistricted following the decennial census and national reappor­
tionment of seats, some delayed, and the court rulings regarding the 
one-person, one-vote principle caused further redistrictings in the mid­
1960s. From 1952 to 1990, there are six elections in which a significant 
number of states (17 or more) redrew district lines (Cox, 1981, table 1). 
These postredistricting elections were in 1952, 1962, 1966, 1968, 1972, 
and 1982. If redistricting consistently boosted pro-Democratic parti­
san bias in the electoral system, there should be a significant positive 
coefficient for this dichotomous variable. A second specification in­
cluded a countervariable that increased by 1 for each election after an 
election until the next redistricting. If the effects of redistricting erode 
with time, we should expect a significant negative coefficient for this 
__
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Table 6.1 
The Effects of Redistricting on Partisan Bias, 1952-1992 
Dependent Variable: Democratic Electoral Bias 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Post-Redistricting Election .70 — — 
(-75) 
Post-Redistricting Counter _ .01 — 
(.25) 
1952 Election — — 3.09 
(1.62) 
1962 Election — — 1.52 
(1.62) 
1966 Election — — 1.77 
(1.62) 
1968 Election — — 1.56 
(1.62) 
1972 Election — — - .2 4 
(1.62) 
1982 Election — — -1.76 
(1.62) 
1992 Election — — -1.02 
(1.62) 
Constant 2.12 2.33 2.12 
R2 .04 .00 .39 
Adjusted R2 .00 .00 .07 
Standard Error of Estimate 1.62 1.66 1.56 
Note: N = 21. Standard errors are in parentheses. The partisan bias percentages are 
presented in table 5.9. The 1952 election was added to the analysis as the major redistricting 
election of the 1950s. Partisan bias in 1952 was 5.2 percent in favor of the Democrats. 
countervariable. Finally, the effects of redistricting were gauged with a set 
of dummy variables reflecting each of the six postredistricting elections 
separately. This specification acknowledges that all redistricting efforts 
may not have had the same effect. 
Table 6.1 presents the redistricting regression results. They suggest 
that widespread gerrymandering does not systematically account for the 
Democratic advantage in the electoral system.11 Although both general 
redistricting indicators (in equations 1 and 2) had their expected sign 
(indicating redistricting may have helped Democrats, if it helped either 
party), neither approached conventional standards of statistical signifi­
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cance.12 The third regression, examining individual redistricting years, 
suggests that redistricting may have helped Democrats in the 1950s (p < 
.04, one-tailed). However, since the 1950s, redistricting effects have not 
approached statistical significance, although redistricting coefficients 
were in the expected pro-Democratic direction until the 1970s. The bot­
tom line, reinforced by the anemic proportions of explained variance in 
bias, is that the Democratic Party's advantage in redistricting appears to 
play an inconsequential role in the aggregate pro-Democratic partisan 
bias in the electoral system. 
The fact that general redistricting effects are not in evidence does 
not indicate that gerrymandering does not, from time to time and place 
to place, have an effect. Moreover, some redistricting effects are masked 
by other developments that may have biased the electoral system. Redis­
tricting in California illustrates both localized redistricting consequences 
and the problem of detecting them. Probably no state in recent history 
was as carefully gerrymandered as California was in the 1980s. With the 
support of a Democratic governor and state legislature, Democratic Con­
gressman Phil Burton masterfully devised a plan to advantage the Demo­
cratic Party. The plan, as Butler and Cain (1992, 104) summarize it, 
displaced some Republican incumbents and put others into the same dis­
trict while at the same time creating new Democratic districts and 
strengthening existing Democratic seats. 
Despite vehement Republican protests and the admiration of Dem­
ocratic politicians for Burton's artistry in sculpting the plan, hard evi­
dence of the plan's effectiveness is elusive. The problem is that the post-
Burton system does not look substantially more biased in favor of the 
Democrats than the pre-Burton system. Nonetheless, the California elec­
toral system was biased in favor of the Democrats in the elections follow­
ing implementation of the Burton gerrymander. In 1982, Democrats won 
28 of 45 seats (62 percent) with less than 52 percent of the statewide vote. 
The average winning Democrat received just over 100,000 votes, while 
the average winning Republican received nearly 120,000. The unwasted­
votes analysis indicates that the electoral system in California favored 
Democrats by 3.7 percent of the seats in 1982. However, because of the 
severe malapportionment that had developed among the state's districts 
over the course of the 1970s, the pre-Burton electoral system was at least 
as biased in favor of the Democrats as the post-Burton system.13 In 1980, 
prior to the Burton plan, Democrats won a majority of seats (22 of 43, or 
51-2 percent) with a minority of the statewide vote (46.7 percent). 
The typical Democratic winner received 104,182 votes while the typical 
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Republican winner received 143,735, nearly 40,000 more votes. The 
unwasted-vote analysis indicates that California's electoral system in 1980 
favored Democrats by 9.3 percent of the state's districts.14 In short, redis­
tricting may produce electoral system bias in particular cases, even if this 
effect does not stand out clearly from preexisting bias. However, there is 
no clear evidence of a generalized gerrymandering basis for partisan bias. 
Turnout and Partisan Bias 
While gerrymandering is probably not a basis for the general partisan 
bias in the system, it is possible that bias, based on disparities in turnout, 
might be affected by the extent of voter turnout. Partisan bias may be 
minimized with increases in turnout. According to conventional wisdom, 
if nonvoters voted, the great majority would vote for Democrats. This 
view is grounded in the relationship of socioeconomic class to both parti­
sanship and turnout. Those on the lower socioeconomic rungs are less 
likely to vote (Verba and Nie, 1972; Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980; 
Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; and Leighley and Nagler, 1992), but 
those that do vote tend to identify with and to vote for Democrats (Axel­
rod, 1986; Stanley et al., 1986; and Erikson et al., 1989). The supposition 
is that if the nonvoting poor and working class were to show up at the 
polls, they would vote for Democrats at a rate similar to that of the poor 
and working class who now vote. If so, if the nonvoters are in large mea­
sure a cadre of unmobilized Democratic votes, the pro-Democratic bias 
of the electoral system should decline in high-turnout elections. As the 
electorate swells, Democratic votes should be disproportionately added 
in traditionally low-turnout, lower socioeconomic districts, where Demo­
crats have enjoyed their electoral system advantage. With these newly 
mobilized Democratic voters added to the electorate, the mean number 
of unwasted votes for winning Democratic candidates should rise to the 
mean for Republican winners, and the pro-Democratic electoral system 
bias should shrink. Bias should decline with a higher price in votes for 
the now not-quite-so-cheap seats. 
Although conventional wisdom anticipates bias to decline with ris­
ing turnout, there are both theoretical reasons and empirical findings to 
suggest this should not occur. First, social characteristics and back­
grounds, though significantly related to political predispositions and vote 
choices, are far from determinative (Abramson et al., 1994; Stanley et al., 
1986; and Erikson et al., 1989). There is a good deal of political diversity 
within most sociodemographic groups, and, while many groups have dis­
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tinct political leanings, few would now argue, as the authors of The People's 
Choice did a half century ago, that "a person thinks, politically, as he is, 
socially" (Lazarsfeld et al., 1944, 27). Second, while many nonvoters have 
sociological similarities to Democratic voters, Campbell (1960) and De-
Nardo (1980) argue that their political distinctiveness is more telling. 
Nonvoters and occasional or peripheral voters tend to be less interested 
in politics and have less firmly held political beliefs and preferences. As 
DeNardo puts it, "Peripheral voters are just as fickle inside the voting 
booth as they are about getting to it" (1980, 418). In the absence of firm 
standing commitments, they are especially likely to be swayed by the po­
litical winds of the campaign and cannot be counted upon by either party 
(Petrocik, 1981).15 Moreover, empirical examinations of presidential vo­
ting indicate that if nonvoters voted, they would divide their votes very 
much like current voters (Teixeira, 1992a, 1992b; Calvert and Gilchrist, 
1993).16 This may also be the case in congressional voting. An examina­
tion of the reported preferences of nonvoters in surveys conducted in 
elections from 1978 to 1990 indicates that they would not have voted 
consistently and substantially more Democratic than actual voters.17 Fi­
nally, regressions on elections from 1936 to 1992 indicate that the Demo­
cratic congressional vote does not increase with rising turnout, whether 
or not controls are included for the election being an on-year election.18 
On the basis of these theoretical reasons and empirical findings, there are 
good reasons to suspect that nonvoters are not systematically inclined 
to vote Democratic. Thus, we should not expect the Democratic vote to 
increase with increasing turnout, even in low-turnout Democratic strong­
holds. Nor should we expect increasing turnout to reduce the unwasted­
vote gap between Democratic and Republican winners and thereby 
shrink electoral bias. 
The evidence indicates that bias does not decrease with higher voter 
turnout. The plot of electoral system bias and national voter-turnout 
rates in figure 6.2 demonstrates that there is no close association between 
turnout and bias. To the extent that there is any relationship, contrary to 
expectations, it appears to be positive rather than negative. However, this 
apparently slightly positive association is probably spurious. Since there 
is a general downward trend in turnout over this period, some effects of 
the sociodemographic downward trend in bias is misattributed to turn-
out.19 In any case, the evidence does not support the notion that bias 
declines with rising turnout. Increased turnout apparently does not 
equalize unwasted votes between the parties by awakening a reserve of 
Democratic peripheral voters. 
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Figure 6.2 
Partisan Bias and Congressional Turnout, 1954-1992 
The Congressional Vote and Partisan Bias 
If the variability of partisan bias is not explainable by redistricting or 
turnout and only slightly reflects a downward trend, presumably trace­
able to changing rules governing redistricting and a weakening of the 
socioeconomic basis of partisanship, what accounts for variation in bias 
from one election to the next? One possible explanation is that bias de­
pends on support for Democratic candidates and varies with that sup­
port. But why? How does this work? It begins with the plausible 
assumption that the cheap seats held by Democrats are the seats that they 
are least likely to lose. Thus, in years in which the public mood is least 
sympathetic to Democrats, their losses tend to be in moderate- and 
higher-turnout districts. This increases the partisan-turnout and 
unwasted-vote gaps and, therefore, the extent of partisan bias. In addi­
tion, in bad years for Democrats, they may be more likely to lose votes in 
their middle- and higher-turnout districts just because there are more 
votes there to lose. In contrast, in good years for Democrats, their seat 
gains may come in moderate- to high-turnout districts, since they already 
hold a large majority of the very-low-turnout districts. They may also gain 
votes both by conversion and slightly higher turnout in the cheap seats, 
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Figure 6.3 
Partisan Bias and the Democratic House Vote, 1954-1992 
making them not quite as cheap as they had been. Both of these changes 
narrows the partisan-turnout and unwasted-vote differences, thus reduc­
ing partisan bias. The two parties come closer to paying the same market 
price, in votes, for a victory. 
What does the evidence show? Was the pro-Democratic bias of the 
electoral system greater in elections in which Democrats received a 
smaller share of the vote? In chapter 5 we observed that partisan bias was 
smallest in years in which the Democratic vote was relatively strong and 
was greatest when the Democratic vote barely reached a majority. In the 
seven elections since 1954 in which Democrats received at least 55 per­
cent of the national vote, the mean partisan bias of the electoral system 
favored them by less than 1 percent of contested seats. On the other 
hand, in the five elections during this period in which Democrats re­
ceived no more than 52.5 percent of the vote, partisan bias typically fa­
vored them by about 4 percent of contested seats. 
The electoral system's bias is plotted against the national Demo­
cratic congressional vote in figure 6.3. As is evident from this plot, there 
is a pronounced negative association between the Democratic vote and 
the extent of pro-Democratic bias in an election. A bivariate regression 
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indicates that bias is reduced by 0.6 of a percentage point with every 
additional percentage point of the congressional vote for Democrats (r = 
— .86). The evidence could not be much stronger: partisan bias for Demo­
crats in the electoral system is inversely related to the national vote for Democrats. 
Table 6.2 offers some insight into the basis for the inverse relation­
ship of partisan bias and the national vote. The table examines the victory 
rates of Democratic congressional candidates in contested districts with 
different levels of turnout and districts won with different amounts of 
votes cast for the winning candidate (unwasted votes). Districts are 
grouped in quintiles both by the number of votes cast and by the number 
of unwasted votes cast in the district. The victory rates in these groupings 
were reported in tables 5.3 and 5.6, respectively. The national Demo­
cratic two-party congressional vote is the independent variable ex­
plaining successful election outcomes in each category. 
With respect to turnout, as one might expect, the table indicates 
that as Democrats do better nationally, they register gains in both low-
and high-turnout districts. Coefficients are positive and statistically sig­
nificant (p < .05, one-tailed) in each category. For every additional 
percentage point of the national vote, Democrats win an additional 1 per­
cent of the lowest turnout districts. However, also as expected, in good 
years, Democrats are likely to register even larger gains in middle- and 
higher-turnout districts. For every additional percentage point of the na­
tional vote, Democrats can expect to win approximately an additional 2 
percent of seats in middle- and high-turnout districts. By picking up two 
high-turnout districts for every one additional low-turnout district with 
each percentage point gain in the vote, the proportion of Democratic 
victories that are in the cheap seats is reduced.20 
The fact that Democrats registered greater gains in middle- and 
high-turnout districts in good Democratic years should reduce the dis­
parity between the parties in the number of votes that each expends to 
win a seat The second half of table 6.2 indicates that this was indeed the 
case. The pattern of coefficients in the unwas ted-vote categories is even 
stronger than the turnout pattern. As the Democratic national vote in­
creased, it made a negligible difference in districts won with few votes but 
an increasingly great difference in districts won with a relatively large 
number of votes.21 The Democratic vote coefficient in the two lowest 
unwasted-vote categories of districts were small (less than .4) and not sta­
tistically significant (p < .05, one-tailed). In the middle and higher cate­
gories of unwasted votes, however, Democratic victory rates increased 
substantially when Democrats did well nationally. The coefficients were 
Table 6.2 
The Democratic Congressional Vote and Success in Districts, by District Turnout and Number of Unwasted Votes, 1954-1992 
Dependent Variable: Percentage of Seats in Category Won by Democratic Candidates 
Turnout Category Unwasted-Votes Category 
Low High Low High 
Independent Variable 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Democratic Share of the 1.01 1.12 2.08 2.10 1.87 .39 - .35 1.07 2.99 4.19 
National Two-Party House (.66) (.66) (.70) (.49) (.68) (.70) (.78) (.90) (.72) (.60) 
Vote 
Constant 23.94 -2.76 -64.20 -66.85 -55.91 49.27 76.55 -7.56 -109.39 -181.21 
Ft2 .12 .14 .33 .51 .30 .02 .01 .07 ,49 .73 
Adjusted R2 .07 .09 .29 .48 .26 .00 .00 .02 .46 .72 
Standard Error of Estimate 6.82 6.75 7.16 5.02 6.99 7.22 7.98 9.28 7.38 6.18 
Note: N = 20. The Democratic congressional vote is the party's share of the two-party national vote. The turnout and unwasted-vote categories 
are as used in tables 5.3 and 5.6, respectively. They reflect the quintiles of contested districts in each year on the turnout and unwasted-vote variables. 
Turnout categories are based on the actual number of total votes cast in districts. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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statistically significant (p < .01, one-tailed) in regressions on districts in 
the two highest categories of unwasted votes. In other words, this was 
where the action was. The Democratic national vote made little or no 
difference in low-unwasted-vote districts. They carried a large majority 
of these districts under any circumstances (recall table 5.6). The Demo­
cratic vote made a big difference, however, in districts won with big votes. 
Among districts with the highest number of unwasted votes, Democrats 
won more than 4 percent more of these seats with every additional per­
centage point of the national vote. In times favorable to the Democrats, 
they were more likely to win in higher-turnout districts and win by larger 
margins. Both of these effects add a considerable number of noncheap 
seats to the cheap-seat base for the Democrats. The mix should mean that 
the average number of votes expended by Democrats in victories comes 
closer to that of Republicans. The bottom line is that, in good years for 
Democrats, the electoral system comes closer to partisan neutrality, but 
in bad years for Democrats, the electoral system was heavily biased in the 
Democratic Party's favor. 
The effects of the congressional vote on bias is estimated within the 
context of trend, turnout, and redistricting effects in table 6.3. The re­
gressions indicated that the conclusions based on the bivariate analyses 
stand intact. There has been a slight downward trend in partisan bias. 
Redistricting and overall turnout have negligible effects on aggregate 
bias. Finally, and most important, bias is inversely related to the vote for 
Democrats.22 When Democrats received a larger vote, bias declined. They 
registered gains in uncheap seats. Conversely, when Democrats received 
a smaller vote, bias increased. For every additional percentage point of 
the national Democratic vote, the electoral system's partisan bias is re­
duced by about 0.5 percent of the seats in the House. 
A caveat to this pattern is in order, however. While, empirically, the 
pro-Democratic bias of the electoral system increases with a declining 
Democratic vote, this cannot, logically, extend indefinitely. At the ex­
tremes, when one of the parties receives all or none of the votes, there 
can be no bias. Hypothetically, if either party received zero votes, the 
system would award that party 0 percent of the seats, and if either party 
received all of the votes, it would win all of the seats. There would be no 
bias at these extremes, because the organization of the vote at these ex­
tremes is irrelevant to the outcome. In terms of the present situation, as 
their vote declined, Democrats would eventually lose even the cheap seats 
(thereby reducing bias). Conversely, with a rising Democratic vote, they 
would eventually win the "high-rent" districts (again reducing bias). 
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Table 6.3 
Influences on Democratic Electoral Bias, 1954-1992 
Dependent Variable: Democratic Electoral Bias in 
Contested Seats 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Democratic Share of the - .5 4 - .5 4 - .51 - .5 3 - .5  2 
National House Vote (.08) (.09) (-08) (.08) (.09) 
Post-Redistricting - .67 - .6 4 — — — 
Election (.40) (.45) 
National Turnout .03 .03 — — — 
(-03) (.03) 
Year Counter - .0 4 — - .0 4 — — 
(.016) (.015) 
Post-1964 — -.51 — -.86 — 
(.46) (.42) 
Constant 99.41 30.39 115.00 31.31 30.18 
R2 .81 .76 .76 .72 .65 
Adjusted R2 .75 .70 .73 .68 .63 
Standard Error of Estimate .75 .83 .79 .85 .93 
Durbin-Watson 2.38 2.12 2.46 2.11 1.65 
Expected Democratic Partisan Bias when the Democratic Vote Equals 50%: 
Equation 3 (with Year = 1972) 30.2 - (.508 x 50) = 4.8 
Equation 4 (post-1964) 30.5 - (.526 x 50) = 4.2 
Equation 5 30.2 - (.516 x 50) = 4.4 
Democratic Partisan Bias +4.2% to +4.8% of contested seats 
(+15.5 to +17.7 seats) or 
+3.6% to +4.1 % of all seats 
Note: N - 20. The Democratic congressional vote is the party's share of the two-party na­
tional vote. The Democratic partisan bias is the percentage of seats that the Democratic Party 
would have won with 50 percent of the unwasted congressional vote minus 50 percent (the percent­
age it would have won in an unbiased system). Partisan bias percentages are presented in table 
5.9. An average of 368 seats were contested in elections since 1954. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
Considering these logical constraints on the relationship between the 
Democratic vote and the extent of bias, we should be very cautious in 
extrapolating likely levels of bias under Republican-vote majorities. Nev­
ertheless, in the middle of the vote distribution, where the parties vie for 
control of the House, the system has been most favorable to Democrats 
when they have been down on their luck. 
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This caveat aside, the analysis suggests that the earlier time-series 
estimate (see table 4.6) understated the extent of bias when both parties 
evenly split the vote. This underestimation goes beyond that involved 
with prior incumbency inflating the vote. The reason for this second un­
derestimation is the assumption that partisan bias has been a fixed char­
acteristic of the electoral system over the last four decades. Because of 
this assumption, the estimated bias is similar to the average bias for the 
period (at the average vote) rather than the bias present when the vote 
is evenly divided. If the effects of the slight downward trend and the 
congressional vote are taken into account, the electoral system midway 
through this period (1972) was biased by 4.5 percent of contested seats 
(about 17 seats) in favor of the Democrats rather than the 3.6 percent of 
all seats (15 to 16 seats) found in the time-series analysis of table 4.6 or 
the 2.4 percent of contested seats (about 9 or 10 seats) average bias found 
table 5.9.23 The calculations are presented in table 6.3. In 1990 the bias 
was only slightly less (4 percent of seats or about 15 seats). After consider­
ing the incumbency multiplier effect, as we examined it in chapter 5, the 
partisan bias favoring Democrats has probably been in the neighborhood 
of 18 to 22 seats. This, however, does not alter the basic finding: although 
bias in the electoral system alone was not sufficient to preserve the Demo­
cratic House majority, it was consistently in the Democrats' favor, contrib­
uted substantially to the maintenance and size of their majority, and was 
greatest when the Democratic majority was most threatened. 
• The Swing Ratio When Bias Varies • 
The fact that partisan bias varies inversely with the congressional vote has 
important implications for the estimation of the swing ratio, the respon­
siveness of the electoral system. Recall that responsiveness is the charac­
teristic of the electoral system in which the representation of parties is 
affected by one party wasting more of its votes in losing candidacies than 
the opposing party. Whereas partisan bias entails asymmetric deviations 
from proportional representation, responsiveness entails symmetric devi­
ations from proportional representation in which a party would receive 
Y proportion of seats if it received X proportion of votes, regardless of 
whether the party in question was the Democratic or Republican Party. 
Conventional longitudinal estimates of responsiveness have been based 
on the faulty assumption that partisan bias is fixed. Since partisan bias is 
not constant, and, moreover, since it is affected by the congressional vote, 
previous estimates of responsiveness may be off the mark. 
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Table 6.4 
The Swing Ratio with and without an Adjustment 
for Unwasted-Vote Bias, 1954-1992 
Dependent Variable: Democratic 
Two-Party Share of Seats 
Adjusted for Partisan 
Unadjusted Bias 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Democratic Share of the 1.53 1.96 1.97 2.53 
National Two-Party House (.17) (.33) (.18) (-31) 
Vote 
Post-1964 — 32.10 — 43.01 
(21.92) (20.21) 
Post-1964 x Democratic — -.58 — - .7 8 
House Vote (-40) (-37) 
Constant -23.02 -46.71 -48.48 -79.59 
R2 .81 .83 .88 .90 
Adjusted R2 .80 .79 .87 .88 
Standard Error of Estimate 1.82 1.90 1.85 1.75 
Durbin-Watson 1.62 1.62 1.76 1.78 
Note: N = 20. Standard errors are in parentheses. Because of autocorrelation, a two-stage 
Cochrane-Orcutt pseudo-GLS analysis was used to estimate these coefficients (Ostrom, 1978). The 
first-order autocorrelations for the equations were .246, .156, .194, and .102, respectively. These were 
used in the partial differencing of the lagged variables. The intercepts have been converted to the OLS 
equivalent. The adjustment for partisan bias entailed calculating the Democratic share of seats if there 
had been no partisan bias as calculated in table 5.10 (for all districts). 
An accurate estimate of the swing ratio requires the examination of 
the seat-vote relationship while taking the variability of partisan bias into 
account. Since the extent of partisan bias has already been calculated and 
the division of the House without partisan bias has likewise been calcu­
lated, the relationship of the parties' division of the vote to the unbiased 
division of seats can be examined directly. Table 6.4 presents the regres­
sions of votes on seats, both unadjusted and adjusted for partisan bias. 
The adjustment for partisan bias is the share of seats that the Democrats 
would have won if there were no electoral bias. These were calculated 
and presented earlier in table 5.10. Since the one-person, one-vote rul­
ings and the growth of the incumbency advantage may have reduced the 
responsiveness of the electoral system, bringing it more in line with a 
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proportional representation system, regressions allowing for a change in 
responsiveness were also examined. These regressions included an inter­
action term of the vote with a dummy variable for post-1964 elections 
and a separate additive term for these elections. 
Once the effects of partisan bias are taken into account, the electoral 
system appears to be more responsive than previously estimated. The 
estimated responsiveness without an adjustment for partisan bias indi­
cates that Democrats could expect to gain about 2.3 seats for every addi­
tional percentage point of the vote in elections before 1964 and about 1.5 
seats for every percentage point of the vote after 1964.24 The estimates of 
responsiveness are greater in both cases in which adjustments for parti­
san bias are made. Before 1964, the responsiveness of the electoral system 
caused about 2.5 seats to shift for every percentage point of the vote. 
After 1964, responsiveness caused about a 1.7 seat shift for every percent­
age point of the vote. In both periods, estimates of the swing ratio were 
about 25 percent greater after adjusting for variation in partisan bias.25 
• The Basis of Cheap Seats • 
The reason why the electoral system has consistently favored the Demo­
crats since at least the mid-1950s is clear: the electoral system has been biased 
because Democrats have consistently carried a large majority of low-turnout con­
gressional districts—the cheap seats. The mix of cheap seats in the Democrats' 
portfolio of seats also explains why bias has varied. Bias is greater in bad 
years for the Democrats, when a larger share of the seats that they con­
tinue to hold are the cheap seats. Conversely, bias is smaller in good Dem­
ocratic years, when Democrats add higher-turnout districts to their base 
of cheap seats. This raises the average number of votes for winning Dem­
ocrats closer to that of the average winning Republican. While the phe­
nomenon of cheap seats explains why the system is biased in favor of the 
Democrats and why this bias has varied in different election years, several 
questions about cheap seats themselves remain. Why do cheap seats exist, 
and why do Democrats win the lion's share of them? Are cheap seats 
intentionally created? Are they avoidable, or are they an inevitable and 
natural product of a constitutional system that apportions congressional 
seats by population rather than by voters? Essentially, these questions re­
volve around one central question—who or what is responsible for there 
being cheap seats? Who created the cheap seats? The Democrats? The 
Constitution? Or, is there some other reason why some seats are so 
cheap? 
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Republicans are inclined to believe that cheap seats are the inten­
tional product of Democratic gerrymandering. We have seen, however, 
that there is little evidence to support this claim. Democrats are not so 
controlling, skillful, and single-minded as to be able to manipulate the 
system to their advantage on such a widespread and consistent basis. 
While Democratic gerrymandering is undoubtedly successful in many 
cases, and while redistricting effects may be masked by other demographic 
trends (as in California in the 1980s), there is no clear evidence that cheap 
Democratic seats depend on successful Democratic gerrymanders. 
An alternative explanation of cheap seats, a view sometimes ad­
hered to by Democrats, is that cheap seats are an inevitable outgrowth of 
the constitutional system set in place by the framers. The Constitution 
provided that seats in the House of Representatives would represent the 
people, not only those that voted. Article 1, Section 2 of the Constitution, 
specifying provisions for membership in the House, and subsequently 
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment (ratified in 1868) indicate that 
"representatives shall be apportioned among the several states according 
to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in 
each state." In other words, the House is supposed to represent people, 
not only voters. If in the process of creating equally populated districts, 
some districts contain many fewer voters than other districts, that is just 
the price of creating the constitutionally mandated equal population dis­
tricts. What matters is that district populations, following the decennial 
census and reapportionment, are as nearly equal as possible. 
But there are two faults with the notion that cheap seats spring nat­
urally from constitutional arrangements.26 First, the Constitution's prin­
ciple of representation in the House being based on population refers to 
the apportionment of seats to the states and not directly to how these 
seats should be awarded within the separate states. Second, the creation 
of congressional districts within states does not prohibit in any way the 
creation of districts that are also likely to be more nearly equal in their 
numbers of voters. 
Constitutional provisions apportioning representation to the states 
according to their populations did not require equal population, single-
member districts for the election of representatives within the states. The 
Constitution was silent regarding whether a state's representatives should 
be elected at-large or in districts. While Madison had indicated in the 
56th Federalist a preference for districted elections, the mode of election 
was left to state legislatures and the merits and constitutionality of both 
forms were publicly debated (Zagarri, 1987, 105-12). Many states in the 
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nineteenth century and some in the twentieth century held at-large or 
multimember district elections for House seats. In 1824, for instance, 
about half of the states with more than one representative to the House 
elected their representatives through either an at-large system or 
through a mixture of single-member and multimember districts.27 Some 
states (New Mexico and Hawaii) even into the 1960s were using at-large 
electoral systems. Thus, since the Constitution, at least as it was interpre­
ted for some time, did not require single-member districts within the 
states, and since turnout disparities can only emerge from the single-
member-district system (or some districting system), it is difficult to place 
the blame for cheap seats with the Constitution. 
While not directly mandated by the Constitution, equal population, 
single-member districts have become the prevailing mode of awarding 
seats.28 Are cheap seats a natural outgrowth of the equal population, 
single-member-district system? The answer is no. Districting systems 
of some sort are logically necessary for turnout differences to exist, and 
single-member-district systems (whether requiring equal populations or 
not) provide the greatest opportunity for these differences. However, 
there is no reason why they would inevitably produce districts with con­
sistently large turnout differences. It is certainly logically possible to draw 
single-member-district lines within a state so that each district is equally 
populated and has an equal expected number of voters. Redistricting 
plans regularly take a variety of considerations besides population into 
account—compactness, community boundaries, and geographic contigu­
ity, among other factors—the expected turnout in an area could be taken 
into account as well. Given the considerable stability in relative district 
turnout (and unwasted votes) that were observed in chapter 5, it seems 
practically possible to make reasonably reliable estimates of expected 
turnout in districts. While consideration of expected turnout would not 
guarantee an equal number of voters in districts, it could greatly reduce 
the huge differences among districts that have provided the basis for 
cheap seats. Moreover, the "equal protection" clause, the basis for de­
mands of equally populated districts, would provide a strong foundation 
for requirements that districts be effectively equal in size as well as nomi­
nally equal (or equally populated). 
If Democratic gerrymandering and the equal population, single-
member-district system are not the cause of cheap seats, what is? The 
answer is geography, the fact that people with traits associated both with 
Democratic voting and with a failure to vote at all tend to live in the 
same areas and that the redistricting criteria of geographic compactness, 
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contiguity, and respect for community boundaries tend to leave these 
areas intact when constructing district lines. In elections in the 1950s, for 
instance, the low-turnout contested districts tended to be geographically 
located in southern states. In 1954, for instance, nearly half of the lowest-
turnout districts were in the South, despite the fact that barely 10 percent 
of all contested seats were in that region.29 While many low-turnout dis­
tricts continue to be found in the South, in more recent years a larger 
number of low-turnout districts have been in urban areas with large mi­
nority populations.30 Of the lowest-turnout quintile of contested districts 
in 1990, less than a third were in the South (20 of 70, or 29 percent). An 
equal number of cheap seats were in New York City and Los Angeles 
alone. Eleven districts in New York City and nine districts in the Los 
Angeles area were in the lowest-turnout category in 1990. Whether in 
the rural South of the 1950s or the inner cities of the 1990s, cheap seats 
were created because district lines respected neighborhoods and the 
sociodemographic characteristics (socioeconomic status, regional culture, 
race) of residents in these neighborhoods predisposed some in these 
areas to vote Democratic and others not to vote at all. 
• Overview • 
Although the electoral system was not the sole reason for Democratic 
dominance in the House, it was an important ingredient. Without bias in 
the electoral system, Democratic majorities in several elections would 
have been tenuous. Chapter 5 demonstrated that partisan bias in the elec­
toral system has been significant and consistently beneficial to the Demo­
crats. This chapter demonstrated not only that the electoral system has 
been biased, but that bias varies in such a way that it was especially im­
portant to sustaining the Democratic majority up to 1994. 
While electoral system bias was important to the Democratic major­
ity over the last four decades, it has varied greatly. It has ranged from 
near neutrality in the 1974 election to a minor bias of four or five seats 
in some years (e.g., 1964, 1982, and 1986) to the severe bias in excess of 
a dozen seats at other times (e.g., 1956, 1966, 1968, and 1980). In this 
chapter, we explored several issues related to this variation. Did it reflect 
a trend related to the advent of the one-person, one-vote judicial rulings 
on redistricting? Did it reflect varying successes in partisan gerrymander­
ing? Did it diminish with rising turnout, when previously nonvoting citi­
zens with suspected Democratic proclivities flocked to the polls? Did it 
reflect the distribution of the congressional vote itself, where vote gains 
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and vote losses came from? More specifically, did bias decline as the Dem­
ocratic vote rose and, in doing so, raise the average price (in votes) of 
seats won by Democrats? 
While a number of factors were plausible causes of varying levels of 
bias, most of these "likely suspects" had little or no effect. There was a 
slight downward trend in the extent of bias, perhaps related to the mal-
apportionment rulings or perhaps related to the civil rights movement, 
but, whatever the mix of causes, this downward trend was only slight. 
There is no evidence that Democratic gerrymandering was effective 
enough on a widespread basis to have produced greater electoral system 
bias for their party. Contrary to what we might expect if gerrymandering 
effects were pervasive, bias was not greater immediately following the 
redrawing of district lines. There is also no evidence to suggest that Dem­
ocratic cheap seats were a result of would-be Democratic voters who just 
did not bother to vote. If cheap seats were cheap just because Democrats 
were benefiting from a quasi-proxy voting system in which voters simply 
reflected the sentiments of their nonvoting neighbors, bias should have 
diminished on occasions when turnout surged and the somnambulant 
(would-be Democratic) neighbors awoke long enough to vote—but it 
did not. 
There is only one condition strongly linked to variation in partisan 
bias—the congressional vote itself. Partisan bias was strongly and in­
versely related to the national congressional vote for Democrats. Bias was 
greatest when the Democratic vote was at its ebb and a larger portion of 
Democratic seats were cheap. On the other hand, the system was least 
biased when Democrats were doing well and gaining ground in high-
turnout, competitive districts (as we observed in table 6.2). 
The association of the congressional vote to partisan bias has im­
portant implications for understanding how the Democrats were able to 
maintain their dynasty in the House. Electoral bias was greatest when 
Democrats needed it most—when the voters provide them with only a 
slim vote majority. Thus, bias played an even greater role in maintaining 
the Democratic majority in the House than we first estimated. This rela­
tionship also explains why Democrats were so overrepresented in 1962, 
1966, 1968, 1980, and 1984 (as we observed in chapter 3, table 3.1), each 
a fairly close election in terms of the national Democratic congressional 
vote.31 The relationship between bias and the vote also confounded esti­
mates of the swing ratio that commonly assume that bias is fixed. After 
adjusting for the relationship between bias and the vote, a reestimated 
swing ratio was greater than previous estimates. 
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This chapter also examined the causes of partisan bias in a deeper 
sense. Was it caused by intentional partisan maneuvering in the drawing 
of districts? Is it an inevitable outgrowth of the constitutional arrange­
ment awarding districts on the basis of population rather than potential 
or actual voters? The answer to both questions is no. Cheap seats are a 
product of socioeconomic housing patterns and respect for geographic 
compactness and contiguity in the drawing of district lines.32 They are 
also a product of failing to take into account likely turnout differences 
when constructing districts. Nevertheless they are a fact of political life 
and the basis for a Democratic tilt to the electoral system. 
However caused, electoral system bias contributed to Democratic 
House majorities from 1954 until the Republican revolution of 1994. The 
system was consistently biased in favor of the Democrats and was particu­
larly biased when Democrats needed help most. But did the electoral 
system also work to the Democratic Party's advantage before 1954 and 
did it continue to tilt in favor of the Democrats in 1994? These are the 
questions addressed in the next two chapters. First, was the electoral sys­
tem prior to 1954 also biased in favor of the Democrats, or has bias been 
more distinctively a feature of the political system from 1954 to 1992? 
7
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The Historical

Perspective

A here is no question that the electoral system worked to the benefit of 
the Democratic Party over the past 40 years and that it did extra duty 
when times were relatively tough for Democrats. Their lean vote majori­
ties at these times were well fattened into substantial seat majorities by a 
favorable electoral system, and, although this process alone may not have 
preserved the Democratic seat majority in the House, it certainly helped. 
The consistent bias of the electoral system over the past 40 years raises 
a question of whether this bias was peculiar to the recent period or was 
present in earlier elections. 
Some might suppose that if electoral system bias were partly respon­
sible for the Democratic dynasty, it must have been absent or, at least, less 
pronounced in elections before 1954.1 However, this need not be the case, 
so long as the claim is that bias helped to preserve the Democratic major­
ity and not that the majority was dependent on bias alone. The bias in 
the electoral system that helped the Democrats from 1954 to at least 1992 
may also have helped them before 1954. Although the thesis that bias in 
the electoral system helped to preserve the Democratic dynasty in the 
House is unaffected by whether bias predated the Democratic majority, 
it may still be useful to gain some greater historical perspective on the 
effects of this electoral system. Did the electoral system before the 1950s 
also favor the Democratic Party? Was it more or less biased than the sys­
tem from 1954 to 1992? 
• Cheap Seats before 1954 • 
There are several reasons to suppose that partisan bias favoring the Dem­
ocrats before 1954 was equal to, if not greater than, bias in more recent 
146 
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years. All of the key factors responsible for creating bias were even 
stronger in the 1930s and 1940s. The class basis of partisan associations 
was stronger then. The class basis of turnout was no less strong then than 
now. Turnout in the then solidly Democratic South was especially low 
compared to turnout in other regions. In short, predominantly lower 
socioeconomic and southern districts were even more likely to have both 
more Democrats and more nonvoters. This provides the arithmetic for 
Democrats winning seats with fewer unwasted votes. In addition, dispari­
ties in district populations were greater in this era predating the one-
person, one-vote court rulings. Although this variance could conceivably 
work to either party's favor, Democratic control of state governments con­
trolling redistricting might have produced district lines favorable to Dem­
ocratic congressional candidates.2 
Table 7.1 presents Democratic victory rates in contested district 
elections in the nine national elections from 1936 to 1952. The districts 
are grouped by their turnout and by the number of votes cast for the 
winning candidate. Districts in the top half of the table are divided into 
quintiles by their total turnout (see table 5.3). Districts in the lower half 
of the table are divided into quintiles by the number of votes cast for the 
winning candidate in the district. The entries are the percentage of dis­
tricts in a particular quintile won by a Democratic Party candidate. For 
instance, Democrats won 94 percent of the lowest-turnout districts in 
1936 and only 22 percent of the highest-turnout districts in 1952. 
In the elections from the mid-1930s to the early 1950s, Democrats 
won most of the cheap seats, just as they have done in elections since. 
Whether we examine district turnout or the total votes cast for the win­
ning candidate (the unwasted votes), Democrats typically won about 
three of four of the cheap seats. In each election from 1936 to 1952, as 
in elections since, the Democrats' best showings among contested districts 
were in the lowest turnout and unwasted-vote categories.3 They consis­
tently won a large majority of these cheap seats. The range of Democratic 
victories in these low-turnout districts was from about two-thirds of the 
seats to better than 90 percent. Democrats did not have anything ap­
proaching this consistent rate of success in higher-turnout districts. In 
fact, Democrats typically won fewer than half of the seats in each of the 
four higher turnout and unwasted-votes categories. Democratic congres­
sional majorities in this period were, thus, largely dependent on their 
winning the cheap seats and their great holding of uncontested seats, 
mostly in the then "Solid South." 
Table 7.2 presents the extent of partisan bias and its basis in un-
wasted votes for the parties in the nine national elections from 1936 to 
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Table 7.1 
The Association between the Party of the Winning Congressional 
Candidate, District Turnout, and Unwasted Votes, 1936-1952 
Association between 
Total District Turnout (or 
the Vote for the Winning 
Percentage of Districts Won Candidate) and the 
by Democrats in District­ Election of a Republican 
Turnout Quintiles Representative 
Low High 
Year 1 2 3 4 5 r Logit Derivative 
1936 94 70 64 73 82 .08 .006 
1938 80 49 45 35 48 .04 .019 
1940 81 46 45 45 62 .32 .003 
1942 81 32 29 25 29 .18 .026 
1944 74 49 33 38 49 .12 .013 
1946 74 30 19 22 19 .32 .054 
1948 79 51 47 39 62 .18 .021 
1950 66 56 27 26 39 .27 .039 
1952 60 49 25 36 22 .25 .030 
Mean 77 48 37 38 46 
Percentage of Districts won by 
Democrats in District Unwasted-
Vote Quintiles 
Low High 
Year 1 2 3 4 5 r Logit Derivative 
1936 91 60 69 79 85 - .0 1 -.002 
1938 82 49 43 35 48 .02 .035 
1940 76 57 34 46 65 .35 .002 
1942 81 37 32 13 33 .19 .048 
1944 72 46 31 39 53 .09 .017 
1946 76 31 22 19 16 .35 .103 
1948 76 46 47 46 62 .09 .020 
1950 69 43 36 30 35 .26 .063 
1952 66 39 31 31 25 .27 .057 
Mean 77 45 38 38 47 
Note; See tables 5.3 and 5.6 for this analysis of elections from 1954 to 1992. The 
unwasted-vote quintiles divide districts into five groupings of approximately equal number on 
the basis of the number of votes cast in the district for the winning congressional candidate. 
Table 7.2 
Unwasted Vote Bias in Contested Elections, 1936-1952 
Contested Districts Contested 
Democrats Republicans Half of Seats That Percentage 
Partisan 
i cxi nod i i 
Mean Mean Votes in Would Have Bias from 
Seats Winning Seats Winning Contested Won with Half of Unwasted 
Year Won Votes Won Votes Districts Unwasted Votes Votes 
1936 269 66,328 82 65,324 11,599,400 175(49.8) +.2 Republican 
1938 169 55,425 158 63,242 9,679,550 175(53.4) +3.4 Democratic 
1940 187 73,594 149 74,997 12,468,300 169 (50.4) + .4 Democratic 
1942 122 42,029 191 51,519 7,483,900 178(56.9) +6.9 Democratic 
1944 168 67,993 178 73,144 12,221,200 180(51.9) +1.9 Democratic 
1946 112 42,251 232 61,939 9,551,000 226 (65.7) +15.7 Democratic 
1948 191 66,645 152 71,101 11,768,300 177(51.5) +1.5 Democratic 
1950 141 58,302 188 70,554 10,742,300 184(56.0) +6.0 Democratic 
1952 129 82,298 207 96,244 15,269,550 186(55.2) +5.2 Democratic 
Mean Partisan Bias +4,5 Democratic 
Median Partisan Bias +3.4 Democratic 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are percentages. Seats uncontested by a major party candidate, multimember districts, seats won by 
third-party or independent congressional candidates, and at-large seats (except those for one district states) are excluded from these calcula­
tions. The half of total unwasted votes is rounded to the nearest 50 votes. The number of contested seats that the Democrats would have won 
if the parties evenly split the vote can be calculated by dividing half the unwasted votes in contested districts by the mean number of unwasted 
votes for Democratic candidates. This number of seats can then be converted into the percentage of all contested seats in that election. Since 
a neutral system would award 50 percent of seats for half of the unwasted votes, any percentage of seats awarded that is greater than 50 
percent reflects partisan bias in the electoral system. 
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1952.4 The data indicate that the magnitude of the pro-Democratic elec­
toral system bias in elections before 1954 was about as great or even 
slightly greater than in post-1954 elections. With but one exception, the 
electoral system was biased in favor of the Democrats throughout this 
period. The sole exception was the 1936 election, and, in this case, as in 
the 1974 exception of the post-1954 era, the electoral system was quite 
nearly neutral. The electoral system bias from 1936 to 1952 boosted 
Democratic numbers in the House by an average of about 15 seats 
and, though incumbency advantages were not so great in those days, 
the incumbency-multiplier effect undoubtedly made the typical pro-
Democratic bias even a bit greater. 
As in more recent elections, Democrats in these pre-1954 elections 
carried a large majority of low-turnout districts, the cheap seats. In every 
election from 1938 to 1952, more votes were cast for the typical Republi­
can candidate winning an election than for the typical Democratic winner. 
However, while the magnitude and basis of partisan bias before and after 
1954 were similar, the location of the cheap seats was not. As we have 
already seen (recall table 5.5), many cheap seats in more recent elections 
have been northern inner-city districts with large minority populations. 
By contrast, in the earlier elections most cheap seats were in the South 
and its bordering states. For example, in the 1942 election, 15 of the 20 
contested congressional districts with the lowest turnout (each won by a 
Democrat) were in southern or border states.5 
The 1950 election offers an unusual opportunity to see directly the 
effects of partisan bias. In this election, half of the national two-party 
congressional vote was cast for Democratic candidates and half for Re­
publican candidates. Despite this even division of the vote, Democrats 
won 234 seats in the House (54 percent). Republicans won only 199 seats 
(46 percent).6 Uncontested seats account for some of the overrepresenta­
tion of Democrats. In 1950, there were 92 Democrats who were elected 
without major-party opposition. In contrast, only seven Republicans had 
free rides. In the contested districts of the 1950 election, Democrats did 
not do as well, but they fared better than they might have in a less hospi­
table electoral system. The national Democratic vote in contested districts 
fell short of a majority (48 percent) and in the median contested district 
the Democratic candidate received slightly less than 50,000 votes, while 
the Republican candidate received almost 57,500 votes, a division of 46.5 
percent versus 53.5 percent. Democrats also failed to carry a majority of 
the districts, taking only 141 of the 329 contested (43 percent). As in most 
elections, Democrats in 1950 typically expended fewer votes to win a seat 
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than did Republicans. The typical winning Democratic candidate won 
with fewer than 60,000 votes. The typical Republican winner, on the 
other hand, received in excess of 70,000 votes. Democrats won 31 of the 
35 contested districts with the lowest turnout, while Republicans won 23 
of the 35 contested districts with the highest turnout.7 If both parties had 
expended the same number of votes for a contested seat victory in 1950, 
Democrats would have won 15 fewer seats and Republicans 15 more.8 
The difference can be put in stark relief by examples at the extremes. At 
one extreme, a Democratic candidate won in the Twelfth District of Texas 
in 1950 with just over 13,000 votes of fewer than 17,000 votes cast. At the 
other extreme, a Republican won in the Twenty-second District of Ohio 
with nearly 220,000 votes of more than 350,000 cast.9 
• Bias in Good and Bad Years • 
Not all elections in this period were like 1950. As in more recent elections, 
there was a good deal of variation in bias in elections between 1936 and 
1952. In several years, bias was nearly absent. In four of the nine elections 
(1936, 1940, 1944, and 1948), bias shifted fewer than seven seats to the 
Democratic column. In other elections, however, it was large. In 1942, 
1946, 1950, and 1952, Democrats won at least 17 additional seats because 
of the electoral system. At the extreme, bias accounted for the election of 
at least 27 additional Democrats in the 1946 midterm, a 54-seat partisan 
swing. 
The variation in bias in this pre-1954 period can be explained in 
much the same way as more recent variation in bias. Bias in the electoral 
system is greatest in the bad years for Democrats (when they need it most) 
and smallest in their good years. Of the nine pre-1954 elections exam­
ined, pro-Democratic bias was smallest in the three elections in which 
Democratic congressional candidates nationwide captured at least 53 per­
cent of the vote (1936, 1940, and 1948). In contrast, bias most strongly 
benefited Democrats in the three elections in which Democrats received 
50 percent (1950) or less of the national vote (1942 and 1946).10 
The two extreme election years in this period best illustrate the as­
sociation of the congressional vote and electoral system bias.11 The 1946 
election marked the low point of the national Democratic vote from 1936 
to 1992 (45.3 percent of the vote). This was also the peak (15.7 percent 
of contested seats) of the electoral system's Democratic bias. In 1946, the 
typical Republican winner received almost half again as many votes as 
did the typical Democratic winner. Democrats in 1946 won only about 
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one of five of the moderate-to-high-turnout districts, yet they continued 
to do well in their low-turnout strongholds—winning three of four of the 
lowest-turnout districts. Despite this strong electoral system tilt in their 
favor, Democrats lost control of the House in 1946, winning only 188 
seats and only 112 of the contested seats. However, without bias, Demo­
crats in 1946 would have been in an even more depleted minority. 
The 1936 election stands in sharp contrast to 1946. In 1936, the 
national Democratic vote was at a high point (58.5 percent), a level only 
approached in the post-Watergate election of 1974, and the electoral sys-
tem's pro-Democratic bias was at a low. The electoral system in 1936 was 
nearly neutral. As table 7.1 shows, Democrats in 1936 won about 9 of 10 
of the lowest-turnout districts (which was not too far from usual), but they 
also did exceedingly well in high-turnout areas. They won nearly three 
out of four of the moderate- to high-turnout districts.12 As in the post­
1954 period, when Democrats did well nationally they added higher-
turnout districts to their win column, and the vote for the typical winning 
Democratic candidate more nearly equalled that of the typical Republi­
can winner. In these good Democratic years, a smaller portion of winning 
Democrats were sitting in the cheap seats. 
• The Cheap Seats of the 1940s • 
Where were the cheap seats before the 1950s? Cheap seats could be 
found in most parts of the country. A listing of seats falling in the lowest 
quintile of both turnout and unwasted votes in 1942, a total of 56 districts, 
finds 17 different states represented. Nevertheless, and despite the large 
number of uncontested districts in the region, a majority of contested 
cheap seats were in southern and border states.13 In 1942, even though 
only 45 districts in these states were contested, and this amounted to only 
14 percent of all contested districts nationally that election year, more 
than half of the districts in the lowest quintiles of turnout and unwasted 
votes were from these states. While the average vote for a winning candi­
date in a contested district outside the South in 1942 was about 52,000 
votes, winning candidates in contested southern districts typically re­
ceived less than half this number of votes.14 
Table 7.3 presents the 17 districts that fell into both the lowest-
turnout quintile and lowest-unwasted-vote quintile in each of the five 
elections following reapportionment in the 1940s. There may have been 
equally cheap seats during this period that failed to make the list because 
they were uncontested at some point during the decade, but these 17 
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Table 7.3 
The Consistently Cheap Seats of the 1940s 
Democratic Vote Percentage in Year 
State District 1942 1944 1946 1948 1950 
Florida 5 71 68 61 71 11 
Kentucky 5 61 58 51 66 63 
Kentucky 7 51 53 41 61 56 
Maryland 1 56 51 49 48 43 
Maryland 3 73 74 64 71 66 
Maryland 4 49 59 57 65 58 
Nevada AL 54 63 41 51 53 
North Carolina 1 93 91 89 93 93 
Ohio 5 36 32 40 48 43 
Ohio 10 36 36 33 42 35 
Ohio 11 39 46 39 49 47 
Oklahoma 2 51 58 63 71 66 
Oklahoma 6 58 6  0 • 66 74 67 
Oklahoma 7 70 71 79 79 67 
Oklahoma 8 39 42 45 58 46 
South Dakota 2 28 31 26 34 40 
Virginia 9 64 56 55 52 58 
Seats Won by: 
Democrats 11 12 9 12 11 
Republicans 6 5 8 5 6 
Note: AL indicates an at-large statewide district. Any district uncontested in any of the 
five election years was dropped from the list. The 17 districts listed were contested districts 
in the lowest quintile of both district turnout and unwasted votes in each of the five elections 
from 1942 to 1950. 
districts illustrate both the cheap seats of this era and the continuity of 
cheap seats.15 These seats ranked near the bottom in both turnout and 
unwasted votes in each election from 1942 to 1950. The so-called "Fight­
ing Ninth" Congressional District of Virginia is, in many ways, a good 
example of a cheap seat in the 1940s. 
The "Fighting Ninth" of Virginia 
The Ninth Congressional District of Virginia was composed of 12 count­
ies in the state's southwestern corner along the Kentucky and West Vir­
ginia borders.16 As Barone et al. (1972) wrote about the district in a later 
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decade, the district is "really part of Appalachia. [It] is a virtually all-white 
coal mining area, where the hills, scarred by strip-miners, are dotted with 
the crude homes of the impoverished mountaineers who live here" (852). 
In 1930 the district elected John W. Flannagan Jr., a Democrat. Flanna­
gan served nine terms in the House, winning reelection throughout the 
1930s and 1940s until he retired in 1948.17 Flannagan faced serious chal­
lenges from a Republican candidate in each election. Although he won 
each bid, Flannagan received less than 60 percent of the district vote in 
five of his nine races and never received more than two-thirds of the vote 
(Cox 1981, 1116-23). He was succeeded in the Ninth by Thomas B. Fu~ 
gate, also a Democrat, who won the 1948 election by a narrow margin 
and served two terms. 
The Ninth District of Virginia, although unusually competitive for 
a cheap seat (hence the "fighting" of the Fighting Ninth), was typical of 
many cheap seats of the 1930s and 1940s in that it was southern, poor, 
and was consistently won by Democrats. It was also consistently cheap. 
The total vote in the Fighting Ninth was never much more than half the 
vote of the typical contested district and often less than half. In 1942, for 
instance, the average turnout in contested districts nationally was over 
79,000 votes, more than three times the 26,189 votes cast in Virginia's 
Ninth District. That year, the Democrat, Flannagan, went to Washington 
on the basis of fewer than 17,000 votes.18 Of the 311 representatives who 
faced a major-party opponent in 1942, only 12 won with fewer votes 
than Flannagan.19 
• Overview • 
The effects of the electoral system before 1954 were examined in this 
chapter. The electoral system from 1936 to 1952, like that of the more 
recent period, was generally biased in favor of the Democrats. It played 
a role in inflating Democratic House majorities since at least the mid­
1930s. In all but one of the nine pre-1954 elections examined, typical 
Democratic winning congressional candidates won with fewer votes than 
did typical Republican winners. There was no appreciable bias in the 
1936 election and a negligible amount in 1940. In general, however, the 
pre-1954 electoral system was biased in favor of the Democrats by at least 
as much as the post-1954 system. The bias was based on the Democratic 
control of the cheap seats. They regularly won about three quarters of 
the cheap seats, a large percentage of which in this era were in southern 
and border states. 
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As in more recent elections, bias was greatest in bad years for the 
Democrats, when they most needed the help. When the going got rough 
for the Democrats, the first districts to go were the higher-turnout dis­
tricts (1946). In tough times, they were able to hold most of their low-
turnout strongholds, like Virginia's Fighting Ninth. Even in 1946, the 
worst year of the period for Democrats, they still won three of four of the 
cheapest seats. 
The fact that electoral system bias in the 1936 to 1952 period looks 
much like that of more recent times in many ways should be expected. 
All the fundamentals to the relationship, the basis for cheap seats—the 
sociodemographic links to partisanship and turnout and electoral dis­
tricting arrangements—were in place before 1954. Analysis of elections 
from 1936 to 1952 adds to the reliability of the post-1954 findings. Elec­
toral system bias favoring the Democrats was evident in 27 of the 29 na­
tional elections from 1936 to 1992. The Democratic dynasty that truly 
began in the 1930s was built on a popular base of electoral support but 
was also magnified by the incumbency advantage and augmented by a 
large number of uncontested seats and by victories in a solid block of low-
turnout districts—the cheap seats. Only the heavy midterm seat losses for 
the highly unpopular Truman administration in 1946 and the substantial 
coattails of Republican presidential candidate and national hero Dwight 
Eisenhower in 1952 were able briefly to interrupt Democratic dominance 
of the House over the sixty years from 1932 to 1992.20 The evidence, 
before 1954 as well as since, lends support to the cheap-seats thesis. To 
a great extent, though by no means entirely, the Democratic Party was 
successful in maintaining its majority in the U.S. House of Representa­
tives because the electoral system was biased in its favor. 
But that majority came to a close, or was at the very least inter­
rupted again, by the 1994 election. What happened? Congressional Dem­
ocrats had enjoyed 40 years of popular support, winning popular vote 
majorities in 20 straight elections. Moreover, as the preceding chapters 
demonstrated, throughout this period the system had also worked to the 
Democrats' advantage. They benefited from incumbency, from more un­
contested seats, and from an electoral system tilted in their favor and 
magnifying their vote majorities into even larger seat majorities. More­
over, as we have seen in the past, bias in the electoral system tended to 
increase when Democrats were not doing so well at the polls. Thus, with 
Democrats failing to attract a majority vote in 1994, bias should have 
been especially in their favor. If so, why was it insufficient to preserve the 
Democratic majority in 1994? Was the system strongly biased in favor of 
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the Democrats, or was it, for some reason, more neutral in 1994? Were 
there still cheap seats to be had in 1994, and did Democrats continue to 
occupy them? We now turn to that fateful midterm election of 1994 to 
explain which elements that had sustained the Democratic majority for 
40 years finally gave way to a Republican majority. 
8
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The Collapse of the

Democratic Dynasty

Lhe November 1994 midterm election brought an abrupt end to the 
Democratic dynasty in the House. For the first time in 40 years, a Repub­
lican majority was elected to the House of Representatives. The election 
sent 230 Republicans, 204 Democrats, and 1 independent to the House. 
With 218 members needed for a House majority, Republicans had a 13­
seat majority—a small majority, but a majority nonetheless, and enough 
to elect a Republican speaker, set the rules, and organize the House com­
mittee system. For four decades, a Democratic House majority could be 
taken for granted. No longer. The unthinkable was now not only think­
able, it had happened. 
The 1994 midterm was a disaster for Democrats. Midterm elections 
are often interpreted as 435 individual elections playing 435 distinct cam­
paigns with 435 separate outcomes. But there was a single, unmistakable 
national story in 1994: the election was a stinging defeat for the Demo­
crats. Since 1958, Democrats had never held fewer than 242 seats, a 25­
seat majority at their low point. 1994 left them with 38 fewer seats than 
their worst showing in more than three decades. Adding insult to injury, 
among the defeated Democratic candidates was the Democratic House 
speaker, Tom Foley of Washington. Republicans, who had been unable to 
top their strongest showing of 192 seats in more than three decades, not 
only broke the 192-seat ceiling but exceeded it by nearly 40 seats. And if 
that were not enough, the post-election party switches of several conser­
vative southern Democratic House members to the Republicans com­
pounded the bad news for Democrats. 
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• Democratic Losses in Perspective • 
The Democratic Party's loss of 52 House seats was the most severe loss 
for either party in several generations.1 In the first half of the century 
elections frequently produced sweeping partisan change. About a third 
of elections between 1900 and 1950 (9 of 26 elections) produced party 
shifts of 50 or more seats. Several moved more than 75 seats between the 
parties.2 Although generally less volatile than the earlier half of the cen­
tury, there have been a few elections since 1950 that produced substantial 
changes in the partisan balance of the House.3 However, electoral 
changes have generally been smaller in more recent decades. There have 
been 22 elections between 1950 and 1992. In these 22 elections, the me­
dian net seat change between the parties from one election to the next 
was only 15 seats. Interelection change has been even more limited since 
the mid-1970s. In the nine elections from 1976 to 1992 the median 
change was only 10 seats. In this context, the 1994 election stands out. 
No party since 1948 had lost as many House seats in a single election 
year as the Democrats did in 1994. 
While the magnitude was surprising, some Democratic seat losses 
in 1994 were expected. In 32 of the 33 midterm elections since 1862, the 
president's party had lost seats in the House.4 In the 12 midterm elections 
from 1946 to 1990, the president's party lost seats in each midterm and 
sustained an average loss of about 26 seats. In some midterm elections 
(1962, 1986, and 1990) the losses were minor, fewer than 10 seats. In 
other elections (1946, 1958, 1966, and 1974), however, the president's 
party suffered major casualties, with losses of as many as 45 to 55 seats. 
But whether few or many, midterm losses for the president's party are 
a fact of American political life, and in 1994 a Democrat occupied the 
White House. 
Despite the expectation of Democratic losses, there were at least 
three reasons to think that they would be moderate, more on the order 
of 20 seats or so rather than more than 50. First, as table 8.1 indicates, 
presidential party losses from 1946 to 1990 had averaged only about 26 
seats and had been even smaller in most recent midterms. Over the previ­
ous two decades, spanning the six midterm elections from 1970 to 1990, 
the mean midterm seat loss for the president's party was only about 19 
seats, and only once (the 1974 Watergate midterm) did losses exceed 25 
seats.5 Presumably the increased advantage of incumbency and the weak­
ened allegiances of partisans had restrained national partisan electoral 
swings. 
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Table 8.1 
Midterm Seat Losses for the President's Party, 1946-1990 
Midterm Elections 
1946-66 1970-90 
Mean Seat Loss -33.8 -19.1 
Median Seat Loss - 38.3 -13.5 
Largest Seat Loss -55.5 -48.5 
Losses of More than 25 Seats 4 of 6 (67) 1 of 6 (17) 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are percentages. 
Second, modest Democratic losses were expected in 1994 because 
the Democratic presidential victory in 1992 had been relatively narrow 
(Campbell, 1993). Nearly as regular as the midterm loss of seats for the 
president's party is the rule that midterm losses are inversely related to 
the size of the prior presidential victory. That is, presidents who win 
popular-vote landslides and carry a large number of congressional candi­
dates into office on their coattails usually suffer bigger losses in the mid­
term when their party's candidates run without the benefit of presidential 
coattails. In contrast, presidents elected with modest vote pluralities usu­
ally sustain smaller losses.6 Since President Clinton won with just 43 per­
cent of the popular vote in 1992 (53.5 percent of the two-party vote 
compared to the post-1944 average of about 55 percent for the winner), 
large midterm presidential losses were unexpected. 
Finally, large Democratic losses in 1994 were unexpected, because 
of President Clinton's standing with the public. To some extent, midterm 
elections are referendums on the president. A popular president can re­
duce his party's midterm loss, while casualties can be heavier under an 
unpopular president. Presidential approval ratings going into midterm 
elections average in the mid-50s. That is, in a typical midterm election 
since 1946, about 55 percent of the public indicate that they approve of 
the way that the president is handling his job. These ratings generally 
run into the mid- to high 60s on the positive side and to the low 40s 
on the negative side (though Nixon's approval rating just prior to his 
resignation and the 1974 midterm sank to the mid-2 0s). President Clin-
ton's approval ratings before the 1994 midterm hovered in the low 40 
percent range. These were low ratings and foreboded somewhat greater­
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than-usual Democratic losses, but they were not appallingly low and gave 
no sign of the Democratic catastrophe that would follow.7 
This chapter addresses two questions regarding the fall of the Dem­
ocratic dynasty in the 1994 midterm election. First, why did the Demo­
cratic House majority collapse? What caused the surprising end of the 
Democratic majority that had survived four often politically tumultuous 
decades and that had not been seriously threatened in more than three 
decades? Second, what was the role in the 1994 election of the structural 
factors that had supported the Democratic majority for so long? What 
role did the Democratic Party's incumbency advantage play in the elec­
tion? Did uncontested seats continue to add to the Democratic column, 
or did Democrats lose this advantage? Did the electoral system continue 
to work to the advantage of Democrats? Were there cheap seats in 1994, 
and did Democrats continue to dominate them as they had for most of 
the previous six decades? 
In the end, all of the structural advantages of the Democratic House 
majority could not protect it from the completion of the Republican re­
alignment. The Republican realignment that began with the Republican 
"southern strategy" of the 1960s took several decades to dismantle long-
standing political allegiances and local Democratic Party defenses and to 
build a Republican base from scratch in the once solid Democratic South. 
It also took decades because of several detours along the way, including 
the Watergate debacle and a disengaged president who reneged on his 
"read-my-lips" no-new-taxes pledge to the voters. In 1994 the realign­
ment appeared finally to have come to fruition. Although Republican 
gains in presidential voting and in party identification had been evi­
dent for some time, they were fleeting and modest at the congressional 
level—until 1994. Based in no small measure on the movement toward 
the Republican Party of conservative white southerners and white males 
nationally, the long-awaited, slow-moving, fitful Republican realignment 
finally arrived. 
The completion of the Republican realignment took place with 
most, but not all, of the structural advantages that had helped to maintain 
the Democratic majority over the years in place. The Democratic Party 
lost control of the House, despite continuing to enjoy an incumbency 
advantage over the Republicans. In 1994, as in each election from 1956 
to 1992, there were more Democratic incumbents than Republican in­
cumbents running, and, despite a groundswell of complaints against 
Congress and the overwhelming popularity of term-limits proposals, 
incumbency remained an asset to candidates. As in past years, most in­
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cumbents fared better than most challengers. However, while Democrats 
continued to enjoy greater benefits from incumbency and would have 
suffered greater losses without it, they did not have their usual uncon-
tested-seat advantage over Republicans. In 1994, for the first time in 
more than 40 years, Republicans held a greater number of uncontested 
seats than Democrats. 
Democrats also lost their House majority despite the electoral sys-
tem's bias in their favor. As in nearly every election since at least the mid­
1930s, the electoral system favored the Democrats in 1994. Because of 
their domination of the lowest-turnout districts, the cheap seats, Demo­
crats paid a lower price for their victories. Had the electoral system been 
neutral between the parties in 1994, Democrats would not only have lost 
control of the House to the Republicans, but they would have lost many 
more seats than they did, and Republicans would have taken control of 
the House with a significantly larger majority. Even with this considerable 
electoral system advantage, however, the Democratic majority was not 
protected from the Republican tide of 1994. 
• The Voters Spoke • 
Why did the Democratic House majority collapse in 1994? Several poten­
tial reasons for the Democratic dynasty's collapse can be ruled out. First, 
it was not caused by generalized anger at congressional incumbents. Not 
a single Republican incumbent in the House was defeated, and most 
Democratic incumbents were reelected. Second, 1994 was also not simply 
a swing back to the Republicans after the defeat of President Bush in the 
1992 presidential election. While many voters indicated their displeasure 
with the Republican incumbent that year by voting for his opponents, 
who collectively received 62.6 percent of the vote, President Clinton won 
the election with only a minority of the popular vote, and the rejection 
of President Bush was not by itself large enough to account for such a 
massive swing back to the Republicans in 1994.8 Finally, the Democratic 
1994 collapse was also not simply a referendum, an emphatic rejection of 
President Clinton and his administration's performance in office. While 
the president's unpopularity was a component of the election, his public 
standing would have had to have been much worse to account for the 
Democratic debacle. 
It is difficult to interpret the 1994 election results as anything other 
than a partisan statement by the voters. The Democrats lost their seat ma­
jority in the House in 1994 because they lost their popular-vote majority. 
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For the first time since 1952, Republicans received a majority of the pop­
ular vote in House elections (52.4 percent). Moreover; 1994 was generally 
a Republican year. Republican gains were not confined to the House. 
Republicans won across the board. They won 21 of the 35 Senate seats 
up for election (60 percent) and with it the control of the Senate that they 
had lost in 1986. They also won 24 of the 36 governorships at stake (67 
percent). The Republican tide also swept over state legislative contests. 
For only the second time since 1954 (recall table 2.6), Republicans con­
trolled a majority of upper chambers of state legislatures, albeit a bare 
majority of 25 to 24. Similarly, for only the second time since 1954, Re­
publicans gained control of a majority of lower state legislative chambers, 
although again by the slimmest of margins, 24 to 23 chambers (with two 
ties). This is a particularly interesting continuity in light of our discussion 
in chapter 2 of the similarity of House and state legislative election results 
over the past 40 years.9 
• The Republican Realignment • 
Was the Republican sweep in 1994 a temporary rejection of the Demo­
crats, based on public reactions peculiar to the circumstances sur­
rounding that election, or part of a more permanent partisan shift toward 
the Republicans, a partisan realignment?10 There is considerable evi­
dence that Republican gains in 1994 reflected a deepening and spreading 
of a Republican realignment that had begun some 20 years earlier. It was 
part of a realignment very unlike the model critical realignment of the 
1930s, when Democrats during the Great Depression displaced the ear­
lier Republican majority largely through the mobilization of new Demo­
cratic voters over a period of about eight years.11 The Republican 
realignment began in the 1960s with a first step that, ironically, strength­
ened the Democratic majority. It developed slowly and erratically over 
the next several decades. The realignment moved at a glacial pace be­
cause it suffered several interruptions and setbacks along the way (includ­
ing the Watergate scandal), required the building of a Republican Party in 
southern states where Democrats historically dominated and Republicans 
were politically inconsequential, and was driven by the slower process of 
converting the partisan predispositions of voters rather than mobilizing 
previously inactive citizens. 
There are many facets to the Republican realignment. It is an in­
tricate realignment involving shifts in partisan loyalties along many 
regional, social, and demographic lines. This said, it is also a simple re­
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alignment or, more accurately, a simplifying realignment. It is primarily a 
conservative realignment in which the parties have been sorted out more 
clearly on ideological grounds. Overlaid on the ideological structure of 
the new partisan alignment is a racial division, although it would greatly 
oversimplify matters to suggest that the realignment was primarily about 
racial polarization. Nevertheless, the initial step of the realignment was 
the movement of African Americans toward the Democratic Party. The 
support of the Democratic Party for the civil rights agenda and for an 
expanded social welfare state, along with the advance of the civil rights 
movement and the adoption of the Voting Rights Act, mobilized great 
numbers of African Americans and drew them closer than ever to the 
Democratic Party (Carmines and Stimson, 1989). Turnout among African 
Americans increased substantially in the late 1960s and into the 1970s, 
especially in southern states, and Democratic presidential candidates 
could now count on receiving nearly 9 of 10 of their votes. 
The Realignment in the South 
The developments of the 1960s, while immediately beneficial to the Dem­
ocrats, also eventually extracted from them a higher political price. The 
move of the national Democratic Party toward the left in civil rights and 
domestic issues more generally provided the foundation of a Republican 
effort to convert conservative Democrats nationally and, more particu­
larly, the Republican southern strategy to break the solid Democratic 
South.12 The presence of conservative white southerners in the more lib­
eral national Democratic coalition had been uneasy for some time. The 
Dixiecrats, led by then-Democratic Senator Strom Thurmond of South 
Carolina, bolted from the 1948 Democratic convention. The more con­
servative southern state Democratic Parties and the near invisibility of the 
Republican Party in southern states preserved the allegiance of many 
white southerners for the Democrats. The southern Democratic candida­
cies of Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton also forestalled Republican inroads. 
Nevertheless, these circumstances merely delayed the inevitable. 
Given the prevalence of one-party systems across the South and the 
conservatism of these Democratic Parties, Republican inroads were ini­
tially limited to presidential elections. The early rumblings that Demo­
crats might not be able to take the South for granted appeared in 1948 
with Strom Thurmond's Dixiecrat candidacy. Every Democratic presi­
dential candidate in the 17 elections from 1880 to 1944 had carried Ar­
kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, and South Carolina. 
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Six other southern states were almost as dependably Democratic.13 In 
1948, four of these states voted for Thurmond. While most returned to 
the Democratic fold in the next several elections, five defected to Gold wa­
ter in 1964. The Democratic presidential lock on the South had clearly 
ended by 1968. In the 1968 presidential election, Alabama Governor 
George Wallace, running as a third-party candidate, carried five southern 
states, and Republican candidate Richard Nixon carried six states in the 
region. Since 1968, the South has generally voted Republican in presi­
dential elections. Southerners returned to the Democrats temporarily in 
1976, in the aftermath of Watergate and with a southerner (former Geor­
gia Governor Jimmy Carter) heading the Democratic ticket, and had 
some success in 1992, with a Democratic ticket of two southerners (former 
Arkansas Governor Bill Clinton and Tennessee Senator Al Gore Jr.), but, 
otherwise, Republican presidential candidates have dominated. Of the 
997 electoral votes cast by the 12 southern states in the seven presidential 
elections from 1968 to 1992, 756 were cast for Republican presidential 
candidates (76 percent), and only 194 were cast for Democratic candi­
dates (19 percent).14 Moreover, Republican strength in the region has 
grown while the electoral voting strength of the region has also grown.15 
Below the presidential level, Democrats continued to dominate for 
some time. In 1968, with the southern presidential shift to Republicans 
well underway, Democrats won more than three out of four southern 
congressional seats, and Republicans conceded about a quarter of south­
ern districts without even mounting token opposition.16 Republicans 
were still a small minority of the southern congressional delegation a de­
cade later. Of the 114 southern members elected in 1978, 82 were Demo­
crats (72 percent) and 32 were Republicans. This division in the region 
was a major reason for divided government nationally. 
Because of its twists and turns and detours, many election analysts 
doubted that a realignment was underway, instead devising explanations 
for idiosyncratic Republican presidential victories and holding to a view 
that partisan dealignment rather than realignment was in process.17 Oth­
ers concluded that a realignment had taken place but that it was a split-
level or "two-tiered" realignment with Republicans becoming the first or 
"sun" party in presidential voting, while Democrats maintained their pri­
macy below the presidency (Ladd, 1989). Another variant on this inter­
pretation claimed that the realignment was "hollow," marked by a 
continuing dealignment or a discounting of the importance of partisan­
ship by the electorate that permitted greater split-ticket voting (Watten­
berg, 1990).18 The 1994 election suggests that these conclusions were 
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premature. The realignment appeared hollow or two-tiered only because 
it was a work still in progress. 
While Republicans continued to post anemic congressional show­
ings in the South, they nevertheless gradually built a base in southern 
state legislatures through the 1970s and 1980s, developing a pool of po­
tential candidates with political experience for future congressional races. 
After the 1964 election, Republicans held fewer than 5 percent of seats 
in the lower chamber of state legislatures in six southern states and ex­
ceeded 12 percent of seats in only two southern states.19 Ten years later, 
Republicans still held fewer than 15 percent of the seats in most southern 
states.20 However, over the late 1970s and early 1980s, Republicans made 
substantial inroads in many southern states. After the 1984 election, al­
though Republicans held fewer than 15 percent of the seats in five south­
ern state legislatures, they held more than 30 percent of the seats in five 
other southern states.21 By the 1992 election, Republicans held over 30 
percent of state legislative seats in seven southern state legislatures, more 
than 20 percent of the seats in another three southern states, and more 
than 10 percent of seats in the two remaining states.22 Republicans were 
now a presence in southern politics and could put forward to voters vi­
able and experienced candidates for the House. They now had to be 
taken seriously. 
Republican state-legislative gains in the South over the 1970s and 
1980s paid congressional dividends in the 1990s. Democrats had main­
tained their southern congressional strength years after they had lost the 
region in presidential voting, but this changed dramatically in 1994. In 
1994 Republicans won a majority of southern House districts.23 They won 
15 of 23 seats in Florida, 8 of 12 seats in North Carolina, 7 of 11 seats in 
Georgia, and 5 of 6 seats in Oklahoma. Republicans gained even in the 
Texas congressional delegation where Democrats outnumbered Republi­
cans by nearly 2 to 1, since they had been outnumbered by 11 to 1 as 
recently as the mid-1970s.24 
Race, Gender, and Realignment 
The conservative Republican realignment not only altered regional vo­
ting patterns but, like past realignments, altered the party loyalties of 
sociodemographic groups. The New Deal realignment was most distin­
guished by sizable class differences in party voting, but it also affected 
religious and ethnic group allegiances (Petrocik, 1981; Erikson et al., 
1989). The current Republican realignment also reflects the changing 
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partisan loyalties of a variety of groups. The most fundamental group 
shift in the current realignment is racial (Carmines and Stimson, 1989). 
Although black voters were more Democratically inclined than white vot­
ers before the 1970s, the average racial gap in presidential voting was 
only about 25 percentage points from the 1940s to I960.25 Since 1964, it 
has been twice as large. While the racial gap is an important part of the 
story regarding the current realignment, it does not help us to explain 
the 1994 congressional results. The racial gap in congressional voting in 
1994 was about 50 percentage points, about 10 to 15 points higher than 
in the four previous congressional elections, but about the same as in the 
1984 election that left the Republicans in the minority (Ladd, 1995, 
48-49). 
A second, less consistent but perhaps equally important, group shift 
in the current realignment may have been the emergence of a gender 
gap. Prior to the 1970s, there were very small and fluctuating differences 
in the party voting of men and women. In a number of elections since 
the 1970s, however, there have been pronounced differences, with men 
more inclined to vote for Republicans and women more inclined to vote 
for Democrats (Bowman, 1995). Although these differences look minor 
when compared with the racial gap, the fact that each group constitutes 
roughly half of the electorate makes the differences important. 
A common misconception of the gender gap is that Republicans 
have a problem attracting the support of women. However, neither logic 
nor empirical analysis supports this view. The gender gap is not a prob­
lem for Republicans; it is a problem for Democrats. Democrats have a 
problem with males. Given that no gender gap was evident before the 
1970s, that the Democrats were the majority party of that era, and that 
the public as a whole has moved away from this Democratic majority, the 
only interpretation consistent with this arithmetic is that males have been 
moving away from the Democratic coalition. 
Table 8.2 presents the history of the gender gap in both presidential 
and House elections from 1968 to 1994. Far from signalling Republican 
problems, the gender gap appears intimately connected to Republican 
success. The last national Republican victory in presidential or House 
voting without a significant gender gap was 1968. Since that election, 
the gender gap dividing line between Republican success and failure is 
remarkably clear. Since 1968, Republicans have lost every election in 
which the gender gap was less than six percentage points.26 Conversely, 
Republicans won whenever the gender gap was equal to or greater than 
six percentage points. This includes the 1994 House election. Con­
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Table 8.2 
The Gender Gap and the Republican Realignment, 1968-1994 
Did Republicans Win 
Republican with a Gender Gap 
Vote of 6 Percent or 
(< Greater and Lose 
Gender Republican When the Gap was 
Year Election Male Female Gap Victory Smaller? 
1968 Presidential 55 53 +2 Yes No 
Congressional 48 48 0 No Yes 
1970 Congressional 46 45 -i No Yes 
1972 Presidential 68 61 +7 Yes Yes 
Congressional 43 44 No Yes 
1974 Congressional 37 39 - 2 No Yes 
1976 Presidential 48 48 0 No Yes 
Congressional 42 43 -j No Yes 
1978 Congressional 42 43 - 1 No Yes 
1980 Presidential 55 47 +8 Yes Yes 
Congressional 44 47 Q No Yes 
1982 Congressional 44 41 +3 No Yes 
1984 Presidential 62 56 +6 Yes Yes 
Congressional 53 48 +5 No Yes 
1986 Congressional 47 44 +3 No Yes 
1988 Presidential 57 50 +7 Yes Yes 
Congressional 46 41 +5 No Yes 
1990 Congressional 46 43 +3 No Yes 
1992 Presidential 38 37 +1 No Yes 
Congressional 47 44 +3 No Yes 
1994 Congressional 57 46 +11 Yes Yes 
Source: The congressional votes in 1978 and from 1982 to 1994 are from Ladd (1995, 
48-49, 54). The data were originally collected by Voter News Service (for 1994), Voter Re­
search and Surveys (1990 and 1992), and CBS News/New York Times (1984, 1986, and 
1988). The presidential votes from 1976 to 1992 are from Bendyna and Lake's analysis 
(1995) of CBS News Exit Polls (1976, 1980, 1988), CBS News/A/ew York Times Exit Polls 
(1988), and the Voter Research and Surveys Exit Poll (1992). The ABC Polls for 1980,1984, 
and 1988 are close to the CBS results, although they indicate an eight-point rather than six-
point gap in 1984. Both presidential and congressional votes from 1968 to 1974 are from 
Miller and Traugott (1989), based on the National Election Studies and their predecessor 
national election surveys. These percentages are based on the two-party rather than total 
vote. The Gallup Poll breakdown of the 1968 presidential vote which separated out Wallace 
supporters also found no gender gap for Republican candidate Richard Nixon. The Mitofsky 
International Exit Poll indicated an eight-point gender gap in 1994 (Ladd 1995,156). 
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gressional Republicans had a gender gap consistently since 1982. How­
ever, it exceeded six percentage points in 1994 for the first time. In fact, 
one survey indicated that the gender gap in 1994 was nearly twice 
that margin. 
Whether the emergence of the gender gap, the inroads of Republi­
cans in the South, and other Republican regional and socioeconomic 
gains indicate the deepening and widening of a permanent partisan re­
alignment or fleeting reactions to the specific political circumstances of 
1994 is impossible to say with complete certainty at this point. However, 
it is quite clear that the Democratic loss of the House in 1994 reflects, in 
one way or the other, the decisions of the electorate. The voters spoke. 
What remains to be seen is whether the candidate context in the 1994 
campaign and the electoral system skewed the 1994 election outcome. 
Did the system, including incumbency advantages, uncontested-seat ad­
vantages, and the organization of votes into seats, make the displacement 
of the Democratic majority easier or more difficult? 
• The Candidate Context in 1994 • 
In previous elections, Democrats had a head start toward a House major­
ity by virtue of more of their candidates running as incumbents, with all 
the advantages and opportunities that incumbency entails, and because 
more Democratic candidates than Republican candidates were unop­
posed. Since incumbency is typically worth additional votes for a candi­
date and since more Democratic candidates than Republican candidates 
were incumbents, Democratic congressional candidates nationally re­
ceived a bonus vote from incumbency. Similarly, since being unopposed 
is worth some additional votes and prevents the opposition from ob­
taining votes it otherwise would have received if voters and potential vot­
ers in the district had been afforded an opportunity to choose between 
opposing candidates and since more Democratic candidates than Repub­
lican candidates in past elections have been unopposed, the Democratic 
congressional vote nationally was larger than it would have been if all 
voters faced a real choice. As I showed in chapter 3, these advantages 
typically added a couple of percentage points to the Democratic vote and 
probably salvaged Democratic vote majorities in two election years (1966 
and 1980). Did they continue to work to the Democratic Party's favor in 
1994? Incumbency did, but Democrats lost their uncontested-seat 
advantage. 
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Incumbency 
As in each election since 1956, Democrats had an incumbency advantage 
in 1994. As usual, a majority of incumbents running for reelection were 
Democrats. There were 225 Democratic incumbents and 157 Republican 
incumbents, giving Democrats a net incumbency advantage of 68 seats. 
Although this was a smaller net seat advantage than in the prior five elec­
tions, it was not unusually small. The net party difference in running 
incumbents had been closer to even in seven elections since 1956 and, in 
an absolute sense, was still strongly to the advantage of the Democrats. 
Although there were unquestionably more Democratic than Repub­
lican incumbents running in 1994, there is a question of whether incum­
bency was still an asset to a candidate? Public cynicism in 1994 was strong. 
Public regard for professional politicians was about on par with that of 
used car salesmen. Was incumbency worth as many votes as in previous 
elections? Did the political earthquake of 1994 signal a collapse in the 
value of incumbency, or did it survive, despite the public protestations 
against Washington insiders? 
Incumbency was not devalued in 1994. The 1994 election was not 
a revolt against incumbents. As evidence of this, we need look no further 
than the fate of Republican incumbents. Not a single Republican incum­
bent in the House, the Senate, or a governorship was defeated for reelec­
tion. There were a number of Democratic incumbents who went down to 
defeat, including 2 incumbent Senators, 5 incumbent Governors, and 34 
incumbent House members.27 However, even with a strong Republican 
tide running against them, most Democratic incumbents in the House 
survived. Of the 225 incumbent Democrats running, 191 (85 percent) 
were reelected. In addition, Jacobson (1995) estimated the Gelman-King 
index of incumbency value at about 10 percentage points, about normal 
for recent election years. Thus, the Democratic share of the 1994 vote, as 
in past years, was padded by votes received because of incumbency, and 
the Republican vote share was diminished to the same extent. 
Uncontested Seats 
If the partisan implications of the incumbency advantage reflected the 
pro-Democratic status quo, the partisan consequences of uncontested 
seats marked a sharp departure from politics as usual. The usual Demo­
cratic advantage in uncontested seats not only disappeared in 1994, 
but a Republican advantage emerged. For the first time in this century, 
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uncontested Republicans outnumbered uncontested Democrats. There 
were 35 uncontested Republicans in 1994 and only 16 uncontested Dem­
ocrats, a 19-seat net Republican advantage. 
This Republican advantage in uncontested seats may be additional 
evidence of a Republican realignment. The realignment not only shifted 
votes, generally and more particularly among some sociodemographic 
groups and in some regions of the country, but it apparently opened up 
some districts to the possibility of electing a Republican and closed the 
possibility of electing a Democrat in other districts. Along the same lines 
as the realignment in voting, the number of uncontested Republican seats 
began rising in the late 1970s and the growth of uncontested Republican 
seats has been strongest in the South. About two-thirds of uncontested 
Republican seats in 1994 were in southern states. Nine uncontested Re­
publican seats were in Florida alone, and another five were in Texas. 
With uncontested seats favoring Republicans and contested incum­
bent seats favoring Democrats, the overall impact of the candidate con­
text in 1994 was minor. Applying the same sort of analysis as outlined in 
appendix A for earlier elections indicates that the Democratic share of 
the national vote would have declined by only about a half of a percent­
age point (from 46.2 percent to 45.7 percent) and the Republican share 
would have increased by an equal amount (rising from 53.8 percent to 
54.3 percent) if there had been no uncontested seats and if neither party 
had received votes due to incumbency.28 
• The Electoral System in the 1990s • 
In nearly every election of the past six decades, the electoral system fa­
vored the Democratic Party. Although this bias was not the sole basis for 
the extraordinary success of Democrats in House elections, it was an im­
portant component of that record. Moreover, bias was greatest when 
Democratic fortunes were at their ebb. So what happened in 1994? With 
the ripening of the Republican realignment working against Democrats, 
public opinion running against the incumbent Democratic president, and 
Democrats losing their long-held advantage in uncontested seats, Demo­
cratic fortunes in 1994 were certainly at their ebb. Did the Democratic 
dynasty in the House end in part because they also lost their electoral 
system advantage in 1994, or did Democrats lose the House despite an 
electoral system still strongly biased in their favor? 
With three different approaches, this analysis makes five separate 
estimates of partisan bias in the House electoral system in the 1990s. The 
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three approaches are the historical approach, a modified hypothetical 
approach, and the unwasted-vote approach. First, the analysis estimates 
bias from the aggregate national vote and seat percentages over the last 
several elections. As in Tufte's (1973) earlier analysis, bias is estimated 
from a seats-votes regression of the last three elections. 
The next three estimates of bias are based on a district-level analysis. 
These are achieved by a modification of the hypothetical vote method 
(Niemi and Fett, 1986) discussed in chapter 4. The second and third esti­
mates are derived using of a uniform partisan seat analysis of the 1992 
and 1994 elections, respectively. Recall that this technique adds an incre­
ment to one party's vote percentages in each district and subtracts an 
equivalent percentage from the other party and then recomputes the seat 
totals on the basis of the new hypothetical votes. The modification intro­
duced here is that the hypothetical vote percentages are translated into 
votes (rather than percentage of votes) in each district and then aggre­
gated nationally. Partisan vote percentages are incrementally adjusted 
uniformly across all districts until the total national vote is evenly divided 
between the parties.29 At that point, with a hypothetical even division of 
the national vote, the winners of each seat are determined on the basis of 
the district vote adjusted by the uniform-vote-percentage swing. These 
are then aggregated to determine the percentage of seats each party 
would have won at an even vote division. This technique was also used 
to generate estimates of bias in contested districts in elections from 1954 
to 1992 and are reported in appendix B. 
The fourth method further modifies the district-level analysis of the 
hypothetical vote swing by examining the 1992 and 1994 elections to­
gether. Rather than assuming a constant or uniform vote swing in each 
district or simulating a likely vote swing through modeling of district 
characteristics (King and Gelman, 1991; Jackman, 1994), the approach 
interpolates the swing from the actual vote swing between the two elec­
tions. The interpolation is achieved by iteratively examining proportions 
of the actual vote swing from 1992 to 1994. For instance, if the Demo­
cratic vote percentage in one district dropped by 20 percent from the 
1992 to the 1994 election (and increased by an equal amount for Republi­
cans) and dropped by 6 percent in another, half of that actual vote swing 
would amount to a 10 percentage point swing in the first case and a 3 
percent swing in the second district. Proportionate swings are examined 
iteratively until the proportionate swing produces an even division of the 
national vote. The percentage of seats that would have been won with 
this swing is then determined. With the vote evenly split, bias is indicated 
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Table 8.3 
Votes and Seats for the Party Receiving the Majority of the House 
Vote in the 1990, 1992, and 1994 Elections 
All Congressional Districts 
Percentage of 
the Vote Contested Districts 
Percentage Percentage Percentage 
Year Majority Party Unadjusted Adjusted of Seats of Votes of Seats 
1990 Democrats 54.1 53.7 61.5 53.5 62.5 
1992 Democrats 52.6 52.7 59.4 52.7 59.9 
1994 Republicans 53.6 53.8 53.2 51.7 51.3 
Note: Vote percentages are of the two-party vote. Seat percentages divide seats won 
by third-party candidates evenly between the parties. The adjusted vote takes into account an 
estimated vote for the winning party in uncontested districts in which the vote is unreported. 
Some states do not report the vote count for uncontested districts, while others do. The esti­
mated vote in nonreporting districts is the mean vote for that year in uncontested districts in 
states in which the vote is reported. The 1994 vote is the official vote reported in Congressional 
Quarterly Weekly Report (15 April 1994, p. 1090). 
by any deviation from an equal division of seats. The final measure of 
bias in the 1994 is an application of the unwasted-vote measure of bias. 
Unwasted votes are examined for both contested districts and for all 
districts. 
The five measures arrived at substantively the same conclusion: as it 
had over most of the past 60 years, the electoral system in 1994 remained 
significantly biased in favor of the Democrats. Bias estimates ranged from 
just under 3 percent (about 12 seats) to just over 4 percent of seats (or 
about 19 seats) in favor of the Democrats.30 
National Election Results and Bias 
The 1994 election had many political consequences and at least one im­
portant analytical consequence. Prior to 1994, estimates of recent elec­
toral system bias required extrapolation from the string of elections that 
had produced Democratic vote majorities. With 1994, for the first time 
since 1954, we have a case falling on the other side of the even vote divi­
sion and are in a position to make a more certain estimate of bias based 
on interpolation from these elections rather than extrapolation. 
Table 8.3 presents the election results, the two-party seat and vote 
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percentages, for the 1990, 1992, and 1994 elections, for all districts, 
and for contested seats only. In the case of all districts, two vote percent­
ages for each election are presented, the actual reported result and an 
adjusted vote that takes into account a simulated vote in uncontested 
districts that do not report vote totals. Most, but not all, states report 
the election results of uncontested elections. Reported vote totals thus 
underreport the vote for parties carrying these unreporting districts. 
The likely vote in these unreporting districts is simulated as the mean 
reported vote in uncontested seats where the vote was reported.31 
The results of these three elections so clearly demonstrate electoral 
system bias that they almost make a more systematic analysis unnecessary. 
In terms of the national vote, the 1994 election was nearly a mirror image 
of 1990 and 1992- In 1990 and 1992, Democrats won modest vote majori­
ties of 53.7 and 52.9 percent, respectively, of the two-party vote (ad­
justed). In 1994, Republicans won a similarly modest vote majority of 
53.8 percent. However, this is where the similarity ends. The elections 
were not at all similar in the proportion of seats that were won by the 
majority party. The similarity of vote percentages and the contrast of seat 
outcomes makes the electoral system's bias obvious. With their two modest 
vote majorities, Democrats won about 60 percent of the seats. With their equally 
modest vote majority, Republicans won only 53.2 percent of the seats. The bias is 
plain. With nearly equal vote totals, Democrats won 6 to 8 percent more 
House seats. If Republicans had been treated by the electoral system in 
1994 in the same way that Democrats had been treated, Republicans 
would have held between 61 and 62 percent of the House after the 1994 
elections.32 Instead of only 230 members in the Republican majority, a 
majority smaller than any Democratic majority in 40 years, there would 
have been a very formidable Republican majority of between 265 and 
269 members. 
Figure 8.1 graphs the seat and vote election outcomes of the three 
elections and plots the associated linear regression. This further extends 
Tufte's analysis of election triplets discussed in chapter 4. The regression 
estimates fit the three elections perfectly! The seat-vote regression esti­
mates indicate a 4.2 percent pro-Democratic bias to the electoral system. 
If both parties had evenly divided the vote, Democrats would have been 
expected to win 54.2 percent of the seats. The tilt of the electoral system 
can also be seen from another perspective—the share of the vote neces­
sary to change the House majority, the critical vote. In order for Republi­
cans to have won a majority of seats in the House, they would have had to 
have held the Democrats to less than 47.9 percent of the two-party vote. 
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Figure 9-1 
The National Estimate of Electoral System Bias, 1990-1994 
Note: The percentages are of all congressional districts. The vote is the adjusted vote from 
table 8.3. The adjustment takes into account unreported votes in uncontested districts. The 
estimated regression line has an adjusted Rz of 1.00 and a standard error for the equation 
of .105. 
District Election Results and Bias 
A second approach to estimating bias is based on an examination of 
district-level election results. There are five steps in estimating bias 
through this modified hypothetical vote method. First, district vote per­
centages are incrementally adjusted away from the party with the major­
ity vote. In 1994, since the Republicans won a vote majority, Republican 
district vote percentages are incrementally adjusted downward and Dem­
ocratic district vote percentages are adjusted upward by the same 
amount. In 1992, since Democrats won a vote majority in that election, 
vote percentages in each district are subtracted from Democratic candi­
dates and added to Republican candidates. Second, these hypothetical 
vote percentages are then converted to hypothetical district vote totals. 
The adjusted district vote percentages are then multiplied by the total 
district vote to obtain the number of district votes that the parties would 
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have received at the adjusted district vote percentages. Third, these hy­
pothetical votes are then summed for all districts and compared. Further 
adjustments are made until the hypothetical aggregated national vote is 
evenly divided between the parties. Fourth, at this point, when the na­
tional vote would have been evenly split, the winning party in each dis­
trict is determined by using the adjusted or hypothetical district vote 
percentages. Finally, these hypothetical victories are then aggregated na­
tionally to determine the proportion of seats that a party would have 
won with half the national vote. Any deviation from a 50-50 split in seats 
indicates electoral system bias. 
This modified hypothetical vote method of estimating bias is ap­
plied in three ways to assess the electoral system of the 1990s. The first 
two of these use a uniform-vote-percentage swing in generating hypo­
thetical votes for the 1992 and 1994 elections. That is, the same percent­
age swing (toward the minority party and away from the majority party) 
is used in each district. The third application takes advantage of the 
change in the party winning the majority of the congressional vote. 
Rather than using the same vote percentage swing for each district, this 
application uses the information about each district's actual swing from 
1992 to 1994. Proportions of the actual vote-percentage swing in each 
district are incrementally used to generate hypothetical votes until the 
national vote total is evenly split. The seat division based on these hypo­
thetical votes is then calculated. As in the other applications, any de­
viation from a even division of seats at this point indicates electoral 
system bias. 
The three applications of the modified hypothetical vote measure 
examine all congressional districts except the at-large district in Vermont 
won by an independent candidate. In order to examine all remaining 
districts, two modifications to the election returns from 1992 and 1994 
were required. First, because some states do not report vote results in 
uncontested districts, there were no votes in 14 districts in 1992 and 13 
districts in 1994.33 Since votes were cast in these districts for one party's 
candidate, the election results would more accurately reflect voter deci­
sions if we could approximate these unreported votes. These votes were 
simulated using the reported presidential vote in these districts and the 
turnout drop-off from the presidential level to the congressional level 
in the uncontested districts in which the vote was reported.34 Second, a 
simulated vote for the party leaving a seat uncontested was calculated. 
By definition, one party wins 100 percent of the two-party vote in an 
uncontested district and the party failing to make a bid receives no votes. 
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As we discussed in chapter 3 and as Jacobson has argued elsewhere (1993, 
50), this vote division does not accurately gauge voter support for the two 
parties. Even a nominal candidate for the losing party in these districts 
would have attracted some votes. To better gauge voter support, a simu­
lated vote for the party leaving the seat uncontested was calculated.35 
The 1992 Analysis. The uniform-partisan-vote-swing analysis of the 1992 
election essentially asks two questions: (1) what percentage of the vote in 
1992 would Democrats have had to have lost and Republicans gained in 
each congressional district in order for the national vote to be evenly 
divided, and (2) if the Democrats had lost these votes and Republicans 
had gained them, how many seats would each party have won? The an­
swer to this second question amounts to asking whether bias existed in 
1992. With an even division of the vote, a deviation from an even division 
of seats indicates bias in the electoral system. Bias in the 1992 election 
does not necessarily indicate bias in 1994. However, 1992 was the imme­
diately prior election, and both elections are organized by the 1990s 
reapportionment. 
Table 8.4 presents the vote swings necessary to achieve an equal 
division of the vote in each of the three applications, including the 1992 
analysis. The table also presents the seat division that would have resulted 
at this even split of the vote. For 1992, the national two-party vote was 
evenly divided, with about a 2.8 percent swing in each district's vote per­
centage toward the Republicans and away from the Democrats. With this 
vote swing, Democrats would have won 233 seats and Republicans would 
have won only 201 seats. With an even division of the national vote pro­
duced by a uniform swing of the vote across all districts, Democrats would 
have won 53.7 percent of the seats and Republicans would have won 46.3 
percent, indicating a pro-Democratic bias of 3.7 percent of the seats.36 
The 1994 Analysis. In 1994, as table 8.4 indicates, convergence on an even 
division of the national vote was achieved after approximately a 3.0 per­
cent swing of the vote away from the Republicans and toward the Demo­
crats. With this even division of the national vote, Democrats would have 
won 229 seats and Republicans would have won only 205 seats. This 
amounts to a 2.8 percent pro-Democratic bias in the system. If the 1994 
election had been a dead heat, Democrats would have won a seat major­
ity. Moreover, the seat majority that Democrats would have won in a 
dead-heat election would be about as large as the seat majority that Re­
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Table 8.4 
Three District Analyses of Partisan Bias in the 1990s 
Method for Vote Examination and 
the Increment of the District Vote 
Percentage that Produced an Seats Percentage 
Even Partisan Division of the Partisan 
Election National Two-Party House Vote Democrats Republicans Bias 
1992 Uniform Partisan Vote Swing: 233 201 3.7 
+2.82 percentage points in 
each district to Republicans 
and from Democrats 
1994 Uniform Partisan Vote Swing: 229 205 2.8 
+2.95683 percentage points in 
each district to Democrats and 
from Republicans 
1992 and Proportional Partisan Vote Swing: 235 199 4.1 
1994 .48663 of district vote swing 
from 1992 to 1994, subtracted 
from district Democratic vote 
percentage, and added to the 
district's Republican vote 
percentage for 1992 
Note: In each case, the adjusted district vote was multiplied by district turnout to obtain the 
number of votes for each party in a district. These were then aggregated to the national vote. In the 
case of the combined 1992 and 1994 proportional vote-swing estimation, the adjusted percentages 
were multiplied by the district's average turnout for the two election years. 
publicans actually won in 1994 with their very real vote majority of be­
tween 53 and 54 percent of the two-party vote. 
The 1992-1994 Analysis. The uniform-vote-swing assumption in the 1992 
and the 1994 analyses is simple and straightforward; however, it is un­
doubtedly unrealistic. Votes may be nearly fixed in some districts and 
very fluid in others. A vote swing is unlikely to be equal in all districts. In 
fact, although the mean district vote swing from 1992 to 1994 was about 
5.7 percentage points toward the Republicans, many districts varied sig­
nificantly from this average. The standard deviation of the vote swing 
between elections was about 8.4 percent of the vote. While Republicans 
gained ground in more than three-quarters of congressional districts 
178 • CHAPTER 8 
(331 seats), Democrats actually won a higher percentage of votes in about 
a fifth of all districts (86 seats).37 
The assumption of a proportionate swing is more realistic than the 
uniform-vote-swing assumption in simulating the distribution of addi­
tional votes. The realism comes from using the actual district vote swings 
and represents an improvement on the more sophisticated vote simula­
tions (King and Gelman, 1991; Jackman, 1994) as well as the simpler 
uniform-vote-swing simulations. The proportionate-swing method uses 
data from a pair of elections and is particularly applicable when the party 
winning the vote majority changed, as it did from 1992 to 1994, and 
when both elections are reasonably close to the even-vote mark.38 Rather 
than examining uniform-vote-percentage swings from one election to the 
next, it examines proportions of the actual vote swing that occurred be­
tween the elections. Proportions of the swings were iteratively examined 
until the national party votes converge at an equal national vote divi-
sion.39 Table 8.5 demonstrates the major iterations in narrowing in on 
the even national vote division. The parties would have equally shared 
the national vote when each district's vote swing was just short of half of 
its actual swing from 1992 to 1994. At this point, 235 Democrats (54.1 
percent of seats) and 199 Republicans (45.9 percent of seats) would have 
been elected, reflecting a 4.1 percent pro-Democratic bias in the system. 
Again, the electoral system is such that Democrats would have won as 
many or more seats in a dead-heat election than Republicans won with 
almost a 54 percent vote majority.40 
District Turnout and Partisan Bias 
With four different estimates of bias indicating that the electoral system 
continued to work to the Democratic Party's advantage in 1994, we 
should expect that Democrats continued to dominate in the lower-
turnout districts and to receive fewer votes in their typical victory. This 
was indeed the case. Table 8.6 examines the turnout and unwasted-vote 
quintiles of contested districts in 1994, as we previously examined for 
earlier elections. As the table indicates, Democrats won a majority of seats 
only among the very-lowest-turnout districts. Democrats in 1994 won 
four out of five of the lowest-turnout districts. This was typical. The aver­
age success of Democrats in these districts over the previous 40 years was 
79 percent. Democrats and Republicans almost evenly divided the next-
to-the-lowest-turnout quintile. However, districts with average to high 
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Table 8.5 
The Proportionate-Vote-Swing Analysis of the 1992 and 1994 
Elections to the U.S. House of Representatives 
Percentage of Interpolated Election Results 
Actual District 
Vote Swing National Vote Percentage Seats 
from 1992 to 
1994 Democrats Republicans Democrats Republicans 
0 52.8 47.2 258 176 
10 52.2 47.8 257 177 
20 51.6 48.4 252 182 
30 51.1 48.9 246 188 
40 50.5 49.5 240 194 
48.663 50.0 50.0 235 199 
50 49.9 50.1 234 200 
60 49.4 50.7 232 202 
70 48.8 51.2 220 214 
80 48.2 51.8 217 217 
90 47.6 52.4 207 227 
100 47.1 52.9 204 230 
Source: Election return data were obtained from Congressional Quarterly Weekly Re­
ports (1993 and 1995). 
Note: The proportion of the district vote swing necessary to obtain an equal division 
of the national House vote is italicized. This proportionate or interpolated hypothetical vote 
method involves six steps. First, each district's actual vote swing from 1992 to 1994 is calcu­
lated. Second, a proportion of this percentage-point swing is added to the 1992 district vote 
percentage to create a hypothetical vote percentage for each party in each district. Third, 
using each district's mean turnout (in raw votes) for the 1992 and 1994 elections, each dis-
trict's hypothetical vote percentage is converted to hypothetical votes for each party. Fourth, 
these hypothetical votes in each district are summed to determine the national vote percent­
ages for each party at the particular proportion of vote swing. These steps are repeated 
iteratively until the national votes for the two parties converge. At that point, on the basis of 
each district's hypothetical vote percentages, the party that would have won each district at 
that critical vote swing is determined and aggregated. Since the interpolated national vote is 
evenly divided at this point, any deviation of the national partisan seat division from 50 per­
cent indicates electoral system bias. 
turnouts split about 60-40 in favor of Republicans. The pattern of parti­
san success in districts grouped by the number of unwasted votes was 
similar to the turnout pattern. Democrats were most successful in the 
lowest category of districts grouped by the number of votes cast for the 
winning candidate. The parallel logit analyses of the ungrouped districts 
further support the finding that Democrats were more successful in 1994 
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Table 8.6 
The Relationship of the Party of the Winning Candidate to 
District Turnover and Unwasted Votes, 1994 
Association 
between the 
Total District 
Turnout (or 
Percentage of Districts Won Unwasted 
by Democrats in Districts Votes) and the 
Grouped in Quintiles by Election of a 
Turnout and Unwasted Republican 
Votes Representative 
Low High Logit 
District Grouping 1 2 3 4 5 r Derivative 
Total District Turnout in Votes 80 46 40 34 44 .23 .036 
Unwasted Votes 68 57 44 43 32 .25 .063 
Note: Unwasted votes in a district are those cast for the winning candidate in the 
district. 
in districts with lower turnout and with fewer votes cast for the winning 
candidate. 
Tables 8.7 and 8.8 list the cheap and the expensive seats of 1994. At 
one end of the spectrum, in table 8.7, are those contested districts that 
were won in 1994 with fewer than 70,000 votes. There were 32 such 
districts, about 8 percent of all contested seats. Four of these seats were 
won with fewer than 50,000 votes. These are the cheapest seats of 1994, 
and nearly all of them were won by Democrats. Democrats won 30 of the 
32 seats (94 percent) in "the under-70 club." As in past years, in 1994 
Democrats dominated the cheap seats.41 
Although Democrats won the overwhelming number of cheap seats, 
they did not generally win them with an overwhelming proportion of the 
vote. Many of these cheap seats were seriously contested. Twenty-three 
of the 30 cheapest Democratic cheap seats in 1994 were won with less 
than 70 percent of the vote. More than half of these, 16 of the 30, were 
won with less than a 60 percent vote for the winning Democratic 
candidate. 
The cheap seats of 1994 were of several types. The list reflects con­
siderable geographic diversity, comprising 12 different states. There are 
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Table 8.7 
Winning House Candidates in Contested Districts Who 
Received Fewer than 70,000 Votes in 1994 
Democratic Votes for Total Party of 
Vote Winning Votes the Winning 
State District Percentage Candidate Cast Candidate 
California 30 70.1 43,943 66,425 Democrat 
Texas 29 73.4 44,102 60,054 Democrat 
Illinois 4 75.2 46,695 62,079 Democrat 
Texas 16 57.1 49,815 87,224 Democrat 
California 46 39.4 50,126 87,721 Republican 
California 31 59.1 50,541 85,467 Democrat 
California 26 66.0 55,145 88,138 Democrat 
California 20 56.7 57,394 101,230 Democrat 
No. Carolina 12 65.8 57,655 87,588 Democrat 
Indiana 10 53.5 58,573 109,571 Democrat 
California 42 51.1 58,888 115,205 Democrat 
California 50 61.6 59,214 104,451 Democrat 
Texas 20 62.5 60,114 96,149 Democrat 
Texas 15 59.9 61,527 104,366 Democrat 
Texas 5 51.4 61,877 123,616 Democrat 
New York 11 90.4 61,945 69,700 Democrat 
Texas 25 53.7 61,959 118,529 Democrat 
Arizona 2 65.6 62,589 100,446 Democrat 
No. Carolina 7 51.6 62,670 121,519 Democrat 
No. Carolina 8 52.4 62,845 119,985 Democrat 
Florida 3 57.7 63,845 110,740 Democrat 
Kentucky 1 49.0 64,849 127,236 Republican 
Texas 24 52.8 65,019 123,081 Democrat 
Texas 27 59.4 65,325 110,018 Democrat 
Georgia 2 66.2 65,383 98,812 Democrat 
California 35 78.1 65,688 84,078 Democrat 
No. Carolina 1 61.0 66,827 109,429 Democrat 
Kentucky 3 50.2 67,663 152,492 Democrat 
New Jersey 13 73.8 67,688 95,467 Democrat 
Mississippi 2 58.0 68,014 126,692 Democrat 
New York 6 80.4 68,596 85,271 Democrat 
Indiana 1 56.5 68,612 121,532 Democrat 
Districts Won by Democratic Candidates: 30 of 32 (93.8%) 
Source: The data were compiled from the official 1994 election returns in Congres­
sional Quarterly Weekly Report, 15 April 1995,1090-97. 
Table 8.8 
Winning House Candidates in Contested Districts Who 
Received More than 140,000 Votes in 1994 
Democratic Votes for Total Party of 
Vote Winning Votes the Winning 
State District Percentage Candidate Cast Candidate 
South Dakota AL 62.0 183,036 305,922 Democrat 
Minnesota 3 26.4 173,223 236,531 Republican 
Massachusetts 10 68.8 172,753 251,240 Democrat 
Montana AL 53.5 171,372 352,133 Democrat 
Kansas 1 22.6 169,531 219,008 Republican 
Oregon 3 78.9 161,624 222,822 Democrat 
Oregon 4 66.8 158,981 238,149 Democrat 
New York 22 26.6 157,717 214,781 Republican 
Alabama 6 20.9 155,047 196,222 Republican 
Nebraska 3 21.3 154,919 196,862 Republican 
Missouri 2 31.3 154,882 230,287 Republican 
Michigan 11 30.9 154,696 226,792 Republican 
Minnesota 8 65.7 153,161 233,271 Democrat 
New York 27 25.5 152,610 204,770 Republican 
California 47 25.8 152,413 212,623 Republican 
Texas 6 22.6 152,038 201,012 Republican 
Ohio 2 22.6 150,128 193,858 Republican 
Arizona 5 29.8 149,514 220,771 Republican 
Ohio 17 77.4 149,004 192,491 Democrat 
Washington 7 75.1 148,353 197,444 Democrat 
New York 21 68.3 147,804 220,674 Democrat 
Florida 19 66.1 147,591 223,370 Democrat 
Massachusetts 9 69.8 146,287 209,656 Democrat 
Massachusetts 7 64.4 146,246 226,920 Democrat 
Michigan 2 24.0 146,164 192,153 Republican 
Arizona 3 29.9 145,396 207,335 Republican 
Colorado 3 30.4 145,365 208,792 Republican 
Michigan 4 25.8 145,176 198,517 Republican 
California 4 36.3 144,936 236,323 Republican 
Idaho 2 25.0 143,593 191,529 Republican 
Maryland 8 29.7 143,449 204,109 Republican 
California 48 23.3 143,275 195,241 Republican 
Virginia 1 24.0 142,930 192,468 Republican 
Nevada 2 31.5 142,202 223,932 Republican 
Massachusetts 5 69.9 140,725 201,459 Democrat 
Washington 8 23.9 140,409 184,574 Republican 
Missouri 6 66.1 140,108 211,817 Democrat 
Districts Won by Democratic Candidates: 14 of 37 (37.8%) 
Source: The data were compiled from the official 1994 election returns in Congres­
sional Quarterly Weekly Report, 15 April 1995,1090-97. 
Note: AL indicates a statewide at-large district. 
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also some concentrations. Seventeen of the cheapest seats were in south­
ern or border states. Eight of these were in Texas and four were in North 
Carolina. Many of the very-cheap-seat districts were majority-minority 
districts, either Hispanic or African American. Of the 32 districts listed in 
table 8.7, 12 were majority Hispanic and 6 were majority African Ameri­
can. Several of these very cheap seats (the Twelfth District in North Caro­
lina and the Third District in Florida) were highly controversial, 
geographically noncompact, racially gerrymandered majority-minority 
districts, districts drawn over extensive areas in order to increase the like­
lihood of electing African American candidates. In addition to the south­
ern districts, another 8 of the 32 cheapest seats were urban California 
districts. 
At the other end of the spectrum are districts won with at least twice 
as many votes as 1994's under-70 club. Table 8.8 lists the 37 seats won 
with at least 140,000 votes cast for the winning candidate in the election, 
the over-140 club.42 Republicans won most of these high-turnout, high-
unwasted-vote districts. They did not, however, dominate in the same 
way that Democrats dominated at the low end. Democrats won 14 of 
the 37 most vote-expensive seats, a distinct, but not inconsequential, 
minority. 
California's Thirty-first District 
A good example of a cheap seat in the 1990s is the Thirty-first District in 
California. It ranked sixth from the bottom of contested districts in terms 
of the number of votes cast for the winning candidate in 1994. Fewer 
than 51,000 voters, about 59 percent of district voters, elected Matthew 
Martinez, returning the Democratic incumbent to Washington for a sev­
enth term. Total district turnout was also low. Fewer than 86,000 votes 
were cast in the district in 1994. The district was in the lowest quintile of 
both turnout and the number of votes for the winning candidate in both 
1992 and 1994. Locate'd in East Los Angeles County and the surrounding 
communities of the San Gabriel Valley, the district's ethnic composition is 
nearly 60 percent Hispanic and about a quarter Asian (Duncan, 1993, 
195). Economically, it has been described as a middle-income area. 
Prior to electing Martinez in a special election in 1982, the district 
had been represented by George Danielson, also a Democrat. Danielson 
was first elected in 1970 (the district was then the Thirtieth) and won 
reelection for six terms, before accepting a judgeship. Prior to Daniel­
son, the district (then the Twenty-ninth) was represented by George 
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Brown. Brown, also a Democrat, was elected in 1962 and was reelected 
to four terms before deciding to make a run for the Democratic Senate 
nomination. 
Although the Thirty-first is unquestionably a cheap seat and has 
elected Democrats consistently since at least 1962, it has not been con­
ceded to Democrats by Republicans. Republicans have contested the dis­
trict in each election for the past 30 years. The challenges have also been 
more than nominal. Although Democrats have won at least the last 18 
elections in a row (since 1962), they have never won more than 75 per­
cent of the vote and often have been held under 60 percent. The current 
Democratic incumbent has won four of his seven terms with under 60 
percent of the vote.43 
The district's representatives over the years have been decidedly left 
of center. The current incumbent typically has ADA ratings of between 
80 and 95 percent and his AFL-CIO ratings have been consistently over 
90 percent, and frequently 100 percent, in favor of organized labor's po­
sitions. His ACU ratings (a conservatism index) are usually in the single 
digits. 
Unwasted Votes and Bias 
As a consequence of Democratic cheap seats in 1994 and Republican suc­
cess in moderate- to high-turnout districts, the typical winning Democrat 
received far fewer votes than did the typical winning Republican. Table 
8.9 presents the unwasted-vote measure of partisan bias for the 382 seats 
that were contested in 1994. Republicans winning contested districts in 
1994 received, on average, about 12,800 more votes than did Democratic 
winners. This is about 13 percent more votes than winning Democrats 
typically received. If unwasted votes were equally divided and rates of 
unwasted votes per victory remained unchanged, with 98,392 unwasted 
votes for a Democrat securing that candidate's election, Democrats would 
have won about 204 (53.3 percent) of the 382 contested seats. This re­
flects a pro-Democratic bias of 3.3 percent of contested seats. As should 
be expected, given the inverse relationship of the Democratic vote and 
pro-Democratic bias of the electoral system, the extent of bias in 1994 
was greater than usual. Of the 12 elections from 1970 to 1992, electoral 
system bias favored Democrats only once (1980) by as much as it did in 
1994 (see table 5.9). Electoral system bias in 1994 was at least a third 
greater than it was in 11 of the 12 previous elections. 
Although the unwasted-vote analysis concurs with the aggregate na­
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Table 8.9 
Partisan Bias and Unwasted Votes in Contested Districts, 1994 
Contested Districts in 1994 
Mean Total Number 
Party of Winning Number of Unwasted of Unwasted 
Candidate Candidates Votes Votes 
Republicans 195 111,209 21,685,800 
Democrats 187 98,392 18,399,300 
All Winners 382 104,935 40,085,000
Partisan Bias Calculations: 
Half of the Unwasted Votes Converted 40,085,000/2 == 20,042,500
pared 20,042,500/98,392 = 203.7to Seats at the Democratic Rate Com  
to Half the Contested Seats (203.7/382) - 50 = 3.32% 
Pro-Democratic Partisan Bias +3.32% of contested seats 
(or 12.7 seats) 
Note: Calculations are based on the official vote counts in Congressional Quarterly Weekly Re­
port, 15 April 1995, pp. 1090-97. The mean partisan bias for elections from 1954 to 1992 was 2.4% of 
contested seats, and from 1964 to 1992 it was 2.0% (table 5.9). 
tional estimate and the three district-level hypothetical vote estimates, it 
only examined contested districts, and the other estimates had consid­
ered all districts. Table 8.10 extends the unwasted-vote analysis of 1994 
to all districts (except one held by an independent). The district votes 
examined were adjusted in the same two ways that they had been ad­
justed for the district hypothetical vote analysis—adjustments for unre­
ported votes in some uncontested districts and for the underestimation 
of support for a party leaving a seat uncontested. The results of the 
unwasted-vote analysis for all districts also find that Democrats have paid 
a lower price in votes for their victories. The average winning Democrat 
received about 16,100 fewer votes than did the average winning Republi­
can. If Democrats and Republicans had evenly divided unwasted votes in 
1994 and won districts at their same rates of unwasted votes per victory, 
Democrats would have won 236 seats, about 54.4 percent. This indicates 
a pro-Democratic electoral system bias of 4.4 percent of seats. 
All five estimates of partisan bias in 1994 indicate a significant pro-
Democratic tilt to the electoral system. Estimates of the systematic pro-
Democratic bias in the electoral system ranged from 2.8 to 4.4 percent. 
In terms of seats, the five bias estimates of 1992 and 1994 indicate that at 
an even division of the vote, Democrats would have won between 229 and 236 seats 
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Table 8.10 
Partisan Bias and Unwasted Votes in All Districts, 1994 
All Districts in 1994 
Mean Total Number 
Party of Winning Number of Unwasted of Unwasted 
Candidate Candidates Votes Votes 
Republicans 230 114,070 26,236,100 
Democrats 204 97,953 19,982,500 
All Winners 434 106,495 46,218,700 
Partisan Bias Calculations: 
Half of the Unwasted Votes Converted 46,218,700/2 = 23,093,500 
to Seats at the Democratic 23,093,500/97,953 = 235.92 
Rate Compared to Half the Seats (235.92/434) - 50 = 4.36% 
Pro-Democratic Partisan Bias +4.36% of all seats 
(or 18.9 seats) 
Note: Calculations are based on the official vote counts in Congressional Quarterly Weekly Re­
port, 15 April 1995, 1090-97. The data also include the simulated vote (based on drop-off from the 
1992 presidential vote) for uncontested districts that did not report the vote and simulated votes for 
parties leaving seats uncontested. This simulation was based on Jacobson's (1993, 50) estimates of 
the vote change a party received once it put forth a candidate and also when it failed to put forth 
a candidate. 
rather than the 217 seats that we would expect from a neutral system.^ All five 
estimates, using three different approaches, are impressively consistent, 
covering a range of only seven seats. All five estimates also indicate that 
the pro-Democratic bias in 1994 was greater than usual and that the sys­
tem deviated by at least 12, and perhaps as many as 19, seats from neu­
trality. In light of the various assumptions made in each of the different 
estimations and the closeness of a number of House races in 1994, this 
range of bias estimates is impressively narrow. 
Moreover, several other estimates of bias lend even more support 
to the finding that electoral system bias has favored Democrats by about 
4 percent of House seats. First, recall that the time-series estimates of 
bias, using the party's share of the national vote in table 4.6, indicated a 
pro-Democratic bias of just over 3.6 percent of seats. Second, Tufte's anal­
ysis of election triplets estimated bias at about 3.8 percent of seats (table 
4.2). Finally, the unwasted-vote estimates of the extent of pro-Democratic 
bias when the vote was evenly divided in elections over the past 40 years 
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(table 6.3) also concurs with these findings. They placed bias at between 
3.6 percent and 4.1 percent of all seats.45 
The electoral system bias that had helped maintain the Democratic 
majority for 40 years, though evident once again in 1994, was insufficient 
to preserve that majority in the 1994 election. It nevertheless played an 
important role in shaping the election results. Had there been no bias in 
1994, Republicans would have won between 242 and 249 seats in the 
House rather than the 230 that they actually won. Conversely, rather 
than holding 204 seats in the minority, a system without bias would have 
reduced the Democratic minority to between 185 and 192 seats. Taking 
the midpoint of 1994 bias estimates, a pro-Democratic bias of 15 seats, 
the Republican seat majority would have been more than twice as large 
had the electoral system been neutral. The actual election results left Re­
publicans with 230 seats, a 13-seat majority. An unbiased system would 
have elected about 245 Republicans, a 28-seat majority. While Republi­
cans had a majority in either case, 15 more Republicans and 15 fewer 
Democrats might have made a difference on many important House 
votes. 
• Overview • 
With the possible exception of Newt Gingrich, the results of the 1994 
election took everyone by surprise. The biggest surprise was that voters 
ended the 40-year reign of the Democratic majority in the House by 
electing a Republican majority. The end of the Democratic majority, a 
majority not seriously threatened for several decades, was understand­
ably surprising. Democrats lost their majority in the House because they 
lost their vote majority and there are many indications that this change 
was the maturation or completion of a gradual Republican realignment. 
Less noticed, though equally surprising to those believing in the 
neutrality of the electoral system, was the small size of the Republican 
seat majority. While it is in one sense impressive that the Republicans 
were able to elect a majority, the Republican majority of 230 seats (later 
added to by Democratic party-switchers) was smaller than any Demo­
cratic majority in the previous four decades. More interesting, the Re­
publican majority was not small because voters provided them with a 
narrow vote majority. The Republican vote majority was no narrower 
than the Democratic majority in the two previous elections. The Republi­
can seat majority was small because of bias in the electoral system. In past 
elections, electoral system bias inflated the Democratic majority. Matters 
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were only slightly different in 1994. In 1994, the electoral system inflated 
the Democratic minority. As they had for most of the past 60 years, Demo­
crats won the cheap seats in 1994. They paid a lower price in votes for 
their victories than Republicans paid, and the result was a closer seat 
division of the House than would have been the case with a neutral trans­
lation of the 1994 votes into seats. There would have been 12 to 19 seats 
more in the Republican majority and 12 to 19 fewer seats in the Demo­
cratic minority if the electoral system had been unbiased. 
Although certainly not widely recognized, the 1994 election came 
close to creating a democratic crisis. Political commentators frequently 
raise the undemocratic specter of one presidential candidate winning a 
popular-vote majority and the other candidate winning an Electoral Col­
lege majority. The 1994 elections nearly produced a similar crisis for the 
House. If Democrats had received only 1.7 percent more of the 1994 
vote, bringing their share of the two-party vote to 47.9 percent, the po­
tential undemocratic consequences of electoral system bias would have 
been realized. With only a 47.9 percent minority share of the vote, Demo­
crats would have won a majority of seats. Even with a majority of the two-
party congressional vote and over 4 percent more of the vote than the 
Democrats nationally, Republicans would have been left once again in the 
House minority. The strength of the Republican tide in 1994 averted this 
situation. The Democratic vote was held shy of the critical 47.9 percent. 
However, the electoral system remains in place and with it the possibility 
that the Democrats could regain control of the House without winning a 
majority of the vote. 
9
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Representation and

Cheap Seats

Ahe evidence is overwhelming: the electoral system for the U.S. House 
of Representatives is biased in favor of the Democratic Party. With only a 
few exceptions, the electoral system has been biased in favor of the Demo­
crats over the 40-year-long reign of the Democratic dynasty in the House. 
As the preceding analysis demonstrated, the electoral system has favored 
Democrats in 28 of the 30 congressional elections between 1936 and 
1994. The best estimates indicate that bias has amounted to about 3.5 to 
4 percent of all seats, or a swing from one party to the other of anywhere 
from 13 to 18 seats.1 That is, at an even division of the vote, Democrats 
would continue to hold control of the House with anywhere from 230 to 
236 seats. 
The reason for this bias is clear: many Democratic representatives 
sit in the cheap seats. These seats are cheap primarily because of their 
low turnout (rather than especially narrow victory margins). Democratic 
success in these cheap seats is based on a steady constellation of politics, 
economics, geography, and electoral districting arrangements. The rela­
tion of sodoeconomic status to turnout, vote choice, and housing patterns 
is at the root of the matter. Less-educated citizens are the least likely to 
vote, and, through several party systems, poorer citizens (who also tend 
to be the less educated) who vote are more likely to vote for Democrats. 
Since housing patterns reflect household incomes and congressional dis­
tricts reflect these concentrations of citizens of similar socioeconomic 
backgrounds, the districts that tend to have low turnout also tend to elect 
Democrats. The pattern was the same whether examining the predomi­
nantly working-class, poor white Protestant rural "Fighting Ninth" Dis­
trict in the Appalachian corner of Virginia in the 1940s (chapter 7), the 
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set of four ethnically, religiously, and racially diverse urban districts in 
the Queens borough of New York City in the 1980s (chapter 5), or the 
predominantly Hispanic, urban Thirty-first District in the East Los 
Angeles area of California in 1994 (chapter 8). In many respects, these 
were very different districts. Yet they also had important things in com­
mon. Many residents of these districts were poor or working class. Turn­
out in these districts was usually very low, and the candidates who won 
these districts did so with relatively few votes. In each case, the winning 
candidate was a Democrat. 
• Consequences • 
This chapter explores the consequences of the bias created by Democratic 
dominance of the cheap seats. One of its principal consequences is that it 
helped to prolong Democratic control of the House. Bias alone may have 
provided the difference between the parties in one election during this 
era, the 1956 election in which Democrats maintained control of the 
House despite Eisenhower's reelection (table 5.10). In conjunction with 
the Democratic Party's incumbency and uncontested-seat advantages, 
bias also may have been critical to preserving the Democratic House ma­
jority in the 1966 and 1980 elections. Table 3.5 in chapter 3 indicated 
that the Democratic vote majority probably would have evaporated with­
out their incumbency and uncontested-seat advantages in these two elec­
tions. However, as the analysis of chapter 8 indicated, because of electoral 
system bias, Democrats could maintain their seat majority so long as their 
national vote did not fall below approximately 48 percent. Without their 
candidate advantages in 1966 and 1980, Democrats probably would have 
lost their vote majorities (receiving 49.2 and 49.7 percent, respectively) 
but would have preserved large enough of a vote minority to keep their 
seat majority—because of the electoral system bias in their favor.2 
Although the Democrats' electoral system advantage was only occa­
sionally necessary to the maintenance of the Democratic dynasty in the 
House, it contributed more routinely to the inflation of the Democratic 
majority. The analysis reported in chapter 5 indicates that, in the typical 
election over the last 40 years, about 8 to 10 additional Democrats were 
elected, and an equal number of Republicans were denied election, be­
cause of electoral system bias.3 This is a considerable impact. Moreover, 
though the extent of bias varied from one election to the next, with one 
exception, bias was in the Democratic direction. 
Even if usually falling short of determining control of the House, 
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bias certainly buttressed the Democrats' control, and this must have af­
fected relations between the parties. For Democrats it meant security in 
their firmly ensconced majority. For some Democrats, this sense of secu­
rity may have developed into a feeling of heady invincibility, perhaps 
arrogance. For Republicans, the consistently augmented Democratic ma­
jority meant frustration. An arrogant majority and a frustrated minority 
are not likely to work very well together, and many believe that they did 
not. Democrats may have felt little reason to accommodate a Republican 
minority, and Republicans may have found their bargaining position too 
weak to bother with compromise. Beyond these strategic or psychological 
effects, the pro-Democratic bias in the House electoral system, when com­
bined with the neutral or pro-Republican electoral systems for the Senate 
(Oppenheimer, 1989; Oppenheimer and Sandstrum, 1995) and the pres­
idential Electoral College, probably increased the frequency of divided 
government in modern American politics.4 In several ways, then, the bias 
of the House electoral system may have had a hand in the governmental 
pathologies known as partisan gridlock. 
The consistent electoral system bias favoring Democrats and the ba­
sis for this bias in the turnout disparities among congressional districts 
may have had wide-ranging consequences beyond helping to preserve 
the Democratic House majority and fueling partisan gridlock. The exis­
tence of cheap seats dominated by one party and the bias that it produces 
raise several issues of representation. The issues of representation are at 
four levels of aggregation: the representation of the public as a whole, the 
representation of constituencies at the district level, the representation of 
groups in the process, and the representation of individual voters. 
There are several questions relating to how well the House as a 
whole has represented the views and perspectives of the American public. 
Has bias in the electoral system skewed the ideological perspective of the 
House? Has bias in the electoral system and its effect of dampening the 
apparent swing ratio of elections (thereby blunting the amount of elec­
toral change that would be produced by a swing of votes) caused voters 
to become more frustrated with the political process and skeptical of its 
fairness? At a second level, how have cheap seats affected the representa­
tion of constituencies? Has it caused overrepresentation of those voters 
who happen to live in low-turnout districts, or has it amounted to a 
system of proxy voting in which the whole public, nonvoters as well as 
voters, are represented? At a third level, have cheap seats caused the 
overrepresentation of some groups in society? Would the elimination of 
cheap seats disadvantage economically underprivileged groups in society, 
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including racial minorities? Finally, at the individual level, the existence 
of cheap seats raises questions about the equality of political representa­
tion. Can a system that permits turnout disparities on the order of seven 
to one, seven voters in one district for every one voter in another, be said 
to be a politically equitable system? Can an institution whose membership 
is based on such political inequities rightfully call itself the "House of the 
People"? In addition to addressing these issues of representation, we will 
also explore several possible reforms that would eliminate or at least 
greatly reduce the number of cheap seats and their effects. 
• Representing the Electorate • 
The consequences of cheap seats extend beyond partisanship to policy 
and possibly to the public's attitudes toward politics and its support for 
the government. By affecting who serves in government, it affects what 
policies the government adopts, and, because cheap seats skew the politi­
cal process from the general viewpoint of the public, public sentiment 
may be less supportive than it might otherwise be. 
Ideology and Public Policy 
The policy consequences of cheap seats are directly related to its partisan 
consequences.5 By adding to the number of Democrats and subtracting 
from the number of Republicans in the House, cheap seats, and the elec­
toral bias they created, have tilted the House to the left. Since Democrats 
as a rule are more liberal than Republicans, adding Democrats to the 
House adds liberals, and this makes a difference to the kinds of public 
policies that are able to win congressional approval. 
The ideological tilt of the cheap seats is examined following two 
elections, 1984 and 1990. As in the earlier analysis, the contested districts 
in these two election years are grouped into quintiles by both the total 
number of votes cast in the election and the number of votes cast for the 
winning candidate (the unwasted votes). Unlike the earlier analysis, 
which reported the percentage of Democrats winning in each quintile, 
table 9.1 reports the median liberalism score of representatives elected 
from districts in particular quintiles. The liberalism score is based on the 
ratings of the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA), a liberal interest 
group, and the American Conservative Union (ACU), a conservative in­
terest group. Both ratings evaluate representatives' roll-call voting on 
about 19 or 20 votes in a session. The scores are the percentage of votes 
supporting the liberal (ADA) or conservative (ACU) position. ACU scores 
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Table 9.1 
Ideological Bias of the Electoral System, 1984 and 1990 
Median Liberalism 
Rating of 
Representatives in 
Contested Districts Association between the Total 
Grouped in Quintiles by District Turnout (or Unwasted 
District Turnout and Votes) and the Liberalism 
Unwasted Votes Rating of the Representative 
Low High 
1 2 3 4 5 r Slope (Standard Error) 
Total District Turnout 
in Votes: 
Post-1984 Election 68 62 28 48 52 - .1 5 - .1  4 (.05) 
Post-1990 Election 85 56 50 41 40 - .2  4 - .20 (.04) 
District Unwasted 
Votes: 
Post-1984 Election 62 69 48 50 28 - .1 6 - .20 (.07) 
Post-1990 Election 78 61 50 40 53 - .1 6 - .21 (.07) 
Note: N = 362 in 1984, and N = 345 in 1990. The unwasted votes in a district are 
votes cast for the winning candidate in the district. The ratings of representatives who filled 
vacancies occurring after the 1984 and 1990 elections were excluded. The liberalism rating 
has a hypothetical range from 0 (most conservative) to 100 (most liberal). The index in 1990 
is based on the ADA and the ACU ratings of congressional roll-call votes in 1991. The value 
is obtained by adding the ADA index to 100 minus the ACU index of conservatism and divid­
ing by 2. Subtracting the ACU index from 100 has the effect of converting the conservatism 
index to a liberalism index, which can then be averaged with the ADA index. The post-1984 
ratings are based on roll-call votes cast in 1986. The post-1990 ratings are based on roll-call 
votes cast in 1991. The ADA and ACU ratings are those reported in the Congressional Quar-
terly's CQ Almanac for 1987 and 1992, respectively. The slope is an OLS estimate of the 
effects of turnout or votes for the winning candidate (in thousands of votes) on the liberalism 
rating of representatives. 
have been reversed, by subtracting them from 100, to make them compa­
rable to the ADA liberalism score. The liberalism index is calculated as 
the average of a representative's ADA score and the reversed ACU score 
and, thus, ranges from 0 (most conservative) to 100 (most liberal). The 
session examined in 1984 was 1986, the second year of the two-year term 
for those elected in 1984. The session examined for 1990 was 1991, the 
first year of the two-year term for those elected in 1990. 
As table 9.1 indicates, the representatives from the cheap seats, as a 
group, are more liberal than those elected from higher-turnout districts. 
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The representatives from the lowest-turnout districts in 1984 had a me­
dian liberalism rating of 68 percent, slightly higher than those from the 
second quintile and much higher than those with average or high turn­
outs. In terms of unwasted votes, the typical cheap-seat representative in 
1984 had a voting record slightly less liberal than those in the second 
quintile, but was much more liberal than members from higher-turnout 
districts. The results in 1990 show even greater differences. The median 
liberalism score of representatives from the lowest-turnout districts in 
1990 was 85 percent, nearly 30 percentage points more liberal than the 
median score in any of the higher-turnout quintiles. The ungrouped cor­
relations and the regressions of the liberalism index also indicate that 
representatives for the lower-turnout and lower-unwasted-vote districts 
tend to be more conservative. The regression coefficients indicate that a 
25,000-vote difference in the number of votes cast for the winning candi­
date (about one standard deviation) produces about a five-point differ­
ence on the liberalism index.6 
Although one might suspect that Democrats who sit in the cheap 
seats are more liberal than Democrats from high-turnout areas, there is 
little evidence of this. For instance, in the 1990 analysis, the median liber­
alism score among Democrats in the bottom-turnout quintile was the 
same as in the highest-turnout quintile; both had a very liberal median 
score of 87.5 percent. There was also no relationship between turnout or 
unwasted votes and liberalism among Democrats in the 1984 analysis. 
The Democrats who sit in the cheap seats are no more or less liberal than 
those from higher-turnout areas, but they are definitely more liberal than 
typical Republican members. Thus, because cheap seats add Democrats 
to the House and because Democrats typically are more liberal in their 
roll-call voting (and those from the cheap seats are certainly no less liberal 
than Democrats generally), cheap seats have produced a more liberal 
House of Representatives than would have been elected under a neutral 
electoral system. 
Behind the ideological ratings are real roll-call votes that decide 
public policy issues, or at least what the House of Representatives has to 
say about these issues. The difference in ideological ratings caused by 
electoral system bias, thus, has real policy consequences. The full extent 
of these consequences is difficult to pin down, however, because we are 
dealing with counterfactuals and the legislative process can sometimes 
take alternate routes to the same result. With a different partisan and 
ideological mix, different coalitions become possible, different deals and 
compromises become feasible, and the votes of different legislators be­
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come critical. Where once party leaders not needing a vote might "free" 
the representative to vote with his or her constituency and please the 
folks back home, a closer vote might cause party leaders to call for greater 
party loyalty. 
Recent Congresses have had many examples of razor-thin margins 
on roll-call votes. A few may illustrate the impact of electoral system bias.7 
One example was the Democratic tax bill of 1992 (H.R. 4210) sponsored 
by then-chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, Democrat 
Dan Rostenkowski. The bill raised taxes on upper-income taxpayers by 
creating a new and higher tax bracket and adding a 10 percent surtax on 
millionaires. The revenues raised by these additional taxes would be used 
to fund a small and temporary tax credit for middle-class taxpayers (a 
$400 tax credit for couples and a $200 tax credit for individual filers). In 
addition, the bill contained various economic-stimulus provisions, includ­
ing the indexing of capital gains. The fight over this legislation was very 
partisan. Democrats claimed it offered much-needed tax relief for the 
middle class. Republicans claimed it was just another Democratic "soak-
the-rich" scheme. The vote on H.R. 4210 was identified by Congressional 
Quarterly as one of 16 "key votes" of 1992. The bill passed the House by 
a vote of 221 to 210. A six-vote swing would have shifted the majority of 
those voting. The bill passed on the strength of its Democratic Party sup­
port. Of the 265 Democrats voting, 219 (83 percent) voted for passage, 
and only 46 (17 percent) opposed it. Republicans were nearly unanimous 
in their opposition to the bill. Only 1 of the 165 Republicans voting voted 
with the Democrats for passage. Although in the end President Bush ve­
toed the bill, the House had expressed its will. 
What would have happened if the electoral system in 1990 had not 
been biased in favor of the Democrats? As we calculated in chapter 5, the 
electoral system was biased by nine seats in favor of Democrats in 1990. 
Assuming that the nine Democrats serving because of system bias voted 
like Democrats generally (a split of about 7.5 in favor to 1.5 opposed) and 
that the Republicans who would have been elected had there been no 
bias voted like other Republicans (virtually unanimous in opposition), the 
expected vote on H.R. 4210 would have been about 213 or 214 in favor 
to about 217 or 218 against.8 This vote would have defeated the bill. 
A similar bill a year later offers another case of an important vote in 
which electoral system bias may have been decisive. This was the 1993 
Budget Reconciliation Bill, H.R. 2264. The bill initially voted on in the 
House was proposed to reduce the budget deficit through a varied mix 
of tax increases and spending cuts or freezes. On the revenue side, there 
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was a tax-rate increase on higher-income taxpayers (including Social Se­
curity benefits), a federal energy tax, an increased corporate income tax 
rate, and revenues that would be generated by auctioning off the public 
radio spectrum.9 The bill also included several provisions that reduced 
revenue, principally through preferences for lower-income taxpayers 
and incentives for economic growth.10 On the spending side, savings were 
made in Medicare spending and in a large number of discretionary pro-
grams.11 The bill was controversial on many fronts, not the least of which 
was the energy tax. With an all-out lobbying effort from the White House 
and promises of changes during Senate consideration, the bill narrowly 
passed the House in late May by a vote of 219 to 213. The vote was parti­
san. Democrats divided 218 in favor to 38 against. Not a single Repub­
lican voted for the bill (0 to 175). The president won a narrow victory, 
one that he might not have won if the partisan composition of the House 
had been even slightly more Republican. A different version of the bill 
narrowly passed the Senate a month later, also without a single Republi­
can vote.12 
The conference report version of the bill was voted on in early Au­
gust. In most respects the bill out of conference was similar to that origi­
nally passed by the House in May. The most important difference was the 
energy tax provision. Instead of a broad-based energy tax, the bill pro­
vided for an increased federal gasoline tax at the pump. Democrats de­
fended the bill on the grounds of deficit reduction and fairness, claiming 
that upper-income taxpayers would bear most of the burden. Republi­
cans attacked the bill for raising taxes, which would slow economic 
growth, hitting the middle class with the increased gas tax, and failing to 
make significant spending cuts in domestic programs. They also attacked 
the retroactive provision of the income-tax increases as unfair. Lobbying, 
on both sides, was every bit as intense as on the initial vote and the final 
votes, in both the House and Senate, were even closer. 
The conference report on H.R. 2264 passed the House by a single 
vote, 218 to 216.13 As close as this appears, this one-vote margin actually 
understates how close this vote was. Congressional Quarterly described 
the scene of the vote: 
As the 15-minute nominal limit on the vote expired, the count was tied at 
210-210. For several more moments, the tally seesawed back and forth, 
with Democrats winning one moment and losing the next. Finally all atten­
tion centered on freshman Marjorie Margolies-Mezvinsky, D-Pa., who had 
announced to the largely Republican constituents in her suburban Phila­
delphia district that she would oppose the plan, just as she had the first 
time in May. 
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But leaders told her they would lose without her, and, with the 
terror-struck demeanor of someone being marched to her own hanging, 
she walked into the well of the House and signed one of the green cards 
required to register a yes vote after time had expired and the electronic 
voting apparatus has been shut off. (Hager and Cloud, 1993, 2127) 
This vote was as partisan as the first. Democrats divided 217 in favor 
(including Representative Margolies-Mezvinsky) and 41 against. The one 
independent in the House (Representative Sanders of Vermont) voted, 
as he usually does, with the majority of Democrats. Republicans were 
again unanimous in their opposition, all 175 voted against the bill. The 
bill went on to the Senate, where a positive vote from Vice President Gore 
was required to break the 50-50 tie vote. President Clinton later signed 
the bill into law and, a year and half later, Marjorie Margolies-Mezvinsky 
lost her reelection bid. 
How would H.R. 2264 have fared in an unbiased electoral system? 
In the 1992 elections, the extra mileage that Democrats got out of their 
cheap seats amounted to about five extra Democrats and five fewer Re­
publicans. Without these extra Democratic votes in the House and with 
these additional Republicans, the prospects of the 1993 Reconciliation 
bill passing, at least in the form that it passed and without the hunting 
down and arm-twisting of other reluctant but persuadable Margolies-
Mezvinskys, would be remote.14 The bias of the electoral system made 
the difference.15 
Bias probably affected the outcome of these and other especially 
close and partisan votes, but most votes are neither so close nor so parti­
san. Yet, whether or not bias determined the outcome of particular pieces 
of legislation, it most certainly affected legislation. Making sizable shifts 
in the partisan composition of the House, as bias did, cannot help but 
change coalition-building strategies, agendas, and the nature of compro-
mises—the substance of legislation. Changing the party balance in the 
House changes who needs to be won over for passage or defeat of a bill. 
It changes who holds leverage in the House and what they can exact as 
concessions for their votes. At the margins, at the very least, partisan bias 
shifted legislation to the left, and removing it would have moved policy 
in a more conservative direction. 
Civic Attitudes 
Partisan bias in the electoral system may also have affected public opinion 
generally regarding the political system and more specifically regarding 
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Congress. Although we can only speculate, partisan bias may have had a 
hand in the decline of civic attitudes over the past 40 years, even if only 
indirectly through its bolstering of the long-tenured Democratic major-
ity.16 Among the most important of those civic attitudes suffering a decline 
were feelings of external political efficacy, the sense that the political sys­
tem is open to citizen influence. In addition, feelings of support for and 
approval of the political system and its institutions, a sense that those in 
the system can be trusted to do what is right much of the time, may have 
indirectly suffered because of electoral system bias.17 
Public support for Congress, while fluctuating from the 1950s 
through to the 1990s, generally declined over this period (Keene and 
Ladd, 1992; Patterson and Magleby, 1992). In reviewing two different 
survey measures of public esteem for Congress from 1963 to 1985, Pat­
terson and Caldeira (1990) found that favorable ratings of congressional 
performance (indicating Congress was doing an "excellent" or "pretty 
good" job) dropped from the mid-40 percent range in the 1960s to the 
high-20 percent to mid-30 percent range in the 1970s and 1980s.18 Pat­
terson and Caldeira observed a similar decline in the numbers expressing 
confidence "in the people running Congress." In the 1960s, roughly 40 
percent declared great confidence in Congress. In the 1970s and 1980s, 
this number had dropped into the mid-teens. By 1992, Congress was 
held in such low repute that only 18 percent of Americans indicated that 
they approved of the way Congress was doing its job.19 
Partisan bias in the electoral system may have indirectly contributed 
to the decline in public support for Congress in five different ways. First, 
by reducing the responsiveness of the electoral system and tilting con­
gressional politics to the left, partisan bias may have contributed to de­
clining sense of political efficacy. Because of bias, the voting public was 
represented by a Congress more Democratic and more liberal than what 
it voted for.20 In addition, because electoral system bias has increased with 
the Democratic vote, the system seemed unresponsive to changes in the 
public's vote. Democrats won large seat majorities when they received 
large vote majorities but also, because of their domination of the cheap 
seats, Democrats still won fairly large seat majorities when their vote ma­
jorities were modest or even narrow. Variation in support for Democrats 
did not seem to matter much. They won sizable House majorities regard­
less. Thus, by both adding to the distortion between votes and seats and 
muting partisan change in the House, electoral system bias may have 
eroded feelings among the public that they exercised control of the gov­
ernment through the electoral process.21 Since political efficacy has been 
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shown to be the most important factor affecting individual evaluations of 
Congress (Patterson et al, 1992, 328-29), if bias in the electoral system 
depressed feelings of political efficacy, it may also account indirectly for 
the public's less supportive evaluations of Congress. 
Second, by expanding and securing the Democratic House majority 
to the point that it seemed unassailable, bias in the system may have con­
tributed to a partisan backlash against Congress. Because of the long ten­
ure of the Democratic majority in the House, Congress as an institution 
may have been considered by some as tantamount to an arm of the Dem­
ocratic Party. Democrats may not have had an objection to this and felt 
that the system was working well. However, among Republicans and per­
haps some independents, this meant diminished support for Congress as 
a political institution. Where they would normally support institutions of 
the government, they felt less friendly to an arm of the opposition party. 
As one might expect in this regard, even after controlling for a variety of 
factors affecting public support for Congress, Republicans have been less 
supportive of Congress than Democrats (Patterson et aL, 1992).22 
Third, by increasing the political independence of the Democratic 
majority in the House and by increasing the likelihood of divided govern­
ment, electoral system bias may have increased conflict between the presi­
dent and Congress and, thereby, lowered public esteem for Congress. 
The public finds political gridlock and partisan bickering in government 
distasteful and this may well be reflected in their evaluations of Congress. 
This is consistent with Patterson and Caldeira's (1992) finding that there 
is "some tendency for public esteem for Congress to be higher when the 
president and Congress are in the hands of the same party and congres­
sional support for the president is high" (38). 
Aside from normal partisan posturing, the role of divided govern­
ment and an emboldened Democratic majority in the politicization of 
ethical and policy disputes may have cost Congress as an institution some 
support. Although we can only speculate about the extent of the relation­
ship, a large and entrenched Democratic majority may have seen partisan 
advantage in emphasizing presidential scandals and interpreting policy 
differences as scandals (e.g., Watergate and Iran-Contra). Congress as an 
institution may have suffered in the eyes of those seeing the Democratic 
majority as using congressional powers for narrow partisan political gain. 
Finally, although we can only speculate, by enlarging and securing 
the Democratic majority in the House, bias in the electoral system 
may have established a context conducive to congressional scandals 
and, thereby, indirectly caused the public to think less of Congress. A 
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seemingly permanent congressional majority may have been more prone 
to scandals. Security in power breeds arrogance and carelessness. Again, 
we may only speculate, but one is left wondering whether the entire his­
tory of congressional scandals in recent decades (Abscam, Speaker Jim 
Wright's book deal, the House check-bouncing scandal, and several other 
individual indiscretions) would have occurred if the Democratic majority 
had been less firmly entrenched. Certainly these scandals did nothing to 
add to the reputation of Congress among the public. 
• Representing the District • 
How well does the electoral system represent the constituencies of con­
gressional districts? In particular, are constituencies in cheap-seat districts 
well represented? Because actual district turnout is rarely, if ever, com­
plete, the question of whether decisions made by voters represent the 
broader constituency (including nonvoters) is a question for all districts. 
The voting fraction of any district decides who represents the entire con­
stituency. But as that active fraction shrinks, as it does in very-low-
turnout, cheap-seat districts, the potential for misrepresentation rises. 
One defense of the equal-population, single-member-district system 
is that it represents the interests of all residents of a district—regardless 
of whether they vote, are registered to vote, pay taxes, are old enough to 
vote, or are even citizens. The argument is that the Constitution and, 
more generally, democratic principles require that all people, not just 
voters, should be accorded representation. Cheap seats may not be prob­
lematic from this perspective. They may not be a problem if the views of 
the voters in these districts also reflect the views of the nonvoters. If they 
do, election results would be unchanged if everyone voted. To take this 
argument further, cheap seats may not only be a nonproblem but may be 
a remedy to the misrepresentation that would result if only voters were 
represented without organizing them into districts. By allowing voters in 
low-turnout areas to speak for (and effectively vote on behalf of) their 
nonvoting neighbors, the views of these nonvoters weigh into the election 
results. Since it is important to the stability and legitimacy of the system 
to represent everyone, the districting system compensates for the failure 
of many to participate in the electoral process. Because of single-member 
districts and the similarities of district residents, the views of nonvoters 
can be counted even though they do not officially register those views at 
the ballot box. 
But are the votes of the few representative of the preferences and 
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interests of the many nonvoters? Put differently, is the cheap-seats system 
effectively a system of proxy voting, where actual voters reflect the con­
cerns of their neighboring nonvoters, or is it misrepresentative, in which 
district lines arbitrarily magnify the independent voting strength of some 
voters and dilute the voting strength of others (those living in high-
turnout areas)? 
The answer to these questions turns on an important counterfactual 
that has long been a matter of dispute: if the nonvoters voted, how would 
they vote?23 Since most nonvoters never vote in any election, how they 
would vote if they were to vote is a matter that we can only speculate 
about. Nevertheless, two possibilities seem plausible: (1) a district's non­
voters might vote like the district's voters or (2) alternatively, nonvoters 
nationally might vote like voters do nationally.24 Because one party cur­
rently does appreciably better in the low-turnout districts in a system of 
equally populated districts, both possibilities cannot be true. The arith­
metic does not add up.25 If nonvoters were to vote like their voting neigh­
bors, the national vote would become more Democratic because these 
nonvoters would come disproportionately from the now-low-turnout 
Democratic strongholds and, assuming that they voted like their neigh­
bors now vote, they would add significantly to the Democratic column. 
If, on the other hand, the national vote did not change as a result of 
getting nonvoters to turn out, then the new voters in the once-cheap seats 
would have to be less Democratic than their neighbors who now vote. 
The two scenarios can also be cast in terms of the two measures of 
the congressional vote: the mean district percentage and the nationally 
aggregated percentage. If nonvoters were to turn out and vote like the 
voters in their districts, the national Democratic vote percentage would 
rise to the party's mean district percentage. Returning to figure 4.3, this 
means that, if everyone voted and the previous nonvoters voted like their 
voting neighbors did, the Democratic national congressional vote would 
typically have increased by about 3 percentage points and, in some elec­
tions (since 1954), by as much as 7.5 percentage points. It is worth observ­
ing that Democrats would gain no seats with these additional votes, 
because each party's vote share in a district would be unchanged under 
this scenario. Democratic vote totals would rise nationally because many 
of their additional votes are located in the formerly cheap-seat districts 
already carried by Democrats. However, whereas they won these districts 
on the cheap under incomplete turnout, they now win them by paying 
roughly the same price in votes per victory as Republicans. It is also worth 
noting that while this scenario is favorable to the Democrats, the increase 
202 a CHAPTER 9 
in the Democratic vote that would result from nonvoters voting like their 
districts is well short of what is usually imagined by hopeful Democrats 
expecting nonvoters to be a large reservoir of would-be Democratic vot­
ers. On the other hand, if everyone voted and those previously not voting 
voted for the parties in the same proportions as voters did nationally, 
the mean district vote for Democrats would decline to their national vote 
percentage. This would typically amount to a decline of about three per­
centage points in the mean district vote but would entail a decline of 
more than six percentage points in several elections.26 In short, with com­
plete turnout, the two measures of the congressional vote would converge 
under either view of the current nonvoter. Under the first view of the 
nonvoter, the national vote moves or converges on the mean district vote 
and, under the second view, the mean district vote converges on the na­
tional vote percentage. 
The conventional view is that nonvoters would vote like their voting 
neighbors and that Democrats would benefit from increased turnout. 
This supposition is based on the socioeconomic and demographic similar­
ities of nonvoters and Democrats. Both groups are more likely to be 
working class or poor. Both groups are likely to be racial or ethnic minori­
ties. Accordingly, it is assumed that because of these similarities, if nonvot­
ers voted that they would disproportionately vote for Democrats. If so, 
there is reason to believe that the nonvoting neighbors in low-turnout 
districts would vote very much like the few who now vote. The current 
system is then not a system of misrepresentation but a system that 
amounts to proxy voting. If the nonvoters voted accordingly, the Demo­
cratic vote would increase but their seat holdings would not, because their 
cheap seats would no longer be cheap. 
If, on the other hand, nonvoters were similar to voters nationally in 
their preferences, the proxy-voting interpretation of electoral system bias 
breaks down. While nonvoters and voters in a district often share socio­
economic similarities, they are politically distinct. There is good reason 
to suppose that nonvoters of lower socioeconomic backgrounds are less 
Democratically inclined than voters of a similar status and, to whatever 
degree Democratic, probably less dependable in their partisan inclina­
tion. There is a good deal of research sustaining this view. A number of 
studies suggest that the nonvoters nationally are similar to voters in their 
issue positions, partisanship, or vote preferences (Verba and Nie, 1972; 
Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980; Leighley and Nagler, 1992; Teixeira, 
1992a, 1992b; Calvert and Gilchrist, 1993; Verba et al , 1993; and Erik­
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son, 1995).27 Related research also indicates that nonvoters are less politi­
cally anchored, more open to the short-term influences of the particular 
campaign and less dependably partisan for either party (Campbell, 1960; 
DeNardo, 1980, 1986; and Petrocik, 1981). These views of the nonvoter 
are consistent with the analysis indicating that bias was not smaller when 
turnout increased (which would have been expected if high-turnout elec­
torates were composed of additional peripheral Democratic voters) and 
that the Democratic House vote (1936 to 1992) was unrelated to national 
turnout rates over those years (chapter 6). 
The reason that adding nonvoters to the electorate may not add to 
the Democratic vote is that nonvoters as a rule are politically less inter­
ested, more volatile, and more easily swayed by the particular conditions 
surrounding specific campaigns. Thus, if previous nonvoters voted like 
voters nationally, district vote percentages would be shifted toward the 
national vote. In many cases, the vote in previously cheap seats would 
become significantly less Democratic than they had been when turnout 
was low. However, given that a majority of the national vote cast was Dem­
ocratic in elections up to 1994, if nonvoters were to divide their votes 
similarly, district votes would not tip previously Democratic seats to the 
Republicans. Democrats would continue to carry even their cheap-seat 
districts.28 Only the additional volatility of the preferences of these new 
voters might have helped Republicans carry a few of the marginal, for­
merly cheap seats. 
Ironically, where the mobilization of nonvoters might have made 
the biggest difference to election outcomes was in 1994. If nonvoters had 
voted and had cast their votes in the same proportions for the parties as 
national voters did, Republican seat gains might have been even greater 
than they were. A simulation of the impact of adding nonvoters to the 32 
cheapest seats in 1994, those in the under-70 club (table 8.6), indicates 
that Republicans might have gained as many as 18 of these seats if the 
newly added voters divided their votes as national voters had (53.8 per­
cent Republican to 46.2 percent Democratic).29 Many of these districts 
were marginal Democratic victories at their low turnout levels. At com­
plete turnout, and with the assumption that the nonvoters would have 
tilted toward Republicans as voters did nationally, Republicans would 
have narrowly won these districts. Of course, there is uncertainty regard­
ing the votes of these newly added voters and perhaps they would not 
have tilted as much toward the Republicans as those actually casting bal­
lots in 1994 did, but, even if Republicans had carried half or even a third 
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of these seats, the turnout of nonvoters might have made a significant 
difference in 1994, a difference unexpected by the conventional wisdom. 
Although there is a good deal of evidence that nonvoters are not 
dependably Democratic voters (even the district-similarity scenario would 
only shift the vote a few percentage points) or politically like the voters 
in their districts, there is no way of knowing with much certainty how 
nonvoters would vote if they were mobilized. As with any counterfactual, 
the implications of perfect turnout cannot be properly considered in iso­
lation. If everyone voted, many things would change. Candidates and 
parties might stake out different positions. Campaign resources might be 
differently distributed. Everything would be thrown up in the air, and no 
one knows how that would affect the voters' decisions. Even district lines 
would undoubtedly be altered under full turnout. It is, therefore, impos­
sible to say to what extent the Democratic bias in the electoral system 
amounts to proxy voting, allowing for the representation of many for 
nonvoting Democrats in low-turnout districts, or to what extent this bias 
amounts to the misrepresentation of the nonvoters. The only way to 
know with much certainty which party would benefit from nonvoters vo­
ting is if they actually voted. However, based on the two likely scenarios 
of how they might vote (like district or like national voters) and with the 
exception of the 1994 election, whatever misrepresentation might be cre­
ated by turnout differences among districts would generally appear to 
be small. 
In the final analysis, we know only two things with certainty. First, 
we know that the electoral system is an advantage for Democrats. Even if 
bias in the electoral system amounts only to an informal system of proxy 
voting (with voters in low-turnout districts wielding the influence of their 
like-minded but nonvoting neighbors), it is a major advantage for the 
Democrats to win seats in the House without having to get their support­
ers to the polls. If all of the nonvoters voted, and voted Democratic 
enough to preserve current Democratic seats, there would be no bias 
from cheap seats or turnout differentials. But the facts are they do not 
vote and we do not know how they would have voted if they had (this is 
why we hold elections), and Democrats hold on to the seats anyway. Be­
cause of the single-member-district system, the impact of a party's no-
shows is confined to the district, and, if they win the district anyway, the 
failure of would-be Democratic voters to turn out costs the party nothing 
in congressional representation. Second, dealing quite strictly with the 
reality of votes as cast and seats as decided, not with the "what ifs" of what 
might have happened if everyone voted or if somehow the system were 
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able to tap the will of silent nonvoters, the electoral system has been con­
sistently and substantially biased in favor of the Democrats. 
• Racial Politics and Representation • 
Any discussion of the fair representation of voters in American politics 
must address the representation of racial groups. Many aspects of the 
American electoral system throughout history have been shaped by and 
have affected racial politics. The electoral system has been used at differ­
ent times both to exclude and to empower African Americans. Perhaps 
no one in recent times has drawn as much public attention and contro­
versy to the racial issues of electoral systems as Lani Guinier. 
In her book The Tyranny of the Majority, Guinier issued a stinging 
indictment of the American political system in general and the principle 
of majority rule in particular. She argues that the American electoral sys­
tem, based on its use of the majority-rule principle, unfairly dilutes the 
full due representation of minorities. She argues that a more democratic 
system would afford minorities their fair share of representation and 
power in the political process. While her argument applies to the treat­
ment of any permanent political minority, it is particularly pertinent 
to racial minorities.30 Guinier argues that the single-member-district, 
winner-take-all electoral system facilitates white dominance, a tyranny of 
an unrestrained and permanent white majority. She finds geographically 
determined single-member districts to be an arbitrary way to organize 
votes into seats and one that dilutes the impact of minority interests. Ac­
cording to Guinier, the bottom line of feeding the racial divisions of 
American politics into the single-member-district, plurality- or majority-
rule system is that "blacks may vote, but it is whites who will govern" 
(1994, 22).31 
Although insightful on several matters, there is much to criticize in 
Guinier's argument. Her reading of Madison, from whom she takes the 
warning of the potential for majority tyranny and whom she counts as 
an ally, ignores his equal concern for the tyranny of minorities and his 
dedication to broadly popular government. Her interpretation of the 
American constitutional order as majoritarian overlooks the many 
impediments to majority rule.32 Her perspective of American political di­
visions as exclusively racial, with a politically homogeneous white major­
ity oppressing a politically homogeneous African American minority, is 
both simplistic and extreme. As reactions to the O. J. Simpson murder 
trial verdict painfully reminded us, racial divisions are unquestionably 
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important in American life, political and otherwise. However, there are 
many other important, cross-cutting divisions as well. Among others, the 
nation confronts economic class, gender, regional, religious, and a variety 
of ideological divisions. For instance, though both Senator Ted Kennedy 
and House Speaker Newt Gingrich are of the same racial background, 
Kennedy has much more in common politically with Senator Carol 
Mosely-Braun from Illinois, who is African American, than with Gingrich. 
Moreover, although African Americans are a permanent racial minority, 
until 1994 they had been an important part of an entrenched political 
majority for six decades. 
Guinier's remedy for what she perceives as the system's shortcom­
ings is every bit as extreme as her perspective on the nation's political 
divisions. She rejects the theory of "black electoral success," the effort to 
get more African Americans elected to office through the advantageous 
drawing of district boundaries and the creation of "majority-minority dis­
tricts" (districts with a population majority of racial minority voters), as 
being inadequate to assure political power over public policy formation. 
By the same logic, she would presumably also reject the proportional 
representation of African Americans, since that would also leave them in 
a minority position within a majority-rule system. Instead, Guinier advo­
cates a form of power sharing under "the principle of taking turns," a 
principle that would lead to public policy careening from left to right and 
back again—an unwise, unworkable, and fundamentally undemocratic 
government. 
While there is much to take issue with, Guinier's assertions regard­
ing the plurality-rule, single-member-district electoral system are most 
important to this study.33 Guinier claims that the majority- (or plurality-) 
rule, single-member district is in principle unfair to minorities and causes 
them to be underrepresented. In this, she parts company with the con­
ventional view. The conventional criticism of the single-member-district, 
plurality-rule system is that it is not unfair to racial minorities in principle 
but that it has been abused in practice. It has been used against minorities 
historically, but there is nothing inherent in the single-member-district 
system that caused this. The people who controlled the electoral system 
chose to use it as a tool of discrimination. Through racial gerrymander­
ing, the impact of the votes of racial minorities had been diluted. The 
impact of African American votes was minimized in the drawing of dis­
tricts, either by packing those voters into a few districts so they would 
only influence a few elections or by spreading the votes among several 
districts so they would be inconsequential. 
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With the Voting Rights Act of 1965, its subsequent renewals, and 
related judicial rulings, reformers have sought to rectify the past discrimi­
nation of electoral systems (Ball et aL, 1984; Parker, 1990; Grofman et al, 
1992). As in all areas of racial discrimination, there is disagreement about 
what a fair system would entail. Some would argue for a race-blind sys­
tem, treating racial minorities like all other minorities. Others argue for 
greater affirmative action, requiring that districts be drawn to maximize 
the prospects of electing candidates who are from racial minority groups. 
This view promotes the creation of as many racial majority-minority 
districts as possible, even at the expense of geographic compactness 
(allowing district lines to encompass scattered areas of a state in order 
to build a majority of minority voters). In their "preclearance" of state 
redistrictings, the Justice Department in the 1980s and early 1990s ap­
parently adopted this so-called max-black policy. The Supreme Court, on 
the other hand, through its rulings in the cases of Shaw v. Reno and Miller 
v.Johnson, took a more moderate position.34 
Whether one accepts a race-neutral or an affirmative-action view of 
electoral system reform or something in between, it is generally accepted 
that the single-member-district, plurality-rule electoral system can be 
made fair to minorities. Guinier, however, is not part of this consensus. 
From her perspective, the effort to make the plurality-rule, single-
member district fair to minorities amounts to tinkering with a fundamen­
tally flawed system. Reformers might succeed in making the system less 
unfair than it was, but they cannot elevate it to her standard of political 
justice. 
There is an element of truth to Guinier's charge against the plurality ­
rule aspect of the electoral system, but her charge is fundamentally wrong 
with respect to the single-member-district aspect of the system. As to plural­
ity rule, on the one hand, she is correct in asserting the familiar charge 
that the plurality-rule system underrepresents minorities of all sorts, in­
cluding racial minorities. However, the equally familiar defense of plural­
ity rule is that its magnification of majorities allows for more stable and 
effective government, a benefit thought to outweigh the underrepresen­
tation of minorities. Moreover, as Guinier acknowledges, her complaints 
on behalf of African Americans are not constrained to racial minorities. 
They could have been made with equal force for Republicans or for any 
minority from right-wing to left-wing extremists. Thus, as well as under-
representing African Americans, the plurality-rule system may disadvan­
tage views anathema to those of a majority of African Americans. In 
addition, from another perspective, the plurality-rule system may be seen 
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to have worked to the advantage of African Americans. Although a racial 
minority, African Americans have also been an important part of the 
Democratic Party's political majority, a majority that benefited from the 
magnifying effects of the plurality-rule system. 
While Guinier is only partly right regarding the impact of the 
plurality-rule system on African American interests, her assertions as they 
apply to single-member districts are outright wrong. African Americans, 
like any minority (including Republicans until 1994), are underrepre­
sented by the plurality-rule system compared to proportional representa­
tion but are not underrepresented as a result of districting arrangements. 
Quite to the contrary, the single-member-district system, which permits 
the existence of cheap seats and the overrepresentation of its voters, sig­
nificantly augments the representation of African Americans. While most 
cheap seats are not majority-minority districts, most majority-minority districts are 
cheap seats. In 1994, 17 (63 percent) of the 27 contested majority-minority 
districts were in the lowest-turnout quintile.35 A large majority of districts 
with significant, though less than majority, African American populations 
were also in the lowest two quintiles of turnout.36 The proportion of a 
district's population made up of African Americans was strongly and neg­
atively associated with district turnout (in terms of actual votes). Every 
percentage point of a district's black population reduced expected turn­
out in 1994 by about a thousand votes. Rather than causing the under-
representation of African Americans, the single-member-district system 
contains and effectively eliminates the otherwise harmful effects of very 
low voter turnout in the African American community. 
Although cheap seats are advantageous to African Americans from 
the standpoint of congressional representation, quite to the contrary 
of Guinier's assertions, they may also have other unanticipated con­
sequences for the system. While African Americans may benefit in con­
gressional representation and while African American congressional 
candidates may benefit from cheap seats, voter turnout of African Ameri­
cans may suffer because of it and African American influence on political 
contests above the congressional level may be diminished. In low-turnout 
African American districts won safely by Democratic congressional candi­
dates, there is little incentive for local Democrats to mobilize higher turn­
out. In fact, they have an incentive not to "rock the boat" and jeopardize 
their safe election. Who pays the price? Those below and those above. 
Potential voters are not mobilized and brought into the system, and Dem­
ocratic candidates further up the ticket are denied these votes. From a 
self-interest standpoint, a Democratic congressional candidate is probably 
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indifferent to winning an election with a high margin of few voters or a 
high margin of many voters.37 Either way, he or she wins with a healthy 
vote percentage. But it makes a difference to voters and to candidates 
running for higher office. A Senate or presidential candidate would much 
rather win a high percentage in a heavy-turnout district than a higher 
percentage of a light-turnout district, because district boundaries are ir­
relevant to their election. They need votes, period. 
Thus, although cheap seats benefit African Americans at the con­
gressional level and accord African American voters a disproportionate 
amount of influence, they may effectively discourage other African 
Americans from turning out and diminish both their influence on con­
tests for higher offices and the chances of Democrats winning these "top-
of-the-ticket" races. 
• The Equal Representation of Voters • 
Ultimately, the existence and effects of cheap seats raise questions of po­
litical justice and equality. In the past chapters, we have been concerned 
with the just and equitable treatment of the political parties by the elec­
toral system. The systematically different treatment of parties with the 
same number of votes raises serious concerns about the fairness of the 
political process. The organization of votes in such a way that Democrats 
win a greater number of seats than Republicans would have with an iden­
tical number of votes is from most perspectives inequitable. 
The inequity of the electoral system in its treatment of the parties, 
while of great importance for public policy and the legitimacy of the sys­
tem, is not the only inequity produced by cheap seats. The huge turnout 
differences among congressional districts raise questions regarding the 
equitable treatment of individual voters. In determining who shall be sent 
to Congress, is it fair and equitable that a voter in one district has twice 
the say of a voter in another district? Is it fair that a voter in one district 
has three or four or five times "the say" as a voter in another district? 
These are not hypothetical ratios. They are evident in every congres­
sional election.38 
The Supreme Court in its rulings over the last several decades has 
gone to great lengths to ensure that congressional districts drawn within 
states are of equal population. Even fairly minute differences are not tol­
erated (e.g., Kirkpatrick v. Preisler). States can no longer draw districts with 
slightly different populations out of respect for community or local gov­
ernmental boundaries. For example, following the 1990 census and the 
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reapportionment of districts to the states, California was allocated 52 
House seats. By the 1992 election, the district boundaries were in place. 
The range of population size across these 52 districts (as measured by the 
1990 U.S. Census) was from 573,684 to 570,874, a difference of only 
2,810 residents. The largest district was less than a half of one percentage 
point larger than the smallest district in the state. 
The rationale for requiring states to draw districts of as nearly equal 
population size as possible is the notion of political equality as embodied 
in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution (Wesberry v. Sanders). 
Equal protection of the law requires that citizens have an equal opportu­
nity to determine who represents them in Congress. This was the basis of 
the Court's principle of one person, one vote. If districts were of unequal 
size, a voter in an underpopulated district would have much more influ­
ence than a voter in an overpopulated district. This violated the equitable 
treatment of individuals before the government. As the Court put it, 
"as nearly as practicable, one man's vote in a congressional election is 
to be worth as much as another's" (Congressional Quarterly, 1985, 695). 
In their efforts to protect political equality in this regard, the Court has 
rejected redistricting plans that deviated by as little as "3.1 percent 
from perfectly equal population districts" (Congressional Quarterly, 
1985, 695). 
Although the Court's interpretation of the equal protection clause 
of the Constitution would prohibit malapportionment of districts, politi­
cal equality is not the only constitutional provision that comes into play 
on the question of malapportionment. The Court is constrained by other 
explicit constitutional provisions. In Senate elections, for example, 
the explicit constitutional requirement of equal representation of the 
states in the Senate (and later the Seventeenth Amendment requiring the 
popular election of U.S. Senators) entails malapportionment. Voters 
in smaller states are accorded greater influence than voters in larger 
states. Similarly, the Electoral College provision for the election of 
the president, because it awards Electoral College votes to the states and 
does not do so in strict proportion to the state's population, allows for 
malapportionment. 
There are two constitutional provisions that prevent the Court from 
entirely preventing malapportionment, the strict adherence to the prin­
ciple of one person, one vote, in House elections. First, the Constitution 
assigns congressional representation to the separate states according to 
each state's population, with the additional provision that each state be 
allocated at least one member of the House. The total number of repre­
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sentatives to be divided to the states is set by law, and, although the 435 
number set in 1911 is arbitrary, some limit is a practical requirement of 
a representative system. The constitutional provision assigning represen­
tatives to the states along with the statutory limitation on the number 
of representatives makes some malapportionment probable. Unless the 
population of the states divides perfectly evenly by the number of repre­
sentatives, some states will be rounded up to an additional representative 
and other states will be rounded down.39 Those rounded up will have a 
smaller ratio of seats to population than those rounded down. In the 
reapportionment of the 1990s, for instance, Montana had one member 
to represent a population of 799,065 and Idaho had two members to 
represent a population of 1,006,749, an average district population of 
503,375 or almost 300,000 fewer than represented by the representative 
of Montana. Just because of the "lumpiness" inherent in representation 
(you cannot assign a fraction of a representative to a state), there is some 
malapportionment in the system. In the 1990s, following this example, 
this "lumpiness" provided greater representation to the resident of Idaho 
and less representation to the resident of Montana. 
The second constitutional provision that allows malapportionment 
in congressional representation is the infrequency of reapportionment. 
The Constitution requires reapportionment of districts based on state 
population as measured by the decennial census. A decade between redis­
tricting permits large population disparities to emerge, especially in a 
growing and mobile nation. Between the 1980 and 1990 Censuses, for 
instance, the nation's population grew by almost 10 percent (Duncan, 
1991, 9). However, the population in some districts grew much more than 
this, while other districts actually lost population. At the extremes, 
through the 1980s, the Thirty-seventh District of California grew by 86 
percent, while the Thirteenth District of Michigan declined by 23 per­
cent. Although they started the decade with nearly the same population 
(about 520,000), by 1990 there were nearly a million residents of the 
Thirty-seventh District in California and only about 400,000 in the Thir­
teenth District of Michigan (Duncan, 1991, 8). Whether or not voters in 
these two districts were political equals at the beginning of the decade, by 
the end of the decade, they certainly were not. With population shifts 
between reapportionments, the districts became malapportioned. 
Aside from the malapportionment that might result from represen­
tatives being awarded in a "lumpy" way to the states and population shifts 
that might occur over the course of a decade, the Court has expressed 
a zero-tolerance for malapportionment. It appears to be the Court's 
212 • CHAPTER 9 
assumption that equally populated districts, at least within a state and 
at the time of the redistricting, provides political equality or the equal 
protection of the laws for the congressional voters of the state. This is an 
erroneous assumption. 
Consider again the case of California's redistricting in the 1990s. 
From the standpoint of population equality, the districts are remarkably 
equal and, one might presume, as the Court apparently does, that this 
ensures the political equality of voters. It does so in only the most formal­
istic sense. In political reality, voters in California's congressional districts 
are very unequal. A California voter in one district may have almost six 
times the say in choosing a representative as a California voter in another 
district. In the Thirty-third District of California in 1992, a district in Los 
Angeles, a mere 50,779 voters elected a member to Congress. In that 
same election, 291,634 voters elected a member of the House from the 
Sixth District of California, in suburban San Francisco. Both seats were 
contested. This is a difference of over 240,000 voters. Despite the fact 
that the districts were equally populated, there were nearly six voters in 
the Sixth District for every one voter in the Thirty-third. In terms of 
political equality, to paraphrase the Court, what is politically important is 
whether one voter's vote is worth as much as another's, not how many 
bystanders are nearby. A voter in the Sixth District was one voice hidden 
among nearly three hundred thousand, while a voter in the Thirty-third 
District was one voice in a much smaller crowd, surrounded by a lot of 
nonvoting bystanders. 
The contrast of the Sixth and Thirty-third Districts in California in 
1992, though extreme, is not unique. District disparities are enormous 
even when looking at groups of districts. Turnout in each of the seven 
lowest-turnout districts in California in 1992 (each contested) was less 
than half the turnout of any of the seven highest-turnout districts in the 
state. A voter in the low-turnout district had more than twice the say of a 
voter in a high-turnout district. This is not political equality. 
An examination of contested-district turnout disparities in other 
states yields similar results. Table 9.2 presents the 1992 turnout for the 
highest- and lowest-turnout districts and the ratio between them for each 
state. The turnout ratios are calculated for all states having at least two 
congressional districts. For example, the ratio of 1.42 in Alabama indi­
cates that there were 1.42 voters in the state's high-turnout district for 
every one voter in its low-turnout district. Turnout in the 1992 election 
is examined because it is the first election following a redistricting and 
any malapportionment due to population shifts between reapportion­
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Table 9.2 
Effective Malapportionment in Congressional Districts in the States, 1992 
Number of Number of Ratio of Voters 
Voters in the Voters in the in Highest- to 
Number of Highest- Lowest- Lowest-
Contested Turnout Turnout Turnout 
State Districts District District Districts 
Alabama 7 280,018 197,545 1.42:1 
Alaska 1 239,116 — — 
Arizona 6 264,066 137,373 1.92:1 
Arkansas 4 249,399 208,924 1.19:1 
California 49 291,634 50,779 5.74:1 
Colorado 6 271,361 227,531 1.19:1 
Connecticut 6 247,520 219,606 1.13:1 
Delaware 1 276,124 — — 
Florida 20 281,259 143,905 1.95:1 
Georgia 11 274,957 150,382 1.83:1 
Hawaii 2 180,955 177,476 1.02:1 
Idaho 2 242,790 229,957 1.06:1 
Illinois 20 274,088 116,606 2.35:1 
Indiana 10 258,451 183,831 1.41:1 
Iowa 4 267,863 257,175 1.04:1 
Kansas 4 292,796 268,806 1.09:1 
Kentucky 6 280,755 206,578 1.36:1 
Louisiana 1 243,580 — — 
Maine 2 358,148 311,372 1.15:1 
Maryland 8 280,419 178,993 1.57:1 
Massachusetts 9 311,620 247,163 1.26:1 
Michigan 15 293,078 184,957 1.58:1 
Minnesota 8 314,010 264,282 1.19:1 
Mississippi 5 204,616 174,609 1.17:1 
Missouri 9 312,442 233,175 1.34:1 
Montana 1 403,735 — — 
Nebraska 3 239,002 233,340 1.02:1 
Nevada 2 270,461 221,488 1.22:1 
New Hampshire 2 255,853 255,083 1.00:1 
New Jersey 13 274,371 145,714 1.88:1 
New Mexico 3 205,214 168,170 1.22:1 
New York 30 265,278 73,067 3.63:1 
North Carolina 12 265,060 163,101 1.63:1 
North Dakota 1 291,554 — — 
Ohio 17 263,071 223,624 1.18:1 
Oklahoma 6 230,816 198,802 1.16:1 
Oregon 5 294,154 269,879 1.09:1 
Pennsylvania 17 307,700 185,591 1.66:1 
continued 
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Table 9.2 (continued) 
Effective Malapportionment in Congressional Districts in the States, 1992 
Number of Number of Ratio of Voters 
Voters in the Voters in the in Highest- to 
Number of Highest- Lowest- Lowest-
Contested Turnout Turnout Turnout 
State Districts District District Districts 
Rhode Island 2 204,413 194,089 1.05:1 
South Carolina 5 198,347 183,086 1.08:1 
South Dakota 1 332,902 — — 
Tennessee 8 216,530 154,504 1.40:1 
Texas 25 264,653 98,673 2.68:1 
Utah 3 252,969 229,061 1.10:1 
Vermont 1 279,113 — — 
Virginia 11 298,642 168,473 1.77:1 
Washington 9 283,950 209,584 1.35:1 
West Virginia 2 203,090 186,291 1.09:1 
Wisconsin 9 292,797 234,176 1.25:1 
Wyoming 1 196,977 — — 
Nation 405 403,735 50,779 7.95:1 
Note:The vote is the total vote cast for any congressional candidate running in 1992. 
Vermont is included here, even though it was won by an independent candidate and has 
been excluded from other portions of the analysis. In 1992, both major parties ran candidates 
in Vermont. 
ments will be minimal.40 The ratio of turnout in the highest to lowest 
districts is the maximum amount of effective malapportionment in the 
state—effective malapportionment meaning the unequal number of vot­
ers from one district to another rather than conventional or nominal mal-
apportionment that refers to unequal numbers of residents in different 
districts, whether they vote or not or even whether they could legally vote 
or not. 
Although nominal malapportionment within states may have been 
effectively outlawed by judicial rulings, table 9.2 indicates that effective 
malapportionment is rampant. The equal rights of residents may have 
been protected through one-person, one-vote rulings, but the equal 
rights of voters have not been. As we have already observed, within a 
state, the Court objects to interdistrict population differences of even a 
few percentage points. However, interdistrict turnout differences are 
commonly in excess of 25 percent and regularly in excess of 50 percent. 
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Put differently, within a single state and immediately following the adop­
tion of a redistricting plan, it is common for a voter in one district to have 
one and a half times as much input into his or her representative as a 
voter from another part of the same state in the same election year. 
Effective rnalapportionment is greatest where there is the most op­
portunity for it, in the large states. In the five largest states, California, 
New York, Texas, Illinois and Florida, turnout differences were consis­
tently at or above the two-to-one ratio. That is, voters in at least one dis­
trict of these states outnumbered voters in at least one other district of 
the same state by a margin of at least two to one. In California, depending 
on where you lived and on which side of a district line you were on, you 
could have been one voter in nearly 300,000 voters to elect a representa­
tive or one voter in about 50,000 voters. In New York, depending again 
on where precisely you lived in the state in relation to district boundaries, 
you could either have been one in over a quarter of a million voters to 
elect a House member or one in about 75,000 voters. 
The empirical facts are clear. First, while congressional districts 
within the same state at the outset of a reapportionment are at least equal 
in population, they are often very unequal in the number of voters. Vot­
ers in some congressional districts are part of a relatively small number 
to decide who will represent their district in the House. Voters in other 
congressional districts are part of a much larger number to decide who 
will represent them. Second, the inequalities in the sizes of active elector­
ates are not temporary matters. It would be one thing if turnout were 
low in one district in one election and high in the next. While this might 
be the basis of inequality in the treatment of voters in any particular elec­
tion, there might be greater equity over time. This is not the case. Cheap 
seats in one election are very likely to be cheap seats in the next. As the 
analysis in chapter 5 and appendix C indicates, district turnout in one 
election is very strongly and positively correlated with turnout in the next 
election. District turnout was strongly correlated, for example, between 
the 1992 and 1994 elections (r = .86, for the adjusted vote in all districts, 
and r = .88, for districts contested in both years). 
The normative implications of these facts are not so clear. What does 
the principle of political equality for citizens require of an electoral sys­
tem? The Courts have determined that, baring constitutional provisions 
to the contrary, political equality requires congressional districts at least 
to be equally populated at the time of their formation. A district with 
many fewer potential voters than another district accords a greater op­
portunity for a citizen in the former district to determine which party's 
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candidate is sent to Washington. The Courts recognized this malappor­
tionment situation as inequitable. They are constitutionally restrained 
from attacking this same malapportionment problem across state lines, 
because the Constitution explicitly allocates representatives to the states, 
or through its development over time, because the Constitution explicitly 
calls for reapportionment every 10 years in accordance with the popula­
tion count of the U.S. Census. However, they can and have vigorously 
attacked population malapportionment within states at the time of redis­
trictings. The question that the cheap-seats analysis raises is whether the 
Courts have gone far enough to protect real political equality in congres­
sional elections. 
The answer to this question, like many questions of equal rights, 
depends on what you regard as equal opportunity and what is required 
for it to be ensured. Some may find no inequality problem raised by turn­
out differences or may interpret the problem as inevitable and without 
remedy. From this perspective, the Court has ensured the equal opportu­
nity of citizens to influence congressional elections by requiring equally 
populated districts. If some potential voters in these districts fail to avail 
themselves of the opportunity to participate in these elections, this is their 
problem. Equal opportunity was preserved. Anything more would move 
the Court toward ensuring equal influence, or equality of results, rather 
than equal opportunity. If the neighbors of these nonvoters have a 
greater say in congressional elections as a result of the nonvoting in the 
district, that is just an unintended consequence of the system. Following 
the disputed proxy voting interpretation of cheap seats, it could be fur­
ther argued that this system appropriately compensates for nonvoting 
and is more representative of the nation as a result. Finally, since it is 
impossible to tell in advance exactly who will or will not vote in a particu­
lar election and since all citizens of voting age should be accorded the 
equal opportunity to vote, it can be argued that districts must be equally 
populated and that there is no feasible way of drawing district boundaries 
before the election to ensure that they have equal numbers of voters. In 
short, turnout equality in districts is neither necessary for the political 
equality of citizens nor feasible in a single-member-district electoral 
system. 
From another standpoint, however, the inequality of a few voters in 
one congressional district having the same amount of representation as 
three or four times their number in another district is very troubling. 
Although equally populated districts provide for the equal political op­
portunity for citizens, the inequality of turnout in districts creates real 
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political inequalities among voters. The one-person, one-vote principle 
demands more than paper equality. A greater equality in the number of 
voters in districts would not mean equal influence but would provide 
voters with the equal opportunity to influence the selection of their rep­
resentative. Moreover, the continuity of turnout across election years, 
which causes the inequality problem for the individual voter to be more 
severe (he or she is consistently underrepresented or overrepresented), 
also makes a remedy more feasible. We know in advance where turnout 
can be expected to be high or low and can use this information in equaliz­
ing expected district turnouts. In short, from this view, large turnout dif­
ferences across congressional districts means that all voters are not 
politically equal, and this violates basic constitutional rights. 
• Reforming the House Electoral System • 
The legitimacy of a representative democracy depends to a great extent 
on the fairness of its electoral system. If the system for obtaining public 
consent for the government is flawed, the popular basis for the govern­
ment is called into question. Holding free, open, and competitive peri­
odic elections is certainly a requirement of popular government, but it is 
also a requirement of representative government that the popular will 
expressed in these elections is fairly reflected in the results of elections. 
The preceding analysis calls into question the fairness of the electoral 
system for the House of Representatives, its fairness to the political par­
ties, and its fairness to voters. In the aggregate, the system has been 
biased in favor of the Democrats. While generally insufficient to have 
determined which party controls the House (except perhaps in 1956), it 
has affected both the numbers of each party in the House and, ultimately, 
the public policies passed by the House. The fairness of the electoral sys­
tem is also a concern for the political equality of individual voters. Under 
current arrangements, where you happen to live in a state, whether you 
live around others who vote or around those who do not, affects how 
much your vote counts toward the election of a representative. 
Judgments about the fairness of the political system depend ulti­
mately on values. On the basis of their values, the framers of the Ameri­
can constitutional system designed neither a purely democratic nor a 
more narrowly majoritarian system. They valued wisdom in the govern­
ment and the consent from a broad spectrum of society as well as securing 
the consent of the majority. As such, they constructed a system that frus­
trated popular majorities in numerous ways. By modern democratic 
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sensibilities, the Electoral College system for electing a president is un­
democratic in that it allows the possibility that a president could be 
elected without a plurality of the popular vote. Critics of the Electoral 
College have for decades called for constitutional reform to make this 
undemocratic outcome an impossibility. Similarly, though the Seven­
teenth Amendment, instituting the popular election of Senators, democ­
ratized the Senate electoral system, the constitutional provision requiring 
equal representation of the states in the Senate is decidedly undemo­
cratic. Regardless of how many live in or vote in a state, they receive the 
same two representatives to the U.S. Senate. The constitutional roots of 
the decidedly malapportioned presidential and Senate electoral systems 
do not exempt them from criticism as being undemocratic or, at least, 
antimajoritarian. However, while a democrat could well find fault with 
these electoral systems, regardless of their origin, they were nevertheless 
intentional and considered features of the political system and constitu­
tional amendments would be required to reform them. 
The effective malapportionment of the House electoral system has 
some similarities with the malapportionment of the presidential and Sen­
ate systems, but there are also some important differences. Like the presi­
dential and Senate systems, the malapportionment in the House system 
has constitutional sources. As already noted, the allocation of House seats 
to the states and the requirement to reapportion following censuses in­
duces some malapportionment.41 However, unlike the presidential and 
Senate electoral systems, the effective malapportionment of the House 
electoral system was not explicitly intended by the Constitution and has 
significant extraconstitutional sources. The drawing of congressional dis­
trict boundaries within the states by state governments allows turnout 
disparities among districts. First, the Constitution itself does not require 
single-member congressional districts within states. As noted in chapter 
6, many states in the nineteenth century and some states up through 
midway through the twentieth century had at-large or multimember dis­
tricts. Second, under the single-member-district system, the Constitution 
is silent with respect to how the states should draw congressional districts, 
except that they should be drawn in such a way that no person within a 
state is denied his or her "equal protection of the laws." 
Without constitutional provisions requiring substantial turnout dif­
ferences among congressional districts (at least those occurring within 
states), with constitutional provisions that might be interpreted as forbid­
ding such large disparities (prohibited in the name of protecting political 
equality), and with the significant and consistently inequitable treatment 
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of the parties that is produced by these turnout differences, there is good 
reason to consider electoral system reforms. Can the electoral sys­
tem for "The People's House" be made to better reflect the will of the 
people? There are a number of possible reforms that would address the 
cheap-seats phenomenon. Potential reforms range from constitutional 
revisions to more modest and perhaps somewhat more viable proposals. 
Of course, the odds are against any reform of the electoral structure, 
but some reforms are less radical departures from present norms than 
others.42 
There are four strategies that may be pursued to varying lengths in 
eliminating or reducing the impact of cheap seats in the electoral system. 
The strategies are based on the understanding that cheap seats are insti­
tutionally created by drawing district lines in such a way that there are 
significant turnout disparities among equally populated districts. In light 
of this, four strategies for reducing the impact of cheap seats seem 
possible: 
1. by defining the relevant population for districts in a narrower 
way, 
2. by drawing fewer district lines that allow for turnout disparities, 
3. by drawing district lines in such a way as to reduce turnout dif­
ferences among districts, or 
4. by increasing turnout enough to reduce interdistrict variation 
in turnout. 
The first strategy, the redefining of the relevant population study, 
is based on the fact that, in reapportionment and in redistricting, people 
are counted who not only do not vote but who cannot vote. The second 
strategy, the fewer districts strategy, is based on the understanding that 
greater turnout disparities among districts are possible with more dis­
tricts. As the state-by-state analysis of district turnout differences in 1992 
showed, larger differences in district turnout were evident in the larger 
states, where more districts allow more interdistrict turnout variation.43 
The third strategy, the turnout-sensitive redistricting strategy, is based on 
the notion that district lines are now drawn without concern for turnout 
differences and that the consideration of turnout in the redistricting 
process might reduce turnout variations across districts. The fourth strat­
egy, the increased-turnout strategy, is based on the notion that bias is 
based on cheap seats, that cheap seats are based on turnout disparities 
among districts, and that increasing turnout nationally will reduce district 
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turnout disparities. At the extreme, if turnout were 100 percent, there 
could be no turnout disparities among districts and no turnout-based 
cheap seats. 
Redefining the Relevant Population 
First, turnout disparities among districts might be reduced if the popula­
tion counted for purposes of awarding and drawing districts bore a closer 
relationship to the electorate. As it stands, the national government 
counts all residents of a state for the purpose of allocating the 435 seats 
to the states and state governments count all residents of an area within 
a state for the purpose of drawing district boundaries within a state. Ev­
eryone is counted. They do not have to be registered to vote. They do 
not even have to be of voting age or eligible to vote. They do not have to 
be citizens. They do not even have to be in the country legally. The very 
broad definition of the relevant population is a source of malapportion­
ment for voting-eligible citizens and for actual voters. 
The definition of the relevant population for the electoral system 
could be tightened for either the awarding of seats to the states or in the 
drawing of districts within the states. In light of the fact that the Constitu­
tion, in both Article 1 and the Fourteenth Amendment, explicitly refers 
without qualification to representatives being apportioned to the states 
on the basis of the number of persons in the state, narrowing the defi­
nition of who is counted for reapportionment would seem to require a 
constitutional amendment. The Constitution was not explicit, however, 
in setting standards for determining districts within states. The equal 
population, one-person, one-vote rulings were based on judicial inter­
pretations of the Fourteenth Amendment's clause guaranteeing equal 
protection of the laws. Since noneligibles (noncitizens and those not of 
voting age) by definition cannot vote, it may be argued that excluding 
them from the redistricting count does not infringe on their rights and 
that the current practice of counting them produces inequalities among 
those who can vote. Counting people who are not eligible to vote, includ­
ing noncitizens and illegal immigrants, in the allocation of districts only 
serves to award arbitrary influence to their voting neighbors and to dilute 
the votes of those living and voting in other districts. Thus, although the 
definition of the relevant population for redistricting could certainly be 
narrowed by a constitutional amendment, this might also be accom­
plished by judicial interpretations refining the notion of one person, one 
vote. Either way, if districts were of more equal size in the number of 
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potential voters, they would probably also be of more equal size in the num­
ber of actual voters, and this would reduce the effects of cheap seats.44 
Fewer Districts 
In pursuing the second strategy, there are a number of proposals that 
would reduce the number of districts and, therefore, the number of turn­
out discrepancies in the House electoral system. The most extreme re­
form along these lines would require national elections for the House. 
This would require both the repeal of the constitutional provisions desig­
nating House seats to the states and the establishment of some sort of 
proportional representation system of election.45 Short of such a radical 
proposal, the system could reduce cheap seats by moving from single-
member districts to multimember districts in states having more than a 
single seat. Multimember districts, with or without proportional repre­
sentation, would make it more difficult to draw districts with such large 
turnout discrepancies. If the number of seats in a multimember district 
remained small, there would still be a possibility of multimember cheap 
seats (as in Queens in the 1980s), but the chances of this happening 
should decline with larger multimember districts. As noted in chapter 6, 
there is no constitutional prohibition against multimember or statewide 
at-large districts, and they were used in many states for many years.46 
The creation of multimember districts is not the only way to reduce 
the number of district lines and thereby reduce turnout differences 
among districts. Interdistrict turnout differences might also be reduced 
by decreasing the number of representatives in the House. As with 
multimember district electoral systems, the electoral system of a smaller 
House would require fewer districts allowing fewer opportunities for 
building districts around pockets of nonvoters. Larger congressional dis­
tricts, whether single-member in a smaller House or multimember in a 
House of the current size, are likely to be more socioeconomically diverse 
and therefore deviate less from normal turnout levels. In addition, larger 
districts, drawing on a deeper pool of available candidates and attracting 
greater media attention, are likely to be more hotly contested. If so, turn­
out might not only be more equal but equalized at a higher percentage 
of eligible voters. Finally, while from one perspective the reform to fewer 
and larger districts may mean that district representatives are less respon­
sive to local constituency interests, the other side of the coin is that con­
gressional representation might become less parochial because of the 
expanded size of districts.47 In terms of implementation, like the 
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multimember district reform, the reduced-House-size reform would not 
require a constitutional amendment. The Constitution is silent regarding 
the number of representatives in the House. The size of the House 
changed frequently throughout American history, until limited to 435 
seats by statute in 1911. 
Turnout-Sensitive Redistricting 
The third strategy is less radical in that it addresses the cheap-seats phe­
nomenon while maintaining the current number of single-member dis­
tricts. The problem of large turnout differences among districts could be 
addressed in the normal course of redrawing district lines. Redistricting 
currently takes a whole host of considerations into account—equal popu­
lation size within the state, the compactness of the district, the contiguity 
of the district, the effects of the district boundaries on the likely fortunes 
of the parties and the current incumbents, and the likelihood that the 
district would elect a candidate who is a member of a racial minority. 
Expected turnout could be added to the list of considerations for redis­
tricting, either by state legislatures or by the Courts. While at some point 
tradeoffs among these districting goals are necessary, the electoral system 
could move toward equal-turnout districts without making tradeoffs in 
some other areas. Specifically, the system could move toward districts 
with more equal turnouts without creating further deviations from equal 
population districts. Although some cheap seats are surrounded by other 
low-turnout areas, others adjoin traditionally higher-turnout districts. 
Reaching out to include some voter-rich areas in currently cheap seats 
could help to equalize district turnouts. This reform is all the more plau­
sible because of the high degree of stability in turnout.48 
Districts in the Los Angeles area in the 1990s illustrate the possibili­
ties of addressing cheap seats through redistricting. One of these districts 
was California's Thirty-first District, the district used as an example of a 
1990s cheap seat in chapter 8. This East Los Angeles district ranked sixth 
from the bottom in turnout among contested districts in the 1994 elec­
tion. Total congressional turnout in 1994 in the Thirty-first was just 
under 86,000 votes. The district was bordered by five other districts. Al­
though two of the bordering districts were also low-turnout districts, 
the Thirteenth and Thirty-third on the eastern and southeastern sides of 
the district, the other three bordering districts had considerably higher 
turnout. Turnout in one district (the Thirty-fourth to the west) was 37 per­
cent higher than turnout in the Thirty-first, and turnout in each of the 
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other two adjoining districts was nearly twice as great. Turnout in the 
Twenty-seventh and Twenty-eighth Districts, on the north and east sides 
of the Thirty-first, were both over 162,000 voters. Certainly, exchanging 
some precincts between these adjoining high-turnout districts and the 
low-turnout Thirty-first would have made the Thirty-first less of a 
cheap seat. 
California's Thirty-fifth and Thirty-sixth Districts also suggest the 
possibilities of turnout-sensitive redistricting. The districts are adjacent 
to one another, with the Thirty-sixth comprising coastal towns and the 
Thirty-fifth to its east comprising Watts and other parts of south-central 
Los Angeles. Turnout in the Thirty-fifth in 1994 was under 85,000 voters, 
fourth from the bottom of all contested districts. Next door, in the Thirty-
sixth, turnout was almost two and a half times as great (195,808 voters). 
Turnout in the Thirty-fifth District, one of the cheap seats listed in table 
8.6, probably could have been increased significantly by drawing the line 
between it and the Thirty-sixth a bit differently. 
Increased Turnout 
The fourth reform strategy involves attempts to change political behavior 
rather than the structure of the electoral system. The political behavior 
of interest is turnout. If turnout were less variable, particularly less vari­
able from one geographic area to another, cheap seats would be less likely. 
One way to reduce turnout variation is to stimulate higher turnout 
rates.49 At the extreme, as discussed above, there would be no turnout-
related bias in the electoral system if turnout were complete (100 per­
cent). If turnout rates rose significantly, turnout variation among districts 
would, at some point, decline. At present national rates of turnout, it is 
easy for turnout in some districts to be quite high while rates in other 
districts are very low. At high national turnout rates, turnout would have 
to increase particularly in now-low-turnout areas, the cheap seats. 
Political reforms that might increase turnout have long been consid­
ered and many have been adopted. Most of these reforms have attracted 
interest because of the general culture supporting political inclusiveness 
and the potential political gains that some (particularly Democrats) think 
might come as a result of increased turnout. Diminishing the inequities 
of the House electoral system has not been a consideration in mak­
ing these changes intended to stimulate turnout, but diminished cheap-
seat effects might well be an unintended result. In recent decades, sys­
temic reforms addressing low turnout have centered on making voter 
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registration less of an obstacle to voting. Allowing eligible citizens to regis­
ter close to or on election day and, more recently, the motor-voter provi­
sion allowing eligible citizens to register to vote while renewing their 
driver's licenses were the latest reforms intended to make registration less 
of an impediment to voting. More could be done, from expanding voting 
hours, to campaign reforms to stimulate turnout, to alternative mecha­
nisms for casting ballots (e.g., greater use of mail-in ballots). 
Most rules and practices of electoral systems do not change rapidly, 
nor should they. The electoral system is at the core of representative gov­
ernment. It should not be tampered with for "light or transient reasons." 
However, a system that is out of kilter, that systematically overre wards 
one party and underrewards another, that consistently and arbitrarily 
weighs the voices of some voters more heavily than those of others, that 
raises questions about the fundamental fairness of elections and the legiti­
macy of the representative process, is a system in which change should 
be seriously considered. 
Appendix 
A

The Effects of Candidate 
Advantages on 
the Vote 
appendix presents in five tables the data and the calculations nec­
essary for the simulation in chapter 3 of what the congressional vote 
might have been for Democrats and Republicans (1) if the parties had 
been equal with respect to the advantages of incumbency and (2) if all 
congressional seats had been contested. As discussed in chapter 3, the 
national vote count might not well reflect the intentions of voters if some 
candidates are systematically advantaged by the political system (incum­
bents) and if some voters cannot express a preference for a party because 
that option is not available on their ballot (uncontested seats). The analy­
sis in the following tables attempts to determine what the vote for the 
parties would have been in elections from 1954 to 1992 if incumbency 
were not a consideration in the vote and if all congressional districts were 
contested by both parties. 
Tables A.1 and A. 2 estimate the number of votes that were attracted 
to each party because of incumbency and the number of votes that were 
forgone by each party by its failure to offer a candidate in every congres­
sional district. Table A. 1 offers these estimates in districts in which Demo­
crats enjoyed these candidate advantages, and table A.2 offers the same 
for Republican districts. In estimating the vote value of both incumbency 
and uncontested seats, the same procedure was used. The number of 
votes cast in an average contested district won by a party (column 2) was 
multiplied by the percentage of votes that an advantage (either incum­
bency or an uncontested seat) was worth. The value of incumbency per 
district was obtained from Levitt and Wolfram (1994) and the value of 
an uncontested seat was set at 23 percent, based on Jacobson's analysis 
(1993) and an assumption that the number of votes that the candidate of 
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the advantaged party receives because of a lack of options approximately 
offsets the number of voters who "stayed home" because the candidate 
was not challenged. This product is the average number of votes attribut­
able to the advantage in a district. This was then multiplied by the num­
ber of districts in which the party had the particular advantage to yield 
the total number of votes that were attributable to incumbency or uncon­
tested seats in a particular year (columns 5 and 7). 
Tables A.3 and A.4 use the above estimates of votes due to incum­
bency and uncontested seats to adjust the actual vote. Table A.3 makes 
the adjustments in the Democratic national vote, and table A.4 does the 
same for Republicans. In each case, the starting point is the actual total 
national votes cast for each party. These numbers were obtained from 
various volumes of the U.S. Statistical Abstracts and CQ's Guide to U.S. Elec­
tions, second edition. Tabulation of votes from the Statistical Abstract re­
quired some adjustments to take into account votes for cross-endorsed 
major party candidates, votes cast in multimember districts in several 
early years in the series, and several other problems noted in note 24 in 
chapter 3. Votes attributable to incumbency are subtracted from the party 
having the advantage and added to the opposing party's totals. For in­
stance, in the case of the Democrats (table A.3), the additional votes at­
tracted to the Democratic total because of Democratic incumbents are 
subtracted from the Democratic total and the additional votes in the Re­
publican column because of Republican incumbents are added to the 
Democratic total. The votes that a party failed to receive because it failed 
to put forward a candidate to accept those votes are then added to that 
party's totals. Since the votes that a party would receive from contesting 
a formerly uncontested seat are supposed to come entirely from an in­
crease in formerly depressed district turnout, rather than at the expense 
of the party holding the uncontested seat, these votes are added to the 
party that had left the seat uncontested but are not subtracted from the 
party with the advantage.1 The candidate-adjusted vote totals for the par­
ties are in the far-right columns of tables A.3 and A.4. 
Table A.5 completes the calculations. The adjusted vote totals (the 
expected vote for a party after removing incumbency or uncontested seat 
effects) are taken from tables A.3 and A.4 and presented in the second 
and third columns of table A.5. The Democratic percentage of these ad­
justed votes is then calculated (column 4) and compared to the actual 
Democratic vote percentage (in column 5). The difference is then com­
puted (column 6). This is the basis for table 3.5. 
Table A.1 
Votes Attributable to Democratic Incumbency and Uncontested Seat Advantages, 1954-1992 
Votes Republicans 
Mean Total Vote Running Would Have 
in Democratic Percentage Value Democratic Votes Due to Uncontested Received if Seats 
Year Districts of Incumbency Incumbents Incumbency Democratic Seats Were Contested 
1954 104,202 3.4 119 421,601 84 2,013,183 
1956 135,028 3.4 153 702,416 69 2,142,894 
1958 118,494 3.4 127 511,657 96 2,616,348 
1960 149,653 4.0 194 1,161,307 76 2,615,934 
1962 121,146 4.0 180 872,251 50 1,393,179 
1964 154,469 4.0 191 1,180,143 41 1,456,643 
1966 123,445 4.0 224 1,106,067 53 1,504,795 
1968 151,023 4.0 192 1,159,857 41 1,424,147 
1970 125,260 6.8 166 1,413,935 58 1,670,968 
1972 165,538 6.8 179 2,014,929 46 1,751,392 
1974 125,235 6.8 161 1,371,073 58 1,670,635 
1976 171,894 6.8 210 2,454,646 46 1,818,639 
1978 128,752 6.8 205 1,794,803 51 1,510,261 
1980 176,936 8.0 212 3,000,835 41 1,668,506 
1982 150,775 8.0 170 2,050,540 47 1,629,878 
1984 198,266 8.0 201 3,188,117 54 2,462,464 
1986 142,685 8.0 178 2,031,834 56 1,837,783 
1988 194,655 8.0 185 2,880,894 61 2,731,010 
1990 145,615 8.0 199 2,318,191 48 1,607,590 
1992 218,743 8.0 196 3,429,890 18 905,596 
Note: The value of incumbency Is from Levitt and Wolfram (1996). The number of votes due to incumbency is the product of the columns 2, 3, 
and 4, the mean number of votes in Democratic districts multiplied by the value of incumbency (.034, .04, etc.) (to yield the number of incumbency 
related votes per district) multiplied by the number of running Democratic incumbents. The number of votes Republicans would have expected to receive 
had they contested the uncontested seats is the product of the mean number of votes in Democratic districts multiplied by the value of uncontested seats 
(.23) and the number of uncontested Democratic seats. 
CO Table A.2 
Votes Attributable to Republican Incumbency and Uncontested Seat Advantages, 1954-1992 
Votes Democrats 
Mean Total Vote Running Would Have 
in Republican Percentage Value Republican Votes Due to Uncontested Received if Seats 
Year Districts of Incumbency Incumbents Incumbency Republican Seats Were Contested 
1954 120,885 3.4 202 830,238 2 55,607 
1956 165,462 3.4 183 1,029,505 3 114,169 
1958 134,290 3.4 167 762,499 1 30,887 
1960 183,327 4.0 130 953,300 3 126,496 
1962 144,173 4.0 150 865,038 1 33,160 
1964 175,778 4.0 159 1,117,948 1 40,429 
1966 139,339 4.0 126 702,269 4 128,192 
1968 170,570 4.0 167 1,139,408 7 274,618 
1970 145,842 6.8 165 1,636,347 5 167,718 
1972 182,669 6.8 146 1,813,538 8 336,111 
1974 138,162 6.8 162 1,521,993 2 63,555 
1976 190,875 6.8 122 1,583,499 6 263,408 
1978 148,042 6.8 109 1,097,287 19 646,944 
1980 204,441 8.0 128 2,093,476 15 705,322 
1982 161,517 8.0 158 2,041,575 11 408,639 
1984 213,574 8.0 140 2,392,029 14 687,708 
1986 154,134 8.0 142 1,750,962 18 638,115 
1988 217,706 8.0 144 2,507,973 20 1,001,448 
1990 168,151 8.0 122 1,641,154 36 1,392,290 
1992 238,081 8.0 125 2,380,810 13 711,862 
Note: See the note to table A.1 for the calculation of the number of votes due to incumbency and the number of Democratic votes that would 
have been expected if challenges were mounted for uncontested Republican seats. 
Table A.3 
Expected Democratic Vote without Incumbency Advantage and Uncontested Seats, 1954-1992 
Votes That Democrats 
Would Have Received Expected Democratic Vote 
Actual Votes Due to Incumbency if They Had Run in without Incumbency 
Democratic Uncontested Advantages and with All 
Year Vote Democratic Republican Republican Districts Districts Contested 
1954 22,355,921 421,601 830,238 55,607 22,820,165 
1956 29,996,724 702,416 1,029,505 114,169 30,437,982 
1958 26,100,713 511,657 762,499 30,887 26,382,441 
1960 35,322,673 1,161,307 953,300 126,496 35,241,162 
1962 27,010,143 872,251 865,038 33,160 27,036,090 
1964 38,218,751 1,180,143 1,117,948 40,429 38,196,985 
1966 27,017,727 1,106,067 702,269 128,192 26,742,120 
1968 33,304,867 1,159,857 1,139,408 274,618 33,559,036 
1970 29,524,283 1,413,935 1,636,347 167,718 29,914,414 
1972 37,772,308 2,014,929 1,813,538 336,111 37,907,028 
1974 30,898,055 1,371,073 1,521,993 63,555 31,112,529 
1976 42,389,976 2,454,646 1,583,499 263,408 41,782,236 
1978 30,537,710 1,794,803 1,097,287 646,944 30,487,138 
1980 40,768,550 3,000,835 2,093,476 705,321 40,566,513 
1982 36,110,782 2,050,540 2,041,575 408,638 36,510,455 
1984 44,435,193 3,188,117 2,392,029 687,708 44,326,813 
1986 33,025,287 2,031,834 1,750,962 638,115 33,382,530 
1988 44,892,268 2,880,894 2,507,973 1,001,448 45,520,795 
1990 32,837,751 2,318,191 1,641,154 1,392,290 33,553,004 
1992 48,685,900 3,429,890 2,380,810 711,862 48,348,682 
Note: The total national vote was calculated from various volumes of the Statistical Abstract of the United States and from Congressional 
Quarterly's Guide to U.S. Elections, 2d ed. The incumbency and uncontested-seat estimated figures are from tables A.1 and A.2. The expected vote is 
calculated by subtracting the Democratic votes due to incumbency from the total Democratic vote and adding to that vote the votes due to Republican 
t  o incumbents and Republican uncontested seats. For example in 1954: 22,355,921 - 421,601 + 830,238 + 55,607 = 22,820,165. Numbers have been 
rounded to the nearest whole integer. 
o Table A.4 
Expected Republican Vote without Incumbency Advantage and Uncontested Seats, 1954-1992 
Votes That Republicans 
Would Have Received if Expected Republican Vote 
Actual Votes Due to Incumbency They Had Run in without Incumbency 
Republican Uncontested Advantages and with All 
Year Vote Democratic Republican Democratic Districts Districts Contested 
1954 20,006,706 421,601 830,238 2,013,183 21,611,252 
1956 28,552,310 702,416 1,029,505 2,142,894 30,368,115 
1958 19,898,734 511,657 762,499 2,616,348 22,264,240 
1960 28,754,240 1,161,307 953,300 2,615,934 31,578,181 
1962 24,093,008 872,251 865,038 1,393,179 25,493,400 
1964 27,930,000 1,180,143 1,117,948 1,456,643 29,448,838 
1966 25,517,488 1,106,067 702,269 1,504,795 27,426,081 
1968 32,041,139 1,159,857 1,139,408 1,424,147 33,485,735 
1970 24,415,000 1,413,935 1,636,347 1,670,968 25,863,556 
1972 33,276,320 2,014,929 1,813,538 1,751,392 35,229,103 
1974 21,272,000 1,371,073 1,521,993 1,670,635 22,791,715 
1976 31,403,615 2,454,646 1,583,499 1,818,639 34,093,401 
1978 25,184,360 1,794,803 1,097,287 1,510,261 27,392,137 
1980 38,407,925 3,000,835 2,093,476 1,668,506 40,983,790 
1982 27,908,458 2,050,540 2,041,575 1,629,878 29,547,301 
1984 40,137,812 3,188,117 2,392,029 2,462,464 43,396,364 
1986 27,065,058 2,031,834 1,750,962 1,837,783 29,183,713 
1988 37,914,616 2,880,894 2,507,973 2,731,010 41,018,547 
1990 28,718,172 2,318,191 1,641,154 1,607,590 31,002,799 
1992 43,008,500 3,429,890 2,380,810 905,596 44,963,176 
Note: See table A.3 for sources and steps in calculations. 
Table A.5 
Democratic Congressional Vote Adjusted for Incumbency and Uncontested Seat Advantages, 1954-1992 
Expected Partisan Votes without Incumbency or Uncontested 
Seat Advantages 
Actual 
Democratic Democratic Expected versus 
Percentage of Percentage of Actual Vote 
Year Democrats Republicans Two-Party Vote Two-Party Vote Difference 
1954 22,820,165 21,611,252 51.36 52.77 -1.41 
1956 30,437,982 30,368,115 50.06 51.23 -1.18 
1958 26,382,441 22,264,240 54.23 56.74 -2.51 
1960 35,241,162 31,578,181 52.74 55.13 -2.38 
1962 27,036,090 25,493,400 51.47 52.85 -1.39 
1964 38,196,985 29,448,838 56.47 57.78 -1.31 
1966 26,742,120 27,426,081 49.37 51.43 -2.06 
1968 33,559,036 33,485,735 50.05 50.97 - .9 1 
1970 29,914,414 25,863,556 53.63 54.74 -1.10 
1972 37,907,028 35,229,103 51.83 53.16 -1.33 
1974 31,112,529 22,791,715 57.72 59.23 -1.51 
1976 41,782,236 34,093,401 55.07 57.44 -2.38 
1978 30,487,138 27,392,137 52.67 54.80 -2.13 
1980 40,566,513 40,983,790 49.74 51.49 -1.75 
1982 36,510,455 29,547,301 55.27 56.41 -1.14 
1984 44,326,813 43,396,364 50.53 52.54 -2.01 
1986 33,382,530 29,183,713 53.36 54.96 -1.60 
1988 45,520,795 41,018,547 52.60 54.21 -1.61 
1990 33,553,004 31,002,799 51.98 53.35 -1.37 
1992 48,348,682 44,963,176 51.81 53.10 -1.28 
Note: The expected votes without candidate advantages were calculated in tables A.3 and A.4. The actual vote percentages were computed 
from the actual votes in tables A.3 and A.4. 
Appendix 
B

The Unwasted-Vote Measure, 
Wasted Votes, and Alternative 
Estimates of Bias 
TH,Lhe single-member-district, plurality-rule electoral system is a respon­
sive system. That is, in converting votes into seats it magnifies the impact 
of the plurality vote. The party with the most votes receives an even 
larger share of seats. This occurs because the party with the minority vote 
wastes a larger portion of its votes on losing candidates. As discussed in 
chapter 4 (see table 4.10), the majority party can avoid wasting votes in 
some districts where it is less popular than average, while the minority 
party wastes votes even in some districts where it exceeds its national 
vote. However, an electoral system can also be structured (biased) so that 
a party wastes more of its votes than its opponent even if the party wins 
the majority of votes. It is possible that bias is based on wasted, as well as 
unwasted, votes. 
In this appendix we (1) formally deduce the basis for the unwasted­
vote measure of bias, (2) determine whether a minority-vote party, as 
assumed, wastes a larger portion of its vote than the majority-vote party, 
(3) determine whether any bias could be traced to differences in wasted 
votes, rather than the unwasted votes examined in the main analysis, (4) 
offer two alternative estimates of bias based on a modified uniform dis­
trict vote-swing analysis and a fixed-swing-ratio analysis, and (5) compare 
these alternative estimates to the unwasted-vote estimate of bias. 
The Formal Basis of the Unwasted-Vote Measure of Bias 
The basis of the unwasted-vote measure of electoral system bias and its 
assumption of an even division of unwasted votes at an even division of 
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the national vote can be demonstrated formally. As already defined, bias 
is present if 
Swd *Surr when Vtd=Vtr, (1) 
where S stands for the proportion of seats and V for the proportion of 
votes. The subscript w indicates seats won by d, Democrats, or r, Republi­
cans. The subscript t indicates the total for all districts. 
A party's total vote is the sum of votes cast in the districts it won and 
the districts it lost: 
Vtp = ^ + Vlp, (2) 
where V is votes, t is the total for all districts, p designates the party, to is 
districts won by the party, and / is districts lost by the particular party. 
How are these votes converted into seats? By definition, only the 
votes cast in districts won by the party are directly converted into seats. 
They are the party's unwasted votes.1 Votes cast in districts lost by the 
party, the party's wasted votes, indirectly affect seat winnings, since a 
party wasting a smaller portion of its votes has more unwasted votes 
achieving representation. We turn first to unwasted votes (V^) and then 
to the issue of wasted votes (Vlfi). 
The number of seats that a party wins depends on two factors: the 
price it pays in votes for a seat and the number of votes it pays for these 
seats. Like any commodity, a party will win more seats if it pays a low 
price and spends a great deal. The price paid for a seat, the number of 
votes expended to obtain a seat, in turn, depends on the district vote 
percentage of the winning party and the total district turnout. A party 
barely winning a seat expends its votes efficiently. A party winning low-
turnout districts also gets a bargain. The relationship of the three factors 
translating a party's vote into seats is stated formally in equation 3: 
Swp = (1/(X(J% X T^/S^)) X Vwp, (3) 
where S^ is the number of seats won by party p, P^ is the percentage of 
the district vote received by the party in each district that it won, Twp is 
the total district turnout in each district it won, and Vwp (as above) is the 
total vote for the party in districts that it won (its unwasted votes). The 
mean of the product of a party's vote percentage in districts that it won 
and turnout in those districts is the mean number of votes per victory 
(the mean number of unwasted votes). Thus, the first right-hand-side 
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unterm indicates that a party won one seat for every (ZCP^ X Twp)ISwp) ~ 
wasted votes.2 The same votes-to-seats formula could be applied to votes 
cast for a party in districts that it lost, except the numerator of the first term 
would be zero instead of one, since the party received no seats for its votes 
in these districts, and the seats variable would, thus, also equal zero.3 
This formalization allows us to locate the reason that the electoral 
system works to one party's advantage over its opponents. With both par­
ties having an equal number of votes, bias would be indicated by one 
party winning a greater than equal number of seats (Swd ¥^ Swr). According 
to equation 3, bias (a larger S^) is the result of some mix of the following 
three factors: (1) a party having more unwasted votes than its opposition 
(higher values of V^), (2) a party winning districts by smaller vote per­
centages (lower values of P^), or (3) a party winning lower-turnout dis­
tricts (lower values of T^). 
If the parties have an equal number of votes (Vtd = Vtr) and waste a 
common proportion ({VJVJ) = (Vlr/Vtr)), then they have an equal number 
of votes to expend in districts that they win (Vwd = Vwr).4 If this is so, 
based on equation 3, the only way that the parties can win an unequal 
proportion of seats at this equal proportion of votes is for the price of a 
seat to be different for the two parties ([l/(Pwd X TJ] ¥> [l/(Pwr X TJ]). 
This is the foundation of the unwasted vote measure. 
Wasted Votes 
Tables B.I and B.2 provide information regarding the total vote and 
wasted votes for the parties in contested seats from 1954 to 1992. We 
should expect that the party winning the larger share of the popular vote 
would waste a smaller portion of that vote in losing causes. Generally this 
means that the Democrats should have wasted a smaller portion of their 
vote, but we should also note that in 6 of the 20 election years Republi­
cans won a majority of the vote in contested districts. In these six elec­
tions, we should expect Republicans to have wasted a smaller portion of 
their vote. 
Table B.2 presents the percentage of their votes that each party 
wasted. The parties wasted anywhere from a quarter to one half of their 
votes. The majority party typically wasted a third of its votes, while about 
41 percent of the minority party's votes were cast for losing candidates. 
In most elections, the expected difference between the wasted votes for 
the majority and minority parties leading to system responsiveness were 
found. The majority party wasted a smaller portion of its votes in 15 of 
the 20 elections. The exceptions were in 1960, 1962, 1970, 1972, and 
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Table B.1 
Votes in Contested Districts by Political Party, 1954-1992 
Democratic 
Votes in Contested Districts Percentage 
Year Democratic Republican Total Votes Seats 
1954 19,581,300 19,642,800 39,221,400 49.92 42.77 
1956 25,985,900 27,907,100 53,893,000 48.22 45.22 
1958 22,316,200 19,597,500 41,913,700 53.24 54.79 
1960 29,906,300 28,140,400 58,046,700 51.52 51.85 
1962 24,386,500 23,813,300 48,199,800 50.59 52.46 
1964 34,727,800 27,674,900 52,402,700 55.65 63.99 
1966 23,759,800 24,970,500 48,730,400 48.76 51.07 
1968 29,937,800 31,043,900 60,981,600 49.09 51.95 
1970 25,649,200 23,977,800 49,627,000 51.68 52.96 
1972 33,073,600 32,250,700 65,324,300 50.63 51.58 
1974 26,672,400 21,128,200 47,800,600 55.80 62.03 
1976 36,975,600 30,519,600 67,495,200 54.78 64.23 
1978 26,083,400 23,132,500 49,215,900 53.00 61.92 
1980 35,024,600 35,534,400 70,559,000 49.64 53.32 
1982 31,033,400 26,758,700 57,792,100 53.70 59.04 
1984 37,008,900 37,510,600 74,519,600 49.66 53.95 
1986 27,899,700 25,014,500 52,914,200 52.73 55.83 
1988 36,860,500 34,858,800 71,719,400 51.40 56.21 
1990 28,410,800 24,690,600 53,101,400 53.50 62.46 
1992 47,093,800 41,662,900 88,756,700 53.06 60.00 
Note: Votes are rounded to the nearest hundred. 
1984. In these five elections, contrary to expectations, the minority party 
wasted a smaller share of its votes. In two of the five cases (1970 and 
1972), the differences were quite small (2.4 percentage points) and the 
vote majorities themselves were small (50.6 percent and 51.7 percent of 
the vote). Of the remaining three aberrant cases (also involving narrow 
vote majorities), two involved Democratic majorities, and one involved a 
Republican vote majority (1984). The minority party in these cases 
wasted more than four percentage points less of their votes than did the 
majority party. Despite these exceptions, in most elections, the majority 
party, as expected, wasted fewer of its votes in losing causes, thereby pro­
ducing responsiveness in the electoral system. 
The assumption that the wasted portion of a party's vote increases 
when the party fares poorly at the polls is tested more rigorously in the 
09 Table B.2 
Wasted Votes by Political Party, 1954-1992 
Wasted Votes in Contested Seats 
Party Winning Did the Majority 
Percentage of the Party's a Majority of Party Waste a 
Wasted Votes Votes That Were Wasted the Vote in Difference Smaller 
Contested in Percentage of 
Year Democrats Republicans Democrats Republicans Seats Percentages Its Votes? 
1954 9,939,700 5,699,000 50.8 29.0 Republicans 21.8 Yes 
1956 12,771,200 8,450,000 49.2 30.3 Republicans 18.9 Yes 
1958 8,667,300 7,977,500 38.8 40.7 Democrats 1.9 Yes 
1960 12,883,900 10,136,800 43.1 36.0 Democrats -7.1 No 
1962 9,963,400 8,742,100 40.9 36.7 Democrats -4.2 No 
1964 10,338,000 13,623,000 29.8 49.2 Democrats 19.5 Yes 
1966 9,206,200 8,827,000 38.8 35.4 Republicans 3.4 Yes 
1968 11,256,100 10,997,700 37.6 35.4 Republicans 2.2 Yes 
1970 9,481,700 8,280,700 37.0 34.5 Democrats -2.4 No 
1972 12,172,200 11,111,500 36.8 34.5 Democrats -2.4 No 
1974 7,855,300 9,694,000 29.5 45.9 Democrats 16.4 Yes 
1976 9,579,900 14,186,300 25.9 46.5 Democrats 20.6 Yes 
1978 7,339,700 10,098,400 28.1 43.7 Democrats 15.5 Yes 
1980 12,254,600 12,304,000 35.0 34.6 Republicans .4 Yes 
1982 9,349,200 11,426,800 30.1 42.7 Democrats 12.6 Yes 
1984 11,932,900 13,803,400 32.2 36.8 Republicans -4.6 No 
1986 8,397,600 9,060,700 30.1 36.2 Democrats 6.1 Yes 
1988 10,874,600 12,443,500 29.5 35.7 Democrats 6.2 Yes 
1990 8,167,800 11,157,600 28.8 45.2 Democrats 16.4 Yes 
1992 14,215,300 18,542,500 30.2 44.5 Democrats 14.3 Yes 
Note: Votes are rounded to the nearest hundred. The percentage of a party's vote that was wasted on losing candidates is computed by 
dividing the number of wasted votes for a party in contested seats by the total number of votes for that party in contested seats (from table B.1). 
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Table B.3 
The Effect of the National Vote on the Percentage of the Vote Wasted 
on Losing Candidates in Contested Districts, 1954-1992 
Dependent Variables: Percentage of a Party's 
Vote That Was Wasted 
Wasted Democratic Vote Wasted Republican Vote 
Independent Variable OLS GLS OLS GLS 
Democratic Percentage of -2.10 -1.34 2.21 1.94 
the Two-Party Vote (.53) (.19) (.28) (.23) 
Constant 144.11 102.55 - 7 5 . 7  4 - 6 1 . 1  8 
N 20 19 20 19 
R2 .47 .74 .78 .81 
Adjusted R2 .44 .72 .76 .80 
Standard Error 5.25 2.27 2.76 2.40 
Durbin-Watson .50 1.85 1.40 1.83 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. The pseudo-Generalized Least Squares estimates 
(GLS) address the autocorrelation problem apparent in the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression 
results. The data were partial differenced using weights of .6 in the Democratic vote equation and .35 in 
the Republican vote equation. The constants in the GLS equations were converted to their comparable 
OLS equivalents (a = a'/[1 - p]). 
regressions reported in table B.3. The dependent variables are the per­
centage of each party's votes that were wasted in an election year, indi­
cated in the third and fourth columns of table B.2. The independent 
variable is the percentage of the two-party vote in contested districts for 
Democrats, indicated in the third column of table B.L We expect that 
Democrats will waste a smaller portion of their vote as they fare better at 
the polls (a negative coefficient) and that Republicans will waste a greater 
portion of their vote as Democrats generally receive more votes (a posi­
tive coefficient). Because of positive autocorrelation in the initial regres­
sion estimates, the regression for each party has also been estimated using 
partial differences (the GLS estimate). The results are entirely in accord 
with expectations. The coefficients are in the expected directions, statisti­
cally significant (p < .01), and of similar magnitudes for both parties. 
Most importantly, we can use these regressions to estimate the expected 
proportion of votes that each party would waste if the national vote were 
equally divided. With 50 percent of the two-party vote, Democrats would 
expect to waste 35.6 percent of their votes ((50 x -1.34) + 102.55). Re­
publicans with half the national vote would expect to waste 35.8 percent 
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of their votes ((50 x 1.94) — 64.18). This is impressively close to the equal­
ity assumption of the unwasted vote measure of bias and permits us to 
expect that the parties would have an equal number of wasted votes if 
they evenly divided the national vote. 
Although the assumptions regarding wasted votes being associated 
with vote percentage of a party and electoral system responsiveness seems 
generally supported by this analysis (leaving electoral system bias to be a 
matter of unwasted votes), the several exceptions to the expectation that 
the plurality party wastes a smaller portion of its votes (table B.2) and the 
autocorrelation in vote-wasted vote regressions (table B.3) suggest that 
wasted votes may on occasion affect bias. The 1954 election is a good 
example. In 1954, though on the short end counting all districts, Repub­
licans narrowly won a majority of the vote in contested districts. As ex­
pected, they wasted a smaller share of their votes than did Democrats. 
However, as table B.2 indicates, the difference in proportion of wasted 
votes between the two parties was much greater than one would expect 
because of the narrow Republican plurality. Although the parties re­
ceived nearly an equal share of the vote in contested districts, Democrats 
wasted more than half of their votes in lost districts, while Republicans 
wasted less than a third of their votes. 
Alternative Bias Estimates 
Table B.4 presents two alternatives to the unwasted-vote measure of bias. 
The first is a modified version of the hypothetical uniform-district-vote-
swing measure. The hypothetical uniform-vote-swing method was dis­
cussed in chapter 4. The uniform-vote-swing method simulates vote and 
seat distributions by assuming uniform incremental vote percentage 
changes across all districts. There are two principal problems with this 
technique as conventionally used: the assumption of uniform change for 
all districts is unrealistic, and the technique estimates bias when the mean 
district vote (rather than the national vote percentage) reaches 50 per­
cent. The modification to the technique used here (and also in chapter 8 
for the 1994 election) addresses the second problem. District vote per­
centages for the two parties are adjusted uniformly across all contested 
districts. These adjusted vote percentages are then converted into new 
district vote totals for the two parties (assuming no change in total turn­
out) and aggregated nationally. Vote percentages are adjusted in­
crementally until the aggregate national vote from the simulation is 
evenly divided. The would-be winners, given the nationally divided vote, 
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Table B.4 
Three Estimates of Partisan Bias in Contested Seats, 1954-1992 
Uniform-District-Vote-Swing Measure of 
Bias 
Adjustment to the Uniform-Swing Fixed Swing-Ratio Unwasted Vote 
Year Democratic Vote Bias Estimate Bias Estimate Measure of Bias 
1954 +.0784 +7.2 Republican +7.1 Republican +2.3 Democratic 
1956 +1.7823 + .8 Republican +1.2 Republican +5.9 Democratic 
1958 -3.2949 +5.4 Republican +1.7 Republican +.6 Democratic 
1960 -1.5282 +2.1 Republican +1.2 Republican +3.3 Democratic 
1962 -.5797 +1.1 Democratic +1.3 Democratic +3.6 Democratic 
1964 -5.8149 +2.8 Republican +2.7 Democratic +.4 Democratic 
1966 +1.2609 +3.2 Democratic +3.6 Democratic +3.9 Democratic 
1968 +.9315 +2.7 Democratic +3.8 Democratic +3.7 Democratic 
1970 -1.6804 +.8 Democratic +.4 Republican +2.2 Democratic 
1972 -.6115 +1.1 Democratic +.3 Democratic +1.9 Democratic 
1974 -5.7905 +.8 Republican +.4 Democratic +.1 Republican 
1976 -4.7864 +3.3 Democratic +4.7 Democratic +1.3 Democratic 
1978 -2.8972 +5.3 Democratic +5.9 Democratic +2.5 Democratic 
1980 +.3530 +4.1 Democratic +4.0 Democratic +3.8 Democratic 
1982 -3.7254 +2.1 Democratic +1.6 Democratic +.4 Democratic 
1984 +.3279 +5.0 Democratic +4.6 Democratic +2.5 Democratic 
1986 -2.7263 +3.3 Democratic +.4 Democratic +.7 Democratic 
1988 -1.3955 +4.4 Democratic +3.4 Democratic +2.1 Democratic 
1990 -3.5029 +7.3 Democratic +5.5 Democratic +2.0 Democratic 
1992 -2.9395 +3.2 Democratic +3.9 Democratic +1.1 Democratic 
Note: The adjustment to the Democratic vote is the percentage point swing in the district votes 
necessary to achieve convergence of the national party votes. The numbers for the three bias estimates 
indicate bias in percent of seats. 
are then determined. Any deviation from an even division of seats indi­
cates bias. 
The second alternative measure of bias is based on an assumption 
of a fixed swing ratio equal to two. A swing ratio of two comports with 
Jacobson's pre-1966 estimate (1990) and the estimate in equation 3 of 
table 6.4. With this assumption, an expected seat division for an unbiased 
system can be computed and compared to the actual seat division. With 
a known vote share, an assumed swing ratio, and a known seat share, we 
can deduce the extent of bias. For instance, consider a party winning 56 
percent of the seats with 51 percent of the vote (approximately the num­
bers for 1968). An unbiased system with a swing ratio of two would have 
awarded the party 52 percent of the seats (2 = (52 - 50)/(51-50)). The 
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difference of 4 percent of the seats must result from bias, since the vote-
to-seat conversion only involves the two processes, and we have already 
accounted for the magnifying effects of the swing ratio. 
The amount of adjustment or uniform-district-vote swing necessary 
to converge on an even vote division and the estimates of bias (in con­
tested seats) are presented in table B.4, along with the unwasted vote 
measure of bias (from table 5.9). The table indicates that, for instance, in 
the 1992 election, if each contested district cast 2.935 percentage points 
less for the Democratic congressional candidate and 2.935 percentage 
points more for the Republican congressional candidate, the national 
vote would have been evenly divided. At this even vote division, Demo­
crats would have won 53.2 percent of the contested seats (215 of the 404 
contested that year), or 3.2 percent more than they would have won in 
an unbiased system. The fixed-swing-ratio estimate for 1992 starts with 
the assumption that a party receiving 53.06 percent of the vote, as the 
Democrats did, should receive 56.12 percent of the seats in an unbiased 
system (assuming a swing ratio of two). Since the Democrats actually won 
60 percent of the seats, the difference indicates a pro-Democratic bias of 
3.88 percent of contested seats. 
Comparison of the two alternative measures of bias in table B.4 to 
the unwasted vote measure finds that both the modified uniform-vote-
swing measure of bias and the fixed-swing-ratio measure less consistently 
indicate a pro-Democratic electoral system bias than the unwasted-vote 
measure. The major differences are in the 1950s. Contrary to the 
unwasted-vote measure, the swing measure of bias and the fixed-swing-
ratio measure indicate that the system favored Republicans from 1954 to 
1960. From 1962 to 1992, however, the three measures are in fundamen­
tal agreement in finding the electoral system to be biased in favor of the 
Democrats. In the 16 elections from 1962 to 1992, the three measures of 
bias are consistent in finding pro-Democratic bias in 13 elections. In two 
of the remaining three elections (1964 and 1970), one of the alternative 
measures agreed with the unwasted-vote measure that the system favored 
the Democrats. The remaining post-1960 election was 1974, in which all 
three measures indicate a nearly neutral system. 
Over the last several decades, the greatest difference between the 
three measures is that the uniform-vote-swing measure and the fixed-
swing-ratio measure have consistently indicated a stronger pro-
Democratic slant to the electoral system than the unwasted vote measure. 
In elections since 1976, the alternative measures typically indicated a pro-
Democratic bias of more than two percentage points greater than the 
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unwasted-vote measure. In short, while the modified uniform-vote-swing 
analysis and the fixed-swing-ratio analysis of bias raise questions about 
the presence of a pro-Democratic tilt to the electoral system in the first 
few elections of the Democratic majority, they reinforce the finding that 
electoral system bias helped to preserve the Democratic House majority 
through its last three decades. In essence, only 2 of the 32 alternative 
estimates of bias from 1962 to 1992 (two measures for each of 16 elec­
tions) differ materially from the unwasted-vote measure. In a comparison 
of the unwasted-vote measure to the two alternatives, we see that the 
unwasted-vote measure tended to indicate a slightly stronger pro-
Democratic tilt over the whole series, but that each of the other measures 
indicated a greater Democratic bias in the 16 elections since 1960. How­
ever, in all cases the mean differences were less than a single percentage 
point. In contrast, each of the three measures in table B.4 found a much 
more Democratically tilted system than did King and Gelman (1991). For 
the 16 elections from 1954 to 1984, the King and Gelman estimates of 
bias differed from the uniform-swing measure by a mean of 1.9 percent­
age points, from the fixed-swing-ratio measure by 2.6 percentage points, 
and from the unwasted-vote measure by 3.7 percentage points. Differ­
ences with the King and Gelman "incumbency controlled" estimates 
were, of course, even greater. 
Appendix 
C

The Carryover Effect of Partisan 
Bias through Incumbency 
discussed in chapter 5, the effects of the electoral system's bias may 
not be confined to a single election. Bias in one election may have reper­
cussions for the results of later elections. The effects of bias in an earlier 
election are carried forward into later elections via incumbency. Since 
bias in the system, by definition, causes one party to win seats that it 
would otherwise not have won, that party has more incumbents who can 
run for reelection in later years and since incumbency is worth votes, bias 
in the previous election inflates a party's votes in subsequent elections. In 
this appendix, this carryover effect of incumbency is examined. 
Several calculations and assumptions are necessary to estimate the 
additional votes and seats affected by partisan bias in a previous election. 
Take 1970 as an example. In the prior election of 1968, 14 Democrats 
were elected as a consequence of partisan bias in that election. That cast 
14 additional Democrats as incumbents going into the 1970 election who 
held that status by virtue of previous partisan bias. Because some incum­
bents retire, run for other offices, or are defeated in the primary, not all 
14 bonus incumbents can be expected to run in the 1970 general election. 
The 14 must be discounted by the rate of incumbents not on the next 
election's general election ballot. In 1970, about 9 percent of incumbents 
did not make it to the general election.1 By this rate, about 13 of the 14 
bonus incumbents from 1968 should have run in 1970. If incumbency 
was worth about 7.1 percent of the district vote in the 1970s (Levitt and 
Wolfram, 1996) and the mean district turnout was about 135,000 votes 
in 1970, then the vote value of each additional incumbent was just less 
than 10,000 votes.2 The vote value of 13 additional incumbents would 
have shifted about 134,000 votes from the Republican to the Democratic 
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column in the 1970 election. The removal of the bias in 1968 would, thus, 
have meant 13 fewer Democratic incumbents running in 1970 and 13 
more Republican incumbents. With this shift of incumbency would also 
go the 134,000 votes in 1970 that it attracted. What difference would this 
make in terms of seats? Not all of these votes would be cast in Republican 
winning causes or would have been drawn from what had been Demo­
cratic victories. We assume that roughly half the votes had been wasted 
by Democrats and half would be wasted by Republicans.3 We further as­
sume that the 67,000 new unwasted votes for Republicans would be 
added to the formerly wasted votes of Republicans, since they come from 
districts in which Democrats had won. In 1970, these votes are added to 
the Republican column in districts in which the mean number of Repub­
lican wasted votes had been approximately 43,000. Since the mean 
number of votes for a victory was approximately 86,000 votes and Repub­
licans, on average, started with a base of 43,000 votes, we could expect 
that the shift of 67,000 unwasted votes from Democrats to Republicans 
in 1970 would have shifted one or two more seats to the Republicans.4 
This would have raised the estimated partisan bias of 1970 from 8 to 9 
or 10 seats (table 5.10). 
Although the carryover of bias from one election to the next is not 
large, it is worth noting. Moreover, partisan bias in earlier elections may 
also carry over beyond the next election. For example, incumbents 
elected because of partisan bias in elections prior to 1968 may also have 
affected the 1970 vote. This is a real possibility because of the high rate 
of incumbent reelections. If Democrats elected another 14 incumbents 
because of partisan bias in 1966, some of these incumbents would have 
survived to run in 1970. Like the bonus incumbents of 1968, the presence 
of these 1966 bonus incumbents in the 1970 campaign would boost the 
Democratic vote and this boost would be traceable to partisan bias in the 
electoral system. 
There is a complication to estimating the carryover effects of parti­
san bias from earlier elections that has not yet been considered. The issue 
is one of double counting. Does partisan bias in earlier elections affect 
the same districts or different districts? The matter can be illustrated by 
the 1970 example. In 1970, Democrats benefited from the candidacies of 
13 incumbents who were incumbents because of partisan bias in the 1968 
election. In 1970, there were also 11 Democratic incumbents running 
who had been elected because of the pro-Democratic bias in the 1966 
election. To what extent are these incumbents likely to be the same? To 
the extent that these are different incumbents, incumbency has a greater 
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multiplier effect. If they are completely different, 24 incumbents would 
have entered the 1970 campaign by virtue of partisan bias in the previous 
two elections. This would mean that previous partisan bias has a more 
substantial effect on the current election. On the other hand, if the 1966 
bonus incumbents were returned in 1968 because of partisan bias in that 
election, we would not want to count them as independently contributing 
more to the inflated Democratic vote in 1970. 
How independent are the effects of partisan bias from one election 
to the next? Since partisan bias is a quality of the entire electoral system 
and cannot be isolated to specific incumbents, the best evidence of the 
independence of bias from one election to the next is the correlations 
between the number of unwasted votes in individual districts across elec­
tions. If there are strong negative correlations in the number of unwasted 
votes in adjacent election years, this suggests minimal overlap of partisan 
bias effects. A zero correlation suggests that partisan bias in the two years 
can be treated as independent events.5 Strong positive correlations would 
indicate considerable overlap in the location of partisan bias effects from 
one election to the next. This would mean that the effects of partisan bias 
from prior elections would be primarily limited to those incumbents ow­
ing their election to partisan bias in the most recent elections. The incum­
bents benefiting from partisan bias in the current election tend to be the 
same as those benefiting from bias in earlier elections. This would suggest 
that the residual or multiplier effects of earlier partisan bias are minimal. 
To examine the extent to which partisan bias effects overlapped 
from one election to the next, the correlations of the number of unwasted 
votes in districts won by Democrats in adjacent election years were exam­
ined for four sets of elections: 1954-56, 1964-66, 1974-76, and 1984-86. 
In all four sets, the number of unwasted votes in a district in one election 
year were positively correlated with the number of unwasted votes in that 
district in the next election year. The correlation between the number of 
unwasted votes in the same district in adjacent elections was .84 in 1954­
56, .63 in 1964-66, .65 in 1974-76, and .69 in 1984-86.6 These correla­
tions suggest that there was considerable overlap in the location of the 
partisan bias favoring Democrats from one election to the next. In the 
1970 example, of the 11 incumbents owing their 1966 election to partisan 
bias and surviving to run in 1970, probably only 3 were not helped into 
office because of electoral bias in 1968. Thus, beyond those not already 
counted based on the 1968 election, 1966 adds only three incumbents 
who owe their election to bias.7 This overlap, in turn, suggests that in­
cumbency effects from earlier elections do not transmit much of the parti­
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san bias found in those earlier elections beyond that evidenced in more 
recent elections. Moreover, for elections further removed from the pres­
ent election to carry over the earlier election's partisan bias, the incum­
bents added by the early election must not only survive to the present 
but must not have been the product of partisan bias in the intervening 
elections.8 
Incumbency exerts a sort of multiplier effect for partisan bias in 
future elections. However, the extent of its effects are constrained by the 
stability of partisan bias. The bottom line in most elections is that incum­
bency boosts the number of seats attributable to partisan bias by about 
two or three seats beyond that estimated at the particular election. 

Notes

Chapter 1 
1. Khrushchev was Communist party leader in 1954 but was vying 
with Georgy Malenkov, the Soviet premier, for full political power. Other 
time markers were that hydrogen-bomb tests had just been made public, 
Gamel Abdel Nasser was wresting control of political power in Egypt, 
Juan Peron still ruled in Argentina, Edmund Muskie had just been 
elected to his first term as governor of Maine, Johnny Carson was host of 
the CBS game show Earn Your Vacation, polio was still a common disease in 
the United States, and Sports Illustrated was in its first year of publication. 
2. In 1992, only 3 of the 258 Democrats elected to the House had 
been members when their party was last in the minority. The three Dem­
ocrats who had served under a Republican majority were Jamie Whitten 
(MS, 1941), Jack Brooks (TX, 1953), and William Natcher (KY, 1953). 
Natcher passed away in early 1994. Sidney Yates (IL) also served prior to 
1954 but did not serve continuously throughout this period. None of the 
176 Republicans elected in 1992 served when their party was last in the 
majority. As of the 1992 election, the longest serving Republican was 
then-minority leader Bob Michel (IL). He began his congressional career 
in the 1956 election, two years after the Republicans last controlled the 
House. He retired from the House in 1994. 
3. The U.S. Bureau of the Census report of Voting and Registration 
in the Election of November 1992 indicates that the median age of voters in 
that election was 44 years of age, indicating that the median-aged voter 
in that election had been born in 1948. In 1994, if one assumes the same 
age distribution of voters (and midterm electorates are usually several 
years older than presidential electorates on average [Campbell, 1993, 
49]), a median-aged voter of 44 years of age would have been born in 
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1950. In 1954, this median-aged 1994 voter would have been only four 
years old. In 1992, over 35 percent of those reporting having voted in 
that election were born after 1954. 
4. Because of the diversity of views within the parties, it is possible 
for a coalition crossing party lines to control the policy-making process. 
The conservative coalition of predominantly southern conservative Dem­
ocrats and most Republicans has from time to time emerged as an 
important factor shaping the congressional policy-making process. How­
ever, in most cases, the party rules; and even when a majority coalition 
forms, the majority party continues to have substantial institutional 
powers. 
5. The origin of the savings-and-loan crisis might be traced to the 
deregulation of that industry begun in the late 1970s and the raising of 
the insurance cap to $100,000. This occurred under unified Democratic 
control of the government. However, the crisis did not materialize imme­
diately but eventually grew to gigantic proportions under divided gov­
ernment in the 1980s. 
6. The infrequency of close elections or marginal districts, espe­
cially in contests involving incumbents, has been well documented in the 
congressional elections literature. Moreover, although districts won with 
a higher vote margin in recent years may be just as marginal as those won 
previously with smaller margins because of the vote volatility of a less 
partisan electorate, there has been a decline in recent years in the num­
ber of marginal or vulnerable seats. See Mayhew (1974), Jacobson (1990, 
1992, and 1993), Bauer and Hibbing (1989), and Garand et al. (1993). 
7. Of the 382 incumbents running in the 1994 general election, 347 
(90.8 percent) won reelection. All 35 defeated incumbents were Demo­
crats. In regard to term limits, 7 of 8 states considering term-limit initia­
tives approved them, bringing to 22 the number of states approving some 
form of term limits on members of the House. The only state defeating a 
term-limit initiative in 1994 was Utah. However, this was not a real set­
back to the term-limits movement, since Utah had previously adopted 
term limits and was voting on a more restrictive measure. 
8. The idea of what constitutes good representation continues to be 
a matter of controversy. Viewpoints of appropriate representational ide­
als range from the delegate to trustee perspectives. There are many un­
settled normative questions regarding how representatives should do 
their jobs—whether they should do what they think is right or only what 
their constituents want, whether they should respond to all of their con­
stituents or those who care most about issues, whether they should try to 
represent the immediate concerns of their constituents or anticipate the 
constituency's more permanent concerns, whether they should confine 
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their concerns for the limited geographic constituency or the nation as a 
whole. The present discussion does not require a position on these ques­
tions, rather only an understanding that elections are an inducement to 
good representation however defined. 
9. It is true that surveys indicate that citizens have only a hazy idea 
of which party is in the congressional majority. From one perspective, this 
may raise doubts about whether the Democratic dynasty caused voter 
frustration. From a different perspective, however, citizens may have 
"tuned out" congressional politics in light of the lack of real competition. 
Additionally, the argument is not that the perceived permanence of the 
Democratic majority frustrated everyone, or even most people, only that 
it frustrated a significant number of citizens (perhaps a large subset of the 
politically knowledgeable public). 
10. The range of realistic combined presidential-congressional 
choices also appear restricted. Rather than having options spanning the 
spectrum from unified Democratic government to divided government 
to unified Republican government, the electorate actually confronts a sit­
uation in which the practical choice is between a unified Democratic gov­
ernment and divided government. 
11. David Rohde (1991) found that party unity in congressional 
roll-call voting increased through the 1980s. However, this increase ap­
pears to have occurred despite the permanence of the Democratic dy­
nasty. Rohde traces the increase to congressional leadership, reforms that 
provided resources for leadership, and an increasing homogenization of 
the Democratic Party. A generation of older southern Democrats once 
much more conservative than their nonsouthern colleagues were being 
replaced over the years by southern Democrats who were more ideologi­
cally similar to nonsouthern Democrats. Many of the more conservative 
seats in the South were being won by Republicans. An additional reason 
for increasing party unity was President Reagan's conservative program. 
It is quite possible, however, that party unity would have been even 
greater in the 1980s if the Democratic majority was seriously imperiled. 
12. Rep. Jim Leach labeled the Democratic dominance of the 
House as a problem of "padlock" at a conference entitled "Government 
in Gridlock: What Happens Now?" cosponsored by the Committee on 
the Constitutional System and the Brookings Institution at the National 
Press Club, 24 February 1993. Sundquist (1993) provides a report of 
this conference. 
13. For example, the Democratic dynasty may directly weaken 
political parties, but it may also indirectly weaken them by increasing 
the likelihood of divided government, exacerbating institutional con­
flicts, weakening public support for the political system, and dampening 
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political competition. Similarly, fixed Democratic control of the House 
may also directly weaken public support for the system but may also 
weaken it by reducing political competition, increasing the likelihood of 
"gridlock," and weakening the political parties. The causal model omits 
a variety of factors external to the model that might be taken into ac­
count. It also omits, for the sake of clarity, several possible interaction 
effects, including the likely interaction effects of both party competition 
and party strength with divided government on interbranch conflict. 
That is, divided government may have weaker effects on interbranch con­
flict when parties are weaker and also when they are less competitive. 
14. While Republicans undoubtedly are also concerned about ob­
taining a share of federal largesse for their districts, more Democrats may 
tackle the assignment without compunction, if not with relish, while more 
Republicans may be less enthusiastic about obtaining local benefits for 
their districts that they might consider unwise or inappropriate pork-
barrel legislation. This ideological difference may also be reflected in the 
candidates nominated by the parties. Because of their progovernment 
inclinations, Democrats may have an easier time finding qualified candi­
dates willing to make the sacrifices necessary to run for office. 
15. A related explanation is that congressional Democrats have not 
yet felt the full effects of the partisan realignment that has reshaped presi­
dential politics over the last two decades. Southern congressional Demo­
crats have been able to keep their national party at arm's length and have 
not been pressed by Republicans, since the Republican organizational 
and activist base in the South was extremely weak. As a result, southern 
congressional Democrats, who might have been defeated if there had 
been an established competitive party system in the region, survived. 
Some have termed this the development of a two-tier party system, a 
realigned presidential system and patched-together New Deal system for 
other offices. 
16. A third Democratic candidate advantage is in the quality of 
their candidates, quality being defined by the objective characteristics 
that are usually associated with a successful candidacy. For a variety of 
reasons, compared to their Republican counterparts, Democratic chal­
lengers more often have greater prior political experience and are thus 
more formidable campaigners. Republican incumbents are more likely to 
face tougher opponents than are Democratic incumbents. While this is a 
candidate effect, it also may be intrinsic to differences between the par­
ties. Ehrenhalt (1991) argues that the Democratic ideology and progov­
ernment orientation naturally provides the party with a richer pool of 
candidates. Thus, this particular candidate advantage may provide voters 
with good partisan reasons to vote for Democrats and thus may be as 
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much an intentional reason for the Democratic majority as a contextual 
reason. 
17. Votes are termed "unwasted" or "wasted" on the basis of 
whether they obtain representation in the legislature. Unwasted votes 
obtain representation in the election of a candidate (and party) for which 
the vote is cast. Wasted votes, those cast for losing candidates, do not 
receive this representation. One might claim that unwasted votes in ex­
cess of those necessary to win a seat are wasted. However, these voters do 
obtain representation. The unwasted votes (beyond the minimum neces­
sary to win the seat) may better be thought of as an inefficient expendi­
ture of votes rather than a waste of votes. 
18. In this part of the analysis, votes will be counted as either 
wasted or unwasted according to whether they were cast for the candi­
date winning the seat, unwasted votes being those cast for the winner. 
Both types of votes enter into the overrepresentation of voters. Th e re­
sponsiveness of the electoral system, as for instance reflected in the "cube 
law" of single-member-district plurality-vote systems, is a result of a larger 
share of the minority party's vote being wasted in losing causes. Bias, in 
contrast, shows up in one party generally using more unwasted votes in 
each of its victories. 
19. The difference in the example of 20,000 votes may not sound 
like a big difference. In fact, it would make little difference if we were 
only talking about two districts. However, the mean votes for each party 
are based on many districts, and therefore the discrepancy can shift a 
substantial number of seats from one party to the other. If each party in 
the example held 217 seats in the House, Republican winners would have 
totalled almost 4.5 million more votes than Democratic winners (23.9 mil­
lion to 19.5 million). 
20. The Fourteenth Amendment, ratified in 1868, among other 
things amended the original apportionment criteria of Article 1, Section 
2. As originally ratified, the Constitution apportioned seats to the states 
according to "the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound 
to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three 
fifths of all other Persons." This was the infamous three-fifths compro­
mise regarding the counting of slaves. The second section of the Four­
teenth Amendment indicates that "Representatives shall be apportioned 
among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting 
the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed." 
It is important to note that both the original and the amended apportion­
ment provisions based the allocation of representatives to the states on 
the number of people in the state, not the number of actual citizens, the 
number of voting-age citizens, the number of eligible voters, the number 
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of registered voters, or the number of actual voters. While these distinc­
tions may not have made much difference in the early years of the repub­
lic, the population criterion now has important implications. Among 
other reasons, it is important because of illegal immigration and the 
extension of the population criteria to the apportionment of districts 
within states (through one-person, one-vote apportionment standards 
mandated by judicial rulings). This establishes the seemingly odd ar­
rangement by which many people are counted for the purposes of appor­
tioning districts but who are then not allowed to participate in the 
selection of the district's representative. 
21. Some states maintained at-large elections on a regular basis and 
some used them on a temporary basis until district boundaries could be 
redrawn after reapportionments. For instance, as late as 1962, eight states 
(Alabama, Connecticut, Hawaii, Maryland, Michigan, New Mexico, Ohio, 
and Texas) having more than a single seat held at-large elections for at 
least one of their representatives. 
Chapter 2 
1. A comparison to other national offices is also instructive. Demo­
crats sustained a 26-year majority in the Senate, from the 1954 to the 
1980 election. Earlier Senate majorities had been maintained over 18 
years (Republicans from 1860 to 1876 and 1894 to 1910). Since 1854, the 
longest continuous single-party control of the presidency was the Repub­
licans' 24-year rule beginning in Lincoln's 1860 election and ending with 
Cleveland's election in 1884. Democrats held the presidency for 20 con­
tinuous years from 1932 to 1952, with Franklin Roosevelt's four terms 
followed by Truman's 1948 victory. Even considering aberrant elections 
in each of these series (breaking up perfect continuity), the recent Demo­
cratic dynasty in the House is impressive by comparison. It is all the more 
impressive in light of the shorter terms for the House, putting consistent 
party control more often at risk. 
2. Keith et al. (1992) and Miller (1991) find that the decline of par­
tisanship has been exaggerated. The analysis by Keith et al. indicates that 
measurement error contributed to the perception that partisanship de­
clined more than it really did. By counting independents leaning toward 
a party as independents rather than as partisans, the correct classification 
according to their analysis, political observers had overestimated the per­
centage of independents in the electorate. 
3. In actuality, only one of these presidential elections, Cleveland's 
first election in 1876, produced divided results between the president 
and the House of Representatives. The other case (1884) was a case of 
a division between the party controlling the presidency and the party 
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controlling the Senate. While it might be said that the 1916 election 
yielded divided results, since Democrat Woodrow Wilson won the White 
House while Republicans outnumbered Democrats in the House, the 
Democrats with the help of third-party members organized the House. 
4. There actually appear to be three eras of divided government. 
Fiorina (1992b) rightly observes that divided government was not so rare 
an event in the later half of the nineteenth century, although it usually 
occurred as a result of presidential party losses in midterm elections and 
not in presidential election years. Thus, in its first era (before 1900), di­
vided government occurred in midterm elections. In the second era 
(from 1900 to 1952), divided government was quite uncommon. In the 
third era (from 1954 to the present), divided government has been 
common. 
5. As an indication of how close the Democrats came to the perfect 
consistency of dominance of lower chambers in state legislatures, they 
would have equalled or exceeded the number of lower chambers con­
trolled by Republicans in 1968 if they had won: two more seats in Cali­
fornia (out of 80), or three more seats in Nevada (out of 70), or one 
more seat in Tennessee (out of 99), or three more seats in Wisconsin (out 
of 100). 
6. The presidency has characteristics of both a national office and 
an office elected by state electoral systems, since nearly all Electoral Col­
lege votes are determined by winner-take-all systems at the state level. 
On the other hand, unlike statewide races for governor or senator, presi­
dential campaigns are national in scope, are covered by the media as na­
tional events and involve the same set of candidates. If it is classified as a 
statewide office, given the Electoral College electoral system, the lower 
success rates of Democratic presidential candidates than those for other 
"statewide" offices may be attributable to (1) the greater volatility of the 
higher-profile presidential contest, in which voters might rely less on ei­
ther incumbency or partisanship, and (2) the more heterogenous nature 
of the Democratic coalition, which is more difficult to hold together for a 
single presidential candidate than a number of Senate or gubernatorial 
candidates tailored to each state's particular mix of the Democratic 
coalition. 
7. This pattern is all the more notable since presidential coattails 
are stronger for these offices and the coattails of successful presidential 
candidates have as often as not belonged to a Republican. That is, Repub­
lican success in presidential contests should made a Democratic dynasty 
in the House (and in state legislatures) less likely than in the Senate or 
governorships. Presidential coattails in House elections are roughly twice 
as long as those in Senate elections (Campbell, 1993, 185). Some of this 
difference, however, may be offset by the fact that coattails in the House 
254 • NOTES TO CHAPTER 2 
are more often wasted because of uncontested seats. This has been partic­
ularly true for several recent Republican presidential candidates who had 
strong drawing power in the southern states, where the Republican Party 
locally remains weak and has often left Democratic incumbents unchal­
lenged (Campbell, 1993, 194). Nevertheless, one would expect that Re­
publican presidential coattails would have done greater damage to House 
Democrats than to Senate or gubernatorial Democrats. 
8. One possibility is that fewer and smaller districts more accurately 
reflect the preferences of the national vote and that, as the majority party, 
this should have been beneficial to Democrats. However, this explanation 
would not anticipate the large variance in the effective size of districts 
(the numbers of voters) that we will see shortly. Fiorina (1992, 66-85) 
also suggests several alternative explanations for why Democrats have a 
stronger record in legislative elections. He suggests that voters upset with 
government practices and policies have reason to vote for executives of 
the opposing party while maintaining the dominant party in their legisla­
tive districts. The maintenance of the dominant party in the district re­
flects the aggregate advantages of party incumbency or majority status 
(with the powers to reward their incumbents and their districts with pork-
barrel projects). He also suggests that some moderate voters who view 
Republicans as closer to their issue positions and the executive branch as 
more responsible for determining policy would vote for a Republican 
executive and Democratic legislative split ticket to get a policy blend 
closer to their preferred position. However, neither version of the Repub­
lican executive and Democratic legislative distinction accounts for the dif­
ference between Democratic success in the House versus the Senate. The 
cheap-seats distinction between large and small electoral districts, on the 
other hand, is consistent with the different records of Democratic success 
in House and Senate elections. 
9. The statement refers only to the direct effects of turnout. Turn­
out may, indirectly, affect the electoral fortunes of candidates. The vote 
divisions in many elections are affected one way or the other by district 
turnout—whether supporters or opponents are mobilized. 
10. Put differently, because of unequal turnout among districts, it 
is mathematically possible for a party to win a majority of the vote in a 
majority of a state's congressional districts and still not win a majority of 
the vote statewide. Note also the different reasonable preferences of 
House versus statewide candidates in the following situation. A candidate 
for a district office would rather receive 80 percent of the district vote 
than 60 percent, regardless of turnout. However, a rational, vote-
maximizing statewide candidate would rather get 60 percent of the vote 
from a district casting 400,000 votes than 80 percent of the vote in a 
district casting 150,000 votes. The high-turnout district adds 80,000 votes 
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to the candidate's margin (240,000 for and 160,000 against), while the 
low-turnout district adds on 60,000 votes to the candidate's margin 
(120,000 for and 80,000 against). 
11. There are two exceptions to the election of House members 
by the single-member-district, plurality-rule system. First, multimember 
districts or at-large seats have been used in the past (though infrequently 
since the 1940s and usually only if redistricting had not been completed 
in time for the election). New Mexico and North Dakota, for instance, 
held at-large elections for its seats into the early 1960s. Texas had an at-
large seat until the mid-1960s. Second, some states use a majority-rule 
runoff system rather than a plurality-rule system. 
12. The electoral system characteristics of "responsiveness" and 
"partisan bias" often raise questions of the fairness of representation un­
der an electoral system. Since partisan bias is asymmetric, benefiting one 
party regardless of circumstances, a biased electoral system is generally 
regarded as unfair to some voters and parties. The "overrepresentation" 
of the majority because of system responsiveness is generally not consid­
ered unfair representation, since it is an advantage to any party that ob­
tains a majority. Some views of fairness, however, would indict any system 
that deviates from proportional representation for any reason, including 
system responsiveness and the wasting of votes by minority parties. While 
this is an extreme view of electoral system fairness, Lani Guinier (1994) 
proposes an even more extreme view based on her "principle of taking 
turns." By this standard, proportional representation of a majority could 
be considered unfairly prohibiting a minority from exercising its turn at 
governance. In examining the effect of the electoral system on racial poli­
tics in chapter 9, we will return to Guinier's analysis. 
13. The association between party coalition characteristics and 
turnout only makes a difference to the representation of the parties be­
cause of the equal population (rather than equal number of voters) basis 
on which congressional districts are drawn. Congressional districts are 
initially constructed so that they are as nearly equal in population (rather 
than actual voters) as state boundaries, census accuracy and the division 
of a fixed number of seats will allow rather than constructed so that they 
are as nearly equal in their number of actual voters. If boundaries took 
different turnout rates into account, potential bias would be attenuated. 
14. It is ironic that the equal-population, single-member-district 
rules grew out of legislative statute and that Supreme Court rulings 
meant to ensure fairness are required elements in the creation of partisan 
bias in the electoral system. It is a further irony that this system has not 
only created inequity in the treatment of parties but also in the treatment 
of voters. This may be yet another case of the unintended consequences 
of electoral reforms. 
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15. While the thesis does not require gerrymandering to produce 
partisan bias in favor of the Democrats, it does not exclude the possibility 
either. Pro-Democratic partisan bias, reflected in their winning cheap 
seats, may be caused by a variety of factors, including the gerrymander­
ing of district boundaries to create safe Democratic districts without ex­
pending many Democratic votes. 
16. The proposition linking the sociodemographic characteristics 
to partisan bias in single-member-district systems depends on the size of 
the district and the extent of turnout. Obviously, in the extreme case, 
where there is a district for every citizen, there can be no bias (if one 
assumes that a vote is required to obtain representation from the one-
person district). Also, there can be no bias from this arrangement if all 
eligible voters actually vote. The proposition depends on a quasi-proxy 
voting arrangement in the district, representation being accorded to citi­
zens (whether voting or not) and representation being decided by a sub­
set of citizens actually voting. 
17. This would also apply to the districting schemes that attempt 
to reflect the turnout-related sociodemographic characteristics more di­
rectly, paying less heed to geographic concentrations. As an example, dis­
tricting systems designed to concentrate racial minorities into common 
districts, regardless of geographic concentrations, may produce partisan 
bias if those minorities vote at lower-than-average rates and associate with 
one party significantly more than the other. 
18. The cheap-seats thesis in its most general form may apply to a 
wide range of electoral systems. It may even apply to multimember dis­
trict, proportional representation systems, although the links of geo­
graphic units to socioeconomic backgrounds, turnout, and partisanship 
may be substantially weakened by both district magnitude (the number 
of representatives) and the proportional representation rule. In addition, 
high levels of turnout in many nations, which suggest reduced variance 
among their districts in turnout (to obtain a high overall turnout rate, 
most districts must have high turnout which compresses the distribution), 
indicates a smaller potential for cheap-seat effects. 
19. Bias might still be created by different winning vote margins 
for the parties. If one party, on average, won with higher district vote 
percentages than the opposition, it would expend more unwasted votes 
per victory than the opposition (indicating bias), even though it did not 
do disproportionately well in low-turnout districts. 
Chapter 3 
1. Connelly and Pitney's (1994) Congress' Permanent Minority f pro­
vides an excellent review of what Republicans believed to be the basis 
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of their inability to end the Democratic dynasty. Republicans named 
the usual systemic suspects for their minority status—gerrymandering, 
incumbency advantages, and generally buying votes, albeit indirectly, 
through big-government pork-barrel programs. Connelly and Pitney 
(12) cite the 1992 Republican platform that claims the Democratic control 
of the House is based on a "swindle by law." However, they also observed 
a good deal of self-criticism among Republicans. Specifically, according 
to Connelly and Pitney (12-14), Republicans thought that their party had 
often failed to mount sufficiently aggressive challenges to the Democrats 
because of the complacency by entrenched Republican incumbents, the 
nomination of weak and politically unattractive challengers, the failure to 
articulate clearly and consistently a palatable and coherent national mes­
sage to the public, and the incompetence of the national party campaign 
organizations and advisors. 
2. In contrast to professional politicians, political scientists have 
showed only marginal interest in exploring the reasons for the Demo­
cratic success in the House. The Democratic dominance in the House 
has been examined directly by Ornstein (1990) and Connelly and Pitney 
(1994). It has also been examined indirectly in the course of explaining 
the increased frequency of divided government by Jacobson (1991) and 
Brady (1993) and indirectly in addressing charges of congressional stag­
nation by Mann (1987). However, with these notable exceptions, the sub­
ject has not received the scholarly attention that it deserves. David 
Broder, dean of Washington pundits and columnist for the Washington 
Post, noted in a pre-1994 election column the general inattention to the 
consequences of the longevity of the Democratic control of the House 
(1994). Broder quoted former Representative Lynn Martin's (R-IL) com­
ments from 10 years before: "If the presidency had been in control of 
one party for almost thirty years that fact—and its implications for our 
political and governmental system—would be the topic of half the news­
paper columns and Ph.D. theses in political science. The Democrats have 
been in control of the House of Representatives that long—and no one 
seems to notice." 
3. This categorization of causes is similar to the categories identi­
fied by Jacobson (1990) in his exploration of the causes of divided 
government. 
4. These figures are based on National Election Study (NES) re­
spondents who claim to have voted in the election. The elections are from 
1952 to 1990, omitting 1954 because of the lack of a comparable NES 
study that year. The figures were calculated from data reported in Keith 
et al. (1992, tables 1.1, 3.4, and 3.5). The summary percentages of parti­
sans count independents leaning toward one party as partisans of that 
party, as the research by Keith et al. strongly indicates, is the appropriate 
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assignment. Pure independents typically amounted to about 9 percent 
(varying from 6 to 12 percent) of self-reported voters. The few apolitical 
voters in the surveys were excluded in calculating the percentages. The 
typical number of self-reported voters in partisan categories are the me­
dians of the 19 NES studies. 
5. This may be a function of the Democratic Party's majority status 
(Riker, 1962). Making the same point as Will Rogers, former Democratic 
congressman Morris Udall decades later said, "When the Democratic 
Party forms a firing squad we form a circle" (Henning, 1992, 67). Also, 
recall in figure 1.2 that the nature of the parties' coalitions was specified 
as having a positive interaction effect on the impact of partisanship on 
the congressional vote. 
6. This is actually a contextual explanation of the Democratic dy­
nasty rather than purely an intentional explanation. The nature of the 
Democratic and Republican Party coalitions only helps Democrats obtain 
a majority of congressional votes because of the congressional electoral 
system. The system of single-member districts and the provision of voting 
for individual candidates rather than party slates often segregates con­
flicting portions of the Democratic coalition in different districts. These 
institutional arrangements allow the separate and contentious elements 
of the Democratic coalition to win representation without doing so at the 
expense of other parts of the coalition. 
7. It should be emphasized that all of the claims regarding why 
voters might be more inclined to favor Democrats for Congress than for 
other offices concern a small minority of voters. Although ticket splitting 
(House and presidential votes) rose from roughly 15 percent of ballots 
cast from 1952 to 1968 to about 26 percent after 1972, about three of 
four voters do not split their tickets for these offices. Additionally, roughly 
a quarter (between 17 percent and 36 percent, since 1972) of split tickets 
in recent years have voted for Republican congressional candidates and 
Democrats at the presidential level. Moreover, of the roughly 20 percent 
of the electorate that casts Democratic-congressional and Republican-
presidential split tickets, many undoubtedly are not casting them as any 
sort of combination vote. That is, the choice of a Democrat at the congres­
sional level and a Republican at the presidential level may be inde­
pendent decisions affected by any number of factors, from candidate 
character to incumbency to visibility to particular issue stands. Thus, it is 
likely that the votes of 10 percent or less of the electorate are motivated 
by an attempt to balance partisan influence in government. 
8. The notion that a significant number of voters intentionally fa­
vors divided representation is generally stated at the district level (a Dem­
ocratic member of the House and a Republican president). However, it is 
sometimes raised to the institutional level that voters want divided gov­
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ernment. At this level the thesis becomes less plausible, because of evi­
dence of voter ignorance. Bennett and Bennett (1993), in examining 
NES data from 1960 to 1984, found low levels of public knowledge about 
which party controls the House of Representatives, despite the fact that 
there was no change in decades. They examined an index of "Knowledge 
of Party Control of the House of Representatives," an index based on the 
number of correct responses to two questions, which party had a majority 
in the House before and then after the election (individuals could score 
0, 1, or 2). Mean scores ranged from about .9 (1980) to about 1.4 (1964). 
The public was least clear about who held a majority in the House when 
the government was divided. For instance, the 1980 NES postelection 
survey indicated that nearly half of the respondents thought that the elec­
tion had installed a Republican majority in the House, another third indi­
cated that they did not know which party now held the House, and only 
about one in six respondents correctly identified the Democrats as being 
in the majority! Correcting for guessing would suggest even greater pub­
lic ignorance. Moreover, Bennett and Bennett (1992) found that split-
ticket voting was least frequent among those who knew which party 
controlled the House. These findings pose a serious challenge any thesis 
suggesting that voters intentionally seek divided government. 
9. Jacobson (1990, 65) also argues that Republicans have suffered 
because many of their candidates are inexperienced. The puzzle of weak 
Republican candidates may, however, be rooted in the party's conserva­
tive ideology, which more highly prizes the private sector over public ser­
vice, as Ehrenhalt suggests (1991). It may also be the case that the same 
partisan bias in House elections is present in state legislative election. As 
noted in chapter 2, Democrats have also done especially well in state leg­
islative races, for offices that, like the House, are elected at the district 
level and therefore allow the cheap-seats phenomena. If so, then the nat­
ural pool of potential experienced Republican House candidates, Repub­
lican state legislators, may also be sparse for the same structural reasons 
that work against the election of Republican House candidates. 
10. Independents leaning toward a party are counted as partisans. 
Democratic identification dropped below 50 percent in 1984 (48.5 per­
cent) and 1988 (47.5 percent). 
11. Assuming no bias in the system, the swing ratio can be applied 
by the following equation: (V — 50) X R = (S - 50), where Fis the party's 
vote percentage, R is the swing ratio, and S is the party's seat percentage. 
Thus, using a swing ratio of 2 yields an expected seat percentage of S = 
[(V — 50) x 2] + 50. For example, a vote of 55 percent should yield 60 
percent of the seats. Alternatively, with known seat and vote percentages 
(assuming again no bias) a swing ratio can be computed as R = (S — 50)/ 
(V - 50). 
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12. The data in table 3.1 indicate that the Democratic majorities in 
seats in each of these elections would have been sizable even if they fell 
short of a majority of votes. Assuming that Democrats had won exactly 
50 percent of the vote in these elections, they would have maintained a 
majority of seats in each case (54.4 percent of seats in 1962, 55 percent 
of seats in 1966, 54.5 percent in 1968, 54.1 percent in 1980, and 54.3 
percent in 1984). These figures, of course, assume that Jacobson's swing-
ratio estimate is accurate. Other estimates differ relatively little from 
Jacobson's. Tufte (1978, 546) estimated a swing ratio of 2.2 from 1900 
through 1970. Ansolabehere et al. (1992, 31) estimate a swing ratio for 
all districts of 2.9 from 1946 to 1964 and 1.3 from 1966 to 1990. If the 
swing ratio is actually greater than 2 before 1964 and 1.5 thereafter, the 
size of Democratic seat majorities won with less than a majority of votes 
could be expected to be smaller. However, as the last column in table 3.1 
indicates, it is unlikely that the true swing ratio has been large enough 
that Democrats would have lost their seat majorities in these elections if 
their vote totals had fallen short of a majority. The "necessary" swing ratio 
is based on the slope between two points in each year—the observed vote 
and seat percentages for the Democrats and the 50 percent vote and 50 
percent seat point from the assumption of an unbiased electoral system. 
13. A third candidate advantage has received a great deal of atten­
tion in recent years, the quality or experience of candidates, especially 
challengers. According to Jacobson (1990, 62-65), Democratic chal­
lengers have generally had greater political experience and have been 
higher-quality candidates than Republican challengers. This candidate 
advantage is not considered a contextual factor that helped preserve the 
Democratic dynasty since it may more appropriately be categorized as an 
intentional reason for voting for Democrats. The fact that Democratic 
candidates have been more experienced may be an advantage intrinsic 
to the party or part of being a Democrat. Ehrenhalt (1991) argues that 
Democrats have had more experienced, stronger candidates because 
Democrats are progovernment and many want to make politics a career. 
Republicans, on the other hand, may be innately at a disadvantage since 
they are often antigovernment and are less enthusiastic about making 
politics a career. To the extent that the Democrats' candidate quality ad­
vantage reflects a systemic advantage rather than something intrinsic to 
the parties and their philosophies, the analysis will have underestimated 
contextual effects. 
14. This is not to claim that incumbency provides automatic votes. 
It should be seen as a set of opportunities for candidates, opportunities 
that are readily exploited by most incumbent candidates. 
15. The Democratic incumbency and uncontested-seat advantages 
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must be considered together to avoid double counting, since incumbents 
hold the overwhelming number of uncontested seats. 
16. It should be noted that incumbency produces votes through 
a variety of mechanisms, and the effects of some of these mechanisms 
are in dispute (e.g., the value of casework). Among other things, these 
mechanisms include the incumbents' campaign-fund-raising and name-
recognition and familiarity advantages over challengers. While incum­
bency itself offers opportunities to exploit in order to enjoy these benefits 
and therefore varies from incumbent to incumbent rather than being a 
constant or across-the-board sort of vote boost, there is little evidence to 
suggest that it varies by party. That is, incumbency generally seems to be 
as beneficial for Republican incumbents as it is for Democratic incum­
bents. The calculations that follow in the chapter assume this general 
equivalence. 
17. Gilmour and Rothstein (1993) observed that the retirement 
rate of Republican incumbents has been greater than the retirement rate 
of Democratic incumbents in every congressional election from 1954 to 
1990. While this contributes to the Democratic incumbency advantage 
and, therefore, the Democratic dominance of the House, this contribu­
tion is rather modest. The effect of this consistent difference is limited 
since the retirement rate differences are themselves often small (e.g., a 
0.3 percent difference in 1982, a 0.5 percent difference in 1968, and a 
0.6 percent difference in 1980), since typically more than 90 percent of 
incumbents of both parties seek reelection, and since, as Jacobson (1990, 
36) and Fiorina (1992a, 23) observe, the parties typically hold better than 
70 percent of the seats left by their retiring incumbents. 
18. The principal challenge to this notion is that Democrats do 
about as well in open seats as in incumbent seats (Gaddie, 1995). Citing 
the partisan standoff in open seats, Jacobson argues that "it is clear from 
this evidence that incumbency cannot, by itself, explain why Republicans 
have not done better in House elections" (1990, 37). Fiorina (1992a, 21­
23, 1992c, 395-96) also challenges the incumbency basis for Democratic 
seat majorities, noting from Jacobson that Democrats have retained 80 
percent of their open seats while Republicans have held 72 percent of 
their seats. This retention rate conflicts with a pure incumbency explana­
tion of Democratic dominance. According to Fiorina, "If the Republicans 
had achieved parity except for incumbency, they would have narrowed 
the gap in the House. That they have not indicates that some other pro-
Democratic force(s) is at work" (1992c, 396). However, the continuity of a 
party holding seats despite the loss of incumbent candidates is quite un­
derstandable in light of both the importance of partisanship and the 
cheap-seats thesis. Because of partisanship, Democratic districts tend to 
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remain Democratic, though at lower margins. Similarly, Republican dis­
tricts stay Republican, though also at lower margins. There tend to be 
more Democratic than Republican districts partly because Democratic 
voters are scattered across many cheap seats while Republicans are con­
centrated in fewer high-turnout districts. 
19. As Jacobson noted "since 1954, no election year has produced 
more than 2 uncontested open seats" (1990, 46). 
20. The drop-off in presidential election years between the total 
presidential vote and the total congressional vote cast in uncontested dis­
tricts, compared to contested districts, indicates that congressional turn­
out would increase if the seat were contested. In addition, it is apparent 
that the unchallenged candidate receives some votes that would have 
gone to the opposing party had that alternative been available on the 
ballot. 
21. The 23 points represent a 20 percent discount of the 29 per­
centage point change observed by Jacobson (1993, 50). 
22. The uncontested advantage may be best understood with a hy­
pothetical district. We start with a base of 100 votes in a contested district. 
On the basis of the adjusted estimate of the uncontested advantage, the 
vote would divide 77 percent to 23 percent. If the district were uncon­
tested, on the basis of the net drop-off of 23 percent, there would be 77 
votes (of course, all cast to the dominant party). Perhaps 3 to 5 of these 
77 would have voted for the opposition party if that option were avail­
able. On the other hand, perhaps 3 to 5 would-be supporters of the domi­
nant party stayed home because there was no challenge. The net 
expected result of the opposition party mounting a challenge would re­
sult in 23 votes out of 100 for the opposition party with the dominant 
party holding its base of 77 votes (though not necessarily the same 77 
votes that it held in the uncontested situation). 
23. The decade estimates of the incumbency advantage (in the vote 
percentage expected due to incumbency) are from Levitt and Wolfram 
(1996, figure 1). Decade, rather than yearly, estimates are used since the 
decade estimates are more likely to tap the structural effects of incum­
bency rather than the cumulative successes or failures of candidates who 
also happen to be incumbents. The reported standard errors of these 
estimates range from .2 to .4. 
24. The total national vote for each party was estimated from vari­
ous volumes of the U.S. Statistical Abstract and Congressional Quarterly's 
Guide to U.S. Elections. The starting point was the total vote for each party 
reported in the Statistical Abstracts. These were a number of adjustments 
required to these figures. Included in the adjustments were the exclusion 
of votes cast in the District of Columbia; a recalculation of votes cast in 
New York prior to 1960 so that votes cast for a major party candidate 
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cross-endorsed on a minor party line would be counted for the major 
party; a recalculation of votes cast in multiseat, at-large elections in New 
Mexico, North Dakota, and Hawaii in the 1950s and 1960s; and estimates 
of votes cast in uncontested seats in states that do not report the vote in 
uncontested elections (Arkansas, Oklahoma, and Florida). The estimates 
of votes in uncontested seats in these states was made by adjusting the 
reported presidential vote in these districts by the mean drop-off rate 
between the presidential and congressional votes in uncontested districts 
for states that report the vote in uncontested districts. To estimate these 
votes in midterm elections, reported or estimated votes in adjacent years 
were used and further adjusted by the rate of the national turnout de­
cline from the on-year to the midterm election. 
25. Recall that even with candidate advantages, the Democratic 
vote fell short of 52 percent in four cases—1956, 1966, 1968, and 1980. 
Without the candidate advantages, we can add the 1954, 1962, 1972, 
1984, 1990, and 1992 elections to those in which Democrats had narrow 
vote majorities of 52 percent or less of the two-party vote. 
Chapter 4 
1. The basic questions addressed here are essentially measurement 
questions rather than explanatory questions. We seek to determine 
whether and to what extent partisan bias exists. While the alternative 
measure of partisan bias will, in a sense, also reveal why partisan bias 
exists (because Democrats are winning cheap or low-turnout seats), it will 
be explained (or treated as a dependent variable) in chapter 6. Chapter 
9 will offer some speculations regarding the effects of partisan bias (parti­
san bias as an independent variable). 
2. Grofman (1983) examined eight different measures of partisan 
bias. These included two measures that would not distinguish between 
bias and responsiveness as sources of over- or underrepresentation or the 
deviation from proportional representation. Several of the other mea­
sures attempt to summarize the extent of bias across the entire range of 
the vote rather than at a single point (i.e., the 50 percent of the vote 
mark), though they require the hypothetical approach to the estimation 
of bias. While it is conceptually satisfying to have a measure of bias that 
summarizes bias across the full vote range (bias when both parties receive 
50 percent of the vote, 51 percent of the vote, etc.), there is no reason to 
believe that the conventional 50 percent of the vote bias estimate would 
not be highly correlated with the summary measure. Moreover, the con­
ventional measure is more directly interpretable, and, in a two-party sys­
tem, the majority vote or seat threshold is of particularly great theoretical 
and practical significance. 
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3. A nonlinear estimation technique is technically the most appro­
priate, since both vote and seat proportions are bounded at 0 and 100 
and since the relationship between seats and votes in every electoral sys­
tem is anchored, awarding a party no seats if it gets no votes and all the 
seats if it receives all the votes. Nonetheless, since the distribution of seats 
and votes in the congressional electoral system is exclusively in the 
middle of the range of both seats and votes, estimation by linear regres­
sion is quite acceptable from a practical standpoint (see Tufte, 1973). 
4. For instance, a Democratic Party vote-seats regression with a 
slope equal to 2 and a constant of negative 50 would yield an expected 
Democratic seat percentage of 50 ((2 X 50) — 50 = 50) when the vote 
percentage is 50. This indicates a neutral electoral system. If the constant 
had been a negative 45, however, the expected seat percentage would 
have been 55 ((2 X 50) — 45 = 55), indicating a pro-Democratic bias of 
5 percentage points. 
5. The violation of the uniform-district vote swing is especially 
problematic if, as in the example in the text, the true vote swing is associ­
ated with the district's vote. In this example, the hypothetical data ap­
proach would underestimate electoral system responsiveness. 
6. Other equally meritorious studies estimating partisan bias have 
also reached divergent findings. Among these are Dahl (1956), March 
(1957), Campagna and Grofman (1990), and Ansolabehere et al. (1992). 
7. Prior to Tufte's analysis, Dahl (1956, 148) examined the electoral 
system using national election results from 1928 to 1954. His analysis 
indicates a 5 percent pro-Democratic bias. This estimate is calculated 
from DahFs seats-votes regression of Democratic seat percentage = (2.5 
X Democratic vote percent) — .7. At 50 percent of the vote, this yields 
Democrats 55 percent of the seats. March (1957, 527) reestimated the 
1928-to-1954 series only with contested seats. This yielded a pro-
Democratic partisan bias of 2.25 percent. In a later analysis of elections 
from 1946 to 1976, Patterson (1979, 139-41) found a 1.75 percent pro-
Democratic electoral system bias. 
8. A further update to include the election triplet of 1990, 1992, 
and 1994 will be examined in detail in chapter 8. It also finds a pro-
Democratic bias, a bias of 4.2 percent of all seats. 
9. The very high estimate of Democratic bias in the most recent 
elections (1984 to 1988) is probably a result of the small variance in this 
triplet (see Niemi and Fett, 1986). In the three elections there was only a 
range of seven seats and less than 2.5 percent of the national congres­
sional vote. 
10. Ansolabehere et al. (1992, 31) essentially concur with Jacobson's 
findings in his mean district-vote analysis. Jacobson's estimates are for all 
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congressional districts, contested and uncontested. They were calculated 
from equation 3 of table 5. 5. Jacobson also estimated partisan bias with 
the mean district congressional measure on only contested seats, rather 
than on all districts. This analysis also indicated a Republican bias in the 
period from 1946 to 1964, but the bias was much smaller than that esti­
mated over all districts (7.2 percent pro-Republican rather than 14.6 per­
cent pro-Republican). The contested-seat-only analysis also produced a 
slight difference in more recent elections, though like the analysis of all-
districts partisan bias, by these estimates bias was nearly negligible in 
recent years (.6 percent pro-Democratic rather than .5 percent pro-
Republican). 
11. Campagna and Grofman (1990, 1253), in their analysis of redis­
tricting in the 1980s, concur that there is no partisan bias in the electoral 
system (see also, Cain and Butler, 1991, 37). 
12. The conclusions King draws from his separate analyses (using 
different methods and data) initially appear at odds with one another. 
King and Browning (1987, 1261) conclude that "the average (bias) of the 
states is not too biased toward one party more than the other." In a cross-
national study, King (1990, 172) concludes that the "U.S. system is mod­
erately biased in favor of the Democratic and against the Republican 
party." King and Gelman (1991, 129) find "an electoral system that has 
remained severely biased toward the Republican party for all elections in 
the last four decades." In addition to the choice of a congressional vote 
measure, King's estimates of partisan bias depends on whether or not 
controls for incumbency are included. Before controlling for incumbency, 
King and Gelman find that "overall bias moves from favoring Republi­
cans to favoring Democrats by about 6 percentage points. The current 
electoral system in the House favors the Democrats overall" (King, 1991). 
A strong pro-Republican bias is found after controlling for incumbency, 
This finding has been relied upon by both Jacobson (1990, 93-94) and 
Fiorina (1992a, 18-21) to dismiss partisan electoral bias as a cause of di­
vided government. The rationale for controlling for incumbency is not 
so clear. First, incumbency might cause partisan bias since incumbents 
influence the drawing of district boundaries. As such, it would seem that 
incumbency might explain the extent of bias, since incumbents seek to 
safeguard their seats, but is irrelevant to estimating the actual extent of 
bias. Moreover, if one wants to explain partisan bias, all effects should be 
considered, not just one. By examining the extent of bias after control­
ling for incumbency, King is estimating bias over and above that associ­
ated with incumbency itself rather than the full extent of bias. Second, 
the relationship between incumbency and partisan bias would seem to be 
nonrecursive. There is an apparent endogeneity problem. Incumbents 
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may affect (through redistricting and otherwise) partisan bias, but parti­
san bias affects incumbency by affecting which party is elected. While in­
cumbents have reason to increase partisan bias in favor of their party, by 
its very nature partisan bias should also increase the number of incum­
bents for a party. 
13. Gelman and King's more recent analysis, limited to congres­
sional elections in nonsouthern states in this century reaches a similar 
conclusion. According to this analysis, "the evidence demonstrates unam­
biguous bias in favor of the Republican party from the 1930s until the 
mid-1960s. After that, the trend toward Democratic bias is consistent and 
sustained" (1994, 539). Their estimates (in their figure 1) indicate that 
the electoral system typically favored Republicans by more than 5 percent 
of seats in the 1950s, was nearly neutral in the 1960s and 1970s, and 
typically tilted in favor of Democrats by 2 to almost 4 percent of seats in 
the 1980s and early 1990s. 
14. Simon Jackman has generously (in a personal communication) 
reestimated the national vote and seat relationship, also drawing the data 
from table 2.8, using logit analysis. His point estimate of bias is a 3.1 
percent Democratic advantage. He further examined the confidence in­
terval around this point estimate. Based on uncertainty regarding param­
eter estimates and the extrapolation required to estimate seat shares at 
an even division of the vote (since the 50 percent mark is outside the 
range of votes in this series and well removed from the series mean vote 
value), the 95 percent confidence bounds are from 48.1 percent of seats 
to 58.0 percent of seats for the Democrats, a possible bias range of 1.9 
percent pro-Republican to 8.0 percent pro-Democratic. The chance of a 
pro-Democratic bias, given these results, however, is quite remote. Jack-
man estimates that the probability of a pro-Democratic bias is .89. The 
consideration of uncertainty in the estimates highlights the importance 
of the 1994 analysis in chapter 8. Because the vote crossed the 50 percent 
threshold for the first time since 1954, we can interpolate rather than 
extrapolate and gain greater certainty in our bias estimates. 
15. Other differences in the regressions also deserve note. Esti­
mates of electoral system responsiveness or the swing ratio are greater 
when the national vote, rather than the mean district vote, is used. Also, 
the national vote division more successfully accounts for variance in parti­
san seats than does the mean district vote. We will reexamine the swing 
ratio (or responsiveness) in chapter 6. In addition, the difference between 
the two measures is even more pronounced in examining elections from 
1938 to 1992. The seats-vote regression using the national vote measure 
indicated a pro-Democratic bias of 2.6 percent of seats while that using 
the mean district vote measure indicated a pro-Republican bias of nearly 
5 percent, more than a 7.5 percent difference. 
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16. Jacobson's equations in his table 5.5 support the claim that the 
decision to use the mean district vote rather than the national vote sub­
stantially affects estimates of partisan bias. His equations 1 and 3 in the 
table are identical in specification and cases and differ only in the mea­
surement of the congressional vote. For both the 1948-64 and the 
1966-88 periods, the equation using the national vote variable indicated 
a stronger pro-Democratic bias than that using the mean district vote. 
The two equations produced wildly divergent results for the 1946 to 1964 
period. The national vote equation indicated a 2.1 percent Democratic 
bias (1990, 93) while the mean district-vote equation indicated 14.6 per­
cent Republican advantage. From 1966 to 1988 the national vote equa­
tion indicated a 3.9 percent Democratic advantage while the mean 
district-vote equation suggests a 0.5 percent Republican advantage. 
These estimates are based on all districts, rather than only contested 
seats. 
17. In their analysis of the "electoral abuse" of malapportionment 
(broadly construed to mean districts with "different numbers of voters" 
[336] rather than different population sizes), Taylor and Johnson (1979, 
342) compared the national vote and the average constituency vote. They 
used the difference of these votes as a measure of malapportionment. In 
a case in which the national vote was 50 percent and the average constitu­
ency vote was 56 percent, they concluded that the malapportionment of 
the electoral system benefited this party by 6 percent. The true strength of 
the party was indicated by the national vote. The electoral system desig­
nation of constituencies created the average constituency vote, and the 
difference indicated the effect or bias of the electoral system. They note 
that the average constituency vote is the vote that "matters" in that it (like 
the percentage of seats won) reflects the actual outcome of the system, 
bias and all. Gudgin and Taylor (1979, 56) refer to electoral system bias 
as "the distribution problem," which occurs when "one party tends to win 
smaller constituencies than its rival." 
18. Erikson (1972) found Republicans to be overrepresented in 
elections from 1952 to 1970 because of a 5.4 percent partisan bias, 
although the bias was virtually eliminated by the late 1960s. Erikson's 
pro-Republican findings are quite likely due to restricting the analysis to 
nonsouthern and nonborder states. The northern states were more likely 
to be Republican, especially early in the series, and more likely to bias 
district lines against Democrats. Unlike the national party division, Dem­
ocrats achieved a majority of the two-party northern congressional vote 
in only 4 of the 10 elections Erikson examined. 
19. Some may argue that the district vote totals should be exam­
ined rather than the national vote, since voters cast their ballots at the 
district level and the national vote is an artifact of combining votes cast 
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across districts- There are two problems with this argument. First, district 
boundaries are in fact artifacts, in that they are chosen and may divide 
the vote in an extraordinary number of ways. The particular choice of 
boundaries may be the principal way bias can creep into the electoral 
system. Second, the question of partisan bias is itself a question of national 
politics: which party, if either, is advantaged nationally by the method in 
which votes are translated into seats? 
20. There is a conceptual flaw, as well, in the mean district-vote 
measure. Since our purpose is to examine the impact of the electoral sys­
tem on the translation of votes into seats, our measures should not them­
selves be direct functions of the electoral system they are to gauge. The 
mean district vote is almost entirely an artifact of the electoral system. It 
reflects how votes have been organized by the electoral system into dis­
tricts. It is therefore a contaminated measure unsuitable for estimating par­
tisan bias. Put differently, the national vote percentages will be the same 
for a nation regardless of how districts are drawn. This is not true of the 
mean district vote. Each redrawing of district lines can produce a differ­
ent mean district vote—without the voters ever changing a single vote. 
21. The difference between the mean district vote and the national 
vote percentage was also consistent in the nine elections from 1936 to 
1952. In each case the mean district vote was substantially more Demo­
cratic than the national vote percentage. Differences ranged between 6.2 
and 11.6 percentage points. 
22. The improper equal weighting of districts has plagued hypo­
thetical analyses, even those that have gone to great lengths to simulate 
district vote swings (e.g., King and Gelman, 1991). Jackman (1994) offers 
a solution to this in his fix for formal malapportionment in the Australian 
electoral system. Jackman weights district vote percentages by the size of 
the district. The same method could be applied to the House electoral 
system, weighting by the number of voters in each district rather than the 
district's population and thus correcting for effective malapportionment 
rather than just formal malapportionment. However, in chapter 8, we 
make a further improvement on the hypothetical vote analysis both by 
interpolating vote swings rather than modeling them and by summing 
hypothetical district votes to a national vote (which is equivalent to Jack-
man's conducting an analysis of weighted district votes). 
23. The problem with using district percentages is entirely an ag­
gregation problem and not an intrinsic problem with the hypothetical 
vote (percentage)-swing analysis of the district vote. The problem of the 
previous hypothetical vote-swing studies is that they estimate bias as the 
seat share (deviation from 50 percent) when the mean district vote is 50 
percent rather than when the national vote total is 50 percent. Jackman 
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(1994) offers a corrective to this method, and a similar corrective is made 
in chapter 8's analysis of bias in the 1994 election and in appendix B for 
elections from 1954 to 1992. 
24. We could add to the differences among studies the specification 
of linear or nonlinear (e.g., logistic) relationship between votes and seats. 
25. One reader of this analysis suggested that differential turnout 
rates related to party should not be considered an aspect of the electoral 
system—that it might be stretching things to include the political sociol­
ogy of turnout and partisanship in the mix of factors thought of as an 
electoral system. However, an important distinction needs to be made 
between the presence of different turnout rate and partisan voting pat­
terns and how those behaviors are organized to affect election results. 
Their organization is very much a matter of the electoral system (see 
Tufte, 1973). No electoral system has any effect whatsoever, apart from 
how it organizes the behaviors of voters. For instance, given the right 
distribution of votes, a majority-rule system could produce proportional 
results. Thus, the particular House electoral system being studied is very 
much responsible for the effects of differential turnout rates. If districts 
were drawn differently or not drawn at all (at-large elections), as might 
happen under different electoral systems, different turnout rates would 
have different consequences for election results. 
26. The mean number of unwasted votes is based on the four dis­
tricts, three of type A, in which the winning party received 80,000 votes, 
and one of type B, in which the winning party received 240,000 votes 
(i.e., [(3 X 80,000) + 240,000]/4 = 120,000). 
27. For example, if a party wins a 55 percent majority of the vote 
nationally (a margin of 5 percent), in any district it could receive exactly 
55 percent (situation 1), between 55 percent and 60 percent (situation 2), 
more than 60 percent (situation 3), between 50 percent and 55 percent 
(situation 4), or less than 50 percent of the district vote (situation 5). 
28. It is also logically possible for a system to be biased because of 
wasted votes. Consider a system of six districts in which Party A wins 100 
to 90 votes in five of the districts and Party B wins 100 to 50 votes in the 
sixth district. In this system, parties evenly divided the total vote (550 to 
550) and each party has a mean unwasted vote per victory rate of 100 
votes, yet Party A has won five of the six seats (83 percent) with 50 percent 
of the vote. The system is clearly biased in favor of Party A, yet the un-
wasted vote rates do not indicate this. The system is biased because Party 
B wastes a disproportionate percentage of its votes (82 percent vs. 9 per­
cent for Party A). The reason bias is possible in this situation is that, de­
spite the even division of the total vote, there is an uneven division of 
unwasted votes (500 to 100). If the total number of unwasted votes had 
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been evenly divided (as it was with the total vote), the rate of unwasted 
votes per victory would accurately reflect the extent of bias. The 
unwasted-vote measure of bias assumes an even split of unwasted votes 
at an even split of the total vote. This assumption is examined in detail, 
along with the effects of the distribution of wasted votes, in appendix B. 
Appendix B also examines a corrected hypothetical vote estimate of bias 
(estimating bias at the 50 percent mark of the national vote rather than 
the mean district vote) and a fixed swing-ratio estimate of bias (assuming 
a swing ratio equal to 2 and attributing further discrepancies of the actual 
seat division to bias) and compares them to the unwasted-vote measure. 
With the exception primarily of the elections in the 1950s, each of the 
three measures indicates a consistent pro-Democratic bias throughout 
the 1960s, 1970s (except for 1974), 1980s, and into the 1990s. 
29. Gerrymandering by packing opposition partisans into fewer 
districts contributes to partisan bias by raising the winning vote percent­
age in a district for that party. Controlling for the total votes cast in a 
district, a party winning with a high percentage of the votes will pay a 
higher price in unwasted votes for its victories than the opposition, and 
the system will be biased against the party paying the higher price. If all 
districts had the same number of votes cast, the electoral system would 
be biased in favor of the party winning districts with a lower percentage 
in districts' votes. Thus, Fiorina's point that the system works against 
Democrats because they run up large vote percentages in uncompetitive, 
urban districts would be valid if low turnout in these districts did no more 
than offset the high winning-vote margins (Fiorina, 1992a, 18). 
30. The two principal interactive paths in the partisan bias model 
analytically must take a value of 1. The number of potential voters in a 
district multiplied by the turnout rate (percentage of potential voters ac­
tually voting) equals the total number of actual voters in a district. The 
number of actual voters in a district multiplied by the percentage of votes 
cast for the winning candidate equals the number of unwasted votes in 
a district. 
31. The fact that the parties had already been assumed to have 
evenly divided the vote means that some of these calculations are the 
same as the values already hypothesized in this case. However, the 
method handles all nondegenerative cases (cases in which each party wins 
a nontrivial number of seats on which to base the mean number of un-
wasted votes). An alternative calculation was also made and produced 
very similar results. Rather than determining the share of seats that the 
Democrats would win with half of all unwasted votes expended at their 
mean number of votes per victory, we can determine how many seats the 
Democrats would win with their number of unwasted votes expended at 
the overall mean number of votes per victory. 
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Chapter 5 
1. See Congressional Quarterly's Guide to U.S. Elections (1985, 683­
97) and Butler and Cain (1992) for excellent reviews of the development 
of standards for reapportionment and redistricting. 
2. The highest-turnout district in 1992 was actually the single-
district state of Montana. Over 400,000 Montana voters cast ballots in the 
state's congressional contest. The disparity between Montana's total vote 
for one representative and the low-turnout contested district in 1992 
(California's Thirty-third) was nearly eight to one. 
3. The descriptions of these four districts draw from various edi­
tions of Barone and Ujifusa's The Almanac of American Politics and Con­
gressional Quarterly's Politics in America. 
4. Alton Waldon, also a Democrat, won a special election to com­
plete Addabbo's unexpired term. Waldon was later defeated by Flake for 
the 1986 Democratic congressional nomination. 
5. Th e 1985 Republican Almanac: State Political Profiles (474) indi­
cated that 65.3 percent of registered voters in Queens voted in 1984, 
compared to 75.3 percent statewide. The 1987 Republican Almanac (764) 
indicated that 44.9 percent of registered voters in Queens voted in 1986, 
compared to 53.2 percent statewide. 
6. The exact population per district figures are 621,400 for Kansas 
and 526,267 for Oklahoma. I thank Jack Pitney for suggesting this 
comparison. 
7. In 1992, a total of 1,382,175 votes were cast in California's five 
highest-turnout districts (districts 4, 6, 10, 15, and 29). More than a quar­
ter million votes were cast in each of these districts. In comparison, less 
than half a million votes (466,392) were cast in the five lowest-turnout 
districts combined (districts 20, 30, 31, 33, and 46). The total votes cast 
in the 5 highest-turnout districts in California exceeded (by over 70,000 
votes) the total votes cast in its 11 lowest-turnout districts. All seats exam­
ined had major-party competition. 
8. Districts, contested by congressional candidates of both major 
parties, are grouped by turnout, measured as the total votes cast for con­
gressional candidates and not as a rate of the eligible electorate. 
9. Because logit fits an S-shaped curve to the relationship, there is 
no single slope for the entire range of the independent variable. The 
derivatives presented in table 5.3 indicate the slope of the curve in the 
middle of the independent-variable distribution. 
10. While many might suppose that these low-turnout Democratic 
districts are predominandy southern, this is not the case. Many light-
turnout districts are northern. In 1990, for instance, four of the five 
lowest-turnout districts were in New York City, and the fifth was in New 
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Jersey. If there is any typical Democratic low-turnout district in recent 
years, it would appear to be an urban and minority-populated district 
rather than a rural southern district. 
11. Other cities on this low-turnout district list are Memphis, Balti­
more, Detroit, and Newark. 
12. There is a fairly close correspondence between a district's turn­
out level and the number of unwasted votes cast in the district. The mean 
correlation between the total number of voters in a district and the 
number of unwasted votes in elections over this period was .85. The cor­
relations ranged from about .7 to .9. Probably because of the reappor­
tionment rulings of the mid-1960s, the association between turnout and 
unwasted vote tended to be a bit smaller in recent years (although in 
1990 it was .88). 
13. The difference of 9 or 10 additional Republicans is computed 
by dividing the total vote difference between the 67 low-turnout Demo­
cratic districts and the 67 low-turnout Republican districts (1,356,602) by 
the mean vote for a winning Republican candidate in 1992 (142,719). 
14. We assume that in an unbiased electoral system a party that 
wins half of the total vote should also be expected to receive half of the 
unwasted vote. With both parties receiving the same number of total 
votes, this appears to be a safe assumption. Only bias in the system would 
cause either party to receive more or less than half of the unwasted vote 
in this situation. For an analysis of wasted votes, see appendix B. 
15. The two alternative estimates of bias presented in appendix B, 
one based on a modified uniform-vote-swing analysis and the second on 
an assumed fixed swing ratio (equal to 2), concur with the unwasted-vote 
measure that Republicans would have won a majority of contested seats 
in an unbiased electoral system in the 1966, 1968, and 1980 elections, in 
addition to the contested-seat majorities that they actually won in 1954 
and 1956. They differ from the unwasted-vote measure regarding the 
1960, 1962, and 1972 elections, which indicates that Democrats would 
have maintained their majorities even in an unbiased system. On the 
other hand, whereas the unwasted-vote measure of bias suggests that 
Democrats would have held their majority in 1984 without bias, the other 
measures indicate that bias made the difference that year and that with­
out it Democrats would not have maintained their majority. At the bottom 
line, an unbiased electoral system would have elected Republican majori­
ties in contested seats between 1954 and 1992 in 8 of 20 elections, ac­
cording to the unwasted-vote measure of bias, and in 6 of 20 elections, 
according to the alternative bias measures. 
16. Two alternative estimates of bias reported in appendix B dis­
pute the unwasted-vote estimate of bias for 1956. They suggest that the 
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removal of electoral system bias from the 1956 election would have 
helped rather than hurt Democrats. 
17. The relationship between incumbency and partisan bias is not 
a simple one. It is most probably nonrecursive and positive in both direc­
tions, partisan bias increasing the incumbency advantage of a party and 
the incumbency advantage of a party increasing partisan bias. The analy­
sis recognizes both links. By its very nature, an electoral system with parti­
san bias will seat more representatives for the advantaged party, and 
some large proportion of these bonus seats will seek reelection as incum­
bents. Conversely, once in office, incumbents attempt to have district 
boundaries drawn to their advantage. While this is often also to the par-
ty's advantage and certainly to the advantage of any successor partisan 
candidate in the district, the interests of the incumbent and his or her 
party are not always in accord. Incumbents are primarily interested in 
increasing the security of their district. Although parties are also inter­
ested in securing districts for their incumbents, they might be willing to 
trade some incumbent security for a greater chance of winning addi­
tional districts. 
18. The lower turnout in the average Democratic district probably 
partially mitigates the multiplier effect of incumbency on partisan bias. 
A 10 percent incumbency advantage translates into fewer votes in a 
low-turnout district than in a high-turnout one. Also, the increased in­
cumbency advantage in recent elections suggests that the extent of 
pro-Democratic bias is also more underestimated in recent years. 
19. Note that it is not necessary for this bias to have increased over 
the last four decades to help explain the increased occurrence of divided 
government. With partisan dealignment, as well as the realignment, fa­
voring Republicans, Republican presidential candidates have met with 
greater success. It is enough that partisan bias in the election of the 
House was, at least up to 1994, an obstacle to a similar Republican shift 
in the House. 
20. As Achen insightfully pointed out some time ago (1977), corre­
lations, as standardized measures of association, do not tell us many 
things about a relationship. The fact that there are strong district-level 
unwasted-vote correlations between election years only indicates that the 
location of bias tends to be the same from one year to the next. They do 
not say anything about the extent of bias from one year to the next. A 
constant could be added or a sealer multiplied to unwasted votes in dis­
tricts in one election year, changing the extent of partisan bias in that 
year drastically without disturbing the correlation over time. Thus, the 
stability of the location of partisan bias should not be mistaken to suggest 
stability in the extent of partisan bias. 
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Chapter 6 
1. The standard deviation of bias from 1954 to 1992 was 1.5 per­
cent of the seats, or nearly 7 seats. 
2. The assumption of a constant partisan bias is implicit in all ex­
isting estimates of partisan bias examining the relationship of votes to 
seats with longitudinal data. This includes Tufte (1973) and would also 
include Jacobson (1990, table 5.5), although the analysis in both cases 
allows for some change in partisan bias over time. 
3. In Wesberry v. Sanders the Court extended to congressional appor­
tionment its one-person, one-vote ruling that it had set for state elections 
in Baker v. Carr and Gray v. Sanders. In the rulings following the Wesberry 
case (Kirkpatrick v. Priesler and Karcher v. Daggett), the Court insisted that 
district population sizes within a state vary by as little as practically pos­
sible. Even with the judicial mandate for minimum population differ­
ences among districts within a state, district sizes unavoidably still vary 
a good deal from one state to the next. For an excellent summary of 
apportionment issues see Congressional Quarterly's Guide to U.S. Elections 
(1985, 683-97) and Butler and Cain (1992). 
4. The post-1960s redistricting population figures for the states are 
from U.S. Statistical Abstract (1980, table no. 835). The figures were origi­
nally drawn from the U.S. Bureau of the Census Congressional District Data 
Book. The data are 1960 census figures for districts of the Eighty-eighth 
Congress. Jacobson (1992, 11) also offers several examples of pro­
nounced malapportionment. 
5. The figures are from the U.S. Statistical Abstract (1974, table no. 
688). The original source is the U.S. Bureau of the Census, Congressional 
District Data Book, Districts of the 93rd Congress. Th e population figures are 
from the 1970 census for congressional districts of the Ninety-fourth 
Congress. Also, Cox (1981, 15-23) presents a very detailed and illuminat­
ing examination of the variance in district populations from 1900 to 
1974. 
6. The decline in white turnout appears traceable to a decline in 
political efficacy and a decline in partisanship. Some portion of the de­
cline may also be related to disaffection from both parties, indifference to 
the candidate choice, and cross-pressures. 
7. This racial history of turnout in national elections over the last 
four decades has been described in a number of studies. For instance, 
Rosenstone and Hansen summarized the trends simply: "White Ameri­
cans turn out less now than they did forty years ago. Black Americans— 
especially in the South—turn out more" (1993, 60). See, also, Asher 
(1992,49-50). 
8. To assess the stability of the trend estimate, the regression was 
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run with and without the 1952 election. Including the 1952 election, the 
regression indicated a .12 percentage point decline in partisan bias with 
each passing election (p = .03, one-tailed). With the series beginning in 
1954, the regression indicated a .09 decline in bias with each succeeding 
election (p = .09, one-tailed). 
9. The stability of these estimates was also examined by reestimat­
ing the regression with and without the 1952 election. With 1952 in­
cluded, expected bias dropped from 3.1 to 1.7 percent, or 55 percent of 
its prior level (p = .03, one-tailed). With 1952 included, expected bias 
dropped from 2.9 to 1.7 percent or 60 percent of its prior level (p = .05, 
one-tailed). 
10. Recognition of voter volatility itself acts to moderate the gerry­
mandering impulse. It can be dangerous for a party to draw district 
boundaries too finely to their advantage. A party cannot be satisfied with 
a very tenuous majority and, because of the uncertainty, must build some 
excess votes into their districts as insurance against unfavorable political 
climates that the future might hold. See Jacobson (1992, 12) and Cain 
(1985). 
11. This is in accord with most prior findings that gerrymandering 
has had an inconsequential net impact nationally. See Fiorina (1992a, 16), 
Mann (1987), and Jacobson (1990, 94-96). Born (1985), in a thorough 
time-series analysis of 79 redistricting plans from 1952 to 1982, found 
that "redistricting does seem to benefit the controlling party, but not 
impressively" (309) and that partisan effects were even weaker follow­
ing the 1964 ruling requiring districts in a state to be nearly equal in 
population. 
12. It is also possible that Democrats might have benefited from the 
passage of time since the last redistricting, thereby offsetting the deterio­
ration of any benefits from gerrymandering. Suburbanization may have 
depleted the population in many Democratic urban strongholds over the 
course of a decade, producing increasing malapportionment in favor of 
the Democrats until corrected at the next reapportionment. Thus, while 
the political forces of redistricting may have most strongly favored Demo­
crats early in a decade, sociodemographic forces may have most strongly 
favored Democrats late in a decade. The case of California in the 1970s 
and 1980s illustrates this masking effect. 
13. One piece of evidence suggesting the extent of pre-1982 malap­
portionment is a comparison of the diversity of district turnout (in raw 
votes) throughout the state. In 1980, one standard deviation in district 
turnout equalled 54,355 voters. After redistricting, this variance was con­
siderably reduced to 32,488 voters. 
14. A similar analysis for 1978 also indicates pro-Democratic bias in 
California prior to the Burton plan. Democrats won 60.5 percent of seats 
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with 51.8 percent of the vote. If there were no bias in the system, this 
would suggest a swing ratio of nearly six. The unwasted vote analysis, 
with Democrats having a mean unwasted vote of about 87,000 and Re­
publicans of about 110,000, indicates a pro-Democratic bias of about 5.1 
percent of California's seats. Analysis of California elections in 1990 and 
1992 indicate that the system remained biased in favor of the Democrats 
in 1990 (4.9 percent of seats), but was essentially neutral following 
the 1992 redistricting (with Democrats having a mean unwasted vote 
of 121,206 and Republicans of 120,450). Cain (1985) found that the 
1982 Burton plan redistricting worked well enough to "swing five seats 
to the Democrats" (331), The unwasted-vote analysis, like Cain's, found 
substantial pro-Democratic bias, although his figures include pro-
Democratic boosts due to system responsiveness as well as partisan bias. 
Also, his figures appear high when simply contrasting the 1982 system to 
the already pro-Democratic 1980 system. Keefe (1988,47) presents a very 
brief analysis of the California redistricting that also finds pro-Democratic 
effects of the gerrymander. 
15. Some nonvoters cannot be counted on as likely Democratic 
votes also because cross-pressures and indecision regarding their pro­
spective vote caused them to abstain (Campbell, 1993). It might also be 
noted that while conventional wisdom now holds that nonvoters are likely 
Democratic votes, many believed in the 1960s that nonvoters were likely 
Republican voters (see Clausen et al., 1965, 322). 
16. Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980, 109) find that voters were 3.7 
percentage points more likely than nonvoters to be Republican in their 
party identification, although even this small difference was not reflected 
in consistent policy differences. They did not examine likely vote prefer­
ence differences, and their 1972 election data might have been affected 
by a depressed turnout of cross-pressured Democrats faced with their 
very unpopular presidential nominee George McGovern. However, 
Verba and Nie's (1972, 224-48) earlier study also found evidence of what 
they termed "Hyperactive Republicans," higher-than-expected participa­
tion of Republican partisans. Comparisons of reported votes of voters 
with the reported presidential preferences of nonvoters in NES surveys 
in 1980, 1984, and 1988 indicate no strong systematic pro-Democratic 
leanings among nonvoters. Nonvoters in 1980 were 7.4 percentage 
points more likely than voters to prefer Democratic candidate Carter to 
Republican Reagan. However, nonvoters in 1984 and 1988 were slightly 
more likely than voters to indicate a Republican presidential preference 
(3.1 percent and 2.1 percent, respectively). While several studies have 
found no pro-Democratic bias, Radcliff (1994, 1995) claims a strong and 
robust relationship between turnout and the presidential vote, suggesting 
that nonvoters, if activated, would add to the Democratic vote. Radcliff 
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examines state votes from 1928 to 1980. He finds, both in states grouped 
by prior Democratic support and in a pooled analysis of all states across 
time, that the Democratic vote increases with turnout. However, the find­
ings may be challenged on several grounds. First, while turnout is statisti­
cally significant in his analysis, it usually accounts for very little variance 
in the vote. Second, and more importantly, Radcliff finds that turnout 
was not associated with the presidential vote before 1960 but was strongly 
related after 1960. This is precisely the opposite of what one would ex­
pect, given the somewhat more partisan character of the earlier period 
and the strong socioeconomic basis of that earlier partisanship. This sug­
gests that the relationship may be coincidental. There were two unrelated 
trends in voting behavior, a decline in Democratic voting and a decline in 
turnout, that are correlated in a time-series (pooled or otherwise) simply 
because they occurred through the same period. There is little to suggest 
that the post-1960 rise in Republicanism was based on the post-1960 de­
cline in turnout. 
17. To assess the likely partisan consequences of potential voters 
not voting in congressional elections, the congressional preferences of 
nonvoters were compared to the reported vote of voters in several recent 
NES surveys (1978, 1980, 1984, 1986, 1988, and 1990). While the re­
ported preferences of nonvoters after an election are subject to rational­
ization and imperfectly reflect how the nonvoters might have voted had 
they actually bothered to vote, they are the best available evidence. The 
analysis of these responses suggests that nonvoters often tilt in favor of 
Democratic congressional candidates, but differences are both slight and 
inconsistent (aspects in accord with the model of the peripheral voter). 
Nonvoters reporting a congressional preference were more likely than 
voters to report a preference for the Democratic candidate in six of the 
seven election surveys examined. However, the difference between voters 
and nonvoters was less than 4 percentage points in two of the six cases 
(and the difference was never as great as 10 percentage points), a major­
ity of nonvoters in most years stated that they had no preference what­
soever, and a large percentage of those nonvoters who indicated a 
preference stated that their preference was "not strong." 
18. The regression included the Democratic congressional two-
party vote as the dependent variable and the percentage of voting-age 
population turning out to vote in the congressional election as the inde­
pendent variable. The unstandardized regression coefficient for turnout 
was .013, not statistically significant (p < .1, one-tailed). Turnout also did 
not have a statistically significant effect in a regression including a 
dummy variable for presidential election years. 
19. Abivariate regression of turnout on bias for elections from 1954 
to 1992 indicated that pro-Democratic bias could be expected to increase 
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by .08 (p < .1, two-tailed) for every 1 percent increase in turnout. The 
regression had an adjusted R2 of .12 (r = +.41). A further regression, 
with a midterm-election dummy variable interaction term, produced sub­
stantively similar results. However, we know that time (as a surrogate for 
sociodemographic and legal changes) is negatively associated with bias, 
and it is well known that turnout decreased over this period. Therefore, 
turnout would have a spurious positive effect if the trend in the data 
series were not taken into account. 
20. The greater responsiveness of high-turnout districts is consis­
tent with Caldeira et al.'s (1985) finding that congressional turnout is 
greater in more competitive districts. 
21. The coefficients are not statistically significant in the three low­
est categories of unwasted votes (p > .05, one-tailed) but are positive and 
statistically significant (p < .01, one-tailed) in the regressions on the two 
highest categories of unwasted votes in table 6.2. 
22. I considered the possibility that the inverse association of the 
Democratic congressional vote and partisan bias might be affected by the 
number of uncontested Democratic seats. It is a plausible hypothesis that 
in good Democratic years (a higher Democratic congressional vote) more 
Democratic seats would be left uncontested by Republicans hesitant to 
fight an uphill battle. Conversely, in bad Democratic years it is plausible 
that more seats often left uncontested would be contested by Republicans. 
If these usually uncontested Democratic and low-turnout seats enter cal­
culations of partisan bias among contested seats, it might depress the 
mean number of unwasted votes for Democrats and thereby inflate parti­
san bias. In causal model terms, the negative relationship between the 
Democratic congressional vote and partisan bias may really be the prod­
uct of a positive effect of the congressional vote on the number of un­
contested Democratic seats and a negative effect of the number of 
uncontested seats on partisan bias (because of the low turnout in these 
districts and the estimation of partisan bias in only contested districts). 
The analysis, however, indicated that the Democratic congressional vote 
did not have the expected significant positive effect on the number of 
uncontested Democratic seats. Therefore, we can conclude that the ef­
fects of the Democratic vote on partisan bias is not the result of the Demo­
cratic vote pushing different districts into the contested category from 
which partisan bias was calculated. 
23. Converting bias estimates for contested seats to all seats reduces 
the rate by a factor of about .88 (382/435). Also, there is the extrapolation 
danger to estimating what bias might be at the even division of the vote, 
since the election series from 1954 to 1992 contains no cases in which 
Republicans won a majority or evenly split the vote. Moreover, although 
we have seen that the pro-Democratic bias increases as the Democratic 
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vote decreases, this must logically reverse at some point, since there can 
be no bias when either party receives 100 percent of the votes. That is, if 
the Republican vote increased greatly, they would eventually crack the 
Democratic hold on the cheap seats. Thus we should be cautious about 
extrapolating bias from this series. The analysis in chapter 8 of the 1994 
election in which Republicans finally crossed the 50 percent threshold 
provides us with better information about bias at the even vote split. 
24. These estimates correspond closely to Jacobson's (1990, 86) 
own. Jacobson's first equation in his table 5.5 indicates a responsiveness 
coefficient of 2.01 from 1946 to 1964 and 1.50 from 1966 to 1988. 
25. The fact that the electoral system was and is more responsive 
than previously estimated has limited implications. The higher level of 
responsiveness is, after all, offset by partisan bias varying inversely with 
the congressional vote. Thus, a shift of one percentage point of the con­
gressional vote toward the Democrats still translates into a shift of only 
about 1.4 percent of seats to the Democrats in the post-1964 period. 
However, the modest shift can now be understood to be a result of two 
processes. With a stronger Democratic vote, Democrats waste fewer votes 
in losing causes (responsiveness) and thus gain more than an equivalent 
percentage of seats. However, these gains are restrained because many of 
these additional votes are cast in districts that they would have won any­
way, only with a smaller number of votes—a reduction in partisan bias. 
26. In tracing the existence of districts with large and consistent 
turnout differences to the Constitution it is sometimes implied that the 
constitutional source of these differences eliminates them as a basis for 
partisan bias. That is, if the system is working as the framers intended, 
this cannot be the foundation for bias. However, while the tracing of 
cheap seats to the Constitution may speak to the intentionality of partisan 
bias, it does not speak to its presence. To say that Democrats pay a lower 
price per victory because of constitutional arrangements serves only to 
explain bias and does not mean that bias does not exist. Factors producing 
partisan bias may be unintentionally or intentionally built into a constitu­
tional system. The evaluation of the electoral system examines only the 
translation of actual votes into seats—not people into seats, not citizens 
into seats, and not adults over the age of 18 years into seats. A constitution 
may have representational goals other than the representation of voters 
(the representation of the entire population, the representation of whites 
and three-fifths of slaves, the representation of property holders, the rep­
resentation of members of a particular religion, the representation of left-
handed people, or whatever) and this may impinge on the representation 
of voters, but analysts should not alter their evaluation criteria as a conse­
quence. The electoral system should not be able to define success in its 
own terms. In other words, we wish to make first-order assessments of 
280 • NOTES TO CHAPTER 7 
the electoral system—the system represents voters well or not so well, 
and not, for a system that is attempting to represent population (citizens, 
left-handers, etc.), the system represents voters well or not so well. 
27. In the elections of 1824 and 1825, 10 states with more than one 
House seat held purely single-member-district elections. Three (Mary­
land, New York, and Pennsylvania) elected most of their members from 
single-member districts but also had several multimember districts. Five 
states (Connecticut, Georgia, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and Rhode 
Island) held at-large elections. Ohio's arrangements are unknown. See 
Congressional Quarterly's Guide to U.S. Elections, 2d ed. (1985). 
28. The single-member-district system became established through 
both state adoption and federal statutes. Congressional Quarterly's Guide 
to U.S. Elections (1985, 678) notes that multimember districts were prohib­
ited by statute in 1842. Davidson and Oleszek (1981, 61) note that at-
large elections in states with more than a single member were prohibited 
by statute in 1967. As previously noted, a series of federal judicial rulings 
established the requirement of equally populated districts. 
29. In 1954, of the 68 districts in the lowest-turnout quintile, 32 (47 
percent) were in the 11 southern states. This is despite the fact that only 
36 of the 346 contested districts (10 percent) were in the South. 
30. The inner-city, minority nature of a number of cheap seats in 
recent years was noted in chapter 5 (table 5.5). Other cities with multiple 
cheap seats in 1990 were Chicago with four (districts 1, 2, 5, and 7), Mi­
ami with two (districts 17 and 18), Baltimore with two (districts 3 and 7), 
and Detroit with two (districts 1 and 13). 
31. Oppenheimer (1989) similarly observed that "if the House were 
apportioned on the basis of voters instead of population, it is likely that 
the Republicans might have won a majority of seats in the early 1980s" 
(665-66). 
32. Where geographic contiguity and compactness have been ig­
nored in recent years to create majority-minority districts, which some­
times produces oddly shaped and far-flung districts, the effect is to 
emphasize the socioeconomic homogeneity of the district and thereby 
create greater turnout disparities among districts. 
Chapter 7 
1. It would also be logically possible that some systematic counter­
vailing pro-Republican advantage offset the pro-Democratic electoral sys­
tem advantage in this earlier period. Such a factor could explain why 
Democrats lost their House majorities in the 1946 and 1952 elections. 
However, it appears that short-term issues may have broken the Demo­
cratic majority in 1946 and that a combination of issues, reapportionment 
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and presidential coattails may account for Republican success in the 
1952 elections. 
2. Despite Democratic strength in the electorate, they were not 
quite as strong in state governments. State constitutional arrangements 
reflecting geographic areas of states in state senates, regardless of popu­
lation, often led to state legislative electoral systems biased in favor of 
Republicans. Republicans often won cheap seats in rural areas. This par­
tially offset Democratic electoral strength. In 1950, for example, Demo­
crats controlled 27 lower chambers of state legislatures while Republicans 
controlled 18 (2 were tied and 2 were nonpartisan). However, Democrats 
controlled both houses of the state legislature in only 19 states, and Re­
publicans controlled both houses in 16 states. Control was split in 11 
states and 2 states were nonpartisan (The Council of State Governments, 
1950-51, 112). 
3. The correlations and logit coefficients in table 7.1 tell about the 
same story, although not quite as clearly, since they are not especially 
sensitive to the differences at the low end of the turnout and unwasted 
votes. In statistical terms, the grouped data suggests a pattern of hetero­
skedasticity and perhaps nonlinearity. Low-turnout districts are strongly 
associated with Democratic victories. Beyond the lowest quintile, how­
ever, things are not quite as dependable. In some years, there was a linear 
relationship. Democrats did best in the cheap seats, not quite as well in 
districts with moderate turnout, and worst in high-turnout areas. In 
other years (e.g., 1936, 1940, and 1944), Democrats did better in high-
turnout districts than in districts with middling turnout. This attenuates 
the correlation and logit measures of the relationship. 
4. The equivalent information for the 1952-90 series of elections 
was presented in tables 5.7, 5.8, and 5.9. 
5. The mean two-party voter turnout in contested seats in 1942 was 
over 79,300 voters. The 20 contested districts with the lowest turnout had 
total votes of less than 28,000. Four of these very cheap seats were in 
Tennessee, another four in Virginia, two in North Carolina, and one each 
in Florida, Kentucky, Maryland, Oklahoma, and Texas. The number of 
cheap seats in the South in this period is especially noteworthy because 
of the many southern and border state districts that were uncontested. 
6. While the 1950 election demonstrates the effects of partisan bias 
quite well, the subsequent election, in 1952, might be viewed as a coun­
terexample. In the 1952 election, Democrats received 49.9 percent of the 
vote (or perhaps slightly more if the Liberal Party cross-endorsement 
votes in New York are counted as Democratic votes [50.3 percent]) and 
only 213 seats (49.2 percent). With nearly the same national vote as in 
1950, why did Democrats lose 21 seats, and does this mean that the elec­
toral system was not biased in their favor? One reason for the difference 
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is that Democrats had a diminished uncontested-seat advantage in 1952 
than in 1950. In 1950, 92 Democrats and only 7 Republicans went un­
challenged, giving Democrats an 85-seat advantage. In 1952, only 80 
Democrats and 11 Republicans ran unopposed. This 69-seat Democratic 
advantage in 1952 was sizable but was still 16 seats smaller than their 
1950 margin. In addition, the 1952 election followed reapportionment 
and Republicans picked up six of the seven new districts allocated to Cali­
fornia. Finally, although Democrats received about half of the total con­
gressional vote, they received only 46.6 percent of the vote in contested 
districts. The responsiveness of the electoral system worked strongly 
against them. Democrats wasted a large portion of their votes in losing 
causes. 
7. Regressions of total district turnout and total unwasted votes on 
the party winning the seat indicated that the likelihood of a Democratic 
winner decreased by three percentage points with every additional 
10,000 votes cast in the district. For every additional 10,000 unwasted 
votes in a district the likelihood of the winning candidate being a Demo­
crat decreased by five percentage points. 
8. In 1950, the average winning candidate, regardless of party, re­
ceived 65,300 votes and the Democrats received 8,220,600 unwasted 
votes. At a rate of 65,300 unwasted votes per victory rather than the ac­
tual Democratic rate of 58,300 unwasted votes, Democrats would have 
won 126 contested seats rather than their 141, a difference of 15 seats. 
9. The number of unwasted votes in the Ohio Republican district 
was more than 16 times that in the Democratic Texas district. The num­
ber of total votes cast in the Ohio district was over 21 times the number 
in the Texas district. Also, there were five nominally contested districts in 
1950 with lower turnouts than Twelfth District in Texas. I considered 
the Texas district as the low end of seriously contested districts since the 
Republican challenger received about 20 percent of the vote. 
10. Despite the assistance of substantial bias in their favor, their 
minority vote (45.7 percent) cost Democrats their seat majority in 
1946. However, a combination of electoral system bias and a substantial 
uncontested-seat advantage provided Democrats in 1942 with a sufficient 
boost to hold their seat majorities despite attracting less than a majority 
of the vote (48.2 percent). 
11. A regression on these nine elections with the extent of pro-
Democratic bias as the dependent variable and the Democratic share of 
the national two-party congressional vote as the independent variable in­
dicated a strong and significant negative effect. The regression produced 
a slope of —1.14 (t = 4.26) with a constant of 62.89. The equation ac­
counted for about three-quarters of the variance in bias (adjusted R2 = 
.71; SEE = 2.8). With 50 percent of the vote, the expected partisan bias 
was 5.9 percent of the contested seats. 
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12. The pre-1954 elections were also examined by Democratic vic­
tory rates in quintiles of turnout and unwasted votes (see tables 5.3 and 
5.6). In 1946, Democrats won 74 percent of districts in the lowest quintile 
of turnout and an average of 20 percent in the three highest-turnout 
quintiles. In 1936, they won 94 percent in the highest turnout category 
and an average of 73 percent (as opposed to 1946's 20 percent) in the 
three highest-turnout groupings. 
13. States were categorized by using the Inter-university Con­
sortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) categories. Virginia, 
Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Caro­
lina, South Carolina, and Texas were counted as Southern states. Ken­
tucky, Maryland, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and West Virginia were counted 
as border states. Of the 135 districts in these states, only a third (45) were 
contested in 1942. Of these contested districts, 55 percent (34) were in 
the lowest-turnout quintile and 53 percent (33) were in the lowest 
unwasted-vote quintile. 
14. The mean number of unwasted votes in the 268 contested non-
southern districts in 1942 was 51,692 votes. By contrast, the mean num­
ber of unwasted votes among the 45 contested southern districts was only 
24,761 votes, 48 percent of the mean in nonsouthern districts. 
15. Many southern cheap seats failed to make the list because they 
were uncontested at some point. Even so, 12 of these 17 "hard-core" 
cheap seats are from southern and border states. 
16. In the reapportionment of the 1940s, the Ninth District was 
composed of Bland, Buchanan, Dickinson, Giles, Lee, Pulaski, Russell, 
Scott, Smyth, Tazewell, Washington, and Wise Counties. Redistrictings 
since then have expanded the district eastward into adjacent counties as 
far as Roanoke. However, in the 1940s the district did not even extend 
as far east as Blacksburg (Cox, 1981, 1122-32). Barone et aL (1972, 853) 
indicate that as of the 1970s, the district was 72 percent blue-collar in 
terms of employment. In racial and ethnic composition, the district was 
only 2 percent black and less than 1 percent of "foreign stock." Undoubt­
edly, the district as constituted in the 1940s was even more working-class 
and poor white in composition than it was in the 1970s. 
17. There was no Ninth District in the 1932 election. Failing after 
the 1930 census to redistrict in time for the 1932 election, Virginia's nine 
House members were elected at-large (Congressional Quarterly, 1985, 
931). 
18. Although the 16,655 votes cast for the winner, John Flannagan, 
were few by national standards, they were the most cast for any winner in 
Virginia in 1942. However, only one other Virginia district was contested. 
19. Nine of the 12 cheaper seats in 1942 were in the southern or 
border states (4 in Tennessee alone), and the remaining 3 were in New 
York. The 2 cheapest seats were the Fourth and the Ninth Districts of 
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Tennessee, both won by Democrats with fewer than 8,000 votes. The 
Fourth reelected Albert Gore, later elected to the Senate and Vice Presi­
dent Gore's father. 
20. Harry Truman, who had succeeded Franklin Roosevelt to the 
Presidency in 1945, was able to win in his own right in 1948 and was 
admired by both politicians and historians in hindsight, but he was not 
especially popular with voters in 1946. Postwar dislocations, shortages, 
and inflation caused his job approval standings to plummet into the low 
30s prior to the 1946 election. This was the lowest midterm rating of any 
president from 1946 to 1990. The average rating is in the 50-to-55 per­
cent range. For an examination of Eisenhower's coattails see Campbell 
(1993, 130-31). 
Chapter 8 
1. Democrats actually lost 57 of the seats that they had won in 1992. 
They also lost two additional seats won in 1992 in the special elections 
during the intervening two years. Republicans lost five seats from their 
1992 victories, all open seats. The difference is the net Democratic Party 
loss of 52 seats. 
2. With adjustments made for the smaller size of the House in the 
earlier years in the century and for third-party seats (to make congresses 
comparable), net partisan shifts in excess of 60 seats occurred in 7 of the 
25 elections between 1902 and 1950 (1910, 1914,1920,1922, 1932, 1938, 
and 1948). Three of these elections (1922, 1938, and 1948) shifted 75 or 
more seats between the parties. In addition, there were another two elec­
tions from the first half of the century in which a party lost more than 50 
seats. The Republicans lost 51 seats in the 1930 midterm, and the Demo­
crats lost 56 seats in the 1946 midterm. 
3. The post-1950 elections that transferred a substantial number of 
seats between the parties are most notably the 1958 election (a 49-seat 
shift to the Democrats), the 1966 election (a 48-seat shift to the Republi­
cans), and the post-Watergate 1974 election (a 49-seat shift to the Demo­
crats). Although these elections produced substantial partisan seat 
changes, they fell short of the 52-seat shift of the 1994 election. 
4. The single exception to this law of midterm presidential losses 
was 1934, when Franklin Roosevelt's Democrats gained nine seats in the 
first midterm of the Democratic realignment. 
5. The median seat loss in the 1970 to 1990 period was even 
smaller, only 13.5 seats. The one midterm eruption of recent years was 
the 1974 midterm, in which Republicans lost 48 seats in the wake of the 
Watergate scandal. There was little reason to think that Democrats in 
1994 carried anything like the baggage that Republicans carried in 1974. 
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6. For an extensive review of the different explanations of midterm 
losses for the president's party and evidence that they are inversely pro­
portional to the size of the prior presidential victory, see Campbell (1993). 
It is not necessary for the president's party to have gained seats in a presi­
dential election for it to have had coattails, although gains are the most 
obvious coattails. The winning presidential party may have coattails and 
actually lose seats if the losses are less than they otherwise would have 
been. This is the case for Democrats in 1992. They lost 10 seats but would 
have lost many more had Clinton lost the presidential election. The 1992 
case is also complicated by the large vote, nearly 20 percent, for indepen­
dent presidential candidate Ross Perot. As a proportion of the two-party 
vote, winning Democratic candidate Bill Clinton received 53.4 percent of 
the vote, a modest rejection of then incumbent George Bush portending 
modest midterm congressional losses for the party in the White House. 
However, if Perot votes are counted as anti-incumbent votes, then 62.5 
percent of presidential ballots cast in 1992 were anti-incumbent votes. 
This suggests that short-term forces were significantly more anti-
Republican in 1994 than the two-party vote indicated. On the basis of 
this estimate of the 1992 political climate, large Democratic losses should 
have been expected in 1994, though even then not as great as actually 
witnessed. 
7. Tufte (1975) and Lewis-Beck and Rice (1992) and others also 
look to the state of the economy as part of the conditions surrounding 
the midterm referendum. The economic growth rates in the 1994 elec­
tion year were about average, suggesting nearly average in-party losses. 
The most prominent forecasting models of midterm elections offered 
predictions ranging from very minor Democratic losses (Lewis-Beck's 
model predicted a four-seat loss) to modest Democratic losses (Campbell 
[1994] and Abramowitz [1994] each predicted losses in the range of 20 to 
25 seats). "On the ground" or district-by-district estimates of Democratic 
losses were on the same order. Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report's pre­
election evaluation of individual races categorized seats as having front­
runners or being toss-ups (Kaplan, 1994). If the parties held districts in 
which their candidates were front-runners and evenly split the toss-up 
districts, Democrats would have been expected to lose 24 seats. A similar 
preelection analysis based on district evaluations by U.S. News and World 
Report (Roberts et al., 1994, 34-35) suggested Democratic losses of about 
27 seats. Even most pundits making calls just a couple of days before the 
election expected smaller Democratic losses. David Broder reported the 
election-eve forecasts of 14 pundits. Only 3 of the 14 predicted a Republi­
can majority, and none predicted Republicans to gain more than 50 seats. 
8. Of the more than 104.4 million votes cast in the 1992 presi­
dential election, Democratic candidate Bill Clinton received about 44.9 
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million. The large difference between Clinton's share of the vote and the 
total vote cast for candidates other than then-President Bush is mostly 
attributable to the large vote for the third presidential candidate in the 
field, Texas billionaire, populist Ross Perot. Perot received the largest 
presidential vote share of any nonmajor party candidate since Teddy 
Roosevelt ran on the Bull Moose ticket in 1912. Perot received about 19 
percent of the total vote. 
9. Before the election, Republicans held majorities in 29 state legis­
lative chambers, and Democrats controlled 66. After the election, Repub­
licans controlled 47 and Democrats 48, a shift of 18 chambers in the 
Republican direction (Ladd, 1995, 1). In terms of the control of both 
state legislative chambers in a state, Republicans after the 1994 midterm 
controlled 19 state legislatures, Democrats controlled 18, and 12 were 
divided. The election placed more state legislatures under unified Re­
publican control than at any time since the 1968 election, when Demo­
crats and Republicans each controlled 20 states. 
10. The concept of a partisan realignment refers to fundamental or 
long-term partisan change as opposed to transitory or short-term change. 
The subject of this change, however, varies in different uses. Some refer 
to partisan realignment as a long-term shift in the partisan allegiances of 
different social, economic, or demographic groups. A more frequent use, 
and the one employed here, refers to a long-term shift in the balance of 
electoral support between the parties—in other terms, a change in the 
parties' "normal vote" (Converse, 1966). While group change usually ac­
companies partisan change, it is not required for it and is not synony­
mous with it. 
11. The New Deal realignment toward the Democratic Party began 
in 1928 and was for the most part in place by the 1936 election, though 
as both Ladd (1995) and Sundquist (1983) point out, related changes and 
adjustments continued for some time. The evidence indicates an unusual 
amount of mobilization occurred over this period. Of the 1936 electorate, 
nearly half had not voted before 1928. A majority of these new voters 
were Democrats. Of the nearly 16 percentage point shift in the normal 
partisan vote, about two-thirds can be traced to mobilization and about a 
third to the conversion of former Republicans to the Democrats (Camp­
bell, 1985, 373). Much as one would expect, the mobilization component 
of this realignment occurred more rapidly than the conversion compo­
nent, which requires the rejection of a previous attachment as well as the 
adoption of a new attachment. 
12. Several researchers have well documented the rise of Republi­
canism in the South. See Petrocik (1987), Bullock (1988), Stanley (1988), 
Carmines and Stimson (1989), Wattenberg (1991), and Black and Black 
(1992), among others. This focus on the South does not mean that the 
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realignment took place only in this region or that the realignment did 
not affect the politics of other regions. The greatest regional shift was in 
the South and particularly in the "deep South." However, the realign­
ment was evident in other areas as well, with some regions moving in the 
Republican direction, while others became more Democratic. My exami­
nation of presidential voting and Bullock's analysis of several offices indi­
cates that Republicans also made significant gains in the Rocky Mountain 
states in the late 1970s, while Democrats had made up for some of these 
losses with earlier gains of their own in New England and the north cen­
tral states (see Bullock, 1988). 
13. Texas, North Carolina, Virginia, and Florida were also nearly 
perfect in the Democratic loyalty over this period. They voted 16 of 17 
times for the Democratic presidential candidate. Each deviated in 1928 
to vote for Hoover in his landslide over Democrat Al Smith, the first Cath­
olic to head a major-party ticket. Tennessee deviated only twice, voting 
15 of 17 times for the Democrat. In addition, from the first election in 
which it cast electoral votes in 1908 until 1944, Oklahoma deviated only 
twice from the solid Democratic line, voting for the Democratic standard-
bearer 8 of 10 times. 
14. The 12 southern states were Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Geor­
gia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, 
Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. Forty-seven electoral votes were cast for 
nonmajor party candidates, and 46 of these were for George Wallace in 
the 1968 election. The only recent election in which a Democratic presi­
dential candidate received as much as a third of the region's Electoral 
College votes was 1976, when Jimmy Carter carried 10 of the 12 states. 
The southern Democratic ticket of 1992 carried only 4 of the 12 states, 
indicating how the region has been slipping further away from the Dem­
ocratic Party. 
15. In the 1960s, the 12 southern states had 136 of the 538 electoral 
votes (25 percent). In the 1990s, these states have 155 electoral votes 
(about 29 percent of the Electoral College). 
16. Of the 136 districts in the twelve southern states in 1968, Demo­
crats won 86 seats, and Republicans won 26. Democrats were uncontested 
in 35 districts that year. 
17. Some went even further. Because of the twists, turns, delays, 
dealignment, and the general confusion in the development of the Re­
publican realignment, along the way a number of prominent analysts 
suggested that the value of the very concept of realignment or its applica­
bility to modern American politics was in doubt (Shafer, 1991). 
18. Subsequent analysis of partisan dealignment indicates that ear­
lier conclusions exaggerated its extent. Keith et al. (1992) found that in­
dependents leaning toward one of the parties in their identifications were 
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much more like partisans than independents and had often been misclas­
sified as independents. The correct classification indicates a much smaller 
drop in partisanship than previously estimated. In addition, Miller (1991) 
found no decline in the correlation of partisanship and the presidential 
vote choice. 
19. The only southern state legislatures to have more than 12 per­
cent of seats held by Republicans following the 1964 election, a good year 
for Republicans in the South though a Democratic landslide year else­
where, were in Tennessee (24 percent Republican) and Oklahoma (21 
percent). Oklahoma is often not counted in the South, although it ap­
peared as loyally Democratic as many border states in the era of the solid 
Democratic south. 
20. Following the 1974 election, Republicans held less than 5 per­
cent of the seats in the lower houses of Alabama (no Republicans), Arkan­
sas (2 percent), Louisiana (4 percent), and Mississippi (2 percent). They 
also held fewer than 15 percent of the seats in the state legislatures of 
Georgia (13 percent), North Carolina (8 percent), South Carolina (14 
percent), and Texas (11 percent). 
21. Republicans after the 1984 election had a significant presence 
in the state legislatures of Florida (35 percent), North Carolina (32 per­
cent), Oklahoma (32 percent), Tennessee (37 percent), Texas (35 per­
cent), and Virginia (34 percent). They were still a small minority in the 
legislatures of Alabama (12 percent), Arkansas (9 percent), Georgia (14 
percent), Louisiana (13 percent), and Mississippi (5 percent). 
22. Republicans held more than 30 percent of state legislative seats 
following the 1992 election (or 1991, in odd-year states) in Florida (41 
percent), North Carolina (35 percent), Oklahoma (32 percent), South 
Carolina (41 percent), Tennessee (36 percent), Texas (39 percent), and 
Virginia (41 percent). They held more than 20 percent of seats in Ala­
bama (22 percent), Georgia (29 percent), and Mississippi (23 percent). 
The least-Republican state legislatures in 1992 were Arkansas (10 percent 
Republican) and Louisiana (15 percent). 
23. In the 12 states of the formerly solid Democratic South (includ­
ing Oklahoma in the count), Republicans won 69 seats in 1994 and Dem­
ocrats won 62. 
24. There were 22 Democrats and 2 Republicans elected to the 
House in the 1976 election. 
25. Several polls of this era (including the 1940s) place the racial 
gap at about 25 percentage points. The Gallup Poll finds a 36-point gap 
in 1952, a 20-point gap in 1956, and a 19-point gap in 1960. Abramson 
et al.'s (1994, 146) examination of National Opinion Research Center 
(NORC) data indicates an average racial gap of 25.4 percentage points in 
the five presidential elections from 1944 to 1960. The mean racial gap in 
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the eight presidential elections from 1964 to 1992 was 49.9 percentage 
points. 
26. Because of sampling error and measurement errors in the sur­
veys and exit polls examined, there is some uncertainty around the size 
of the gender gap, the dividing line for when it portends Republican 
victory or failure, and the election in which the gender gap began to be 
related to election outcomes (1972, 1976, or 1980?). Other polls in 1984, 
for instance, had the gap at seven or eight percentage points (NES and 
ABC News Poll). Mitofsky International exit polls in 1994 (Wilcox, 1995, 
18) indicated an 8-point gender gap in 1994—less than the 11-point gap 
reported by Ladd (1995) but still above the apparent 6 percent threshold. 
Additionally, we should expect the gap to shrink a bit in landslide Repub­
lican elections when large numbers, regardless of gender, are attracted 
to the Republican candidate. The smallest gender gap with a successful 
Republican candidate in recent years, for instance, was for Reagan in his 
1984 landslide election. 
27. As further evidence that incumbency remained potent, nearly 
half (16 of 34) of the defeated Democratic incumbents were freshman. 
Thus the reelection rate of freshman Democratic incumbents was 75.8 
percent (50 of 66 running) while the reelection rate of nonfreshman 
Democratic incumbents was 88.7 percent (141 of 159 running). 
28. There were 209 contested Democratic incumbents and 122 
contested Republican incumbents. There were 16 uncontested Demo­
cratic incumbents and 35 uncontested Republican incumbents. The 
mean total two-party vote was 154,658 votes in Democratic districts and 
173,200 in Republican districts. The analysis used the 1992 estimated 
vote value of incumbency of 8 percent and a vote value of uncontested 
seats of 23 percent. The total votes were adjusted by subtracting from a 
party votes that it won because of its incumbents, adding to its total votes 
that were won because of the other party's incumbents, and adding to its 
total votes that it would have won in the districts that it had left uncon­
tested. The initial base vote for the parties included adjustments for un­
contested districts with unreported votes. This was the adjusted vote in 
table 8.3. On the basis of the adjustments for uncontested seats and in­
cumbency, the Democratic vote would have increased in numbers from 
about 32,306,000 votes (46.2 percent) to about 32,804,000 votes (45.7 
percent), and the Republican vote would have increased from about 
37,563,000 votes (53.8 percent) to about 39,028,000 votes (54.3 percent). 
29. The even division of the national vote is the split of the aggre­
gated national vote totals rather than a mean district vote percentage of 
50 percent. The split of the aggregated national vote takes into account 
the very real differences in the effective size of district votes. Calculating 
bias on the basis of a mean district vote of 50 percent erroneously counts 
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each district equally and ignores the large differences among district 
vote totals. 
30. None of these estimates include the multiplier effect of the 
Democrats' incumbency advantage. That is, the votes in 1994 have been 
taken as exogenous. In fact, however, we know that past pro-Democratic 
partisan bias increased the number of Democratic incumbents and that 
increased their 1994 vote. Including this multiplier effect would have in­
creased estimates of the pro-Democratic bias by several seats. 
31. There are alternative vote simulations for districts that do not 
report the vote. In the district-level analysis that follows, the vote is simu­
lated using the presidential vote totals in the district and the average 
drop-off rate in uncontested districts that did report the House vote. A 
further refinement was made in this second simulation, simulating the 
vote that the uncontesting party would have been expected to have re­
ceived had it mounted opposition in the district. The national vote divi­
sion using this second simulation does not vary much from the more 
simple simulation using the vote in reporting uncontested districts. 
There is no difference between the simulations in the 1992 national vote 
division: both estimated Democratic votes of about 52.7 percent. In 1994, 
the second simulation indicated a Republican vote of 53 percent, whereas 
the first simulation indicated a Republican vote of 53.8 percent. 
32. This is not what a neutral electoral system would have pro­
duced. It is the expected outcome of a hypothetical system as biased in 
favor of Republicans as the actual system is biased in favor of Democrats. 
The expectation of 61 to 62 percent of seats is based on a comparison of 
the adjusted votes for Democrats in 1990 to the Republican vote in 1994. 
A majority vote of 53.8 percent (the size of the 1994 Republican majority) 
is one-tenth of a percent point more than the 1994 Democratic vote ma­
jority. In that election, Democrats won more than 61 percent of House 
seats. 
33. In addition to unreported votes in states that do not report the 
vote in uncontested districts, there were no votes for the seven districts 
in Louisiana. Louisiana's runoff open-primary system does not require a 
general election if a candidate receives a majority vote in the initial vo­
ting. All seven district races were settled in the first round of voting. 
34. The mean turnout drop-off from presidential to House voting 
in uncontested districts that reported the vote in 1992 was 15.2 percent. 
Therefore, in uncontested districts not reporting the 1992 House vote, a 
district's House vote was initially simulated as 84.8 percent of its presi­
dential vote. As a point of reference, the rate in contested seats for 1992 
was 94.2 percent. The mean turnout drop-off from the 1992 presidential 
vote to the 1994 midterm vote in uncontested districts reporting the dis­
trict vote was 41.4 percent, reflecting in large part the regular turnout 
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decline from the on-year to the midterm election. The 1994 House vote 
in uncontested districts in which the vote is not reported is initially simu­
lated as 58.6 percent of the district's prior presidential vote total (1 — 
0.414). Again, as a point of reference, the equivalent mean rate in districts 
contested in 1994 was 70.5 percent of the district's 1992 total presidential 
vote. These simulated votes in unreporting uncontested seats, along with 
the votes in uncontested seats in which the vote was reported, were ad­
justed further to take into account the vote that would have gone to the 
party not contesting the seat and then the mean drop-off in contested 
districts. 
35. The simulated vote in uncontested seats was calculated as 29.8 
percent of the winning party's vote in the district. This amounts to a dis­
trict vote division of 77 percent (100/129.8) to 23 percent. This procedure 
assumes that the votes for the uncontesting party were entirely produced 
by higher turnout. However, some of these votes may have been at the 
expense of the winning party. To take this into account, votes for both 
parties (in the uncontested districts) were discounted so that the district's 
drop-off rate equalled that in contested districts in the election. The dis­
count rate was 14 percent in 1992 and 7 percent in 1994. 
36. Note that the unwasted-vote measure of system bias indicated 
a smaller bias in 1992. It indicated a LI percent pro-Democratic bias. 
However, this measure examined only contested elections. Additionally, 
as noted in chapter 4, some bias may also be caused by an asymmetrical 
difference in wasted votes. That is, if the electoral system causes one party 
to waste more of its votes when the parties evenly divide the vote, the 
system is biased in favor of the other party. See appendix B. 
37. There was no change between 1992 and 1994 in 17 districts. In 
districts with Democratic gains, the mean gain was about 5 percent of 
the vote. 
38. One could conceivably use district characteristics to model the 
proportionate swing, just as the vote swing itself has been simulated by 
King and Gelman (1991) and Jackman (1994). That is, if an even national 
vote division would have been achieved after about half of the swing from 
1992 to 1994, it is not necessarily the case that all districts would have 
equally experienced half of their vote swing. Some might have more eas­
ily swung in the Republican direction and others might have held back. 
However, given that the 1992 and 1994 elections were each only about 
three percentage points off center, and given the likely difficulty of mod­
eling proportions of district vote swings, the simple iterative application 
of constant proportions would seem adequate to estimate bias and an 
improvement over hypothetical methods that do not examine pairs of 
elections and actual district level vote swings. 
39. The vote swing was calculated from the 1992 vote percentage 
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base in each district. The adjusted swing was multiplied by the average 
total vote in the district for the 1992 and 1994 elections. This provided a 
hypothetical vote for both parties in each district. These were then aggre­
gated to determine whether the national vote was equally divided. If not, 
further proportions of the vote swing were examined until the national 
party votes converged. 
40. Combining the district level analysis with the unwasted vote 
analysis clarifies the basis for the pro-Democratic bias. The average hypo­
thetical vote for Democratic winners was about 114,400 votes. The aver­
age hypothetical vote for Republican winners, on the other hand, was 
about 128,300 votes. Democrats paid almost 14,000 votes less than Re­
publicans did for a victory. 
41. Looking at turnout, rather than votes for the winning candi­
date, produces the same conclusion. Democrats won 36 (90 percent) of 
the 40 lowest-turnout districts (all contested) in 1994. Each of these dis­
tricts had a total turnout of fewer than 120,000 voters compared to the 
average district's 170,000. 
42. The over-140 club is, if anything, even more diverse than the 
cheapest seats. The 30 most-vote-expensive seats represent 19 different 
states. There seems a slight, but only slight, tilt toward northern, eastern, 
and midwestern states rather than southern and western states. 
43. The high showing of Democrats since 1962 was in 1974 and 
1976, when Democratic candidate Danielson won 74 percent of the vote. 
Of the 17 elections since 1962, the Democrat won with less than 60 per­
cent of the vote 8 times. The district numbers changed over several redis­
trictings over the years. It was the Twenty-ninth District in the 1960s and 
the Thirtieth in 1970s. 
44. An even division would have been 217 of the 434 seats exam­
ined, Vermont's single seat excluded because it was won by a third-party 
candidate. The aggregate analysis indicates that Democrats would have 
won 235 seats. The 1992 uniform district swing to the Republicans indi­
cated that Democrats would have won 233 seats. The 1994 uniform dis­
trict swing to the Democrats indicated that Democrats would have won 
229 seats. The 1992-to-1994 proportionate-swing analysis indicated that 
Democrats would have won 235 seats. The unwasted-vote analysis for all 
districts indicated the Democrats would have won 236 seats. 
45. The two alternative estimates of bias in appendix B, the modi­
fied uniform-vote-swing measure and the fixed-swing-ratio measure, also 
generally support these findings of the direction and magnitude of elec­
toral system bias. Although the alternative measures differ in the assess­
ment of bias in the 1950s and though they do not suggest a strong 
relationship with the congressional vote, for elections after 1960, they 
indicate a median pro-Democratic bias in contested seats of 3.5 percent 
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in the case of the fixed-swing-ratio measure and 3.2 percent in the case 
of the modified uniform-vote-swing measure. By converting this for all 
districts and on the basis of the average election of 376 contested districts 
(from 1962 to 1992), this amounts to a bias of 3 percent of all districts for 
the fixed-swing-ratio measure and 2.8 percent for the modified uniform-
vote-swing measure. Both are within the 2.8-to-4.4 percent range of esti­
mates generated in the 1994 election analysis. 
Chapter 9 
1. The 1954-to-1992 analysis indicated a 15.5-to-l7.7 seat bias 
(table 6.3). The five estimates of bias in 1994 placed it at between 13 and 
19 seats, with a mean of 16 seats. None of these estimates includes the 
carryover effect of prior bias through incumbency. The analysis in chap­
ter 4 and appendix C indicates that the carryover effect of bias amounted 
to two or three additional seats. The analysis of two alternative bias 
estimates in appendix B, although differing from the unwasted-vote 
measure for elections in the 1950s, also finds a pro-Democratic electoral 
system bias for elections in the 1960s, 1970s (except 1974), 1980s, and 
into the 1990s. In recent decades, these estimates have indicated an even 
greater pro-Democratic bias than the unwasted-vote measure. 
2. Bias, along with the Democratic advantages in incumbency and 
uncontested seats, may also have preserved the Democratic seat majority 
in 1968. First, without candidate advantages in 1968, the analysis in chap­
ter 3 indicates that the parties would have evenly divided the national 
vote (see table 3.5)—in which case the pro-Democratic bias of the elec­
toral system would have kept the House under Democratic Party control. 
3. These are conservative estimates. Including the incumbency car­
ryover effect would increase the estimated impact to between 10 and 12 
seats. In addition, bias estimates in particular elections are lower than the 
bias of 15 to 18 seats for the system because bias was found to increase 
inversely with the Democratic vote, and the average Democratic congres­
sional vote from 1936 to 1992 was 53.2 percent, 3.2 percentage points 
beyond the 50 percent vote mark. Thus, bias in particular elections in 
which the Democratic vote exceeds 50 percent, which includes all elec­
tions from 1954 to 1992, will generally be smaller than bias when the vote 
was 50 percent. 
4. Observers have long suspected that electoral systems using the 
states as political districts are biased in favor of the Republicans. In light 
of the great population differences among the states, an electoral system 
based on the equal representation of the states, like the Senate electoral 
system, is likely to be biased in favor of the party with greater voting 
strengths in the small states. Since Republicans have been generally more 
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popular with those living in rural areas and in the less populated western 
states, the Senate system is mostly likely biased in favor of the Republi­
cans. Oppenheimer and Sandstrum (1995), using an indirect approach 
to estimating bias, found that the Senate system has been consistently 
biased in favor of Republicans from 1958 to 1994. Bias occasionally was 
as great as eight seats, but typically was about five seats. In 1994, bias was 
only a single seat. The presidential electoral system, although also based 
on the states, is more complicated, since states have unequal numbers of 
electoral votes based largely, though not exclusively, on their population. 
Most observers regard the Electoral College system as also favoring Re­
publicans, though Garand and Parent (1991), in a uniform-vote-swing 
analysis similar to King and Gelman's analysis of the House system, claim 
that the conventional wisdom is incorrect and that the system has favored 
Democratic presidential candidates in recent decades. Garand and Par-
ent's analysis indicated that the Electoral College system favored Demo­
crats in 10 of the 12 presidential elections between 1944 and 1988. The 
results, however, are suspect since they are derived by using the mean 
district vote rather than the national vote percentage (1019 n. 4). 
5. The impact of partisanship on roll-call voting is well docu­
mented. Bond and Fleisher (1990) found that the interaction of the rep-
resentative's partisanship and ideology were the most important variables 
affecting the passage of bills endorsed by a president. 
6. The slope coefficient is based on an assumption of linearity. The 
quintile analysis, however, suggests that the greatest differences are at the 
low end of the spectrum and that there are not consistent differences at 
the upper end. 
7. There are numerous examples of very partisan, very close votes 
in the House on important bills. Bond and Fleisher (1990) recount one 
example involving the 1987 budget reconciliation bill. After losing the 
vote on the rule to the Republicans helped by some defecting conserva­
tive Democrats, Speaker Jim Wright made a few changes in the bill and 
brought it back up for a vote immediately: "The vote on final passage 
appeared to be a loss for the Speaker. When the fifteen minutes normally 
allowed for voting had expired, the vote was 205-206. Wright delayed 
announcing the outcome until Jim Chapman, a second-term Democrat 
from Wright's home state, rushed back to the floor and changed his vote 
and the outcome" (129). This is another bill that might well have gone 
against the Democrats if their numbers had not been augmented by elec­
toral system bias. 
8. These estimates begin with the recorded vote of 221 in favor and 
210 opposed. This vote includes the nine Democrats in the House by 
virtue of electoral system bias. If the votes of these nine Democrats on 
this legislation had divided like those of other Democrats, they would 
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have voted seven or eight votes in favor and one or two votes against. If 
these nine Democrats had not voted, the vote would have been 213 or 
214 in favor and 208 or 209 opposed. If these nine Democrats had been 
replaced by nine Republicans, who voted like other Republicans (virtually 
unanimous in opposition), the final vote would have been 213 or 214 in 
favor and 217 or 218 against. 
9. A very controversial aspect of the income-tax-rate hike was that 
it would be imposed retroactively. The proposed tax-rate increase also 
violated the movement toward tax simplification (at least with respect to 
the number of tax brackets or rates) that was hammered out in the mid­
1980s. The tax provision also included an additional 10 percent surtax 
for those with incomes (excluding capital gains) over $250,000. 
10. These revenue losers included an expansion of the "earned­
income tax credit," a tax break for lower-income taxpayers, and the cre­
ation of tax-preferred federal "empowerment zones," both of which re­
duced federal revenues. Rules regarding the tax treatment of intangible 
assets, passive losses, and business investments also were changed. The 
luxury tax on certain items (airplanes, yachts, etc.) was repealed or in­
dexed to inflation rates. Finally, long-held investments would have been 
subjected to a reduced capital gains tax. 
11. The reconciliation process requires various committees to pro­
duce savings in programs under their jurisdiction. Congressional Quar­
terly indicated that the bill froze many discretionary programs "at or 
below fiscal 1993 levels through fiscal 1998 (29 May 1993, 1386). A more 
detailed discussion of these proposed savings can be found in Congres­
sional Quarterly Weekly Report (7 August 1993, 2138-42). In reviewing these 
reconciliation changes, it is clear that some were not spending reductions 
but spending increases (for example, $2.5 billion more for the food stamp 
program over five years) and others were more specific revenue increases 
rather than spending cuts (for example, extending the tax on diesel fuel 
to recreational boaters and extending the period of the tonnage fees on 
foreign cargo ships entering U.S. ports). 
12. Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report (7 August 1993, 2134) of­
fered an excellent summary of how the bill changed at various stages 
from Clinton's initial proposal to the House to the Senate and eventually 
through the conference committee. 
13. One seat was vacant, the Third District in Michigan, The seat 
had been held by Paul Henry, a moderate Republican, until his death. 
14. There cannot be perfect certainty about whether bias made the 
difference on these votes. There is some chance that the Democrats in 
the House because of bias might have voted more like Republicans 
on these particular bills, and thus replacing them with Republicans 
(through an unbiased electoral system) would not have made as much of 
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a difference. For instance, in the example of the 1992 vote on H.R. 4210, 
if the nine Democrats in the House because of bias had voted 5 to 4 for 
the bill (instead of 7.5 to 1.5), the bill might have passed narrowly even 
without the votes that Democrats had because of system bias. In addition, 
Democratic leaders might have been able to persuade additional Demo­
crats to the party's side on these issues. Some members might have voted 
their constituency position, since their votes were not needed for the 
Democratic position to prevail. In an unbiased House in which their votes 
would have mattered to the outcome, they might have been pulled back 
to the party line. Through various deals, compromises, promises, or 
threats, Democratic leaders might also have been able to pull in a few 
additional votes if needed. Of course, the same uncertainties are present 
on the Republican side, although on these votes Republicans (the most 
likely source of additional votes on the Republican side of the issue) were 
nearly unanimous at the outset, so there were fewer prime opportunities 
to attract additional support for the party's position. In addition, the mi­
nority party has fewer resources or levers to use as inducements to their 
position. Nevertheless, it is possible both that some issues that appeared 
to have been decided because of electoral system bias might not have 
been and that some issues that appeared not to have been decided be­
cause of bias in fact were. 
15. It might be noted that Margolis-Mezvinsky was not elected from 
a low-turnout district. This is true. However, without the extra Demo­
cratic votes of those who did sit in the cheap seats, Margolis-Mezvinsky's 
vote would not have decided the outcome of this bill. 
16. Abramson (1983) documents a general decline from 1952 to 
1980 among white respondents to surveys in several civic attitudes. He 
observes a decline in "external" political efficacy as measured by re­
sponses to the statements "People like me don't have any say" and "Public 
officials don't care what people think" and also a decline in political trust, 
measured by an index of four or five survey questions including "How 
much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washing­
ton to do what is right—just about always, most of the time, or only some 
of the time?" Abramson found no consistent bivariate relationship be­
tween Republican Party identification and political trust (198). However, 
he noted that the association between education and trust was weaker 
than expected (232). He also noted that political trust reflects evaluations 
of incumbents as well as more system-based evaluations. In light of these 
findings, it seems plausible that trust among Republicans suffered under 
the 40-year reign of Democrats in the House, that this may have masked 
the expected more positive effects of education (education being posi­
tively associated with income, which is positively associated with Republi­
can identification), and that the higher educational attainment of 
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Republicans may have offset the depressing effect of being in a seemingly 
permanent minority. In terms of external political efficacy, Abramson also 
notes that respondents were sensitive to whether their party was in gov­
ernment. He notes that the efficacy of Democrats rose when a Democrat 
was in the White House and that the efficacy of Republicans rose with a 
Republican administration. Given this, it seems plausible that efficacy 
would be affected by partisan control of Congress and that there may be 
a cumulative effect of the years, at least among those who were aware of 
who held control of the House. 
17. Republican Representatives Armey, Dunn, and Shays and their 
staffs (Koopman et al., 1994) documented declines in public approval of 
and confidence in Congress and the more generalized trust in govern­
ment. They attribute these declines to the long tenure of Democratic con­
trol of the House and what they regard as the related scandals. 
18. Patterson and Caldeira (1990) draw their aggregate national 
poll results mostly from Harris Polls, but also from the NORC and NBC 
surveys. They indicate that the mean rating for the confidence question 
was "41.5 percent in the 1960s, 17.1 percent in the 1970s, and 15.5 per­
cent in the 1980s" (30). The mean positive congressional evaluation 
percentages by decade were "43.9 percent in the 1960s, 26.9 percent in 
the 1970s, and 33.3 percent in the 1980s" (30). Since they were drawing 
on data only through 1985, I updated the mean with four additional 
Harris surveys done in the late 1980s (Keene and Ladd, 1992, 87). The 
updated mean for the 1980s was 37.5 percent, still well below evaluations 
in the 1960s. 
19. The congressional approval ratings series are from Gallup Poll 
surveys reported by Keene and Ladd (1992). The 18 percent approval 
rating was from a March 1992 Gallup Poll. It was the lowest rating in the 
series dating back to April 1974. 
20. Partisan bias may also help to explain the conundrum of why 
voters seem to like their congressman individually while they are dis­
dainful of Congress as a whole (Fenno, 1975). It is, in part, an aggrega­
tion problem. Congress in the aggregate is skewed toward those few 
voters in low-turnout districts. Just as the national vote percentage is less 
Democratic than the mean district-vote percentage, the median voter na­
tionally is not represented well by the median representative. 
21. If bias had the suspected effects on efficacy, they were probably 
not uniformly felt throughout the public. The political efficacy of consis­
tently Democratic voters probably did not suffer (and might have been 
enhanced). However, those who occasionally voted Republican might 
have judged the system to be unresponsive or beyond their ability to 
influence. 
22. Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (1995, 119) draw a distinction 
298 • NOTES TO CHAPTER 9 
between public regard for the members of Congress and public support 
for the institution of Congress itself. While they find that Republicans 
held members of Congress in significantly less esteem than did Demo­
crats, they found no direct effect of partisanship on approval of Congress 
as an institution. However, partisanship may have affected approval of 
Congress as an institution indirectly by affecting levels of efficacy. Addi­
tionally, very little of the variance in approval of Congress as an institu­
tion was explained by the 11 independent variables (adjusted R2 = .08), 
raising the possibility of a large amount of random error in the measure­
ment of the dependent variable. This combined with potential multicol­
linearity concerns (partisanship's multiple correlation with the other 
independent variables, particularly socioeconomics, demographics, ide­
ology, and views regarding representation) suggests caution before dis­
missing possible direct and indirect partisan effects. 
23. As an aside, the what-if question (what if everyone voted?) is the 
most commonly asked question regarding the cheap-seats thesis by my 
fellow political scientists. Implicit in the what-if perspective are two highly 
questionable notions, that nonvoters are would-be Democrats and that a 
system of proxy voting through weighting some votes more and diluting 
the impact of others is a just form of representative democracy (if every­
one voted, nothing would change, so nothing is wrong with the present 
system). This despite the fact that neither electoral system analysis nor 
democratic theory would allow for the counting in any way of votes that 
were never cast. The commonness of this what-if question also stands in 
sharp contrast to the inattention to the more obvious what-if questions 
regarding the impact of incumbency and uncontested seats on the aggre­
gate vote. Examinations of the Democratic Party's big incumbency advan­
tage over the decades was limited to examining which party won seats 
after incumbents left them. The focus on the what-if question regarding 
system bias minimizes the reality of Republican votes being given short 
shrift by the system. 
24. A third option for simulating the vote of nonvoters can be 
drawn from rational-choice theory, the thesis that nondecisions are actu­
ally implicit decisions, and empirical research indicating that many non­
voters are likely to feel cross-pressured by (Campbell, 1993), indifferent 
to, or alienated from (Zipp, 1985) the candidates. From these perspec­
tives the nonvote is an expression of a near-equal preference (or dislike) 
of both candidates and amounts to half a vote for each. Since a split vote 
is not an available option and a nonvote has the same effect without some 
of the costs of voting, these would-be voters express their will by not vo­
ting. If they were to vote as a group, we would expect them to divide 
their votes evenly. In terms of the aggregate impact of this scenario, the 
national vote would be moved toward an even-vote division, with the cur­
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rent majority-vote party maintaining its majority status. For the period 
of 1954 to 1992, this would have meant reducing Democratic vote majori­
ties. There would be no change in district seat winners, but the winning 
candidates would win by smaller margins. With complete turnout, there 
would be no interdistrict turnout differences (except those resulting from 
malapportionment from the lumpiness of assigning a limited number of 
districts and respecting state boundaries in the allocation of districts) and 
no system bias resulting from such differences. 
25. The arithmetic can be illustrated by returning to the two hy­
pothetical districts of chapter 4 (table 4.7). Recall that the low-turnout 
district, won by the Democrat, had a turnout of 100,000 voters and the 
high-turnout district, won by the Republican, had a turnout of 300,000 
voters. The vote percentage margin in each case was 80 percent for the 
winning candidate and 20 percent for the losing candidate. The national 
vote percentage was 65 percent for Republicans and 35 percent for the 
Democrats. We now also assume that there are half a million possible 
voters in each district (400,000 nonvoters in the low-turnout district and 
200,000 in the high-turnout district). Under the assumption that nonvot­
ers are like those who voted in the district (splitting their votes in the 
same partisan ratio), if everyone who could have voted did, the vote divi­
sion in the districts would have remained the same and the Democratic 
portion of the national vote would have risen from 35 to 50 percent (each 
party would have received half a million votes). Under the alternative 
assumption that nonvoters are like those who voted nationally (splitting 
their votes at the national partisan ratio), the national vote division would 
have remained the same, now with 650,000 Republican voters and 
350,000 Democratic voters. There are big differences within the districts. 
In the first district, the formerly Democratic cheap seat is now neither 
cheap nor Democratic. With perfect turnout and assuming that new vot­
ers split identically to the national vote division, Republicans would have 
received 280,000 votes (56 percent, 260,000 added to the initial 20,000) 
and Democrats would have received 220,000 votes (44 percent, 140,000 
added to the initial 80,000). Republicans would still have won the for­
merly higher-turnout district, now with 370,000 votes (74 percent, 
130,000 added to the initial 240,000) and 130,000 votes for the Demo­
crats (26 percent, 70,000 added to the initial 60,000). 
26. A difference of three percentage points or so may not seem es­
pecially great, but it is substantial from one perspective. The typical (me­
dian) congressional vote change from one election to the next was only 
2.3 percentage points in elections from 1954 to 1992. Of course, from 
another perspective, the difference is not so consequential. If nonvoters 
were voting as their voting neighbors had, the Democratic vote would 
have increased by three or four or more percentage points, but no seats 
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would change hands. The district-vote percentages, now based on many 
more votes cast and no longer cheap in the once-low-turnout areas, 
would (by our assumption regarding the new voters) remain unchanged. 
27. There is some research suggesting that voters nationally do not 
reflect the views of nonvoters. Radcliff (1994, 1995) found Democrats to 
benefit from higher turnout, but flaws in this research were addressed by 
Erikson (1995) and also in chapter 6. The critique suggests that a decline 
in turnout accompanied a decline in Democratic voting through the 
1970s and 1980s and that this coincident trend was mistakenly interpre­
ted as a causal one. As further evidence of this, the relationship between 
the Democratic vote and turnout should been even stronger in earlier 
years when the socioeconomic basis of partisanship was even stronger 
but, tellingly, was not. Others (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Verba et 
aL, 1993) have also tried to make the case that voters do not well reflect 
the views of nonvoters, but they have not been able to point to systematic 
differences in preferences or opinions (other than some possible differ­
ences in issue emphases between the two groups). 
28. Assume that the Ve is the Democratic district-vote percentage 
among existing voters and that Vn is Democratic district-vote division 
among newly added voters, the previous nonvoters in the district. The 
combined or total vote (Vt) when both groups voted would be a weighted 
average of the two percentages, Vt = (b1 X Ve) + (b2 X Vn), where bx and 
b2 are the weights (1 > bx ^  0, 1 ^  b2 ^  0, and b1 + b2= I). In cheap-seat 
districts, b2 is much greater than bv However, as long as the original vote 
(Ve) is over 50 percent Democratic and the vote of new voters (Vn) is over 
50 percent Democratic (as it would have been if the former nonvoters 
voted like existing voters had in elections from 1954 to 1992, although 
not in 1994), then the new total vote (Vt) would be over 50 percent Demo­
cratic, regardless of the relative magnitudes of b1 and br If because of the 
volatility of new voters, Vn drops below 50 percent in some districts, it 
would be possible for Vt to drop below 50 percent and the likelihood 
increases with higher values of b2, the cheap seats. 
29. The simulation was done on the 32 districts won with less than 
70,000 votes in 1994. These are listed in table 8.6. Democrats won 30 of 
the 32 districts. The simulation involved four steps. First, the voting-age 
population for districts was estimated from national census information. 
On the basis of a voting-age population of approximately 186 million 
and 435 districts, the voting-age population of each district was initially 
estimated at approximately 428,000. Because of uneven apportionment 
among states, various rates of state growth in the interim, presence of 
noncitizens in the count, and other factors that might add some error to 
this estimate, a more conservative estimate of 400,000 potential voters 
was used. The second step involved estimating the number of nonvoters 
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in the 32 districts. This was done by subtracting the number of actual 
voters from the 400,000 possible voters. The third step simulated the 
number of votes each party would receive from these nonvoters if they 
had voted and had cast their ballots in the same partisan proportions as 
voters had. Republican votes in the district would have increased by 53.8 
percent of the number of previous nonvoters. Democratic votes in the 
district would have increased by 46.2 percent of the number of previous 
nonvoters. The fourth step added these new votes for each party to their 
previous vote totals (among actual voters) and calculated the new district 
vote percentages for each party. According to these new vote percentages, 
Republicans would have won 20 of the 32 districts (adding 18 to the 2 
they had won), and Democrats would have kept 12 of the seats, although 
7 of these by less than a 51 to 49 percent margin. When considering the 
impact of uncertainty on possible Republican gains in these cheap seats, 
we might also expect Democrats not to hold some of these marginal dis­
tricts as well as expect Republicans not to reap all 18 of their possible 
seat gains. 
30. Guinier is careful to draw a distinction between permanent and 
temporary minorities. Each election will place someone in the minority. 
Although her principle of "taking turns" suggests that she is troubled by 
anyone being a political loser, Guinier is more concerned about groups 
being permanent losers. 
31. Lani Guinier, then a professor at the University of Pennsylva-
nia's Law School, was nominated by President Clinton in April of 1993 to 
serve as the Assistant Attorney General of Civil Rights. Her nomination 
was quite controversial. Conservatives found Professor Guinier's views 
on civil rights and democratic processes to be radical, unacceptable, and 
out of the mainstream. They dubbed her "the Quota Queen." Senator 
Minority Leader Bob Dole saw Guinier as being "consistently hostile to 
the principle of one person, one vote; consistently hostile to the majority 
rule; and a consistent supporter, not only of quotas, but of vote-rigging 
schemes that make quotas look mild" (Guinier, 1994, ix). Liberals de­
fended her views, arguing that her writings had been misinterpreted and 
misunderstood and that she was well within the democratic mainstream. 
On further reflection and a determination that the nomination was in 
trouble, President Clinton withdrew Guinier's nomination before the 
Senate had even begun holding hearings. In The Tyranny of the Majority, 
Guinier offers a collection of her essays and law review articles on race 
and representation to clarify the record and, presumably, refute the 
charges against her. 
32. The list of impediments to majority rule is lengthy. Among the 
many impediments are staggered elections of fixed and long durations, 
separation of powers, the presidential veto, bicameralism, federalism, 
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filibusters in the Senate, the two-term limit for the president, the Elec­
toral College, the congressional committee system, the Bill of Rights and 
other constitutional safeguards of minority rights, and judicial review. A 
system that requires successive majorities elected for different terms and 
under different procedures essentially requires an extraordinary major­
ity to act. This provides minorities with an effective veto over the will of 
the majority. 
33. Although much of Guinier's research concerns the effects of the 
institutional structures and decision rules (plurality rule) on racial repre­
sentation, her essays are bereft of serious empirical analysis. In view of 
the fact that the subject matter involves attributes, opinions, votes, 
boundaries, election outcomes, and the behavior of representation, all 
very quantifiable matters, the lack of rigorous analysis is all the more 
startling. It leaves the nonlegalistic portions of Guinier's arguments un­
supported by direct and systematic evidence. 
34. In Shaw v. Reno, the Court in 1993 struck down "bizarrely 
shaped" districts drawn to maximize the chances of electing an racial mi­
nority representative. The court took further steps away from affirmative 
action redistrictings two years later. In the case of Miller v. Johnson, the 
Court in 1995 invalidated a prominority racially gerrymandered Georgia 
district on the grounds that the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment "does not permit the state to separate citizens into districts 
on the basis of race without compelling justification" (Greenhouse, 1995, 
4E). The majority opinion found that race could not be "the predominant 
factor" for drawing a congressional district, but left open the extent to 
which race could affect redistricting decisions (Idelson, 1995, 1944-46). 
The Eleventh District in Georgia was one of several districts nationally 
that were drawn with little regard for geographic compactness or com­
munities. The district stretched 250 miles from Atlanta's southern sub­
urbs across to the South Carolina border and south to Savannah in order 
to create a district with a majority of minority voters. As structured, the 
district's population was 64 percent black and 60 percent of its registered 
voters were black. In 1994, the district elected Cynthia McKinney, a Dem­
ocrat of African American heritage (Mauro and Watson, 1995, 8A). 
35. Of the 76 lowest-turnout districts in 1994, 17 were majority-
minority districts and 59 were not. Of the 32 majority-minority districts, 
5 were uncontested. Of the 27 contested majority-minority districts, 17 
were in the lowest-turnout quintile, 8 were in the next-to-lowest, and 2 
were in the middle quintile. There were no majority-minority districts in 
the two high-turnout quintiles. The relationship between race and turn­
out was similarly strong and negative in 1992. 
36. There were 37 districts in 1994 with African American popula­
tions, which constituted between 20 and 50 percent of the district. Of 
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these 37, 7 were uncontested in 1994. Of the 30 remaining contested 
districts, 11 were in the lowest quintile, and another 11 were in the next-
to-lowest quintile. 
37. Alternatively, these congressional candidates may actually pre­
fer winning with fewer voters, if this corresponds with smaller campaigns 
and reduced fund-raising efforts. 
38. The notion of equal political influence in voting is not a matter 
of just equal numbers of citizens in each district nor even an equal num­
ber of voters. Even with the numbers of voters equalized, voters in dis­
tricts with close contests may have greater influence than voters in 
districts with landslides. Alternatively, however, one could argue that dis­
tricts should be drawn not to equalize or maximize voter influence but to 
maximize voter satisfaction with his or her representation. That principle 
might group voters to produce landslide rather than competitive results. 
Fewer voters would find themselves on the losing end of the election (al­
though they might not be satisfied in an absolute sense if many thought 
that they were voting for the lesser of two evils). Yet further, one could 
argue that districts should be drawn to maximize choice so that, with both 
candidates nearly equally appealing, as many voters as possible would be 
indifferent to who won. These competing virtues of close and lopsided 
elections complicate the question of whether redistrictings ought to take 
competitiveness into account to equalize voter influence. These compet­
ing virtues, however, have nothing to do with the inequities related to the 
different effective sizes of districts. 
39. There have been a number of methods for allocating seats. 
Congressional Quarterly's Guide to U.S. Elections, 2d ed., summarizes the 
various methods that have been used over the years (1985, 685-90). Con­
gress initially assigned seats according to a quota of inhabitants in the 
state. For instance, at 40,000 inhabitants per seat (the rate adopted in the 
1820s), a state with 80,000 inhabitants would receive two seats. However, 
a state with 119,000 inhabitants would also receive just two seats and a 
state with 79,000 inhabitants (just 1,000 less than a two-seat state) would 
receive only one seat, since there was no rounding up. Congress later 
adopted the Vinton Method, which uses major fractions to assign seats to 
states. After determining the number of inhabitants per district nation­
ally, the state population was divided by this quota and additional seats 
were assigned sequentially to states with the largest fractions until the 
total number for the House was allocated. Seats are now allocated 
through the "method of equal proportions," which minimizes the pro­
portional difference between the average size of districts in different 
states. 
40. Table 9.2 also presents the greatest national turnout disparity 
between districts. The greatest difference was between the number of 
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voters in Montana's at-large district and the Thirty-third District of Cali­
fornia, a ratio of nearly eight voters in Montana to every one voter in 
California's Thirty-third. The effective malapportionment between these 
two districts is due to three factors: turnout differences, the "lumpiness" 
of representation, and the constitutional requirement that representa­
tives be allocated to the states. Because of this last factor, the Court might 
not attempt a remedy of this particular malapportionment, even if they 
recognized the effective malapportionment resulting from turnout 
differences. 
41. These constitutional provisions for the House system are less 
compelling to malapportionment than those in the presidential and Sen­
ate systems. The designation of representatives to the states (Article 1, 
Section 2, and Amendment 14, Section 2) would produce less malappor­
tionment if the size of the House were adjusted to more evenly divide 
into state population counts. The number of seats in the House is set by 
statute rather than designated by a constitutional provision. In general, 
a larger number of seats would leave states with smaller remainders. A 
larger number of seats, for instance, would have remedied the severe 
malapportionment of Montana in the 1990s. Montana fell just short of 
being awarded two seats. Its one at-large district is the most heavily popu­
lated district in the country. Also, the constitutional provision that dis­
tricts be reapportioned following every census (Article 1, Section 2) would 
not appear to prevent more frequent redistricting as severe malappor­
tionment develops throughout a decade. 
42. The five conditions believed to provide the basis for cheap seats 
were discussed in chapter 2. Beyond the existence of the single-member-
district system, these conditions included (1) the correlation of parti­
sanship and socioeconomic status, (2) the correlation of turnout and 
socioeconomic status, (3) the spatial concentration of those with common 
socioeconomic backgrounds, and (4) the reflection of this spatial concen­
tration in congressional districts. Since cheap seats depend on the con­
junction of these conditions, any development that would weaken any 
one condition would reduce cheap seats. For instance, all other things 
being equal, cheap-seat bias would be diminished if the parties changed 
so that they were more socioeconomically similar. If socioeconomics were 
less strongly associated with turnout, cheap seats would be less conse­
quential. Also, if housing patterns became more socioeconomically het­
erogeneous, cheap seats would make less of a difference. In considering 
reforms that might reduce cheap-seat effects, these conditions are re­
garded as being beyond conceivable manipulation or, in statistical 
terms, exogenous. 
43. All things being equal, turnout disparities would appear to be 
curvillinearly related to the number of districts. Turnout disparities are 
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impossible when there are no districts (one at-large election) and also 
when there are as many districts as there are voters. While this suggests 
that turnout disparities might be reduced by either increasing or decreas­
ing the number of districts, it seems plausible that turnout disparities 
would increase with the number of districts until the number of residents 
in the district became quite small. 
44. Malapportionment could also be addressed by more frequent 
reapportionments and redistrictings. As noted earlier, over a 10-year 
period districts (both within and among states) can grow very unequal in 
population. While practically unlikely, one remedy would be more fre­
quent censuses or using other intercensal population estimates to address 
gross population shifts that occur between censuses. 
45. In actuality, an at-large, plurality-rule system would also elimi­
nate cheap seats, although it is extremely unlikely that anyone would 
prefer at this level of aggregation a winner-take-all House to some form 
of proportional representation. 
46. A significant side benefit of multimember districts would be that 
each representative from these districts would be elected from a some­
what broader and probably more diverse constituency. This might help 
to counteract the parochialism often found in House members, who often 
represent narrow interests at the expense of broader public interests. 
47. If the number of districts were reduced by reducing the num­
ber of representatives, it would also affect the legislative functioning of 
the House of Representatives. Representatives in a smaller House might 
be less specialized, and the House might be less formal in its proceedings, 
taking on some characteristics of smaller legislative bodies like the U.S. 
Senate. 
48. This analysis has observed substantial stability in turnout from 
one election to the next. One cannot necessarily infer from this that there 
is a similar degree of turnout stability at smaller units that would be used 
to compose new, more equal turnout districts. However, some significant 
stability is probably present and allows turnout to be seriously considered 
in assembling a district. 
49. As noted in the analysis presented in chapter 6, bias has not 
varied significantly with variation in national turnout. However, congres­
sional turnout has varied over this period within a restricted range, from 
the low 30s to about 60 percent. Logically, bias generated by turnout 
differentials, a major but not the only possible source of electoral system 
bias, is eliminated if turnout is equal among districts. Apart from differ­
ences caused by the numbers of noneligibles in districts (noncitizens, fel­
ons, and those under age) or interstate differences in apportionment, 
equally populated districts should have equal numbers of voters when 
turnout is complete. 
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Appendix A 
1. While the effects of contesting a seat appear much larger than 
the incumbency advantage (.23 vs. from .034 to .08), the difference is less 
than one might first suppose. Votes affected by incumbency are at the 
expense of the opposing party, while votes affected by uncontesting a seat 
are not. The effects of not contesting a seat are felt primarily through 
depressed turnout. 
Appendix B 
1. Unwasted votes are defined as those cast for a winning candi­
date. Wasted votes are those cast for losing candidates. Votes are deemed 
unwasted if they are awarded representation. A party may expend an 
inordinate number of votes in a winning cause and, in one sense, waste 
votes. However, we preserve the distinction and suggest that these are 
inefficiently spent unwasted votes. Their impact on seats shows up in the 
higher winning vote percentage for the party (high levels of P^) and, 
therefore, higher numbers of unwasted votes per victory (the denomina­
tor (P^ X Twp)). 
2. The turnout variable could be further broken down into its com­
ponents, beginning with the district's population and discounted by the 
proportion of the population that are citizens, the district's population of 
citizens discounted by the proportion who are of voting age, and further 
by the proportions registered and actually turning out to vote. This 
would allow us to locate with even greater precision the reason for low 
priced districts. 
3. The more general equation, tracing all votes for a party to seats 
that it won, would be: S^ = ((l/(l(Pwp X T^)ISwp) X V^) + ((0/(2(Plp X 
Tlp)/Slp) X Vlp)). This simplifies to equation 3, since the numerator of the 
second term, indicating that a party wins no seats for votes cast in districts 
that it loses (subscript I), is zero. 
4. The fact that bias may also be traced to the parties having an 
unequal number of unwasted votes even with an equal number of total 
votes may also be traced to the different unwasted-vote prices per seat 
that the parties pay. For instance in 1994, based on the proportional 
swing analysis of Chapter 8, Democrats had about 1.35 million more un-
wasted votes (votes cast for winning candidates) than Republicans at an 
even division of the national vote. Or, from the other perspective, Repub­
licans wasted about 1.35 million more votes in losing candidacies than 
did Democrats. Why did Republicans waste more votes than Democrats 
even though both parties had an equal number of votes? Republicans 
wasted more votes than Democrats not because they were losing the 
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closer races (the parties' average losing-vote percentages were about 
equal) and not because they were losing in higher-turnout districts (they 
were actually losing more often in lower-turnout districts than were Dem­
ocrats) but because they lost more seats than Democrats, and they lost 
more seats because of the turnout district differential between the parties. 
That is, the lower price that Democrats paid for victories saved them from 
wasting votes and caused Republicans to waste more of their votes. Thus, 
the Democratic electoral system advantage was based both directly and 
indirectly on the distribution of the parties' votes and Democratic 
strength in low turnout districts. 
Appendix C 
1. The figures are extracted from Ornstein et al. (1992, 58). To ob­
tain the drop-out rate for incumbents, the number of retirements and 
number of those defeated in primaries are divided by the total number 
representatives. In 1970, there were 29 retirements and 10 primary 
defeats, for a total of 39 not making it to the general election. This 
amounted to 9 percent of the 435 members. 
2. I use the mean turnout of all contested districts rather than 
Democratic districts since the incumbency-advantage percentage is based 
on an analysis of all contested districts. 
3. The assumption that half the votes are wasted and half are un-
wasted is probably not entirely correct, but this should not alter the esti­
mated number of seats being shifted. The Democrats as the majority 
party will probably lose more than half of their votes in the unwasted­
vote category, and the Republicans will probably expend more than half 
of the shifted votes in the wasted-vote category. The former would mean 
that the assumption of the analysis would underestimate seat changes 
from eliminating prior bias, and the latter would mean that the assump­
tion would overestimate this change. 
4. The number of seats added from prior bias can be calculated as 
the number of unwasted votes shifted divided by the number of addi­
tional votes needed for a victory. The number of additional votes needed 
for a victory can be calculated as the mean number of unwasted votes 
(regardless of party) less the mean number of wasted votes for the party 
benefiting from the shift of votes. In the case of 1970, Republicans 
needed about 43,000 votes to add to their mean of 43,000 wasted votes 
to obtain the mean of about 86,000 votes for a victory. Since 67,000 un-
wasted votes were shifted, Republicans could be expected to gain 1.6 
seats (67,000/43,000 = 1.6 seats). 
5. There would be an overlap of incumbents due to partisan bias 
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in this case. It would be equal to the product of the proportion of these 
incumbents to all Democratic incumbents in each election. 
6. The correlations of unwasted votes for all contested districts 
were similar to those of districts which were won by Democrats. Lagged 
correlations with the total numbers of voters in districts (both for all con­
tested districts as well as just those won by Democrats) also indicated a 
good deal of stability. The correlations of the total vote for all contested 
districts were .91 in 1954-56, .70 in 1964-66, .79 in 1974-76, and .72 in 
1984-86. The correlations of the total vote in districts won by Democrats 
in both election years were .91 in 1954-56, .68 in 1964-66, .78 in 1974­
76, and .82 in 1984-86. 
7. The estimate that only 3 of the 11 bias-incumbents of 1966 being 
new is based on the lagged correlation of unwasted votes and a simula­
tion. The unwasted vote or bias correlations were on the order of .7. A 
simulation was conducted on adjacent elections with 100 districts with 
varying degrees of overlap among seven incumbent seats that were won 
by virtue of partisan bias. The extreme case is the perfect replication of 
the first election, producing a correlation of 1. With six of the seven seats 
overlapping (86 percent), the correlation was .85. With five of the seven 
overlapping (71 percent), the correlation was .69. With four of the seven 
(57 percent), the correlation was .54. With three of the seven (43 per­
cent), the correlation was .39. It would appear that the simulation of an 
overlap of five of seven districts most closely fits the observed correlation 
of bias using the unwasted-vote measure. This would mean that about 30 
percent of incumbents traceable to partisan bias in an election at time t 
are not counted among such incumbents produced by the election at time 
£4 -1  . Of course, this simulation assumes an equal proportion of these 
incumbents in the two elections. If there are fewer in the time t + 1 elec­
tion, more from the election at time t will not have been already counted. 
Conversely, if there are more in the time t + 1 election, fewer from the 
election at time t will not have been already counted. 
8. There is an additional reason why partisan bias in earlier elec­
tions might have a reduced impact on later elections. The carryover effect 
of partisan bias is based on the installation of incumbents (because of 
system bias) who would not otherwise have been elected continuing to 
win election because of their partisan bias based incumbency. However, it 
is quite possible that a Democrat elected because of partisan bias in an 
election at time t — 2 would have been elected in the next election (t — 
1) without the benefit of the bias based on incumbency obtained at t — 2. 
If so, then the effects of partisan bias at t — 2 would not be carried 
through by incumbency to the election at time t. 
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